UNCOMMON THREATS: GERMANY'S MUSLIMS, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Zachary Shore

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

The Johns Hopkins University

AICGS POLICY REPORT #5

UNCOMMON THREATS: GERMANY'S MUSLIMS, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Zachary Shore

AICGS POLICY REPORT #5

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) is a center for nonpartisan, advanced research, study, and discourse relating to the Federal Republic of Germany, its politics, economy, culture and society. Founded in 1983, AICGS has been a premier source of research and analysis for the policymaking and policy-advising communities in the public and private sectors. Drawing on an international network of scholars and specialists, the Institute has consistently generated in-depth, nonpartisan assessments of Germany's policy choices and developments and their impact on the transatlantic dialogue.
Affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University, AICGS provides a comprehensive program of public fora, policy studies, research reports, and study groups designed to enrich the political, corporate, and scholarly constituencies it serves.

ISBN 0-941441-71-7

Additional copies of this Policy Report are available for $5.00 to cover postage and handling from the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Suite 420, 1400 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2217. Telephone 202/332-9312, Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: info@aicgs.org Web: http://www.aicgs.org

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The global war on terrorism has reopened the debate on the status of immigrant populations within western societies, a debate that is of particular salience to Germany.

Both the United States and Germany are lands of immigration with large foreign-born populations. Both nations now face the daunting challenge of managing immigration in a world of porous borders and heightened concern about terrorist threats. But Germany faces special challenges. With 3.2 million Muslims—three quarters of whom are German-born descendents of "guest workers" from Turkey—Germany has the second largest Muslim population in Europe. It also has the notorious distinction of having been the base for the 9/11 hijackers. Germany thus must grapple with contradictory pressures to embrace diversity and liberalize its immigration and citizenship laws on the one hand, and enhance government vigilance over possible extremists within its borders who may already be planning future attacks, on the other.

Since 9/11 the domestic aspect of international terrorism has been discussed mainly within the context of *who* should be allowed to enter and remain in a country such as Germany. There has been, however, little discussion of what to do with potentially radicalized immigrants *already within a country's borders*—those who have either lived in country for a significant period of time or are second or third generation descendants of immigrants who remain on the fringes of society. The failure of mainstream societies to integrate immigration populations successfully clearly can exacerbate social and economic tensions. Far less certain is the degree to which inadequate integration of immigrant populations may contribute to international terrorism, either directly through expansion of the pool of those willing to support extremist causes or indirectly through enhanced willingness to support terrorist causes with financial or other resources. The question of possible linkages between immigrant Muslim populations in Germany, Europe, and the United States is bound to be controversial and raise political sensitivities; the issue nevertheless is worth further discussion and exploration.

The complex linkages between the international dimension of terrorism and the integration of minority populations are the subject of Zachary Shore's analysis. Shore assesses the situation of Muslim immigrants in Germany, noting

the failure of many to integrate into mainstream German society. Shore teases out the complex linkages between the marginalization of these immigrants and the potential of these individuals to seek outlets of expression through religious and political extremism. He argues that efforts to improve the image of the West in the eyes of Muslims abroad through development assistance and education programs *must* be complemented by a concerted effort to fund integration programs at home. Failure to address the real needs of these Muslim communities could, according to Shore, potentially widen the pool of potential extremists throughout Europe, and, as we saw on 9/11, export the problem to other states. Shore offers concrete policy recommendations for Germany, emphasizing the urgent need for transatlantic cooperation not only in combatting international terrroism, but also on the domestic issues that could fuel extremism and cause further unrest on both sides of the Atlantic.

We are grateful to the Robert Bosch Foundation for its generous support of this publication.

Cathleen Fisher
Associate Director
AICGS

February 2003

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Zachary Shore was AICGS/Bosch German American Dialogue fellow in 2002. He recently served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State. Dr. Shore earned his D.Phil. in modern European history from St. Antony's College, Oxford, and has served as a National Security Fellow at Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. In addition to consulting for Oxford Analytica on U.S. Balkans policy, he has authored numerous articles and editorials on history and foreign policy, and his first book, *What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy*, was published by Oxford University Press in December 2002.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Germany's need to integrate its 3.2 million Muslims has assumed a new urgency since September 11, 2001, yet German policymakers remain focused on combating Islamic extremism abroad. Police investigations continue to indicate that the threat from radical Islam in Europe is rising, and opinion polls confirm that Europeans harbor genuine fears of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, German leaders have not yet recognized the need for greater long-term investments in integrating their Muslim residents.

