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Between Tokyo and Berlin
The Art of Dialogue in Reconciliation

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How important are personal relations between leaders across countries for reconciliation?

What can Japan and Korea learn from the challenges and success stories in Europe?

“Hurray!” yelled my students with joy. No surprise. I just told them that I had to wrap up the class early in order to make it on time to the airport. On my way to Narita, I checked my flight ticket: From Tokyo, To Berlin—two cities that are certainly exciting destinations for tourists. But these two words, when combined, resonated stronger in me. A blended sense of freedom, excitement, and loneliness captivated me upon my arrival at Tegel. “Entendu?” was the first word that came into my ears. I looked around and saw a group of teenagers inattentively listening to their teacher for guidance: “It must be a French school trip...!” I encountered similar groups each time I left the hotel in Berlin during my three-day stay.

Fifty Years after the Franco-German Treaty

France and Germany celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Elysée Treaty in 2013. It is not even necessary to enumerate all the successful stories of turning their *Erbfeindschaft* (enmity) into amity. The Franco-German school exchange program is one of the remarkable achievements that French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made by signing the famous reconciliation treaty in 1963:

Young people in the two countries will be given every opportunity to strengthen the bonds which link them and to increase mutual cooperation. In particular, collective exchanges will be increased. A body for developing these opportunities and promoting the exchanges will be set up by the two countries with a single administrative council in charge. This organization will have at its disposal a joint Franco-German fund to be used for exchanges between the two countries, of school children, students, young artisans and workers.¹

With and since the creation of the Franco-German Youth Office—OFAJ (*Office franco-allemand pour la jeunesse*) in French and DFJW (*Deutsch-Französisches Jugendwerk*) in German—tens of thousands of youth each year enjoy the opportunity to rediscover each other

through various forms that include not only school and extra-curricular exchanges and work placements, but also voluntary activities, sport, and artistic events. As the Secretary General of the Franco-German Youth Office, Markus Ingenlath, emphasized during his keynote speech at the AICGS conference, the Youth Office serves as an instrument to implement the basis of the Elysée Treaty with the aim of learning the otherness with regard to the other.² It is thus surely thanks to the Treaty that all the youth programs became institutionalized. However, the

French pupils' school trips to Berlin rather appeared to me as an on-going effort for mutual understanding, which helps the treaty signed half a century ago become lively and sustainable. This constant dialogue between the past and the present as well as the open attitude that allows the future generation to meet the dark side of their history through the eyes of their erstwhile enemy is indeed a powerful way of living reconciliation on a daily basis.

Fifty Years after the Korean-Japanese Treaty

Korea, my homeland, and its inseparable enemy Japan, where I teach peace and reconciliation, will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea next year. A simple comparison of fifty years after the Franco-German Treaty with fifty years after the Japan-Korea Treaty does not make much sense since the historical and political background leading to the signing is totally different. If the former resulted from the willingness of both sides to end the hereditary enmity and embrace the "otherness," then the latter was rather an expression of official recognition that Korea and Japan decided to normalize their political-diplomatic relations: "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void."³ Consisting of six short articles, this normalization treaty certainly does not have the same tone of reconciliatory gestures expressed in the Elysée Treaty. Nonetheless, it served as a base to start creating interaction in various fields.

By choosing the economic sector to materialize their joint political decision, the Korean-Japanese relationship took the road of pragmatism that can be easily observed in other cases, such as the rapid improvement of Polish-German relations after

