

WEST GERMANY
EAST GERMANY
AND THE
GERMAN
QUESTION

▪

*Five Lectures at the
American Institute for
Contemporary
German Studies*

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American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

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GERMAN ISSUES ▪ 1

Few big political questions in Europe have attracted as much sustained interest as relations between the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. How Germans in on these perceptions can have important consequences for East-West security, the North Atlantic Alliance, and these America's position on the European continent. There has been a notable upswing of public interest in the "German Question" over the past few years, for the allies of the two Germanys, as Dietrich Stobbe observes, still react with "seismographic sensitivity" to actual or apparent changes in German policies.

For this reason, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies invited five distinguished Germans with varying perspectives to deliver lectures on relations between the two German states. The following chapters are adapted from these lectures, which were delivered on five separate occasions in Washington, D.C. between May 1984 and June 1986. The Institute publishes them as part of its effort to deepen Americans' understanding of current German issues.

Dr. Walter Wallmann presents a mainline position typical of many in the governing Christian Democratic Party. His thoughtful historical review stresses that Konrad Adenauer's choice of western integration for the Federal Republic was the right one. He warns against any attempt to solve the German question by cooperating with the Soviet Union to the detriment of the Western alignment which has brought the Federal Republic great advantages. Dietrich Stobbe of the Social Democratic Party stresses that West German policy must subordinate reunification to peace and freedom and have no illusions about possible Soviet willingness to relinquish its dominance over the Warsaw Pact states, including the GDR. Still he believes that the two German states should play a major role in promoting East-West cooperation and do so within their respective alliance systems.

Otto Wolff von Amerongen provides data on trade between the two German states which suggest that this trade is far more important to East than to West Germany; "inner-German" trade, as the Federal Republic characterizes it, is tied to several West German political ob-

jectives while, in the case of the GDR, economic interests predominate. Like German-German relations as a whole, trade and other economic ties between the GDR and the Federal Republic form a very necessary component of a common Western policy toward the East.

Klaus von Beyme tackles the difficult problem of assessing the sense of "nationalism" among young people in the two German states. In the GDR, official attempts to create an indigenous national feeling have not been very successful, and GDR citizens retain a rather individualistic awareness. In West Germany, von Beyme finds, an *Identitätsrevolution* and cosmopolitan ideas have fragmented the national movement, and youth hardly seem disposed to make sacrifices for reunification. National consciousness may have increased among them, but national pride is absent. Above all, German youth are quite realistic about the apparently low chances for political reunification.

As the only East German among the Institute's lecturers, Max Schmidt covers German-German relations extensively. Given the burden of history, East and West Germans have a special duty, he argues, to work to preserve peace in Europe, "... the absolutely predominant issue in GDR-West German relations." In a forceful presentation of East German positions, Schmidt emphasizes that there is no longer "one divided Germany but two German states... sovereign, independent, [with] opposing social systems and in different alliances." A German problem or even an "open" German question no longer exists. Relations between the two Germanys must be reliable and predictable; and, if they are, they can contribute to stability in Europe. Schmidt covers in some detail the entire range of West German-East German relations, political, security, economic, and humanitarian. He concludes with an exposition of "unresolved problems," as formulated in the so-called Gera Demands of Eric Honecker, the GDR head of state.

Walter Wallman's lecture was delivered on May 15, 1984; Dietrich Stobbe's on October 3, 1984; Otto Wolff von Amerongen's on October 30, 1984; and Klaus von Beyme's on February 7, 1985. Max Schmidt's lecture was prepared in January 1986 for delivery on June 18, 1986. The texts have been slightly altered where necessary to bring them up to date.

The Institute is pleased to offer these views to American readers as the first in a new series of occasional papers entitled *German Issues*. The costs of the lectures and of publishing them were covered by generous grants from the American Hoechst Corporation and Mars, Incorporated, to which we wish to express our deep gratitude. The views expressed by the lecturers are their own, and neither the contributing sponsors nor the Institute are responsible for them.

R.G. Livingston
Acting Director

May 1986

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IS THERE A NEW GERMAN QUESTION?

WALTER WALLMANN

I wish to thank you most warmly for the opportunity to express some fundamental thoughts on the "German Question." German politics finds itself in a more difficult situation today than just a few years ago. The basic consensus over foreign policy in the Federal Republic has broken down. A consensus on the central issues of national security and the Western alliance had existed between the two major parties, the SPD and the CDU, since the SPD party conference in Bad Godesberg in 1959. However, the SPD drifted away from the double-track position first enunciated by former Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Moreover, the SPD has, intentionally or unintentionally, reopened the question of German membership in the NATO Alliance. This is an ominous development. Undeniably, the Alliance could not survive a continuing split between those allies supporting and those opposing the American missile deployment. The SPD's acceptance of the so-called "Peace Movement's" position thus evoked surprise, puzzlement, and distrust, not only in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also among our European neighbors.

Distrust of developments in Germany is not altogether new. It finds roots in the early post-World War II period, especially in the fierce controversy between Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher. But its origins lie, perhaps more importantly, in the unpredictability of German politics in the years 1890-1945, and even in the evolution of the Second German Empire in the 19th century. We Germans became a nation very late in our national history. Unlike the French and the British, we had no opportunity to formulate a consistent foreign policy over a period of centuries. Moreover, this inconsistency has never been merely the concern of Germans alone. In fact, the tragedy of German history is that the European balance of power was based on disunity in the center of Europe. Only after 1870, was Bismarck first able to formulate a German *raison d'etat*.

Bismarck's primary goal was a territorially satiated German state on the basis of the German *Reich*. In other words, the "German revolu-

tion"—as Disraeli called German union—would remain a tolerable entity for its European neighbors. Under Bismarck, Germany's foreign policy was thus predictable for the rest of Europe. After 1890, however, Bismarck's successors failed to understand the great foreign policy value of this predictability. They were incapable of defining either the question of Germany's intricate alliance system or Germany's role in world politics. Hence erupted that suspicion and distrust of Germany which in turn drove Germany eventually into an almost total isolation in the European system. Bismarck's successors could not decide whether to align with the British for the purpose of checking Russian penetration in the Balkans or, conversely, to align with the Russians in a common colonial and naval policy. German leaders after Bismarck wanted things both ways. Unsurprisingly, they gambled away both opportunities.

Similar difficulties of defining and following German *raison d'état* existed during the Weimar Republic. Once again, German politicians during the 1920s were undecided over basic foreign policy options. They could not choose whether to seek to overcome the consequences of Versailles by joining the revolutionary Soviet Union, or whether to join the Western system as an ally of the victors of World War I. The fundamental unpredictability of German foreign policy was therefore perpetuated.

After 1945, the Federal Republic of Germany fortunately had a statesman able to create and implement a *raison d'état* for the newly-formed German state—the first consistent and stable "reason of state" since Bismarck. To Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic's only chance for survival lay in an alliance with our present allies. His policy of Western integration thus had absolute priority. He resisted efforts by others to restore national unity "at all costs" as threatening the loss of freedom for all parts of Germany. Adenauer's foreign policy concept for West Germany including NATO, the European Community, and our close relationship with the United States has had concrete results.

The Social Democrats and their chairman, Kurt Schumacher, heavily criticized Adenauer at that time. They believed that it was possible to create a neutral Germany without alignment with either of the two blocs and argued that Adenauer was gambling away such a possibility. But for practical purposes, no Western historian now shares this earlier Social Democratic judgment. Allow me to quote one American political scientist, David Calleo, who noted in his 1978 book, *The German Problem Recon-*

sidered: "In any event, the opportunity for reunification probably never really existed." Clearly Adenauer's foreign policy was the only alternative for the Federal Republic after 1945.

Adenauer's decision for Western integration was correct not only in foreign policy but in domestic terms as well. In the 1950s, our country needed a political and, even more, an intellectual *rapprochement* with the Western democracies. We needed their enlightenment and rationalist tradition—their mental health—in order to recover from the deep moral confusion and identity crisis into which the National Socialist experiment had plunged us. By then, some German politicians' dream of a "third course" somewhere between Western democracy and totalitarian communism, had crumbled. Indeed, that dream, one shared by many German intellectuals and writers, above all Thomas Mann, had lost any foundation in the realities of the world political environment.

Though Adenauer himself had deliberately omitted the goal of reunification in his *raison d'état* for West Germany, he never gave up the ideal totally. But he was convinced that "unity in freedom" would be impossible in the prevailing political circumstances. It is, of course, true that some Germans have never understood Adenauer's *raison d'état*, even though they adhered with conviction to his policy of Western integration.

We still witness the benefits of Adenauer's historical legacy. Since 1949, the alliance with the United States, Great Britain, and France, Germany's participation in NATO, and the evolution of the European Community have brought the Federal Republic of Germany a degree of peace, security, and freedom that is unprecedented in German history. Now, thirty years later, Schumacher's question whether this policy really served German interests can be answered with an unqualified "Yes." This policy has not only served German but European interest. The reintegration of West Germany into the community of free nations has helped Europe regain its stability, despite Stalin's strenuous efforts to block it.

Notwithstanding the success of Adenauer's policy, recent years have repeatedly posed the question whether fresh foreign policy initiatives might, after all, help overcome Germany's and Europe's division. This question provided the starting point of the Brandt government's *Ostpolitik* after 1969 and provides, in all likelihood, the background to the SPD's current attitude toward the Western alliance. The Brandt

government's objective was to bring about "change through *rapprochement*" by normalizing relations with the East. In other words, it sought changes aimed to pave the way for the eventual reunification of Germany through the creation of an all-European peace zone. I have, however, always had and continue to have considerable doubts whether the *Ostpolitik* of the 1970s could ever secure the peace.

I fear that *Ostpolitik's* very premises were incorrect. Indeed, *Ostpolitik* misinterprets Soviet aims. Russian policy, after all—and I deliberately use the word Russian—also follows a *raison d'état*. Since the days of the Polish partitions, that policy's *leitmotiv* has been to create a *cordon sanitaire* on the eastern European frontiers of Russia. For this fundamental reason, the Soviet Union can only be interested in change insofar as it serves the objective of displacing the United States from the European continent. Meanwhile, the Soviets will do everything within their political and military power to resist changes that threaten their own predominance in eastern Europe. The events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have demonstrated this beyond any doubt. In other words, the possibilities of a reunited Germany or a "European peace zone"—whatever this means—will interest the Soviet Union only insofar as they promise to cement its political hegemony. Hence I have no faith in the concept of "change through *rapprochement*."

Allow me at this point to address several questions arising out of our complex German history. The dream of a distinctly German course—of forming a bridge between East and West—is, of course, an old German theme. In 1983, we celebrated the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. While we must use great care in finding historical antecedents in current events, it is safe to say that the Protestant Reformation paved the way for the troublesome "separate course" of German history. By dividing Germany along religious lines, the Reformation prevented Germany from becoming a modern nation state until very late in its history. Our separate course meanwhile endowed us with many specifically German problems and perspectives, which have often made it difficult, both historically and currently, for our neighbors to understand us. Luther's intellectual legacy has, of course, also brought about many cultural achievements. German idealism, the German classics, Kant and Goethe, Bach and Beethoven would never have developed without Luther's heritage. However, this inheritance has likewise prepared the ground

for separatist, anti-Roman, anti-European, and even anti-Western tendencies in our cultural and intellectual history. Important names in German history represent this trend: Thomas Mann, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Niekisch, and Gottfried Benn. Without German Protestantism's tendency towards a culturally and politically distinct course, the other sources of an anti-Western mood in the years before the First World War would hardly have developed so far. The Lutheran social ideal of the "natural or historically grown community"—in the words of the historian Thomas Nipperdey—contradicted the social concept of the Western democracies and anticipated the hostility with "pragmatic" England. Michael Stürmer, in his great book on the German Second Empire, which he termed "the restless empire," refers to this indecision against England as the critical political mistake.

We need only to substitute America today for England at the turn of the century to see the parallel. Even now, certain circles in Germany exhibit a vaguely anti-Western mood and hostility towards capitalist America. Consciously or unconsciously, these circles idealize the social-utopian community and the protestant ethic of convictions and reject Max Weber's concepts of responsible action based on rational judgement. Insufficient understanding of the West, detachment from its intellectual roots, and exaggeration of its mistakes remains a "tradition" in Germany. These prejudices have, in fact, contributed to a kind of intellectual equidistance in the examination of totalitarian communism and Western democracy, which refuses to see major differences between them. That this attitude is tantamount to surrender to the hegemonic demands of the Soviet Union in Europe hardly needs to be emphasized. Passages from Henry Kissinger's letter to President Nixon on February 16, 1970, illustrate this:

"The most worrisome aspects of *Ostpolitik*, however, are somewhat more long-range. As long as he is negotiating with the Eastern countries over the issues that are current on the table—recognition of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse, various possible arrangements for Berlin—Brandt should not have any serious difficulty in maintaining his basic pro-Western policy. . . . But assuming Brandt achieves a degree of normalization, he or his successor may discover before long that the hoped-for benefits fail to develop. . . . Having already invested heavily in their

Eastern policy, the Germans may at this point see themselves as facing agonizing choices. It should be remembered that in the 1950s, many Germans not only in the SPD under Schumacher but in conservative quarters, traditionally fascinated or enthralled by the vision of Germany as a "bridge" between East and West, argued against Bonn's incorporation in Western institutions on the ground that it would forever seal Germany's division and preclude the restoration of an active German role in the East. This kind of debate about Germany's basic position could well recur in more divisive form, not only inflaming German domestic affairs but generating suspicions among Germany's Western associates as to its reliability as a partner."