The challenges involved in Europe's integration dilemmas, transatlantic relations, and the war on terror are intricately interwoven. If it is true that supporters of terrorist networks are typically drawn from pools of socially alienated young men, then it would be useful to better integrate these men into their larger societies and shrink the pool of potential extremists. Shrinking this pool is of enormous interest to both the United States and Europe as the allies adjust to confronting new common threats.

Europe's Muslim problems are mounting just as transatlantic bonds between the United States and its staunchest European allies are being refashioned. During the Cold War, the United States and western Europe faced a common threat from the Soviet Union, but today the perception of threats and the means to combat them are diverging. Freed from the fear of Soviet nuclear attack and liberated from the constricting bonds of the Cold War alliance, Europeans are gradually exerting their independence from American positions on international security. That Chancellor Schröder pledged to withhold German support from an attack on Iraq shows how far Europeans are coming toward understanding their new independence.

One of the principal difficulties confronting U.S.-German relations is that both nations have distinctly differing perceptions of the threat posed by international terror. These divergent perceptions have created friction in the transatlantic relationship in a number of respects. First, the U.S. administration is focused almost exclusively on terrorism issues, while the German government wants to address a wider array of topics. Second, mounting transatlantic tensions exist over how best to allocate

funds in a war on terror, with the United States favoring vast military expenditures and Germany preferring long-term development assistance.

A further difficulty for Germany in the war on terror is that German political leaders, diplomats, and scholars who study terrorism seem more committed to providing development aid for Muslims overseas and less committed to funding integration programs for Muslims at home. Both measures, however, share the same aim: to combat terrorism by reducing poverty and fostering economic development.

Germany and the United States can combat terrorism by fostering Muslim integration in Germany and by increasing cooperation regarding Muslim states.

Joint U.S.-German measures should:

- **Emphasize a Coordinated, Integrated Strategy.** It is essential that the United States and Europe not employ military means that militate against their political objectives. When military force must be used, it should be done only as part of an integrated strategy designed to further political stability within both the state and region in question. This means discussing with the European allies the likely political ramifications of military operations and devising plans for stabilizing the target region after operations are complete, whether this requires a degree of "nation-building" or simply public diplomacy campaigns, humanitarian assistance throughout the region, or other non-military measures.

- **Increase Aid in Kind.** Rather than providing the funds to purchase computers or schoolbooks, the EU should give the computers and schoolbooks themselves, thereby precluding the possibility of those funds being mismanaged, aiding corruption, or being funneled toward terrorists. American and EU overseas development aid programs should act in tandem, determining who can provide particular aid in kind to particular states. The Bush administration's new Millennium Challenge Account could be modified to include aid in kind, determined after discussions with EU representatives.

- **Establish a Transatlantic Dialogue on Muslim Integration.** Relevant officials and scholars from the United States and EU member states with significant Muslim populations (Germany, France, Britain, and Holland) should explore the linkages between disaffected, long-term resident Muslim populations and global/ domestic terrorism.

- **Define War Aims**. Despite German discomfort with the term, the United States is unlikely to modify the phrase, "war on terror," given that the President has committed America to a "war." However, Germany and the EU should press the United States to define its war aims and to outline the conditions under which the war must end. A clear and precise definition might enable the Europeans to offer more robust support by knowing America's vision of the war's scope and limits. European qualms over perceived American human rights violations (such as in holding "enemy combatants" without access to due process, in some cases "for the duration of the war") could thereby be reduced and result in greater transatlantic cooperation.

Germany's integration measures should include:

- **A *Head Start* for Muslim Preschoolers.** By providing intensive early language education from teachers who can communicate with the children, many of the later difficulties children experience in school can be reduced. Drop-out rates should decline, as should unemployment and crime rates among young Muslim men.

- **Funding for Greater Language and Literacy Training for Muslim Mothers.** Since it is the mothers who typically have the greatest contact with their young children during the day, it is critical that Muslim mothers possess the German language skills that will allow them to read to their children and help teach them German from an early age.

- **Modernization of German Citizenship Laws.** Rather then basing citizenship on ethnicity, with some exceptions, citizenship should be based on birth in the country.

- **Sponsorship of Citizenship Drives.** A more immediate step toward including Muslims in German society would be for the German government to launch proactive citizenship drives, through public service announcements and advertisements in targeted media, to encourage eligible applicants to become citizens.