1989: "Cross-border trade and interest in each other's expanding markets can serve as a serious incentive for rapprochement and future reconciliation."⁴ However, the astounding progress lies in the socio-cultural exchanges among the younger generation. As a concrete outcome of the South Korean-Japanese friendship treaty in 1998, Japanese film, music, and video gradually gained direct access to the South Korean market. This belated opening brought about a "Nippon feel"—a strongly favorable or even addicted attitude toward Japanese culture—in South Korea, while Korean pop culture also enjoys an unprecedented boom in Japanese society, internationally recognized as "Hallyu fever" (Korean Wave). While Japanese novels often top the bestselling lists in the Korean literature market, one cannot escape hearing K-pop around the Shibuya station area, one of the most crowded in Tokyo, or seeing the gigantesque poster featuring Big Bang or Girls' Generation, a South Korean idol group, which was unthinkable a few decades ago. This cross-cultural affinity among youth, in addition to economic interdependence, gives an impression that both countries have reached a certain level of reconciliation. Nonetheless, the gulf between these "geographically close but psychologically far" countries is seemingly insurmountable these days.

Europe and Asia: What and Why to Compare?

At the core of the South Korean-Japanese impasse lie the seemingly irreconcilable history issues. The never-ending accusations and denial have become crystalized to the extent that no one even hopes to find a breakthrough any more. A series of state-level meetings cancelled; hate speeches made against Koreans in Japan; South Korean courts' orders against several Japanese companies to pay damages over wartime forced labor followed by the Japanese argument that all compensation issues were settled by the 1965 Treaty: These are some of the major consequences of history we are facing today. Even on the university campus where I work, the number of students interested in taking Korean language classes has diminished three times compared to a year ago, which brought about some course cancellations. Despite the number of exchange student programs with Korean universities, Japanese

students' lack of interest in going to study in Korea runs the risk of making some of the agreements obsolete.

Looking into this love-hate relationship, one cannot help but ask a simple question of "why." We often say that the German relationship with neighboring states is a special case for interstate reconciliation. But the seemingly irreconcilable relationship between Japan and adjacent countries may be classified one day as an exception as well. Korean-Japanese reconciliation is an issue that everyone is fully aware of but to which no one is willing to find a solution any more. In an attempt to provide some answers to the "why" question, academia, mass media, and politicians have been focusing on comparing the unsuccessful Asian cases to the successful European ones. A comparative approach does offer useful insights. However, it

also contains the danger of misjudgment depending on what and why to compare.

During his official visit to Norway in September 2012, former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak made a speech at the University of Oslo entitled *Korean Route and Its New Horizon*: “European Peace sets an example for Northeast Asia. Despite the historical and cultural difference, I do not believe that universal ethics for peace is different. In Northeast Asia, we desperately need it as well.”⁵ During his talk, he emphasized that the only way for Asia to reconcile is to follow the European way, that is to say, true self-reflection and apology. Likewise, current President Park Geun-hye expressed her vision of peace in Northeast Asia in comparison with the one in Europe:

Postwar Europe’s journey toward integration was possible due to a new window of cooperation based on a ‘grand reconciliation’ among Germany, France and the U.K. We also remember West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s landmark 1970 visit to the monument commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943. That was when Europe’s journey toward reconciliation really began. In the same vein, Northeast Asia also requires corresponding steps from the region’s main historical and wartime transgressor. The lingering pain of Asia’s victims, including Korea’s and other countries’ so-called comfort women, as well as outstanding historical legacies must be fundamentally addressed. Only then will Japan be welcomed as a respectable and leading Asian country. And if Northeast Asia is to skillfully overcome its historical legacies while contributing to global norms, it has to champion open nationalism that enhances the spirit of community-building while safeguarding universal values and democratic governance.⁶