Kissinger could not have described the present dilemma more precisely.

It is well understood that we Germans attach great importance to a successful conclusion of the disarmament talks. The reason is our geographical position. We would automatically become the battlefield between East and West in the event of an armed conflict. In recent years, the Soviet Union has deployed over 350 SS-20 missiles, which give it a superiority in the field of intermediate-range missiles, leaving Western Europe extremely vulnerable and liable to blackmail. Against this background, the NATO foreign ministers decided in 1979 on deployment. It is necessary to emphasize that these missiles were in no way being forced upon us by the Americans. On the contrary, the European NATO countries wanted these weapons deployed on our territories for our own safety, in the event that the Soviet Union should refuse to take sincere disarmament measures.

It has clearly become increasingly difficult to cope with the psychological stresses created by this vicious circle of nuclear armament. Like every responsible politician in this country, I know that nuclear weapons pose the threat, for the first time in history, of wiping out life on this continent and throughout the great expanses of the world. On the other hand, we should not forget that this same nuclear potential has also helped to maintain peace in Europe for 40 years. Meanwhile conventional wars have been fought at great cost to human life in many other parts of the world. Clearly nuclear weapons do not by themselves threaten the peace. In all likelihood, war finds its major source in political

structures rather than in weapons systems. Despite these truths, I am convinced that it will become increasingly difficult to convince the population of the need to modernize missile systems.

The question remains whether there are any alternatives to nuclear deterrence. One can, of course, imagine such alternatives. However, I would question the capability and the will of both East and West to find and develop them. One such alternative came to our attention recently in a famous and controversial speech by Manes Sperber, the late Peace Prize winner of the German Book Trade. He called for a Europe both militarily and politically capable of providing its own deterrent force. For him, that included the concept of an (independent?) European nuclear power. A new attempt at closer political cooperation between the big European powers is certainly conceivable. But Western Europe would then have to pursue one common foreign policy toward the rest of the world and one common European defense policy within NATO. The political coordination between the governments would need to be so close that they could then relate to the U.S. as a unit and thus form the second—the European—pillar of the North Atlantic alliance. The Americans, for their part, have repeatedly demanded such a European pillar. Unfortunately, I currently see no evidence of willingness by Great Britain or France to have their national foreign policies subsumed into such a larger entity. Thus, as much as I welcome Sperber's ideas, I consider them to be unrealistic under present circumstances.

Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt offered a second alternative in a 1983 speech at the Bundeswehr College in Hamburg. In his view, the West must be ready to respond to any attack with like weapons. "By and large, we must be able to match our adversary on conventional battlefields with any weapon, type of weapon, and strength of force." Accomplishing this goal would require new efforts throughout Western Europe. But this poses many problems. For example, neither Great Britain nor France demonstrates the political willingness to abandon its own nuclear deterrent systems and small if well-trained professional armies for the sake of a conventional force buildup.

Let me refer again to the dangers of the third alternative—the gradual withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from the Western alliance and its *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. This course would represent a realistic alternative only if the Soviet Union changed its *raison*

d'état, in other words, if it abandoned its extreme, security-obsessed expansionism in favor of maintaining the *status quo*. It would have to drop the view that national developments within its sphere always represent immediate threats to its military and security interest. Without such a change by Moscow, this alternative must be considered illusory. Events in Poland or in the German Democratic Republic unfortunately reveal no evidence of such a change by the Soviets. Indeed, the Soviet Union has so far been unprepared to transform its empire into a form of socialist commonwealth. Neither has the Soviet government understood that its own military security would be better served by countries that are socially at peace domestically than by those militarily suppressed. In summary, my criticism of this alternative is simply that the conditions for such a policy do not exist.

Finally, I want to warn that even a false policy is capable of enthral-ling people, so long as it satisfies certain emotional needs. At present, the division of Europe continues to be regarded as something unnatural, while the Europeans consider their dependence on the superpowers to be a dismal burden. Under the circumstances, we must weigh the possibilities for change, lest our political system become vulnerable to uncontrolled developments in Europe. Above all, we need understand- ing from our European allies—the British and the French. They must realize that the present situation cannot last forever and that the “Ger- man Question” must sooner or later be resolved. Neither Great Britain nor France has sufficient economic or military power to shape world politics unilaterally. Their potential would be reduced even further were the Federal Republic of Germany to withdraw from the Western alliance. The political elites of these two countries must therefore decide whether to regain their world political influence by working through a united Europe or eventually grow dependent on decisions made outside of Europe. In addition, the United Kingdom must decide whether to shape its future as a European great power or as part of the Anglo-Saxon world on the North American continent. Both options are possible, but not simultaneously.

Should Great Britain or France fail to heed this warning—for whatever reason—then the neutralist tendencies in the Federal Republic of Germany are bound to grow. The danger is that a younger genera- tion, lacking knowledge and experience of the war and post-war years,

might seek to settle the German Question by cooperating with the Soviet Union. The chances of this happening are perhaps not very great. We know, however, that German politics has not always been free from false hopes and utopian dreams.

To conclude, let me emphasize that the world political realities of the 1980's allowed no alternative to deployment. The European NATO coun- tries sought deployment in order to restore the military balance in Europe. Only one course will bring the Soviet Union to reconsider the high economic and political price that its armament efforts extract from its own people and from the Soviet system's own stability. We must make it quite clear to the Soviet Union that their actions cannot dissolve the community of interests between the United States of America and Western Europe. We Europeans and Americans must therefore resist, coolly but resolutely, any attempt by the Soviet Union to solve its own problems at the expense of the Atlantic alliance. The collapse of the Soviet Empire can endanger us only if we lack a unified foreign policy concept. Peace and security cannot be won through weakness. In my view, the Western democracies should have learned this lesson once and for all time from the events of 1933-1939.

GERMANY—A CHALLENGE FOR THE SUPERPOWERS

DIETRICH STOBBE

Germany's future is closely tied to the relations between the superpowers. During the Cold War, the demand for German reunification formed a central issue in the East-West conflict. During the *detente* period, the question of American reunification gave way to a *modus vivendi* between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. This *modus vivendi* provided the essential precondition for our *Ostpolitik*. Now, the situation has reversed itself somewhat. During the past several years, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have again deteriorated. Our experiences in Europe of the 1950s and 1960s thus seem to be catching up with us.

What will become of the Germans and what could or should become of them are once again controversial questions in international affairs. The debate over intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe is a prime example. Confusion reached a grotesque degree; accusations included those of a new "German revanchism," an irrational search for "German identity," new nationalisms on the Left and Right, neutralism, and pan-Germanism. The public discussion of Erich Honecker's planned and then postponed visit to the Federal Republic demonstrated that world attention has once again begun to focus on the Germans. Other European countries, especially our immediate neighbors, still react with seismographic sensitivity to actual or apparent changes in German policies. Obviously, how the Germans perceive their future remains vital to the security of Europe. For these reasons, Germany remains a central challenge for both world powers.

Created by the victors of World War II and imposed upon the German *Reich*, the existing international power structure is most visible today in Berlin. This structure based itself on, among other things, the fear of an eventual revival of German nationalism. Certainly much has changed since the end of World War II, but the question of whether the Germans will want to re-establish their national identity or accept an existence divided in two states remains a source of concern for other European countries as well as for the world powers.

Recent developments have intensified this concern. The question of Germany's legitimate borders has, in fact, been revived in German politics. Elements of the political Right in the Federal Republic have renewed their demands for reunification. Persons in positions of political responsibility have asserted the continuing existence of the German Empire in its 1937 borders. Such assertions have naturally provoked strong reactions in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland—reactions that cannot have surprised those who made the original assertions. Other voices declare that German reunification is a necessary precondition for a "European peace order." Undoubtedly, these demands endanger the modicum of practical cooperation with the GDR that has been achieved with so much difficulty. Meanwhile, they threaten to harm our relations in Western Europe. Witness Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti's accusation of pan-Germanism. Nevertheless, we must unfortunately cope with the situation created by these statements.

New neutralist tendencies in the Federal Republic have generated other concerns. Some of these new voices want both West Germany's and the German Democratic Republic's withdrawal from existing military alliances. The concern that the Germans might take the neutralist route has an irritating effect on international politics, one comparable to the reunification issue itself. Although the terms, "reunification" and "neutrality," imply quite different circumstances and policies, illusory talk of reunification on the one hand and unrealistic demands for neutrality on the other are dangerous and must be opposed.

It must be emphasized that the vast majority of Germans rejects both of these political outlooks. The postwar experience has demonstrated a common majority view in the Federal Republic, the GDR, and divided Berlin: resolving the "German Question" may be impossible for a long period, possibly another century. Concurrently, however, the German people understand that successful East-West cooperation has permitted a *modus vivendi*—one providing a realistic framework for a bearable and, perhaps eventually, a good relationship between the two German states. Clearly, present international circumstances allow only small and difficult steps. Even so, the specific implementation of the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the Federal Republic and of the quadripartite Berlin agreement has helped tremendously to alleviate the hardships of Germany's division.

An honest analysis must acknowledge that the vast majority of Germans have come to terms with the catastrophic breaking points in their history. They realistically appraise their prospects for the future. Indeed, most Germans base their assessments on the existence of two German states and know that movement toward national unity is only possible insofar as there is progress in East-West cooperation. Working toward East-West understanding has thus developed into a national obligation. It is a kind of "national self-limitation," unnatural to other Europeans. It is our special contribution to peace. Our self-restraint provides, in fact, one of the most important foundations for the East-West cooperation that Europe so urgently needs—a cooperation defined in the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975.

The question whether Germany represents a "challenge for the superpowers" can best be answered by examining the roots of policies pursued in Germany since 1945. There are three major sources of the Federal Republic's policies:

The first is democratic values. In contrast to Americans, Germans failed to bring about a successful democratic revolution. The liberal revolution of 1848 collapsed. The half-hearted revolution of 1918/1919 resulted in a Weimar Republic with severe defects that made it unviable in the long-run. Not until after 1945 was democracy firmly established in Germany, and then only in one of the German states—the Federal Republic. But there the commitment to democracy has grown. A functioning, pluralistic society in the West German context has revealed itself in changes of government and of coalition, in social change, in the toleration of challenges to the established party system, and in general in a lively political debate over fundamentals.

The second root of West German policy is the goal of German unity. In contrast to Americans, Germans in the East and West bear the heavy burden of guilt for having started a war of aggression resulting in the deaths of 60 million people. The sole period of German national unity within the German Empire—the 74 years from 1871 to 1945—closed with a balance sheet of horror. Thus the idea of German unity has been discredited for other nations, at least in Europe. But the human, economic, and political burdens of division are too heavy for the Germans themselves simply to ignore. And Berlin's particular situation repeatedly poses difficult questions. Indeed, no German government

can escape the unity question.

The third source is Western integration—unique to the years after 1945. The history of the post World War II period has defined the Federal Republic as an integral part of the West. This defines in turn the parameters of West German policy. After the First World War, the United States combined economic commitments in Europe with political isolationism; it remained in the political background until the Nazis' victories forced intervention. The American strategy of political abstinence from European affairs was thus proven not to be viable.

After the Second World War, the United States drew a different conclusion. It became, it is fair to say, a superpower—one based essentially on its power in Europe. The United States assumed political functions in Europe and continues to exercise them today. This has made the Federal Republic's integration in the West a natural, even a constituent fact. The vast majority of West Germans views these realities today just as they did during Adenauer's chancellorship. In other words, integration in the West is the precondition for *Ostpolitik*, rather than an alternative to it. Our membership in the Western alliance limits the scope and maneuverability of any "national" policy available to the Federal Republic.

These then are the roots of West Germany's policies: the commitments to democracy and to integration in the Western alliance; and the obligation to work toward overcoming the nation's division. Taken together, they exert decisive influences on the national policy of any West German government.

Several clear priorities derive from them:

First, peace is the central precondition for any West German freedom of action. The conviction "war must never again be initiated on German soil" has become very popular in Germany. It represents a maxim both for the West German chancellor and for the East German leader. A war waged with today's high technology weapons would in all likelihood leave the countries of Central Europe, including Poland, destroyed or enfeebled. The awareness that we must either get along with one another or die with one another now determines political attitudes in both German states.

Second, self-determination flows only from peace and freedom. Self-determination is a natural right throughout the world, even where it

is at present not respected. The West Germans have, of course, a legitimate right to demand more freedom for the people living in the GDR. But in so demanding, they must not threaten the peace. In fact, West German *Ostpolitik* postulates that "self-determination" for the Germans is conceivable without unity. In other words, freedom takes precedence over unity.

Third, West German policy subordinates reunification to peace and freedom. Although our Basic Law defines unity as an eventual goal, our sense of reality and of historical responsibility prevails. It is more important to introduce certain freedoms for the East Germans than to overemphasize the theme of national unity to the point where the GDR rejects negotiations and thus rules out peaceful change. Obviously, the power structure in Central Europe remains unchangeable. The GDR cannot accept the concept of reunification without questioning its own existence as the other German state and its commitment to a communist system of government. Hence another distinction—possibly one of very great importance. The Federal Republic's constitution speaks of national unity, not of reunification. For the majority of Germans, the goal of reestablishing a large German state composed of the remaining elements of the defeated German Empire has become increasingly unrealistic. But increased German unity, as a nation and as a part of a Europe which is itself growing closer together, has found greater appeal and utility. In other words, a European cooperative framework might serve to diminish the antagonisms of the two systems. Only this approach to the German national question can prevent Germany from becoming again a dangerous challenge for the world.