UNCOMMON THREATS: GERMANY'S MUSLIMS, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Europe, home to millions of Muslims, faces a dilemma. Demographic trends, driven by birth rates and immigration, mean that Muslim populations in Europe will increase dramatically within the next generation. But these groups have been poorly integrated into their respective societies. If current trends continue and young Muslims remain alienated, fundamentalist Islam could find fertile ground across the continent. However, if these groups are genuinely integrated, their participation in civil society will bring distinct changes to traditional Christian Europe.

Germany's need to integrate its 3.2 million Muslims has assumed a new urgency since September 11, 2001, yet German policymakers remain focused on combating Islamic extremism abroad. Police investigations continue to indicate that the threat from radical Islam in Europe is rising, and opinion polls confirm that Europeans harbor genuine fears of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, German leaders have not yet recognized the need for greater long-term investments in integrating their Muslim residents.

Europe's Muslim problems are mounting just as transatlantic bonds between the United States and its staunchest European allies are being refashioned. During the Cold War, the United States and western Europe faced a common threat from the Soviet Union, but today the perception of threats and the means to combat them are diverging. Britain, Germany, and France recognize the danger inherent in militant Islam, but are less inclined to use military force to uproot it. These western European states have long viewed terrorism as a domestic issue and resist pressure from Washington to fall in line with American policies and approaches. Freed from the fear of Soviet nuclear attack and liberated from the constricting bonds of the Cold War alliance, Europeans are gradually exerting their independence from American positions on international security. Europeans are realizing that they no longer need the United States the way they once did. This dawning recognition is allowing ever-bolder steps away from junior partner status and towards an autonomous European role on the international stage. That Chancellor Schröder

pledged to withhold German support from an attack on Iraq shows how far some Europeans are coming to understand their new independence.

This paper focuses on Germany as a case study within the larger transatlantic dilemma. It seeks to trace the linkages between two related issues: the domestic challenges confronting Germany as it attempts to integrate its growing Muslim population and the transatlantic tensions embedded in the United States' war on terror.

The challenges involved in Europe's integration dilemmas, transatlantic relations, and the war on terror are intricately interwoven. If it is true that supporters of terrorist networks are typically drawn from pools of socially alienated young men, then it would be useful to better integrate these men into their larger societies and shrink the pool of potential extremists. Shrinking this pool is of enormous interest to both the United States and Europe as the allies adjust to confronting new common threats.

THE PERCEPTION GAP

A December 8, 2002, *New York Times* article, "Europeans Fear That the Threat From Radical Islamists Is Increasing," asserted that European political leaders and police have found that terrorist networks within Europe are deeper and more pervasive than previously recognized and that the threat from Islamic extremism "may take years to neutralize." Noting the problem's global nature, the article continued, "Senior European officials dealing with terrorism say that recent investigations have uncovered surprisingly well-established networks of Muslim militants with potential to commit terrorist acts and affiliations that stretch across Europe to operatives in North America, North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia." The article accorded with the general European public's fears. The results of an extensive survey in summer 2002 showed that Europeans, like Americans, see terrorism as among their top concerns.[1]

However, Oxford historian and political commentator Timothy Garton Ash argued in a December 2002 *New York Times* editorial that Europe and the United States are far apart on their perception of being at war.[2] German diplomats and scholars interviewed as part of this research project confirmed Garton Ash's assessment.

One of the principal difficulties confronting U.S.-German relations is that both nations' governments have distinctly differing perceptions of the threat posed by international terror. While the Bush administration believes itself at war, most German officials do not, although many in the German populace and political leadership share Americans' fear of Islamic extremism. These divergent perceptions have created friction in the transatlantic relationship in a number of respects. First, the U.S. administration is focused almost exclusively on terrorism issues, while the German government wants to address a wider array of topics. As one German diplomat explained it, "We come to the table with a range of pressing issues, and the Americans speak only about terrorism."[3] Even if the December 2000 Strasbourg Christmas market attacks, the planners of which were arrested in Frankfurt, had been successful, the diplomat contended, Germany would still not feel itself at war. Since Germany has a longer history of dealing with terrorism, the population may be better prepared psychologically for an attack's impact. From some diplomats' perspective, the shock of 9/11/01 seems to have traumatized the American people into a response disproportionate to the actual threat. Most German officials interviewed during this research project agreed that combating international terrorism is a high priority, but maintain that it cannot be the only item on the transatlantic agenda.