The “what” to compare is two-fold: First, European peace through cooperation, in other words, the result of reconciliatory politics. A considerable amount of South Korean mass media has made special reports on the treaties, agreements, or partnerships that led to economic, diplomatic, socio-cultural, and history reconciliation between former European enemies. Second, the European way of reconciliation through repentance and apology: Terms such as “universal ethics” or “global norms” contain a moral tone. Park pointed out a specific political figure, German Chancellor Willy Brandt, to praise his way of reconciliatory gesture toward Poland in 1970. The mass media has repeatedly used this episode, to the point that most Koreans now know who Willy Brandt is, even though not many would be able to name Angela Merkel. One of the major Korean newspapers, *Chosun Daily*, compared Brandt’s apologetic gesture to the behavior of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo: “Abe’s Yasukuni shrine visit reflects the non-repentance of Japan about the past. If there is Abe who behaves brazen [about the past], there are also some politicians who became

the symbol of peace and moral conscience with a heartfelt apology for their nation’s wrongdoing. And there is West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.”⁷ The message is clear: accusing Japan for its attitude about the past, which explains the “why” to compare. The objective of comparing the European cases to the Northeast Asian ones is thus to ask for a sign of repentance through what is called a “heartfelt” apology in a way that Europeans have shown, especially Willy Brandt in 1970.

What if Brandt had been born in Japan and become the Japanese prime minister? Would history have changed? This is not an easy question to answer. A political figure does play a crucial role in promoting reconciliation. However, there is no greater ambition than hoping something will change one day. Moreover, the dilemma Korea risks falling into is whether forcing someone to repent can actually be considered as the “sincere” apology that Korea wants Japan to show. In other words, can a moral act be forced? There might be a Japanese prime minister ready to kneel down. Nonetheless, the meaning of apology then can never be the same as Brandt’s, since his was not made as a response to any Polish claim. The repeated denial of the past wrongdoing is certainly a justifiable element that provokes anger and frustration among the Korean population. However, Korea will never find an exit from this vicious circle if it continues its blaming to humiliate Japan—at least not the exit that leads to reconciliation. There is an urgent need to look for another way to approach the issue, unless Korea actually can be satisfied with a forced version of apology as a final goal of reconciliation. The focus of comparison between

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Europe and Asia thus should not be on what has been achieved in the European reconciliation. Rather, if Korea and Japan want reconciliation to be achieved, it has to be on what methods political and societal leaders have used to produce those achievements Europe enjoys today.

Political Dialogue: Continue Communicating Even When There Seems to Be No More Hope

National leaders' communication skills are crucial to create a mood for reconciliation. It does not simply mean shaking hands on a red carpet or holding a state level meeting to agree on any economic joint project. These political scenes we observe through the mass media are the outcome of the process to arrive at the reconciliation. What is more important to think about is the process political leaders chose to produce those outcomes. And this means a strong political willingness not to give up communicating, even when it seems hopeless. It is not so hard to come to a compromise with someone who shares

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a similar opinion or common interest. True leadership, however, proves its real worth at the moment when one has to find a solution with

someone from the opposite position or of different opinion: In other words, someone with whom one is doomed to live together but stays in the complete otherness. Moreover, people learn by watching their leaders: "National elites learn to share mutual understanding and mutual confidence by direct interactions and mass populations will learn to have mutual understanding and mutual confidence by receiving messages about one another from their respective national elites."⁸ Leaders' attitudes toward their counterparts have a huge impact on shaping the image of their future relations. Their acts may sometimes be symbolic but the willingness to communicate is a powerful expression of political determination, which can positively affect public opinion. Talking to each other does not equal reconciliation. Dialogue may even lead us to a conclusion that there is simply no possibility to arrive at reconciliation. It nevertheless opens the door to see whether accepting each other one day is feasible. To do this, the first step is to make a constant effort to understand why the opposite side does not see the same issue the way we do.