The immutable realities of the existing European power structure create concrete alternatives for West German foreign policy. Through the GDR, the Soviet Union defends on German soil its gains resulting from the Second World War. The Soviet Union became a world power by extending its political sphere to the Elbe River. Nothing suggests any Soviet willingness to relinquish its dominance over the Eastern European states in the realms of foreign policy, security, and ideology. Obviously the Soviet Union needs a predictable and stable GDR to secure its control over Eastern and Central Europe.

Power structures within the Warsaw Pact have nevertheless changed significantly. The GDR's internal and external position is, for example,

different under Honecker than it was under Ulbricht; such changes are due partly to the consequences of *detente*. Nor can the indigenous strivings of the GDR, Poland, and other Eastern European nations for greater external and internal independence from the Soviet Union be overlooked. These aspirations have been and will doubtlessly remain a crucial and constructive part of the process of any successful East-West cooperation.

Meanwhile the two German states can play a major role within this context of potential East-West cooperation. It is an historical irony that these two states have become, for their respective superpower allies, the strongest partners in terms of conventional military strength and economic power. This gives them considerable influence, making them indispensable. But such influence has limits. The alliance structures are firm, having developed over three decades in both East and West. They could not be changed without enormous repercussions. Such changes would endanger, if not destroy, the peace. This reality requires the alliance systems' preservation. As a result, the two German states can only pursue policies which promote the German national interest *within* their respective alliances and which promote East-West cooperation *through* these alliances.

Departure from the alliances would, on the other hand, reduce German influence and diminish the chances for preserving the peace. Such a departure would endanger freedom in the Federal Republic, expose two neutral German states to an uncertain fate, and destabilize Berlin. Clearly, the Germans would not want and will not choose this course. The two German states must remain partners of the superpowers within their respective alliances.

But how can the preservation of this situation remain sufficiently appealing to future generations of Germans? How can German youth come to view it more as an opportunity and less an imposition of outside control or even of loss of sovereignty? The pressures of this situation became especially evident in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) debate. Certainly Bonn did what was required to preserve the unity of the alliance. But the debate also revealed limits to its ability to persevere. Indeed, bitter disappointment over the lack of any meaningful reconciliation of East-West interest in the area of intermediate-range nuclear weapons alienated many people from the defense and

detente consensus that we proudly enjoyed for many years. Disappointment has created mistrust, especially because the anticipated new Soviet readiness to make concessions after the INF deployment—as prophesied by the hard-liners in the West—failed to materialize. In the German view, the dialogue on arms control and disarmament forms the core of efficient superpower cooperation. But this dialogue stagnated so depressingly that many people in divided Germany were encouraged to withdraw into a new German “dream world.” This development is certainly deplorable and regrettable. Given the situation, however, the Germans cannot afford to rely upon such feelings. To dream, to deplore, and to regret do not constitute the basis for a viable policy. We Germans must be realistic and base our policy once again on facts.

Accordingly, three foreign policy options confront West Germany today. All three are, in fact, under serious discussion in the Federal Republic. Though not all are truly viable, these options nevertheless avoid extremes and are sufficiently important to deserve serious and careful analysis. The first option—the concept of a “joint German-German responsibility”—has played a central role in German political discussion for the past several years. The new German quest for identity now gaining strength no longer emphasizes reunification. Instead, it focuses on a kind of “two state patriotism,” which hopes to create new room for more independent intra-German action by establishing more distant relationships to the respective superpowers. Those who adhere to this school proclaim a kind of autonomous German *detente*. This alternative has only existed with the current intensity since the *detente* process between the superpowers themselves ceased functioning. As established *detente* structures faltered, the tendency toward a unique German-German interchange, bypassing the superpowers, was strengthened.

Despite its appeal, however, the potential for “joint German-German responsibility” confronts a major limitation arising from our postwar experience—Berlin. There can be no isolated German solutions because isolated solutions for Berlin do not exist. The only real German progress in the Berlin question came—significantly enough—through the framework of a functioning cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any separate German-German *detente* which attempts to ignore the superpower confrontation is doomed

to failure. The cancellation of Erich Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic reaffirmed this. It will become yet more obvious. Progress can be made in the intra-German relationship only if and when the German states develop sufficient influence within their own alliances to convince the superpowers of the necessity of East-West cooperation. In other words, seeking to develop or preserve a special intra-German *detente*, one more or less isolated from superpower relations, would only foster another illusion. Instead, the Federal Republic must, paradoxically, concentrate upon building a new consensus about East-West cooperation in the West, where such a consensus obviously does not now exist.

The second alternative is the "Europeanization of Europe." This dream, widespread in universities and churches in both East and West and especially in Poland, has been very strong in recent years. Its adherents believe that European *detente* is possible by circumventing the superpowers. They argue that the superpowers' global commitments have somehow given our continent more maneuverability. They fail, however, to recognize the extent to which the United States and, above all, the Soviet Union have needed their military, economic, and political positions in Europe as the foundations of their world power roles. Thus, the "Europeanization of Europe" is simply ahistorical. It fails to assess correctly our continent's historic importance for the superpowers. A European peace order will only gain new ground insofar as the Europeans succeed within their respective alliances in convincing the superpowers of the utility of new cooperation efforts. That is the key. It exists nowhere else.

Finally, the third alternative is that of alliance options. Neither an isolated German option nor even a purely European option offers the two German states any significant or realistic prospects for success. The relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR can only be developed further by employing existing alliance ties, not by negating them. Within the Western alliance, Bonn must actively promote the United States' return to the principles of parity and cooperation among the superpowers. The SPD and the German *Bundestag* readily acknowledge that Foreign Minister Genscher recently fought for such a return before the United Nations General Assembly. The SPD will support any foreign policy which promotes the constructive balance of East-West interest on a parity basis. This approach in no way implies

a policy of "equidistance" to the superpowers, as is sometimes suggested. That should be sufficiently clear, unless, of course, one believes that President Nixon had "equidistance" in mind when he signed the 1972 declaration between the superpowers.

In the next period, much will depend upon whether the European members of the alliance succeed in coordinating their policies better. A stronger European consensus would also serve American interest, potentially improving the transatlantic dialogue. Greater European self-assertiveness in the alliance would be productive and realistic in numerous areas: the adherence of the European nations to established East-West structures in trade and industry; joint policies toward the Third World; increased West European arms cooperation; coordinated influence on the political strategy of the alliance; a common European assessment on needed changes in military strategy; and a joint renunciation of unilateralist tendencies. The Federal Republic would play a leading role in any such European discussion. Whether the Federal Republic now plays a strong enough role may certainly be doubted. In any case, there is widespread feeling in West Germany and in other European countries that the Western alliance no longer has a sufficiently coherent political strategy toward the Warsaw Pact. The reestablishment of cohesion can only occur on a partnership basis; an effective alliance must express the interests of all its members.

In conclusion: the free part of Germany can best pursue its peace, freedom, and unity interests through the Western alliance. The task is more difficult today. Policy shifts have torn apart the consensus on defense and *detente*. At this time, while America is making decisions about its own future which may result in new policies, Germans must respectfully and seriously listen to the American arguments. We must avoid succumbing to the pitfalls of prejudice and preconception. After all, Germany's "challenge" for the superpowers also derives from the superpowers' own symbiosis with the two German states. Dissolution of that symbiosis will be impossible for the foreseeable future. This constitutes another reason to exercise patience in dealing with one another and to reflect upon the other side's position.

Fortunately, there are people in the United States interested in the intensive study of these often very complex German problems as well as the prospects for German-American relations. The studies undertaken

at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies will certainly help maintain our historic orientation toward one another and help steer an important friendship through difficult waters.

GERMANYS

OTTO WOLFF VON AMERONGEN

*E*conomic ties between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are, despite certain peculiarities, part of broader East-West economic relations. Differences of opinion over the political character and desirable scope of trade with the East have occurred in the Atlantic Alliance, especially between 1980 and 1983. While the quarrels have been set aside, the problems have not disappeared. Technology transfer, for example, remains a focus of continuing controversy. This is particularly true after final passage of the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 by the US Congress. Therefore, it is necessary to review again the key elements of the controversies and to discuss the role of economic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

The scope and dynamics of East-West trade are often overestimated. This is particularly true for the 1980s. The major thrust of that trade was during the years of 1972-1975. In that period, trade with the member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), as a share of total foreign trade of the OECD countries, climbed from 3.0% to 3.8%. By 1984 this share had fallen again to 2.8%. This trend represents no dramatic change and it belies the notion of a positive dynamism.

The *detente* process, culminating in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, could not accomplish miracles. As a matter of fact, experience of doing business with the East over a period of decades teaches that severe limits exist, which are due to the inflexible planning system of the state trading countries. The effort in the second half of the 1970s to expand Western exports by increased granting of credits worked as an eventual brake because of the debt service burden. A gross indebtedness of about \$90 billion caused both Western banks and Eastern planners to manage their economic relationship more cautiously. Then, in the 1980s, the CMEA nations began to consolidate their trade balances. The path to this consolidation led through strong doses of import restrictions.

For most of the CMEA members, trade with the West constitutes nearly one third of total foreign trade. In 1984, the Soviet Union's

Western trade as a share of its total trade accounted for 30%; the respective figure for the GDR was 29%. Only Bulgaria (12%) and Czechoslovakia (16%) fell far below this level. Taken as a whole, the figures clearly demonstrate that the Eastern countries are far more dependent upon East-West trade than is any Western nation.

Aside from the issue of US grain deliveries to the Soviet Union, the discussion of East-West economic relations has focussed on the problems of energy, credits, and technology transfer.

The natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe became a controversial issue between the United States and several West European countries. There can be no doubt that the natural gas market is less flexible than the oil market. Soviet petroleum deliveries to Western Europe have been and still are significant. However, Western demand is decreasing, and therefore there is no probability in the foreseeable future of a Western European oil dependency upon the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic, for instance, draws roughly 8% of its oil supply from the Soviet Union—a share that many other petroleum suppliers would eagerly assume.

The structure of the natural gas market is different. The distribution of pipelines makes a long-term relationship between suppliers and users indispensable. In 1990, Western Europe will draw roughly 20% and the Federal Republic about 30% of total gas supply from the Soviet Union. The question is whether such dependence upon Soviet gas poses serious risks. The availability of other suppliers and the existence of a Europe-wide pipeline net suggest that it will not. There is no real dependence, because the Netherlands and Norway could compensate for any potential cutoff of Soviet gas. Moreover, there remain sufficient reserves in the discoveries of the North Sea. Indeed at the present time, the problem seems instead to be how to avoid an overproduction of gas for the 1990s.

Also the international credits extended to the East do not pose a serious problem. Much criticism has been heard from the American side about the readiness of Western banks to finance East European imports with credits. But clearly, the Eastern European debt problem compared to the Latin American debt problem is much easier to manage, in terms both of its absolute volume and of the outlook for the consolidation of trade balances. The net indebtedness of the CMEA countries has, in

fact, fallen from \$75 billion in 1981 to \$55 at the end of 1984, that of the GDR from \$12 billion to below \$7 billion. Only Poland poses a continuing problem, but generally there is no looming credit crisis *vis-à-vis* the East.

Currently the transfer of technology from the West to the East (and increasingly among Western nations themselves) poses possibly the most controversial issue between the United States and Western Europe in the context of East-West economic relations. Sometimes it is viewed too narrowly as a problem of some Western microchip being exported to the East for industrial applications and ending up as part of a new military equipment. Nevertheless, we must face the problem that our technology exports could support Soviet armaments technology. The possibilities of applying high technology components to both civilian and military purposes—the so-called dual-use potential—have grown; and the differences between them have become increasingly blurred. We must, of course, adjust ourselves to new technological developments within the proven framework of the COCOM agreements. This cannot mean, however, that every technology transfer to the East will be “devilish.”

The United States and Western Europe have different economic interests in their respective trade with the East, and so they naturally approach these problems somewhat differently. The U.S. traditionally exports more raw materials, above all grain, to the East, while the West Europeans sell primarily finished goods. Given these realities, special care must be taken to avoid the suspicion that the U.S. because of different economic interests, wants to limit technology transfer. Similarly, the U.S. position concerning this issue must avoid the impression of using “military security” as a pretext to restrain vigorous competitors on the world market.

For the Federal Republic, the complex problem of technology transfer touches its dealings not only with Eastern Europe but also with the GDR. The share of manufactured goods in the GDR's deliveries to the West accounts for roughly 70%. Compared to other CMEA states, this is relatively high. But it must be remembered that the GDR is a developed industrial state, which has to export finished goods. Not surprisingly, it seeks to purchase modern manufactured goods for capital investment from its Western trading partners. In this context, it has to be pointed

out that the COCOM rules also apply with regard to the GDR. These are plain realities that must be considered in any evaluation of the controversies inherent in East-West economic relations.

In this connection, greater understanding of the background of inner-German economic relations might help to forestall actual or potential controversies. The legal basis of this trade, which West Germany does not consider to be foreign trade, is American and British military laws of 1945. Within this framework the Federal Republic and the GDR agreed to the so-called Berlin Protocol of 1951, which is still valid with some modifications.