In 1996, searching for new transatlantic bonds in the absence of a Soviet threat, Germany and the European Union developed the New Transatlantic Agenda. In this document, Germany outlined a range of vital issues requiring American and German cooperation, including reducing poverty in the developing world; combating global environmental degradation; creating a more vigorous, coordinated response to international crime (such as trafficking in women, children, and drugs); and defusing international terrorism. Since the Bush administration declared "war on terror," terrorism has overshadowed all other essential issues.

The second irritation in transatlantic relations stems from the Bush administration's decision to launch a "war" on terror. Fighting a war implies mobilizing a nation's most vital resources and focusing them on defeating the enemy. Since Germany does not feel itself at war, it is not willing to commit the level of resources the Bush administration would

wish. This perception gap extends to differences over war with Iraq, the conduct of the Middle East peace process, and the admission of Turkey into the EU.

A third divergence involves the use of military force. Germans point out that they currently have deployed approximately 10,000 troops in dangerous situations, operating in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, and on the horn of Africa. German forces also comprise the second largest contingent in Afghanistan after U.S. forces. There is some resentment in official government circles that Americans rarely recognize these tangible German commitments. Conversely, many Germans look upon the United States' recent military history as one of eagerness to fight but reluctance to build. While the Bush foreign policy team has expressed an aversion to nation-building, the Germans see this step as essential in order to stabilize a country or region following a military operation. Beyond the political advantages Schröder may have hoped to gain from his stance on Iraq during the election, German military forces are stretched too thin to participate meaningfully in any attack, and the sagging German economy makes another costly war highly unpalatable. Given these factors—military and economic overstretch—it is understandable why the Schröder government feels justified in withholding support for an invasion of Iraq. American policymakers need to recognize these reasonable inhibiting factors when assessing the tensions created by Chancellor Schröder's position on Iraq.

Chancellor Schröder's break with the United States over Iraq reflected his public's perception that American policy is needlessly aggressive. The dissatisfaction of the German public over America's handling of recent events can be seen in comparing the results of 1993 and 2002 polls. In 1993, 62 percent of Germans said that they saw the United States as a guarantor of global security and peace. In 2002, that figure had fallen to 48 percent. Only 19 percent say that they hold a positive view of President Bush, while 50 percent hold a negative view. (In the United States, the President's approval ratings currently hover around 60 percent.) Of greater concern, one-fourth of Germans consider themselves anti-American, and 73 percent feel that the United States is the dominant partner in the German-American relationship.[4]

Part of the perception gap involves uncertainty over Europe's role on the international stage. Some in the Bush administration as well as some leading commentators on transatlantic relations have recently asserted that Europe is irrelevant, even going so far as to claim that Europe's emphasis on diplomatic solutions to international conflicts is the result of both its weakness and its peaceful milieu, made possible by American protection.[5] Other leading figures in the United States, typically Democrats, have argued that European cooperation is critical for a strong American response to international conflicts.[6] In contrast, some European commentators such as Josef Joffe have observed that it is the Europeans who no longer need the United States as it did during the Cold War, and consequently a greater divergence on international affairs is natural and likely to increase. On the other side, some German scholars and diplomats have argued that Europe needs the United States more than ever as a stabilizing force on the continent, from the Balkans in Kosovo, Macedonia, and potentially Montenegro, to the Caucasus, the Baltics, and Northern Ireland.[7]

The fact that no general consensus on the nature of the transatlantic security relationship as yet exists reflects the lack of a perceived common threat. But lost in the debate is the further significance of the Bush administration's agenda. Many of the themes outlined in the New Transatlantic Agenda were in fact part of the Clinton administration's Europe policy, from environment to crime to development. It is only since the Bush administration's launching of a war on terror and abandonment of Clinton's support for an international criminal court and the Kyoto protocols that the transatlantic divide has truly intensified. Finding common ground, therefore, has been exacerbated not simply by the demise of the Soviet threat, but also by the rise of a Bush administration agenda that is at sharp variance with previous American administrations' global policies.[8]

Not only is there disagreement over Europe's role in international security in general and in combating terror more specifically, there is also a substantial perception gap regarding the manner in which terror should be fought. The depth of the transatlantic divergence over how to prevent terrorism involves conflicting assumptions about how funds are best allocated. While numerous German officials and scholars, as well

as American scholars outside of the Bush administration, recognize the need for long-term investment in alleviating poverty as a critical means of checking the terrorist threat, the Bush administration has chosen to invest greater funds in defense spending for military operations. To comprehend the German view, it is necessary to examine the words of some leading scholars on the subject. Speaking directly to the problem of finding common threats, Karl Kaiser, Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, has stressed the need for transatlantic cooperation in reducing the deep wealth inequities between the North and South, particularly within Muslim states.