We can easily name one or two leaders we consider "great," "influential," or "charismatic." However, it is not easy to think of leaders who were good at turning enmity into amity through communication. Among few pioneers of dialogue, the most exemplary are Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. They were not close friends by nature. They did not share many views on foreign affairs, especially when it came to their relations with the United States. Despite their conflicting views, the French president and German chancellor were convinced that the more their opinions differed, the more there was a need for talk. Lily Gardner Feldman described how crucial the meeting between the two men at de Gaulle's family home in September 1958 was on the path to the 1963 Franco-German Elysée Treaty that cemented reconciliation psychologically and institutionally. She quoted de Gaulle's words: "From then until mid-1962, Konrad Adenauer and I were to write each other on some 40 occasions. We saw each other fifteen times. We

spent more than 100 hours in conversation."⁹ There was a clear commitment of constant dialogue between them instead of saying "Oh, you are different from me, so I won't talk to you anymore!" In *La réconciliation franco-allemande: le dialogue de Gaulle-Adenauer*, Maurice Vaïsse acknowledged that de Gaulle and Adenauer each had an exceptional personality to conduct dialogue, which helped consolidate any reconciliatory attempt between 1958 and 1963. It was the political willingness to continue the dialogue even at the critical moments when conflicts and clashes were there: "Can we keep confidence in de Gaulle?" Adenauer once asked Antoine Pinay [the French foreign minister at the time]. De Gaulle regretted speaking too openly to the chancellor in Rambouillet. Nevertheless, they did not stop facing each other."

The crucial lesson here is the practice of mutual tolerance. While celebrating the successful achievement of the Elysée Treaty in 1963, de Gaulle shed light on the fact that the Franco-German reconciliation was not simply an outcome imposed by circumstances, but rather an opportunity to discover the value and merits of the other side. Facing the "otherness" risks provoking anger and frustration.¹⁰ But confrontation is not necessarily a bad thing. As Marek Prawda, Ambassador of Poland to the European Union, said in explaining the never-ending story of the Polish-German reconciliation process: "we are learning to understand to have differences of opinion. And I call that a mature partnership, initially as a goal to aim for."¹¹ Avoiding facing the difference may bring a certain level of peace but that peace is superficial. The opposite of love is not hatred: It is indifference.

As Irani and Funk suggest in *Rituals of Reconciliation*, communication skills are fundamental.¹² We can only hope that our political leaders possess those skills, which are often derived from their individual character or personality. Nonetheless, there are elements that can facilitate the dialogue by creating chemistry at the state level. Dialogue includes eye contact, gestures, feeling, and atmosphere, but it is foremost wording. If national leaders have a common language they can practice to share their opinion, it will not only create a mood for a better understanding between them. It will also affect both populations as it creates a broader sense of "we-ness." Because language is one of the most important factors in creating a national identity, knowing each other's language can be a powerful sign of willingness to understand the otherness.

Wenn ich Sie alle so um mich herum versammelt sehe, wenn ich Ihre Kundgebungen höre, empfinde ich, noch stärker als zuvor, die Würdigung und das Vertrauen das ich für Ihr großes Volk, jawohl, für das große deutsche Volk hege. Es lebe Bonn, es lebe Deutschland, es lebe die deutsch-französische Freundschaft!¹³

When de Gaulle paid an official visit to Germany in September 1962, a few months before the signing of the Elysée Treaty, he delivered a speech in Ludwigsburg to young Germans—in German—for about fifteen minutes without reading a script:

When he talked about the great German nation, he certainly did not mean that the past could be simply washed away. He clearly mentioned during his speech that Germany was condemned for what it did to the neighboring states. But his attitude delivered a message of invitation for a constructive dialogue. His talk appealed not only to young Germans who passionately applauded several times during his speech, but also to the German political leaders who were standing behind him, especially Adenauer, who showed a great smile on his face at the end of his speech.

Another element that can connect leaders from the opposite side is a shared religious faith or a certain belief in a spiritual value. When nationality, ethnicity, race, or culture divides us, we need to find something that helps us create a sense of belonging. Again, the sense of “we-ness” does not mean the deletion of difference or any rejection to bring justice back. It means an invitation to open our minds to talk to each other. Religion, for some, is like a cloth we put on and take off whenever we want. But, for others, it is a profound part of self that strongly affects the way we look into the world. The three founding fathers of the European integration process, Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, French foreign minister Robert Schuman, and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer

“Monsieur le Président et cher ami, Dans la lourde charge que Dieu a mis sur mes épaules, je trouve une consolation toujours renouvelée, une grande consolation: l’assurance que nous sommes tous deux unis dans un même but. De le savoir me redonne toujours courage.”¹⁴

Societal Dialogue: Listening to Understand the Difference

“Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together,” argues Karl Deutsch from his transactionalist approach.¹⁸ Communication does not refer only to wording, that is to say, delivering a message. It also involves a listening attitude. Some listen to prepare to attack the other’s argument, while others pretend to listen but are simply waiting for one’s own opportunity to talk. These types of listening attitudes might appear as a passive action. But the true listening attitude is a very active and even demanding action since it requires us to empty ourselves in order to enter into another’s way of thinking with one goal: to fully understand why the opposite side does not always think the way we do. This active way of listening is not an expression of agreement. It is an expression of a willingness to understand the difference by looking into the same issue from the eyes of others. Each time I participated in a Korea-Japan-China trilateral meeting, I

had a strong religious faith that bound them together to move forward, especially during the period when they had to face a strong domestic opposition for their reconciliatory politics right after the end of the second World War. In his Letter to Robert Schuman on January 14, 1951, Adenauer wrote:

Adenauer and de Gaulle’s shared Catholic values also helped them overcome criticism of reconciliation in both France and Germany. They often expressed their commitment through significant public gestures, such as a joint mass celebration.¹⁵ The joint mass celebration of Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during his visit to Krzyzowa, Poland, in 1989 was also seen as “true reconciliation between Poles and Germans 50 years after Hitler swept through Poland and ignited World War II.”¹⁶

A shared value does not necessarily mean sharing the same religious faith. It can be interpreted in a broader sense as a shared belief in a human value such as “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” A common language or a spiritual connection is certainly not an indispensable requirement for an effective joint political leadership. But it helps create a mood to continue communicating with each other. As Dariusz Pawlos from the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation argued during his presentation, persistence and consistency in leaders’ action are needed.¹⁷ From this point of view, South Korean President Park and Japanese Prime Minister Abe are in an even more difficult situation to create a sense of we-ness to initiate a constructive dialogue since neither of them has ever delivered a speech in their counterpart’s language nor do they share a religious faith.

often found a very passive way of listening among participants. Each side comes on behalf of its government to deliver the message: “We think this is right: our position is this.” But there was no space for a mutual understanding. There can be millions of meetings in this way; there will never be any step toward reconciliation. Adenauer consulted counterparts’ opinion before he published his apology speech to make sure that the wording he considered right was also the way the counterpart would agree.¹⁹ You do not only deliver a message. You listen when others talk, but you also have to listen to what others think about what you say when you talk. Dialogue should be a constant interaction that implies a two-way communication.

An attitude of active listening can be useful for joint history textbook commissions, as reconciliation means the ability to

“understand the past from the other point of view as well and to put this together to understand it.”²⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, for instance, described how the courageous forays by Turkish

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scholars to investigate the fate of the Armenians contributed to initiating a fragile but sustained dialogue that goes beyond accusation and denial.²¹ Romain Faure, an expert on international textbook revision from the George Eckert Institute, described the reason the actors involved in text-

book revision were willing to cooperate with their former enemies, particularly with Germany, and why they carried on this cooperation for a long period of time. According to him, the main two factors are: similarities in the professional position of central actors and the rather informal but regular interaction among them: “six central actors of textbook revision had very similar professional trajectories and equivalent professional positions in their respective countries. They were historians but they didn’t belong to the central intellectual figures of the time. Due to their positions in several other associations and committees, they were also mediators between different professional fields, in particular between university and school, between politics and education, but also between the national and the international arena. [...] [S]ustained cooperation was allowed by the fact that the leading actors interacted very regularly. [...] They were able to develop common points of view but also to struggle from time to time, since they knew they had been cooperating successfully before. I would even go beyond this argument and state that the leading actors in the field of European textbook revision formed a kind of transnational community.”²²

Etienne François, a co-editor of the Franco-German joint history textbook, also shared his experience that stresses the crucial importance of the active listening attitude among participants:

Unlike natural science where objectivity exists, history always contains conflicts since there are different interpretations and perspectives. For this reason, it is challenging but also interesting. Each country has its own history, culture, and identity. But the world does not consist of only my version; there are other countries as well as international society. We have to be able to see this point. Without embracing the otherness, if we only argue from our own perspective, there will be always conflicts.