Currently inner-German trade amounts to DM15 billion, making up barely 2% of our foreign trade. For the GDR, however, this represents nearly 10% of its total trade. From the outset, inner-German trade has been interwoven with a political discussion in the Federal Republic on the subject of inner-German relations in general. Accordingly, inner-German trade has always been closely tied to certain broad political objectives. Simply stated, they are as follows:

- Trade should enable Germans in the GDR to improve their quality of life.
- Trade should help limit the economic integration of the GDR into the Eastern bloc.
- Trade should help the FRG maintain undisturbed access to West Berlin.
- Trade should help to link the two German states within a framework which can be characterized by the political phrases "change through rapprochement" and "normalization towards securing peace."

While there exist other rationales and objectives for this trade, most West German politicians in all three major parties would agree with those mentioned here.

The GDR takes, of course, a different view of inner-German trade. For it, purely economic interests predominate, and it views this trade simply as part of its normal foreign trade. In other words, there exists a kind of parallelogram of interests in the development of economic relations between the two German states—motivated in the FRG by political objectives and in the GDR by economic ones.

The institutional framework of inner-German trade reflects this

parallelogram of interests. After 1945, a special trust authority for inter-zonal trade was erected to oversee the administration of trade. Military occupation prohibitions against high-level interchange between both parts of Germany made this authority necessary. In the early 1950s, the West German cabinet established the "German East-West Trade Committee" in order to promote economic relations with those states with which the Federal Republic of Germany had no diplomatic relations.

With respect to inner-German economic relations, financial transactions are conducted on a clearing basis, and both sides have granted each other a reciprocal, interest-free overdraft credit called a "swing," which in actuality is utilized only by the GDR.

A new stage of relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany was brought about with the conclusion of the Basic Treaty of December 1972. This treaty included reciprocal recognition as separate states, while acknowledging, of course, Bonn's official and firm insistence that the "two states of Germany" could not be foreign countries to each other. Thus, trade with the GDR remains, as before, "something special"—namely "inner-German" and not foreign trade. This status has also been recognized by member countries of the European Community through a special protocol to the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Even the GDR's head of state and party chief, Erich Honecker, referred to this peculiar status as something special in an interview with an American journalist in November 1972.

Besides these political considerations, inner-German trade also has important economic aspects. Indeed, inner-German trade reflects numerous concrete economic interests in both the FRG and the GDR. In West Germany, more than 7,000 firms with some 45,000 specific contracts annually participate in this trade. Remarkably, small and medium-sized firms have dominated the trade, accounting for roughly 85% of it. They deliver mostly basic materials and investment goods.

Precisely what inner-German trade means for production and growth of the GDR economy remains unclear. From this perspective, economic ties with the Federal Republic have certainly reached a prominent position. With nearly 10% of the GDR's foreign trade, West Germany is its second largest trading partner, ranking just behind the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic is the GDR's most important market outside the CMEA. Physical proximity, good transportation links, and the

lack of a language barrier provide easier access to the West Germans than to Eastern countries. Furthermore, the difficult market conditions in West Germany continue to pose challenging quality and price tests for GDR products.

That the GDR wants mostly imports consisting of basic materials and labor-saving technologies naturally gives the Federal Republic added importance. Notwithstanding the serious economic problems of recent years in the GDR, West German firms have continued to provide at least 50% of the GDR's total investment good imports from the West. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that there exists no free technological trade with the GDR—as a result of COCOM controls.

The GDR, just as the Federal Republic, is very strongly dependent upon external economic influences. Particularly at the CMEA Summit in the summer of 1984 Soviet demands for better quality goods had to be accepted. Together with a new price-setting mechanism, such obligations naturally limit the GDR's maneuverability in terms of economic relations with the FRG. Inevitably, the future of inner-German trade will be shaped more by necessities than by desired goals. Genuine industrial cooperation on the enterprise level between the two German states is still completely underdeveloped. Furthermore there exist a variety of problem areas, such as structural weaknesses and insufficient delivery capacities in the GDR. New opportunities will depend upon whether the GDR succeeds in overcoming its excessive fear of contact with the West, the Federal Republic in particular. On the other hand, the sustained basic trade ties that have been achieved, combined with certain inherent dynamics offer reason for viewing further developments with optimism.

Reflecting this hope, Richard von Weizsäcker, the then Governing Mayor of Berlin and now Federal President, wrote in the German weekly *Die Zeit* in 1983:

“If we succeed in improving step by step cooperation in the areas of science, technology, nutrition, ecology, transport, economics, energy, and Third-World policy, then in the end arms control and even freedom of movement could become possible.”

This statement referred primarily to East-West relations as a whole. Thus the reference to arms control as an intended goal of cooperation which is a preeminent responsibility of the superpowers.

If one leaves out this issue, then Herr von Weizsäcker accurately describes the goal the FRG has to deal with in its relations with the GDR. This obligation constitutes no German-German “special path.” However, inner-German relations, if properly handled by governments on both sides of the Atlantic, form a necessary component of a common East-West policy.

The Federal Republic's role is of considerable importance. Its geographical position enables it to see nuances among Eastern nations and react to them, whereas from a distance, such as from Washington, D.C. or California, there seems to be but one Eastern bloc. Not surprisingly, the Federal Republic's perceptions are especially keen in the area of West German-East German relations.

President von Weizsäcker's call for cooperative relations between the two Germanys and East and West in general reflects, of course, the established self-interest of both sides. Such improved relations would represent neither charity nor a wedge for *detente*. Furthermore, broad cooperation and dialogue with the GDR have nothing to do with the possible goal of a reunification of the two German states. While West Germany seeks, where possible, arrangements with the GDR that are also in the interest of the East Germans, its *Deutschlandpolitik* creates no dependencies or obligations that conflict with its Western alliance duties. In the words of a frequently misused slogan, the Federal Republic pursues no “self-Finlandization”. Whoever sees something different in the ties between Bonn and East Berlin confuses isolated and peripheral voices on the left and right in West Germany with declarations of official policy. The corollary in the United States would be to view William Safire of *The New York Times* as the official spokesman of the U.S. administration.

Finally, there are numerous reasons stemming from German history and the post-war experience for seeking improved inner-German relations. After all, it was Germany which became the focus of two disastrous wars in Europe during this century. The Federal government's efforts, under Chancellor Kohl as well as under his predecessors, to promote relations with Eastern Europe, particularly with the GDR, rest largely on a sense of a special German responsibility for Europe.

Since the 1960s, the following has held true: the better the East-West relationship, the better is the relationship between the two Ger-

man states. There have been some exceptions to this rule. Although for a time, inner-German relations seemed to improve alongside worsening East-West ties, the Kremlin's successful pressure in 1984, which led to the cancellation of Honecker's visit to Bonn, has reaffirmed the historic axiom. The GDR might conceivably play a role as a Soviet instrument in the West. On the other hand it has recently become more apparent that East Berlin is not merely an extended arm of Moscow. The GDR has its own political and economic interests in the West, ones not necessarily always identical with the Soviet Union's political calculations there. This hardly means, however, that the GDR strives for a kind of German-German special relationship that might promote somehow one or more of the national unification concepts now existing in the Federal Republic. In any case, there are clear limits to the GDR's freedom of action even under conditions of relatively good East-West relations.

It must not be forgotten that the years of East-West *detente* were positive and productive years for the GDR. *Detente* promoted the GDR's adaptation to the postwar international system. *Detente* made the GDR multilaterally and bilaterally respectable, helping it develop from a merely recognized to an increasingly respected state. Whether the GDR leadership will also succeed in winning the consent and approval of its own population depends upon long-term achievements in the areas of living conditions and freedom of movement. The situation is similar in the other small countries of the CMEA, especially Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. *Detente* has, on the whole, promoted these objectives in Eastern Europe. Only insofar as the Soviet Union ignores or neglects the potential benefits of Western economic ties will there be serious disagreement between Moscow and other Eastern capitals, including East Berlin.

Events following the West German Parliament's decision in late 1983 to go along with the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons on West German soil illuminated this reality. While the Soviets directed furious propaganda against the United States and the Federal Republic, reviving long-buried charges of *revanchism* against Bonn, Honecker proposed a "limitation of damage" by continuing talks with West Germany and by cautiously criticizing the deployment of additional Soviet missiles on East German soil. The threatened "ice age" in relations between the Germanys did not begin. Additionally, a press

controversy tantalizingly revealed a hitherto unknown coalition of interests between the Eastern countries. When the Soviet Union directly and indirectly attacked the GDR's *Westpolitik*, Hungarian newspapers declared their support for the East Germans. This incident in particular casts doubt whether Vice President George Bush was correctly informed, when, during a speech in Vienna in September 1983, he divided the countries of Eastern Europe into "good guys" and "bad guys." The events of 1984 clearly demonstrated that East Berlin is not merely Moscow's proxy and that the GDR has a life of its own. Nevertheless, Honecker's refusal in the fall of 1984 to visit the Federal Republic illustrates not only the GDR's always narrow room for maneuver but also its immutable foreign policy priorities.

In conclusion, one cannot assess the Federal Republic's *Deutschlandpolitik* without understanding the motives and goals of the GDR's leadership. It confronts continuously severe limitations. Above all, the GDR is in no position to pursue visions of German reunification. Nor can it embrace neutrality concepts of any kind. This means two things. First, anxieties among West Germany's neighbors and elsewhere about an eventual German reunification are entirely unwarranted. Second, there can be no grand vision of West German *Deutschlandpolitik*. We can be guided only by what is possible. Perhaps cooperation in the fields mentioned above will prove fruitful, allowing a good neighborly relationship to emerge from the *modus vivendi* that exists now. So much the better. Controversies which have lasted for decades have burdened Europe long enough. Perhaps a good neighborly relationship between the two Germanys will be the basis for new efforts to remove political tensions in Europe and ultimately between East and West in general.

ATTITUDES OF GERMAN YOUTH TOWARD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES

KLAUS VON BEYME

German Political Culture and the Feeling of National Identity

Germans were not trusted after the war. Similarly, many well-known studies of political culture were unflattering to the German character. Consider Sidney Verba's verdict of 1966: "... the passivity of the German citizen, [his] pragmatic orientation to politics (bordering on cynicism), lack of political involvement of the bulk of the population, the legalism, the subject orientation—all these indicate a political system in which firmly democratic attitudes are as yet not established." By the 1970s, other studies had begun to question the validity of judgments such as Verba's. Now, twenty years after Verba's assessment, it is absolutely clear that his characterizations need to be revised.

A great deal of empirical evidence demonstrates the necessity for revising Verba's picture of the Germans. Seminal studies of "civic culture," the German political culture, have found no significant German peculiarity or divergence on the scales measuring democratic attitudes. While the studies have suggested marginally weaker "participatory" attitudes in Germany compared to the United States, most other measurements, both verbal and active, have shown that Germany has fundamentally changed. Among the older judgments, only the idea of a special German tendency toward "legalism" seems to have retained a certain validity. Meanwhile, the "latecomer" among Western democracies has become in some respects a kind of Mecca for new alternative forms of behavior and political activity. For example, the Green Party, the West's most successful ecological party, now seeks to mobilize the youth for new forms of a "double strategy" in German politics—one that utilizes both conventional and unconventional behavior. The Greens can, in fact, be considered as the "party of the youth," with 71% of their voters being under age 35, compared to 32% of the SPD's, 34% of the FDP's,

and 22% of the CDU's. The Greens provide perhaps the most striking evidence of important changes in German political culture.

While political attitudes have changed, the official ideologies of the two German states have remained basically consistent. If anything, the ideologies have perhaps become more rigid in recent years. With the Christian Democrats' assumption of power in 1982 in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and a renewed "Cold War" by the East bloc since 1980, both German systems have become more intransigent regarding their mutual relationship and the national question. To be sure, the new Bonn government, lacking the same "pressure to succeed" (*Erfolgszwang*) as its predecessor, employs a more modest intra-German terminology. In contrast to the SPD's *Ostpolitik* and *detente*, Kohl's government emphasizes the "democratic values competition" with the East. In addition, Kohl now blames the former SPD government for having unnecessarily relinquished many legal positions and rhetorical advantages *vis-à-vis* the East. It is perhaps unfortunate that the new conservative government has been, in some respects, more successful in its dealings with the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The GDR, cooperating somewhat, has abandoned some of its more pettifogging definitions of the "class nation" in favor of the vaguer terms such as "socialist fatherland" and "homeland" (*Heimat*). Of course, the GDR needs to be more flexible in its official statements on the national question, which touches the very core of its internal legitimation. In fact, the national question poses continual language problems. For example, since there is no English equivalent for the German word, "*gesamtdeutsch*," it is frequently mistranslated as "pan-German"—a term that conflicts sharply with the GDR's official view of itself. In any case, the problems of language and rhetoric inherent in the German national question remain important obstacles, and this reflects deeper ideological differences between the two German states.

Notwithstanding these ideological divergencies, which naturally affect youth attitudes on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the process of political socialization imposes certain common perspectives on the youth of the two Germanys. Youth in both Germanys are subject to similar methods of defining political and social realities, even if the actual definitions themselves differ substantially. For example, official concepts of

the "nation" in both West and East Germany resemble the old "organic" and "objective" traits of 19th century German nationalism, which based itself in romanticism and other irrational movements. Both German states, moreover, claim to represent the "whole of Germany," although they justify it differently. In the West, the rationale for representing Germany is essentially "cultural"; in the East, the rationale is based on "class." Both justifications, however, stress an objective, pre-existing reality beyond immediate citizen control and reminiscent of the old non-democratic tradition of German nationalism.