> In fighting terrorism, we must develop intelligent, non-military approaches to the societies where terrorism originates. A serious inter-religious dialogue will be necessary in order to convince Muslim leaders to adopt a modernized and non-violent Islam. Given the closed nature of most Muslim societies, this requires a major and sustained effort. Since failing states become dangerous hot spots from which terrorists could operate, they can no longer be ignored as they were in the past. Consequently the extraordinarily difficult tasks of trying to reestablish a minimum of governance and order in such regions will be a shared task. The same is true for overcoming growing poverty and the disparity between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world, since the chances for defeating terrorism remain dim if a large part of humanity remains in crisis and poverty ridden while the modern means of communication project the images of the affluent North into their societies. As the United States and Europe attempt to deal with the problems of terrorism, they must not forget that many of the old problems for which they developed common institutions and policies still remain. The security and development of Europe as a whole, and of its periphery in the Middle East and North Africa, will remain a common task.[9]

Kaiser's observations have been echoed by numerous scholars and policy pundits. Professor Christian Hacke has noted the divergent views on development assistance in this way:

> Military action alone cannot counter terrorism. Not only in the Middle East, but also in the Third World in general, the swamp that breeds political and religious fanaticism can be dried out only by sustained measures of development politics. While the United States prefers to fight terror with military action, and is reserved when it comes to development policy, Germans and Europeans emphasize the necessity of economic and social structural change.[10]

German commentators have not been alone in their objections to a primarily military solution. Criticizing the Bush administration for its insufficient commitment to development assistance, Daniel Hamilton, assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration, has argued for more robust aid to combat terrorism. His observations mirror those made in Germany.

> There is a new rhetoric in Washington about foreign assistance. President Bush has said that the war is not only a military one but also a war for global prosperity, and that U.S. security requires that the world's impoverished children be fed, educated and given health care. Secretary of State Powell has said that he fully believes "that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives. But neither the White House nor the Congress have turned this new rhetoric into a new reality.[11]

Hamilton further asserts that while the Bush administration has raised military spending by $46 billion in the most recent budget, it increased development assistance by only $300 million. This is misleading, for it

overlooks the funds set aside for development aid in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). Under the supervision of the National Security Council, the MCA intends to increase America's overseas development aid by 50 percent, to approximately $5 billion by 2006. The funds will be allocated to between ten and twenty states as reward for implementing the reforms the Bush administration believes will enhance democratization and growth. In short, the funds will reward those countries deemed already to be on the right track; it will do nothing to aid the many more nations struggling to reduce poverty.

A further, though less prominent divide can be seen in the German Foreign Ministry's newly created "Dialogue with Islam." The Ministry is attempting to raise awareness within Germany and beyond of the need for better understanding of Islam and its political dimensions. Operating with a modest budget of roughly 5.1 million Euros, the office supports academic exchanges and conferences relating to Islam, language and religion education for the Ministry's ambassadors to Muslim countries, and special programs for education in Afghanistan.[12] The office also aims to support a network of Germany's foreign ministry personnel serving in Islamic states, allowing them to share information and experiences more readily.

Much of the impetus behind the Dialogue is the notion that Germany is increasingly becoming a Mediterranean power as the EU expands and Germany's role in it is becoming central. This brings Germany ever closer to the Islamic world. The Dialogue seeks to identify the weak links in Germany's relations with Islamic states and, as far as possible, address them. One of the first questions that the U.S. Department of State's Charlotte Beers allegedly posed to the Dialogue was, "How will you measure your success?" Again, there is a perception problem. While the American government tends to demand that monies spent on public and cultural diplomacy programs be justified in concrete, measurable terms, the German Foreign Ministry is more willing to invest in long-term strategies without the certainty of success, and without the ability to measure progress in linear terms.