When asked whether a joint history textbook between Japan and Korea would be possible, he answered:

“To make it possible, they have to learn how to accept their differences. For instance, if we had pushed Germany into a corner saying ‘Germany is a bastard and an aggressor who launched the war!’ we would have never been able to continue working together. Having said this, it is also difficult if one side continues making excuses and beautifies their past. If Germany had had an attitude of ‘it was impossible to avoid having Nazism if we consider the background of the Versailles Treaty that asked Germany to pay a colossal amount of reparation,’ then it would have been difficult to work together. In any history, there is light and shadow: What was glorious for us could cause pain for others. The French revolution and the Napoleonic period made neighboring countries suffer. Only when we have courage to face and open up ourselves to the dark side of history, can the work for joint history textbooks advance.”²³

A Message to My Japanese and Korean Students

When de Gaulle made his historic speech in Ludwigsburg in 1962, he specifically targeted the younger generation. He knew that the hope for the future lies in the hands of young people and the Franco-German reconciliation process proved it right. The joint French-German history textbook project was written by historians but the initiative came from students: “Participants in the French-German Youth Parliament meeting in 2003, on the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, proposed the project, which was then taken up by the German Department for Foreign Affairs and the French Ministry of Education.”²⁴ Dagmar Pruin described how Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste, e. V. (Action Reconciliation, Service for Peace), a volunteer organization founded by Protestants in 1958 but open to other religions, beliefs, and convictions, helped youth get engaged in the construction of

the reconciliation process between the “perpetrator” Germany and neighboring states. This hope for youth works similarly for Korea and Japan. I would love to one day see the Japanese prime minister talk to Korean students to ask for an active engagement in dialogue; or a South Korean president come to Japan to ask students to get engaged in the reconciliation. But more than that, I put my hope in the younger generation.

Teaching peace and reconciliation in Japan and Korea is not an easy experience. I still remember my first class in Japan when my students asked me: “Sensei, Japan is such a peace-loving country. Why are Koreans and Chinese angry at us?” I also remember my first class in Korea when I addressed the Korea-Japan relations: “What’s wrong with them? Why are they not apologizing for their misdeeds?” Neither side showed any

space to try to understand why the other side does not think the way they do. When I asked Korean students to try to think what attitude they would have had if they were born Japanese, their reaction was violent. When I asked Japanese students to do the same exercise, they looked at me not as a professor but as “the other Korean.” However, since I started giving lectures about the Polish–German case, the Armenian–Turkish case, the relations between other African countries and France, and the Caribbean countries and England, students started having deeper reflections in a more comparative way. The first step toward reconciliation—before we argue about who is right and wrong or who should apologize or forgive—is the willingness to understand how and why the other side sees the same issue from a different angle.

A sense of we-ness beyond national borders is a new concept in international relations and has very few empirical cases. For this reason, international NGOs promoting interfaith or intercultural dialogue can play a crucial role in broadening the horizon of public perception toward the otherness. There are

a few religious movements both in Japan and Korea in which youth are actively playing a role. Focolare, a Catholic lay movement, and Rissho Kosei-kai, a Buddhist organization, can be good examples, to name but two. Both movements, in consultative status with the UN ECOSOC, share a commonality of openness to diversity despite their monotheist roots and have a particular interest in promoting dialogues among cultures and religions. Focolare organized a series of Japanese–Korean youth meetings last month in Seoul for an intercultural and interreligious dialogue where youth from Rissho Kosei-kai were also invited. This type of youth may not bring a drastic change in reconciliation but it is through day by day efforts that we learn to think about the quality of the peace relationship we want to have with our daily “enemies.” The first step toward reconciliation is probably to reconcile with oneself, for all depends on how I perceive the others. Impossible? We all have once experienced in our life what French philosopher Pascal Blaise claimed in his *Pensées*: “Le Coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point [The heart has its reasons that reason does not know.]”