Thus Chancellor Schmidt argued that "culture" was the determining historical force: "The Germans do not want—and those who nevertheless would like to do so, couldn't—to renounce their belonging to the German nation." Meanwhile, Schmidt's counterpart in the GDR, Erich Honecker, drew the opposite conclusion, namely, that a more material, i.e., "class" identity defined the German nation: "A nation is a historical category. . . nations rise and change depending on concrete historical conditions." Hence the two sides identify different historical forces as fundamental—the West, culture; and the East, class. Neither side, meanwhile, argues that citizens are able to decide democratically whether to accept these allegedly "objective" social conditions and other so-called "real" forces (*Sachzwänge*). In other words, the processes of political socialization in the two Germanies are quite similar, despite differing purposes and terminologies.

Not surprisingly, the Federal Republic's official annual "reports on the state of the nation" of the early 1970s drew on an "objectivist" concept of the nation in the effort to elucidate and legitimize a limited German unity. The reports doubtless had considerable impact in both German states. Relying upon Deutsch's theory of communication, they were discrete and they subtly assumed a common German national consciousness as existing in both German states. Where unable to empirically validate such consciousness, the authors, a team of scholars and politicians, introduced vaguer terms such as an "orientation in behavior towards the nation" (*nationale Verhaltensorientierung*) and a "subjective feeling of German relatedness" (*subjektives Aufeinanderbezogensein der Deutschen*). Yet the reports, which were written under the auspices of the late Peter Ludz, were not universally accepted. The reports drew, in fact, considerable criticism, even from adherents of the Deutsch school

of communication theory, who tersely labelled them "new mistakes with old figures." Nevertheless, the reports unquestionably influenced the process of political socialization, especially the national question, in both German states.

National Consciousness in the GDR

Assessing the degree of genuine national consciousness in the GDR poses many difficulties. First, the condition of empirical studies in the GDR makes comparisons between the two Germanys very problematic. Second, there is a substantial "asymmetry" in the impact that each German state has on the other. Since media impact flows mostly from West to East, the sources of national unity feelings among GDR citizens, particularly the youth, remain unclear. Finally, the sense of nationalism itself is in the GDR's case partly superimposed from above—by the government. All of these issues pose many problems to the analyst.

In the German states, true empirical research exists only in West Germany. Not that West German research is free of methodological problems. The behaviorists' criticism of the vagueness of concepts like the "relatedness of the population in the two German states" is probably justified. But GDR research is primitive by comparison. Studies of GDR attitudes have relied largely on surveys conducted by Western radio stations. These are inherently flawed, because they necessarily elicit more responses from those who are opposed to the political system. Moreover, these secret polls undoubtedly ignore or underestimate a kind of "paranationalism"—meaning, a certain pride in the GDR's humble beginnings and in the obstacles which it has overcome. In other words, there is in the GDR a sense of being "proud of one's worn-out trousers".

West Germany clearly exercises greater impact on East German society than *vice versa*. This influence probably began shortly after the war. West Germany's growing ties to the Western alliance offered an opportunity to join the victors of 1945, while the eastern parts of the country remained identified with the defeated, those who had carried the war's major burdens and suffered its most severe consequences. An underdog feeling has existed in the GDR, especially among East German youth. Consequently, the GDR needed to construct other popular rationales for identifying with "the Republic." Specifically, the GDR has

encouraged pride in social, health, and educational achievements. It has also promoted success in sports. More recently, the GDR has utilized symbols of German national history—occasionally, however, to the discomfort of its neighbors, including Poland. For example, the resurrection of the monument to Frederick II on the avenue *Unter den Linden* in East Berlin and the speeches commemorating the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth have left the impression that only Protestant nations can be revolutionary.

Despite such legitimizing efforts in the GDR, the asymmetry of impact that the two German states have on each other remains intact. The GDR attracts relatively little attention by West Germans. Meanwhile, the majority of East German families allow the "class enemy" into their living rooms each evening via West German television. East German authorities now largely accept this media impact and no longer remove antennas. Indeed, access to Western television and the right to use West German currency in specified shops testify to a kind of collusion between government and people. The East German government thus tends to acquiesce in the prevailing asymmetry.

What makes West Germany's impact acceptable to the GDR authorities is its benign and non-confrontational character. The FRG's influence, in fact, rests in no way upon force or power. Nor has the FRG believed in the utility of economic sanctions—unlike some American administrations. Instead, West Germans have promoted an economic *detente* within a larger political *detente*. This approach is now generally accepted in West Germany. The CDU government of Chancellor Kohl has not even debated its wisdom. Nevertheless, the Federal Republic directs many aspects of its intra-German policy more at the East German population than at the government.

The FRG's impact on national feeling in East Germany remains difficult to assess. On the one hand, the East German people, existing in a kind of apolitical private sphere, know much more about the West than vice versa. They are therefore bound to be influenced by West German rhetoric and justifications. But on the other hand, it is clear that West German events and policies do not always serve to strengthen a popular East German identification with Western values. In fact, the evidence suggests that the East Germans view Western party and interest group competition as confusing. And like most Germans after

the war, they probably would have preferred, in the abstract, a continuation of the Nazi regime over the new Communist one. No doubt their views have changed considerably since then. The GDR population now derives most of its national pride from being the most efficient socialist country within CMEA. In addition, the GDR population, including its youth, retain some traditional Protestant and Prussian values as sources of national identification. Note the general latent hostility in the GDR toward the syndicalist Solidarity movement in Poland and toward the political activism of the Catholic Church there. Justifications and symbols from within the GDR probably have more impact on the development of national feeling there than does any Western impact.

Not that GDR efforts to create an indigenous national feeling have been highly successful. It is true that official cultural policy has encouraged traits of national consciousness. But most GDR citizens retain a rather individualistic awareness. Bonn's first quasi-ambassador to East Berlin, Günter Gaus, Head of the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic in the GDR, has termed the GDR a "society of niches" (*Nischengesellschaft*) in which the majority protects and identifies itself in very unpolitical ways. Cultural politics and propaganda have hardly changed this. Authorities have repeatedly criticized even the most renowned writers, from Plenzdorf to Christa Wolf, for their highly individualistic sense of what constitutes heroism. Meanwhile, the important and rich literature of the GDR relates only obliquely to the German problem and to life in the two Germanys. It recalls instead the obsessions and provincialism of irredentist literature in 19th century Eastern Europe. That literature preoccupied itself with only two themes: nationalism and love. Hence it could not achieve recognition within a more cosmopolitan world literature. Complicating the picture further is the fact that some of the best works by East German authors are prohibited there and thus published only in West Germany. Indeed, some of the best known East German writers, for example Biermann, have been exiled to the West and thus have indirectly strengthened West Germany's claim to be the "home of all free Germans." GDR restrictions on its own intelligentsia have made West Germany a kind of subsidiary reference culture (*Referenzkultur*), despite GDR efforts to foster an indigenous national culture.

Empirical Evidence on the Attitudes of the West German Youth toward the GDR

While we cannot clearly identify and classify the strength and breadth of national consciousness in East Germany, we have a solid empirical foundation for evaluating the attitudes of West German youth toward the GDR. To be meaningful, however, judgments regarding West German youth must be compared, where possible, with those regarding the youth of other Western countries. Unfortunately, the European Community's *Eurobarometre* poll of views and opinions rarely includes the youngest age groups. In Germany's case, meanwhile, the Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) of 1972 apparently settled the problem of German unity. Emnid's 1973 poll found that 52% of all West Germans accepted the division of Germany, confirming that both German states will likely remain separate entities.

Nationalism is, of course, not dead, perhaps least of all among youth. Karl Deutsch's hasty conclusions, based on cybernetic theories, that worldwide communication would make nationalism obsolete have proven premature. Nationalism has instead assumed new forms. In many European countries, neo-nationalism has arisen more from the libertarian left than from the conservative and authoritarian right. Leftist criticism of superpower politics, nourished by Maoist elements and a kind of "cultural revolution" among others, has promoted a new concern for national interest and ideals.

The ecological and Peace movements are, on balance, more relaxed about the national problem. However, the Peace Movement's avowed neutralism can be viewed as favoring both peace and national rapprochement; and its appeal therefore has much potential. Meanwhile, a strange "collusion" between the old Right and the old Left has developed in response to changing values. Not coincidentally, right wing extremists and nationalists exist in the ranks of the ecological party. A 1981 study discovered that two percent of the Green electorate could be defined as "ecological fascists." In a broader sense, many young Germans no longer willingly accept Germany's division as justifiable punishment for Nazi crimes which occurred before their birth. Finally, Europeanist undercurrents provide a substitute for nationalism in an age of Europe's decline, although "snapshot" surveys have rarely illuminated their importance. These various developments may represent a general

Identitätsrevolution, in which cosmopolitan ideals combine with new political and rationalist concepts of the nation, simultaneously, however, fragmenting the national movement itself.

How has this *Identitätsrevolution* affected West German views of German reunification? Survey results are complex and contradictory. For example, although a 1984 poll found that two thirds of West Germans saw no chance for reunification within a time span of 30 years, roughly the same percentage would favor it if it seemed possible. Indeed, German youth seem to adopt the venerated truism: "Never say never." Roughly 61 percent of those between the ages of 20 and 30 considered the two German states *not* parts of one nation, but nearly 80 percent admitted a vague longing for reunification. Most youngsters under 21 years of age similarly reject the one nation hypothesis, but 56 percent do not consider the GDR a foreign country. Concurrently, although Austria is by far the most popular foreign nation among West German youth, one half claim to feel closer to a GDR citizen than to an Austrian. The results are, in short, inconclusive. They demonstrate, above all, that German youth are willing for the present to live with contradictions, meanwhile trying to keep options open for the future. In 1982, for example, only 12 percent of those under age 30 wanted to delete the paragraph in the Fundamental Law's Preamble that emphasizes the right to self-determination and to unity of the German nation.

Personal contact with East Germans and visits to the GDR seem to alter perceptions dramatically. This contradicts general experience with superficial transnational contacts, which often tend to strengthen national biases. Even short visits by young West Germans to the GDR have changed their views of the intra-German relationship, with 71 percent of the visitors regarding the GDR as "not a foreign country," compared to 56 percent of those who have never crossed the border. Among teenagers, 59 percent claim to want reunification; this proportion increases to 74 percent among those who have visited the GDR. Personal experience of the GDR is clearly a highly important factor shaping West German attitudes on the national question.

What motivates these attitudes, and how strong are they? Here the data indicate important differences between German youth and the older generations. Humanitarian and political goals lead youth's agenda of reasons for improving intra-German relations. Thus they seek improv-

ed contacts and living standards in the East, while envisioning the elimination of a focus of international tension in Central Europe. They nevertheless view European unification as a higher priority than German reunification. Sharing this priority with older Germans, the youth differ insofar as they do not consider Europeanism a surrogate for nationalism as during the Adenauer era but still seem more ready to sacrifice for the cause of Europe than the youth of most other members of the European Community. Regarding reunification, German youth seem ill-disposed to make large sacrifices for the cause. While roughly 37 percent advocate neutralism as a viable course for Germany, only about 21 percent think that it would provide a foundation for German reunification. Meanwhile, only a tiny minority would accept the East German socialist system as a way of solving the national problem. At the same time, West German youth show a striking unwillingness, compared to youth in other Western nations, to fight militarily to defend their political system. But this represents a common pattern among those nations which were defeated in the Second World War. In fact, what might be called "defense morale" is even lower among the youth of Japan (22%) and Italy (28%) than of West Germany (35%).

The above data raise further important questions. While national consciousness among West German youth has clearly increased, has there been an accompanying growth of national pride? The evidence suggests not. Among the nations of the European Community, Germans rank at the very bottom in terms of national pride, even below the Belgians, many of whom doubt that their two ethnicities actually form a nation. A 1983 survey revealed that only 23 percent of German youth were proud of being German, compared to an average 37 percent of the youth of other Western countries. A high percentage of German youth demonstrates a willingness to emigrate, an attitude that does not correlate precisely with national pride. More telling are answers to the following question: "If you were not a German, what would you prefer to be?" Among those under age 30, 22 percent chose to be U.S. citizens, 21 percent French, 18 percent Swedes, and 7 percent British. What these figures mean precisely for German national pride is unclear. But they do shed light on allegations of growing anti-Americanism among West German youth, even among the ecologists. German youth clearly distinguishes between the appeal of the American people and

society and certain aspects of American policy.

There are, of course, other obstacles to the development of German nationalism. There is no attractive capital city; national ceremonies play a minor role; and the national holiday is contested and controversial. Most German citizens do not even know their own national anthem. Given Germany's experience, the general lack of national identity feelings is perhaps not difficult to explain. Nor is it only the events of World War II that inhibit a long-term German national feeling. The modern nation state has, in fact, been a mere *intermezzo* in German history, lasting only from 1871 to 1945. Even then, many traditional loyalties belonged to the *Länder* rather than to the central government under the *Reich*. Historically, "Germany" was always more a "geographical" than a "political" concept. And even during the heyday of the Second Empire, many German intellectuals doubted the wisdom of creating a German national empire that was too weak to predominate in Europe but too large and powerful for the old balance of power. All of these experiences help to explain why national consciousness among German youth today is a highly intricate and elusive phenomenon.

To conclude, surveys of German youth opinion reveal them to be quite realistic about chances for German reunification and how to confront the national problem in the future. Some analysts have termed their attitude cynical. Perhaps this is an accurate assessment. If so, however, this so-called cynicism merely reflects the larger bipolar cynicism, which is reflected in paying lip service to the cause of German unity while considering Germany's current divided condition to be tolerable and perhaps preferable. Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti was more candid in 1984, when he argued that the division of Germany is permanent. Though his remarks aroused much commotion in Germany, they are perhaps representative of views which predominate among both Germany's allies and adversaries.

Cynicism is, of course, an unfortunate response to the situation confronting the two Germanys today. But there are also more positive signs. Given prevailing realities, many Germans, including the youth, have emphasized the *cultural* sources of national feeling and justifications for a national "unity" of some kind. In this context, the self-centeredness and ethnocentrism of the younger generation are perhaps not very surprising. They may presage a deeper and more lasting search for a true

national identity that is viable in the modern world. The youth face, after all, a situation with many precedents in German history and should therefore recall, once again, the words of the great 18th century German poets, Goethe and Schiller: "To create one nation, Germans you hope in vain. Develop instead—you can do it—your freedom as human beings."

THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND ISSUES OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE

MAX SCHMIDT

Peace has prevailed in Europe for more than 40 years. While other peoples, including those of North America, were fortunately spared from suffering in this century the experience of modern warfare on their territories, Europe has had to live under the burden of two world wars, both of them unleashed by the rulers of the former German *Reich* and both of them fought primarily in Europe.

Today the states and peoples of the European continent are fated, at the risk of their own annihilation, to break the sinister circle of earlier decades and centuries, the alternation of war, peace, and yet another war, and to make a genuine commitment to eternal peace, notwithstanding the fact that they find themselves facing each other in the form of two antagonistic social systems and of the two most powerful military alliances in human history, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. With the existence of the means for nuclear mass destruction and with a tremendous concentration of military force, no chance of survival would be left to Europe in a Third World war. Europe's destiny would necessarily be comparable to that of ancient Carthage, of which the poet Bertolt Brecht wrote: "Three wars were fought by the great city of Carthage. The city was still powerful after the first, still habitable after the second, but no longer retrievable after the third."

The nuclear age has added a new logic to East-West inter-state relations. The following statement was made by Mikhail Gorbachev, after his 1985 summit meeting with Ronald Reagan: "Under the present conditions, the crux of the matter is no longer simply a confrontation between two social systems, but it is our choice between survival and mutual destruction."¹ This situation calls for an abandonment of patterns of thought and behavior which have grown and become fixed in the course of centuries. Yet such abandonment has not taken place everywhere. Albert Einstein's plea to the effect that the atom bomb had changed everything but our thinking is still largely valid. However, contours of new thinking and appropriate political action, in line with the

requirements of the nuclear age, have begun to take shape in East and West.

I am inclined to suggest the following criteria as catalysts for a new intellectual approach to the problem: "*Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum*. Let him who desires peace prepare for war." This classical Roman quotation has been adhered to by governments for ages as a guideline for their international posture. Today, when nuclear stockpiles are sufficient for multiple annihilation of mankind, any further enlargement of arsenals is likely to increase the probability of self-destruction in case of war. Peace can no longer be built on arms. More arms do not provide more security. This is nowhere clearer than in Europe, where NATO and the Warsaw Pact are confronting each other fully armed so that a conflict would deprive them of even the last trace of security. The conclusion is final and compelling that arms limitation and disarmament have become an objectively necessary prerequisite for a lasting safeguarding of peace.

Radical change is required for the perception of the relationship between war and politics. This is of particular relevance to Clausewitz' postulation of war as "an instrument of politics."² The use of nuclear weapons cannot be an instrument of reasonable politics. It would rather be an irresponsible, irrational act to put at stake the very existence of man. Clausewitz' own brilliant anticipation has come true in our days, since he spoke of the possibility that "the means might get out of any proportionality to the purpose".³ A number of conventional military categories have thus lost all their substance, as for example, the notion of victory which has always been the goal of belligerent parties. There "can be no winners" in a thermonuclear war, as has been pointed out by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in their joint statement in Geneva.⁴

Security of the state, by tradition primarily defined as a national issue and as security from or against opponents, is no longer practicable by such conventional patterns. The fact of reciprocal interdependence of East and West with respect to nuclear destruction, when redefined in positive terms, has brought about a state of reciprocal dependence for security. Today, security can be guaranteed only by due consideration of the other side's legitimate security interests. In other words, security is no longer achievable as a result of rivalry but only as a result

of active partnership of all opponents concerned. Erich Honecker, in a recent interview with *Die Zeit*, a West German newspaper, said "... instead of perishing together in a nuclear war, we should rather learn to live together. Even more, we should also learn to get along well with each other."⁵

All these reflections finally take me to a point which I should like to define as the gravitational center of a new way of thinking, namely the insight that world peace is no longer one of several goods for choice but has rather become *sine qua non* for the continued existence of human civilization. Certainly peace is not the whole story, but it is just as certain that without peace there will be no story at all. There is no longer any reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence among states of different social systems.

To become permanent, peace and peaceful coexistence must be much more than simply absence of war. They ought to be characterized by the following developments:

- an international process of continuous reduction of the physical danger of war by arms limitation and disarmament;
- recognition of realities and legitimate security interests of other states by all actors in international relations;
- movement towards the most extensive and deepest possible inter-systemic and intrasystemic cooperation between states at all levels, political, military, economic, cultural, and human relations.

Safeguarding of Peace—the Issue that Dominates GDR-West German Relations

No one should try to make the public believe that reflections of this kind are not appropriate in a lecture on relations between the two German states. The contrary is true. The relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are most intimately interwoven with the issue of peace. The foreign, security, and military policies of the GDR are characterized by the quest for putting this concept into full effect through political action. In the GDR, peace and disarmament policies are laid down in the Constitution. Article 6 of the GDR Constitution reads as follows: "The German Democratic Republic stands for security and cooperation in Europe, a stable peace order in the world, and for general disarmament."⁶ This

applies to the GDR's relations with other countries, naturally including relations with the other German state, the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is the established position of the GDR that peace is the absolutely predominant issue that governs GDR-FRG relations as well. Relations between the two German states ought to be designed not only with the end effect of creating no potential source of tension on the international scene but also for the purpose of making a positive contribution toward its improvement in the direction of more peace. Proceeding from the fundamental issue of our time, such a call is based on a number of very specific reasons.

A review of history shows that during the early postwar decades GDR-FRG relations used to be a source of permanent insecurity and even of temporary danger of war in Europe. Hard factual evidence has been produced to the effect that leading political circles in the Federal Republic were not ready for decades to accept the existence of the GDR and were trying all means to wipe the GDR off the map.

The young state of the GDR was to be strangled in its cradle and later on eradicated in a "rollback" process, as formulated by John Foster Dulles. The plans were ready for that exercise and have been disclosed to the public in the meantime. They were wide-ranging and included a trade embargo, diplomatic blockade, subversion, and even a military option. However, the worst did not happen, and that was owing to the persistent peace policy pursued by the GDR and her allied socialist countries as well as, on the Western side, to the levelheadedness displayed by the U.S., France, and Britain, which in critical situations did not allow themselves to get involved in a war against the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a shooting war which would have been fought for the interests of those in West Germany who wanted to extend their rule to include the GDR. These implications were very strongly felt after August 13, 1961, when a majority of political leaders in Bonn were setting sail for open confrontation to punish the GDR for having secured her hitherto unprotected frontier with West Berlin, thus having put an abrupt end to West Berlin-based anti-GDR espionage and sabotage.

The role of peacemaking in the context of GDR-FRG relations is predominant for another, even more weighty reason. German history has been burdened by the responsibility for having unleashed two world wars. The GDR, from her very inception, has derived from that burden

a special duty for herself, namely to see that war shall not again be unleashed from German soil and that no more death and destruction shall be inflicted upon other nations.

Finally, it should be understood that the frontier between the GDR and FRG is the contact and demarcation line between two social systems in Europe. The main military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both of them equipped with all means for modern warfare, are facing each other from positions on the territories of the two German states. The Federal Republic is the country with the world's highest density of nuclear weapons. No scenario of military conflict in Central Europe is imaginable that would not lead to the extinction of the two German states as functioning industrial societies. Hence, to the German Democratic Republic the assurance of peace means both established policy and action for survival.

In this context, it is highly appreciated in the German Democratic Republic that influential circles in the Federal Republic have defined and articulated their basic interest in a similar way. When in Moscow, in March 1985, Erich Honecker met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG. Their joint statement stressed that "war must never again be unleashed but peace must originate from German soil."⁸ This has been a joint commitment to a partnership of responsibility for peace, notwithstanding all socio-economic, political, and ideological differences.

The point, however, cannot be bypassed that on this fundamental issue the attitudes taken by the FRG government have not been entirely free of contradictions, with a gap between words and deeds. There are certain military and military-political activities which are not compatible with the stated goal of stabilization of peace. This applies particularly to the key role assigned to the FRG in implementing the NATO resolution of December 1979. The deployment of US nuclear intermediate-range missiles of strategic radius—most of them stationed in the FRG—and the resulting countermeasures taken by socialist countries to deploy in the GDR and Czechoslovakia operational-tactical missiles of comparable range have created a situation in Europe which is characterized by more missiles but less security. The approximate military parity between East and West has been adversely affected towards more instability in periods of crisis by the deployment in the

FRG of Pershing II missiles, which, as generally accepted, leave only a few minutes for early warning. In a situation of acute crisis, consequently, the pressures on political decisionmakers would be such that the danger accidental, no longer controllable, and to both sides equally disastrous developments has become greater.

Against such background, it is less sufficient than ever before to confine one's own posture to mere contemplation and to verbal commitment to peace policies. "Those often do evil who do nothing. Not to ban injustice if you can means to ask for it." That reminder was once made by Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius to his passive contemporaries. The challenge today is for active implementation of everyone's public commitment to peace. That is the only practicable way to take a consistent approach to putting into reality the declared intention of the governments of both German states, namely "to make peace with ever fewer weapons."

It is the assumption of the GDR that the two German states bear responsibility for military measures relating to their own territories and military forces. Their reciprocal relations cannot be kept free of these issues by referring to residual rights and responsibilities of the great powers. The very fact of the GDR's and FRG's involvement in opposing alliances does not imply for both states, after all, the absence of need or room for an active pursuit of specific objectives of peace assurance likely to result from their own national interests. There are, in fact, possibilities for action at various levels, proceeding from both countries' firm integration within their respective alliances, and for activities in parallel with the other German state, both within the alliances and between the two states.

An additionally binding obligation to take action results also from Article V of the "Treaty and Basic Principles of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany." The Basic Treaty, which was signed in 1972, reads as follows: Both states "shall support efforts towards arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in the context of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, for the purpose of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and conducive to international security."⁹

The GDR in pursuit of her own policies has honored this obliga-

tion in a highly complex manner. The GDR has been supporting within the Warsaw Treaty all initiatives for peace and disarmament collectively taken by the alliance and it has been taking action for implementation. These initiatives have been of an extremely wide-ranging nature, as has been reaffirmed in the Sofia statement of the Warsaw Pact countries of October 23, 1985, with constructive positions being suggested on all major issues of the problem: "There is no single category of weapons on which they [the members of the Warsaw Treaty] would not be prepared to bring about reduction and removal from existing arsenals and destruction for good, on the basis of an agreement with other states and with due consideration of the principle of equality and equal security."¹⁰

The GDR, in this context, is particularly committed to supporting the complex proposals made by the USSR on January 15, 1986, for step-by-step liberation of the world by the year 2000 of all types and arsenals of nuclear weapons, including the approach taken by the Soviet Union to negotiations with the US in Geneva, aimed at signing a joint ban on manufacture, testing, and deployment of offensive space weapons, coupled with a reduction by 50 percent of the big powers' strategic arsenals. This is in agreement with the guideline confirmed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan for the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, according to which no arms race must be permitted in outer space and the nuclear arms race on earth ought to be halted. Prevention of a qualitatively new stage of space militarization has in any case been assuming the role of a key problem in general arms limitation and disarmament.

SDI, the US program for the development of space weapons, must be strategically interpreted as an attempt to obtain a nuclear first-strike capability.¹¹ This actually entails the risk of an uncontrolled arms race both in outer space as well as in the context of strategic offensive weapons. One can, therefore, fully subscribe to views, such as those expressed by John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, according to which "...in the context of real security...this issue has become the key issue of all problems."¹² This should as well be taken into due consideration by the two German states. It would be highly useful, no doubt, "if, notwithstanding their different social systems and their affiliation with different alliances, both German states worked for non-

militarization of outer space."¹³ However, while the GDR has been acting on these lines, the government of the FRG has embarked on the road to political support of SDI.

It has been in the spirit of responsibility for peace that the GDR has proposed—also in letters from Erich Honecker to Chancellor Kohl—to have the Pershing II and cruise missiles removed on the one side and the countermeasures in the GDR and Czechoslovakia removed on the other, measures through which “we got nuclear weapons into our own territory, for the first time in history.” That is why the GDR has pledged unconditional support for the proposal of an interim agreement on nuclear intermediate-range weapons in Europe, one of the topics discussed at the Geneva November Summit.