NOTES

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1 Franco–German Treaty of 22 January 1963, Joint Declaration II(2), Paris, France, 22 January 1963.

2 For further details, see Markus Ingenlath, “Keynote: 50 Years of Franco–German Youth Exchange Programs,” AICGS conference on Political and Societal Leadership in Encouraging Reconciliation, Berlin, Germany, 22 October 2013, <<http://www.aicgs.org/issue/keynote-50-years-of-franco-german-youth-exchange-programs/?print=1>>.

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6 “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” *Wall Street Journal*, 12 November 2012, <<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310294100492>>.

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8 Donald J. Puchala, “The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration,” *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1968): 38–64.

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10 Maurice Vaisse, “La réconciliation franco-allemande: le dialogue de Gaulle–Adenauer,” *Politique étrangère* 4 (Winter 1993): 963–72.

11 Marek Prawda, “Germany and Poland,” DAAD Scholarship Holders / Alumni, German Academic Exchange Service, <<https://www.daad.de/alumni/netzwerke/vip-galerie/mitteleuropa/12759.en.html>>.

12 George E. Irani, and Nathan C. Funk, “Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab–Islamic Perspectives,” *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper* 19: OP:2. (2000).

13 “When I see you together like this surrounding me and when I witness your engagement, then I can sense—more so than before—the appreciation and trust that I have for this nation, yes, the great German nation. Long live Bonn, long live Germany, long live the German–French friendship!” (AICGS Translation from German.) Charles de Gaulle, “Speech delivered to young Germans,” Ludwigsburg, Germany, 9 September 1962.

14 “Dear President and friend, Under the heavy task that God has put on my shoulders, I have the constantly renewed consolation: the promise that we are both united for the same goal. And that continues to give me courage.” (Author’s translation from French.) Henry Beyer, Robert Schuman, *L’Europe par la réconciliation franco-allemande* (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1986), 111.

15 Lily Gardner Feldman, “Introductory Comment” at AICGS conference, 22 October 2013, <<http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EVZ-presentationOct2013.pdf>>.

16 Paula Butturini, “German–Polish Mass Is Latest Sign Of Change,” *Chicago Tribune*, 13 November 1989.

17 Dariusz Pawlos, “What are the characteristics of societal leaders who played a key role in Polish–German reconciliation?” AICGS conference, 22 October 2013, <<http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Dariusz-Pawlos.pdf>>.

18 Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 77.

19 Lily Gardner Feldman, “Introductory Comment” at AICGS conference, 22 October 2013, <<http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EVZ-presentationOct2013.pdf>>.

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Political and Societal Leadership in Encouraging Reconciliation: A Comparison of Japanese and German Foreign Policies in their Neighborhoods

Like Germany in Europe, Japan in Asia after World War II recovered economically faster and more completely than any of the countries it had conquered and occupied. Unlike Germany, however, Japan did not regain a role of leadership in its geographic region. Germany's strategy of reconciliation won it a respected return to the family of nations, surrounded by partners dependent but not fearful, responsive but not resentful. Japan, which undertook limited efforts to reconcile with the enemies it made for itself, established vital economic relations but without the acknowledged leadership that its economic superiority might have cemented. It seems fair to surmise that Japan without reconciliation would be destined to be without real friends, and without conferred leadership in Asia.

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Between Tokyo and Berlin The Art of Dialogue in Reconciliation

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