In concrete compliance with Article V of the Basic Treaty, the GDR has also submitted to the Federal Republic a number of proposals, with the view to downgrading military confrontation, especially in Central Europe. This would be beneficial not only to the two German states but to Europe as a whole. The GDR has proposed, for example, to accept Sweden’s initiative for establishing in Europe a zone free of nuclear weapons along the demarcation line between the two blocs. The GDR responded immediately by putting her entire territory at disposal for inclusion into such a zone, provided there would be reciprocity and equal security.¹⁵ A somewhat similar proposal was made by the GDR (jointly with Czechoslovakia) to the FRG regarding the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons.¹⁶

The achievements possible on the basis of bilateral good will, willingness to compromise, and balanced adjustment of interests have been clearly demonstrated by a framework for an agreement on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe, which was jointly worked out by expert groups of political parties, the SED of the GDR and the SPD of the Federal Republic in a one-year exercise and submitted to the public in 1985.¹⁷ Both groups also agreed on verification of observance of such an agreement, a question which has often been highly controversial. Western experts have confirmed in this context the GDR’s profound willingness to compromise and her constructive attitude in considering Western ideas on verification.

The GDR does not insist in a narrow-minded and self-righteous manner on having all her proposals completely accepted. We have never

thought that the philosopher’s stone originated in our country. The proposals made by the GDR are rather a reflection of her policies of dialogue for peace, disarmament, and cooperation. The GDR will continue to believe in dialogue and will take advantage of any chance for helping to bring about a change for the better in the international situation and will continue to contribute appropriate ideas and suggestions to European and worldwide discussion. This is our interpretation of the linkage between international and our own interests.

Such an attitude, by our definition, should include the willingness to listen to the other side and become familiar with the other side’s interests, in order to find on such basis compromise and consensus for reduction of the physical danger of war as well as for arms limitation and disarmament in the heart of Europe and beyond. That is what we in the GDR mean by thought and action in terms of a broad coalition of common sense and realism for peace.

Existence and Coexistence of the Two German States—A Constant of European Stability and a Peace Order

The two states of the GDR and FRG have been in existence since 1949. The FRG, as is generally known, was founded before the GDR. Its constitution came into effect on May 23, 1949. The GDR was established on October 7, 1949. The proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany reflected the political determination of her ruling circles of that period of history to divide Germany. However, that project was feasible only with the agreement and support of the three Western allies. The incorporation of the FRG into the political and military alliance of NATO in 1954–55, the subsequent formation of the Warsaw Treaty with the GDR as one of its founding members, and decades of diametrically opposed social developments in the two German states have made the existence of the GDR and FRG an irreversible fact and a constant of the European postwar system. Today, the very existence of the two German states and their membership in different alliances are components of stability and part of the international balance of forces in Europe.

The former German *Reich*, which had not been proclaimed until 1871 in Versailles in the wake of the Franco-German war (before that there had been nothing but a number of small separate German states, each

with full sovereignty), perished in the inferno of the Second World War. What arose from its ashes has not been *one* divided Germany but *two* German states.

Today, the GDR and FRG exist as two sovereign, independent states of opposing social systems and in different alliances. This factual situation must be the point of departure for everything. It is fully accepted by the GDR and to some extent by the political decision-makers of the FRG as well.

That, however, has not been the case during the past. The political leaders of the FRG long refused to accept the outcome of the Second World War and postwar developments. They rather worked for revision, which in plain language would have been nothing but a modification of European postwar frontiers at the expense of the FRG's eastern neighbors. The FRG defended a fiction of "continued existence of the German *Reich* within the frontiers of 1937", an illusion supported even today by substantial right wing, conservative forces in the CDU/CSU. It was that fictitious fabrication from which a claim was derived to "reunification of Germany," which as matter of fact was not even based on an assumption of equality but had always continued to claim to incorporate the GDR (plus certain regions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR) and to eliminate those countries' political and social systems.

Efforts were made by the FRG until the second half of the sixties to enforce that claim by a policy of international isolation of the GDR and proclamation of her "non-existence" and by presenting the FRG as the only legitimate German state. This policy went down in history under the heading "Hallstein Doctrine" or the "Claim to Sole Representation." It eventually perished in history. Being equally based on presumptuousness and illusion, that policy necessarily failed for at least two reasons: it was in absolute contradiction to reality, and the persistent support rendered to the GDR by the Soviet Union and the other member states of the Warsaw Treaty proved to be a dependable guarantee for the security and existence of the GDR and her statehood. Nevertheless, it was that policy which constituted a permanent hotbed of tension in Europe and which continued to block an all-European political *detente*, when all the other European states as well as the US and Canada had long begun to dissociate themselves from "Cold War"

practices in East-West relations.

That situation was changed only in the early seventies, when the FRG decided to recognize the status quo in Europe (though not with all consequences) and to have that recognition laid down in international law. A formally binding legal basis for the postwar system and national frontiers in Europe was set up at last. Here are its formal, constitutional elements:

- Treaties of Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague of the early 1970s between the FRG and the states concerned;
- The Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 (USSR, USA, France, and United Kingdom) on Berlin (West);
- The Treaty on Basic Principles of Relations between the GDR and FRG, the so-called Basic Treaty.

It is provided in Article I of the Basic Treaty that in order to make a positive contribution to *detente* and security in Europe (Preamble) and to develop normal good neighborly relations, both sides shall reaffirm now and for the future "the inviolability of the frontier they have in common... and shall commit themselves (Article III) to unrestricted respect for their territorial integrity." Both sides shall assume "that the territorial authority of either state shall be confined to its territory. Both states shall respect each other's independence and authority with regard to internal and external affairs."

A German problem or even an "open" German problem no longer exists, notwithstanding occasional references in political publications in the Federal Republic and even in official government statements where that alleged problem has sometimes been inflated to the status of a "question of destiny... for the Federal Republic of Germany."¹⁹ History has rolled over it. The people of the GDR have exercised their right to self-determination and have chosen its socialist system. "German reunification" is not only not desired by the overwhelming majority of the GDR population but is even considered extremely dangerous in view of the experience of the history of "Greater Germany."

Continued insistence by certain forces in the FRG on their own creed of reunification is nothing but chasing after a chimera. Is it not sober and realistic to see that the reality of socialism (in the GDR) and the reality of capitalism (in the FRG) are just as irreconcilable as fire and water? That insight cannot be bypassed by leaders in the CDU/CSU.

For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl recently felt prompted to declare in public that "probably there would be no return . . . to the nation state of the 19th century."²⁰ This is even less than probable, since any significant intention to give up one's own system for the system of the other side does not exist in either German state, either in the general public or among political leaders. The GDR will continue systematically to improve and strengthen socialism, while the social system of the FRG and its prospects are the business of the FRG and its people.

The nation problem should be understood in a similar context. The different choice of social systems and of alliances with which the two German states are affiliated has inevitably entailed a differentiated national development. "One German nation" has long ago ceased to exist.

These issues are perceived by the GDR not only under national but also under all-European and even global aspects. In this respect, one point can be made crystal clear: The existence of two German states is a fact with which the Germans themselves and other nations in East and West can live. And they all have been living with it for four decades, very much better and more safely than they used to with the presence of the former German *Reich*. That *Reich* brought nothing but ruin to other nations, and it is therefore fortunate for them all that it perished once and for all in the flames of the Second World War. The present territorial status quo in Europe is both a prerequisite and a foundation for adding content to the network of European conventions and for establishing a peace order on our continent. To touch it would mean to touch calm and stability in Europe. The leading circles of the Federal Republic too are absolutely aware that no one can be won over for change in terms of "Greater German" reunification—none of the countries neighboring the two German states and not even their NATO allies. Italy's Foreign Minister Andreotti has publicly said what many thought by themselves: "There are two German states now, and there should be two in the future."²¹

Therefore, significant importance can be attributed to the following suggestion made in the Honecker-Kohl statement of March 12, 1985: "Inviolability of frontiers and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe within their present frontiers are basic prerequisites for peace."²² This is a challenge to the political leadership of the FRG to let such consistency of political expression be followed

by an equal amount of consistency in political action.

The concept, after all, that there is no reasonable alternative today to peaceful coexistence among states of different social systems is fully applicable to the two German states. The conditions in international law for such coexistence on an equal footing include renunciation of force, inviolability of frontiers, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and abstention from interference in other countries' internal affairs. These have been specified in both the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of Helsinki. These principles are at the same time the very basis for the consistent policy of peaceful coexistence which is generally pursued by the GDR toward all countries different from herself in their social systems, no matter whether Japan, France, Italy, the US, Sweden, the FRG or any other Western country.

GDR-FRG relations, if pursued with persistence on the basis of these principles, can be a factor of growing stability in Europe as well as of reliability and predictability. Taken as a whole, they have a beneficial impact on people in both states. Points of departure in that direction are connected to points of overlapping interests of both German states, but political determination is also required. The following statement by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has, therefore, been highly appreciated: "We wish that substance be added to the partnership of responsibility to which the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR have committed themselves. Included in that growing substance are economic cooperation, political dialogue—also on issues of confidence building, arms control, and disarmament—and the development of human contacts. An example should be set by the two German states at all levels of the Helsinki Final Act, so that war never again be unleashed from German soil but inspirations generated for peace. That will be in the interest of all neighbors."²³

The GDR is ready for appropriate action and has no fear of contact. It is rather her policy to seek dialogue with all forces who have a say in the affairs of the FRG, no matter whether we like them or not. Today a profound basis has been created for such an approach, since GDR-FRG relations have been filled with considerable substance in the course of time and this substance ought to be cultivated, broadened, and strengthened.

Substance of Relations Felt Primarily by Citizens of Both States

"Politics," according to Johann Gottfried Seume, a democratic German writer (1763–1810), "should be defined as something that contributes or is to contribute to general well-being." Let that somewhat terse and one-sided but also humane and wise definition be an opener to discussion of the criteria by which to evaluate achievements and shortcomings as well as the present situation in GDR-FRG relations. The question would then appear to be opportune for specific results for the peoples of the GDR and FRG from these relations since the late sixties, following the end of the Cold War between the two sides.

There are certainly several answers to that question. The first is that the general improvement of relations and the removal or mitigation of earlier points of dispute have defused a dangerous hotbed of tension in East-West relations and have made life in Europe palpably safer. This has been largely attributable to the fact that both the GDR and FRG, in a bilateral process of learning sometimes painful to each side, have succeeded in objectifying the ways in which they are dealing with each other. True, setbacks cannot be ruled out and are quite often systematically provoked by flag-waving right wing conservative forces standing for outdated, revanchist positions in the FRG. Such events primarily account for the FRG government's attitude on certain issues on which it is trying to stick to obsolete positions. Further reference will be made to these points later on.

Yet this is no longer the surface feature of everyday life in relations between these two states. Also, personal meetings between top-level politicians of both sides have in the meantime assumed some sort of normality, and this can be only conducive to the maintenance of bilateral relations with a high degree of continuity and to early identification of upcoming problems. Particular importance in this context should be attributed to several meetings of Erich Honecker with Helmut Schmidt during his term of office as well as with Helmut Kohl since 1982. Reference should be made also to his talks with Willy Brandt and Hans-Jochen Vogel, two leaders of SPD, and with Franz Josef Strauss and Martin Bangemann, chairmen of two other political parties, CSU and FDP.

These developments and political dialogue were decisive conditions

for preventing the full impact upon GDR-FRG relations of an aggravation in East-West tension and of a general deterioration of the European situation which began to occur in the wake of the NATO missile deployment of 1983. The GDR worked for a policy by which to limit the damage, although certain negative repercussions could not be entirely avoided. The relations between the GDR and FRG are, after all, closely integrated with East-West relations in general and consequently cannot be decoupled from the general trend of East-West developments. That inseparable linkage should be always taken into due consideration by both sides, as it is of cardinal relevance to their own relations.

A network of agreements has been woven and considerably expanded between the GDR and FRG since the early seventies, with direct or favorable effects on everyday life of the citizens of both states. Here are the most important conventions in this context:

- December 17, 1971: agreement on transit traffic and transport of civilian persons and goods between the FRG and Berlin (West);
- May 26, 1972: agreement on issues relating to transport;
- September 20, 1973: governmental agreement on principles of minimization of damage along the frontier between the two states (regarding preservation of the environment);
- April 25, 1974: governmental agreement on health services;
- March 30, 1976: governmental agreement on postal services and telecommunication;
- October 31, 1979: governmental agreement on exemption of road vehicles from taxes and levies; and
- December 21, 1979: governmental agreement on veterinary services.

The progress achieved through these agreements and numerous subsequent implementation clauses has been palpable. Those using transit routes between the FRG and West Berlin through the GDR or transit frontier postal and telecommunication services or medical services during visits in the other state or any kind of services and facilities at different levels all have specific benefits from these agreements. The degree of normality in all these areas today is much greater than it used to be fifteen or even ten years ago.

More agreements of substantive importance were signed in the

eighties, including one on the highly sophisticated problem of transfrontier potassium mining. The GDR has declared her readiness and desire to enter into additional formal agreements on subjects not yet covered. For example, a draft is being prepared for an agreement on protection of the environment. A bilateral agreement on cultural exchange has been signed.

Each of these formal agreements has considerably eased the life of many people in both German states, and all of them have contributed strongly to the development of relations between human beings. Mutual flows of visitors, travel by GDR citizens into the FRG in connection with urgent family affairs, and similar developments have been on a rapidly rising trend. Youth group exchange programs are growing. Some 1.6 million GDR citizens travelled into the FRG in 1984, while 3.6 West Germans went the other direction. Related to the populations of the two German states, the number of GDR travellers has been higher. Assistance has been rendered to thousands of people in the very complicated field of family reunion, a legacy of Germany's division with effects down to today. In the context of family reunion activities, almost 40,000 GDR citizens moved for good to the FRG in 1984 alone, just to mention one of many relevant figures.

The GDR considers the area of human relations a major element of her relations with the FRG, and, taking an open-minded attitude on all associated problems, she is acting fully in keeping with the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975.

Given the efficiency of her own system and the increasingly visible political and social shortcomings in the system of the FRG, the GDR, is not at all afraid of contacts with the West. While efforts are being continued, primarily through an almost round-the-clock beaming of FRG electronic media into the GDR, which present to many GDR citizens an image of the FRG modelled by brilliant surfaces of consumer goods, the overwhelming majority of the GDR population has understood what the purpose of life should be. The yardstick by which to measure quality of life in society is related to social housing, security, and opportunities for individual development rather than to streamlined motor cars.

Finally, economic relations also rank high in GDR-FRG relations. For the GDR and contrary to many an allegation, they are neither the crux nor prime mover of her relations with the FRG. They are never-

theless elements of stability which must not be underestimated. They have been continuously and greatly expanded, despite more difficult conditions in the world economy. The trade volume in 1970 (export and import) was 4,500 million Marks. In 1984, the figure grew to 15,500 million, and the limit of 16,000 million will be surpassed 1985. This has been the result of attractive economic opportunities on each side. Berthold Beitz, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Krupp, told Erich Honecker in a meeting that the dynamics of GDR trade were of substantive importance to numerous companies in the FRG, among them outstanding corporations as well as small and medium enterprises with specialized production.²⁴

This has been also a result of an appreciable development of overall political relations between both states and of insights voiced also by leading economic and business circles of the FRG.²⁵

It has also resulted from the resistance offered by decisive political and economic forces in the FRG to blueprints for trade wars and to attempts to restructure East-West trade toward political confrontation.

The development of bilateral economic relations between the GDR and FRG has by no means reached its limit. Measured by the potentiality and structure of both economies, there is more room for expansion. This is, however, obstructed on the FRG side by a number of obstacles, some of them protectionist and others politically motivated. Limitations in terms of value and quantity are still imposed on GDR exports. The discriminatory COCOM provisions are applied to East-West trade, and other threatening measures are taken. The point must be made that continued expansion of economic relations between the two German states will remain meaningful, as it has been in the past, only on the basis of reciprocal benefit. It has been along these very lines that economic exchange with other Western countries, such as Japan, France, and Austria, has taken a surprising upswing in recent years.

Unresolved Problems

Overall relations between the GDR and FRG have followed a positive development, when measured by the original point of departure. Yet nothing should be idealized. On important issues relations are still very far from comprehensive normalization and far from having reached stan-

dards comparable to those typical of relations between either German state and third countries such as Austria. The causes lie on the FRG side and are related to shortcomings in coming to grips with burdens of the past. There are four major problems awaiting satisfactory solution: The legitimate demand made by the GDR concerning full respect for her citizenship, amicable agreement on a settlement of the Elbe River frontier, dissolution of the Salzgitter Authority, and transformation of both states' representation into embassies.

"All these are policy issues of fundamental relevance to relations between the GDR and FRG. Those who are genuinely interested in effective steps towards normalization of relations should make step-by-step contributions to resolving those policy problems,"²⁶ for all of them have resulted from the FRG government's ongoing refusal of full recognition in terms of international law for the GDR, a refusal not only in declarations but in political practice. In the final analysis, such an attitude is aimed not only against the GDR but against the territorial status quo in Europe and is thus a potential danger to stability and peace. A solution to these problems is urgent, not because of the demands made by the GDR but because the FRG is somewhat lagging behind developments in international law and should catch up for the benefit of Europe as a whole.

Let us take a brief glance at these four problems. First, the fictitious idea of a "continued existence of the German *Reich* within the frontiers of 1937" has prompted the Federal Republic from the very beginning to postulate the continued existence of "one single German citizenship" and to imply in a presumptuous manner that this citizenship is identical with the citizenship of the FRG. The following political intention is concealed behind that fabrication: the existence of an independent GDR citizenship is denied. The FRG claims FRG citizenship for the entire population of the GDR (as well as for all individuals who are considered as ethnic Germans and have their residence in regions which once were part of the German *Reich* but became Czechoslovak, Polish, and Soviet territory in 1945). Whenever and wherever possible, all these people are treated as FRG citizens.

With her own signature under the Basic Treaty, the FRG had to give up in terms of international law the "concept that the GDR was not a state but merely a region which actually belonged to the Federal

Republic of Germany."²⁷ Every state has citizens. Hence, formally the FRG is not required to concede to the GDR the right to her citizenship. A GDR citizenship is in existence, with or without the consent of the FRG government. Yet the FRG is required to respect GDR citizenship. One should think that this was undisputed and natural. Practice, however, is different.

The government of the FRG has clung until today to its original, historically outdated concepts. In everyday political life in the FRG there are cases of snubbing of GDR citizens which would not be tolerated by any state. GDR travel documents held by GDR visitors in the FRG are withdrawn and invalidated by West German authorities. FRG passports are issued to GDR citizens by FRG diplomatic missions in third countries. GDR citizens with temporary residence in the FRG as diplomats, economic representatives, journalists or in other positions or assignments have received call-up papers for the *Bundeswehr*, registration cards for elections, invitations to present tax statements, etc. Extradition of GDR citizens who are wanted in the GDR for legal offenses and have fled to the FRG is refused as a matter of principle, with the excuse being offered that they are "Germans" and thus citizens of the FRG. Thus, several criminals found guilty of murder cannot be brought to court in the GDR.²⁸

Such disrespect of GDR citizenship actually prevents further normalization of relations between the two states, including work on humanitarian issues, with full normalization of travel being rendered impossible.

Second, the case of the stretch of frontier along the Elbe River is another example of attempts made by certain political forces in the FRG to maintain artificially a potential for tension in GDR-FRG relations which can be activated at will and mobilized to jeopardize developments and progress at other levels. This impression is likely to be reinforced by a closer look at the issue. Precisely 93.7 km of the GDR-FRG frontier are formed by the Elbe River, in other words, less than ten percent of the entire frontier. All mapping issues relating to the rest of the frontier have long been settled by a joint frontier commission. Yet the Elbe stretch has been the subject of negotiations for more than twelve years. Documents held by the former World War II allies are likely to suggest that Elbe was the point of contact of the former Soviet and British oc-

cupation zones. However, no unambiguous information is recordable from those documents on the real course of the frontier, which had been marked differently on the west or east bank or along the center line of the river. The center line course, however, has been confirmed in documents more recently retrieved, including maps kept in British archives. The GDR has now proposed finding a settlement in keeping with former allied practice and in agreement with customary practice in international law, that is to mark the center line throughout as the frontier. That proposal had once been accepted in a protocol by the FRG side, in 1975. However, in the meantime, the FRG government has gone back on its own position and is demanding that most of this stretch of frontier be marked on the east bank of Elbe, that is in GDR territory. A settlement by agreement has so far been refused.

Third, the so-called Central Record Authority of the Provincial Administration of Justice, in Salzgitter, Lower Saxony, was set up in 1961 and must be considered as a politico-legal absurdity which is unique in the world. It is "a child of the Cold War," as has been frankly admitted even by legal experts of the FRG.²⁹ The very existence of this Authority is a blatant violation of the aforementioned clause in the Basic Treaty according to which the sovereignty of each state shall be confined to its own territory. The Salzgitter Authority is a demonstration that in this respect the FRG has continued to treat the GDR as *Inland*, in an attempt to expand its own jurisdiction. The Salzgitter Authority was established for the purpose of collecting evidence against GDR citizens who commit offenses against FRG law on the territory of the GDR. "Such offenders are to be brought to [FRG] justice."³⁰ Such circumstances perhaps may go beyond a non-German's imagination for their absurdity and contradictory nature. Let us try to illustrate the problem by an artificial example: Salzgitter is comparable to the hypothetical existence in Canada of an Authority to investigate the practice of US customs officers for compliance with Canadian law. "Offenses" would then be followed by investigation procedures against the US citizens concerned who, in case of entry into Canada, would be brought to court. Should such US citizens dare to travel into any other country, Canadian authorities would be entitled to demand their extradition. Between 1961 and early 1984, 31,000 law cases were prepared in Salzgitter against

GDR citizens. The Federal government, by denying its competence, is trying to evade action in response to the demand for removal of the "Salzgitter Central Record Authority." It asserts the problem is an exclusive matter of the state administration concerned, that of the state (*Land*) government of Lower Saxony. If that were really the case, conditions today are more favorable than ever before for the Federal government to make its positive influence felt. The Federal government in Bonn is led by the CDU/CSU, and the same political party is at present in power in most *Land* administrations.³¹

Yet, nothing has happened, which is likely to suggest that even political party majorities are worth nothing as long as political determination is lacking.

Fourth, the problem relating to the status of each side's mutual diplomatic representations in the other's capital has something to do with the illusion of an "open German problem," an illusion not definitely buried as yet. The FRG government continues to insist on its view that the two German states are not foreign countries relative to each other and that there is something like "special inner-German relations." It, therefore, insists on "special" names for the diplomatic representations to demonstrate its concept to the rest of the world. They are called "Permanent Representation" rather than "Embassy," the common and usual designation, although their structure and scope are absolutely identical with those of any embassy.

This is another case of an abnormal condition which is artificially kept alive, although correction has become overdue.

An overall assessment of developments is likely to support the conclusion that the relations between the GDR and FRG have grown in a positive way since the early seventies. Developments have been neither unproblematic nor straightforward. On the contrary. Yet even this is considered as evidence that balancing and adjustment of interests and compromise solutions between East and West are possible after all, provided that positive approaches are taken and willingness displayed by both sides. GDR-FRG relations have thus been reshaped in a way which has proved to be of substantial benefit to security in Europe and to the everyday life of citizens in both German states. This is appreciated as a good point of departure for further progress.

1. *Neues Deutschland*, (Berlin), November 22, 1985.
2. C. v. Clausewitz, *Ausgewählte militärische Schriften*, (Berlin, 1980), p. 445.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 405.
4. Joint Soviet-American Statement, in *Neues Deutschland*. loc. cit.
5. Erich Honecker, interview for *Die Zeit* in *Neues Deutschland*, January 31, 1986.
6. *Constitution of the GDR* (Berlin, 1974), p. 12.
7. Statements made by leaders of the FRG in the past were clear on that point. It was said, for example, by C. von Brentano, later the Federal Republic's Minister of Foreign Affairs: "We shall do everything and take any possible chance, and I really mean it, everything and any possible chance, for the purpose of getting back the Soviet occupation zone" (his discrediting label for the GDR, author). *Bayerisches Volksecho*, (Munich), March 8, 1952.
8. *Neues Deutschland*, March 13, 1985.
9. Treaty on Principles of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, in: *GDR Gazette*, Part II, Berlin, 5/1973, p. 26.
10. "For Elimination of Nuclear Danger and for a Turn to the Better in Europe and the World." Statement by the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, in *Neues Deutschland*, October 24, 1985.
11. For details see M. Schmidt/W. Schwarz, "SDI in the Context of US Military Strategy" in: *IPW-Berichte*, Berlin 1/1986, pp. 13 ff.
12. J. Steinbruner, "Arms Control: Crisis or Compromise," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Summer 1985, p. 1036.
13. Erich Honecker, interview for *Saarbrucker Zeitung*, *Neues Deutschland*, November 13, 1985.
14. Erich Honecker, interview for *Die Zeit*, loc. cit.
15. See "GDR proposes FRG government support Swedish initiative," letter from Erich Honecker to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in *Neues Deutschland*, February 9, 1983.
16. See: "GDR proposes to FRG government to enter into negotiations on a zone free of chemical weapons," letter from Erich Honecker to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in *Neues Deutschland*, September 16, 1985.
17. See "Framework for agreement on establishment in Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons, with commentaries on framework agreement," in *Neues Deutschland*, June 20, 1985.
18. Basic Principles Treaty, loc. cit.
19. Statement by FRG Cabinet Minister H. Windelen, quoted in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), October 22, 1985.

20. Interview with H. Kohl, in *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt* (Bonn), November 9, 1985.
21. Quoted in *Die Welt*, (Hamburg), September 17, 1984.
22. *Neues Deutschland*, March 13, 1985.
23. *Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1985, p. 259.
24. *Neues Deutschland*, September 24, 1985.
25. See statement by O. Wolff von Amerongen, President of Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, in a meeting with Erich Honecker in *Neues Deutschland*, September 19, 1985.
26. Erich Honecker, interview for *Die Zeit*, *loc. cit.*
27. R. Fenner, "Die Geraer Forderungen und das Karlsruher Urteil" in *Deutschland-Archiv* (Cologne), 10/1985, p. 1062.
28. Full documentation in *Neues Deutschland*, January 20, 1985.
29. R. Fenner, *loc. cit.*, p. 1069.
30. *Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1962, p. 1301.
31. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) is in charge of five state governments and has called for removal of the Salzgitter Authority.