While Germany is attempting to increase cultural understanding of the Islamic world and simultaneously pursuing diplomatic engagement, stricter financial oversight, economic development aid, and military

measures when necessary (such as in Afghanistan), the United States has focused its non-military engagement efforts on trade. Secretary of State Powell announced on December 12, 2002, the new "U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative." This program provides $29 million in pilot projects aimed primarily at fostering trade between the United States and Arab nations, on the assumption that increased trade and its expected resultant economic growth facilitate democratization. Despite the minimal amount of funding provided to implement the Initiative, many economists dispute the premise that economic growth from foreign trade reduces inequalities within developing nations.[13]

GERMANY'S UNCOMMON THREAT

As the United States and Germany continue to search for common ground and to define Europe's role in the international arena, Germany faces a looming domestic crisis with international implications. Muslim discontent with their status in German society may be on the rise. Resentment of their second-class role in German society and anger over America's policies toward the Muslim world could fuse to form a dangerous mixture. In September 2002, a Turkish German apparently planned to attack the American military base in Heidelberg. Although his plot was foiled, this could be a harbinger of future security threats. During interviews with members of the Islamist group Milli Goros, a group of Turkish Muslims under surveillance by the German government because of its past violent rhetoric, the members expressed a desire to integrate, but when pushed, few believed it necessary to give up any cultural practices in favor of greater assimilation. When asked about the causes of anti-Americanism, they echoed the frequent objections to America's support for Israel and repressive regimes. Further questioning, however, demonstrated the extensive misinformation pervading these communities. For example, one highly educated young leader of the Muslim community in Hamburg believes that more innocent Afghans died in American bombings than people died in the 9/11 attacks, and that the CIA funded Osama bin Laden for years. He further maintains that the United States, as a result of its policies toward the Muslim world, is creating hundreds of potential future bin Ladens. In interviews with Ramazan Ucar, the elected Imam of one of Hamburg's large Turkish

Muslim communities who was recently featured in the *Washington Post*, the Imam expressed notable anti-American sentiments, reflecting a profound lack of understanding of the American perspective on Middle East and world affairs.[14] These discussions and many others illustrate America's failure to project a positive image to Muslims in Germany. These deep misperceptions, when combined with radical Islam, yield a volatile solution, one that, if not effectively neutralized, could harm both America's and Germany's interests. There is no guarantee that better integration will preclude all extremist violence, but if Germany's rising Muslim population is not better integrated, extremists will have a larger, more restive pool of *potential* supporters from which to draw.

BACKGROUND

Although Muslims have lived in Europe for many centuries, the major wave of Muslim immigration in the modern era began following World War I and continued through the period of decolonization. Britain and France began absorbing Muslims from South Asia and the Maghreb, respectively, to help with reconstruction following both world wars. Despite the standard challenges faced by nearly all new immigrants, the Muslims who settled in these countries found opportunity, freedom, and tolerance. To help rebuild its own shattered post-World War II economy, Germany invited many Muslim guest workers from Turkey, expecting that these guests would one day return home. But finding conditions more agreeable in their new surroundings, many remained, sent for wives, and began families. As the author Max Frisch put it: "Wir riefen Arbeiter, und es kamen Menschen" ("We called for workers, but people came").

Today roughly 15 million Muslims live in Europe, approximately 4-5 percent of the total population. Despite the passage of several decades, their integration has been uneven. While some have prospered, many more have not, and the younger generations are facing new obstacles and challenges, including language barriers, racism, and xenophobia, as will be described below. Tensions with their host countries are further exacerbated by sharply rising Muslim birth rates, economic stagnation, rising unemployment, and crime. Small but vocal political parties in France, Holland, Denmark, and Austria have successfully tapped into the widespread anti-immigrant sentiment, while heated debates over

immigration laws have occurred in Britain and Germany, and at the EU level as well.[15] For Muslims in Europe, the future has become increasingly uncertain.

Germany is gradually coming to terms with the reality that it is indeed a land of immigrants. According to the Independent Commission on Migration's thorough 2001 report, "The political and normative guiding principle of the past that 'Germany is not a country of immigrants' has become untenable as the maxim of migration and integration policy. More and more people are becoming aware that migration to Germany involves both enrichment and problems."[16] With a total foreign population of roughly 7.3 million, or 8.9 percent of the populace, the demographic trends on foreigners alone do not bode well for a country with weak integration. As Philip Martin has observed, the numbers speak for themselves. The ethnic German population is projected to decline to 62 million by the year 2030, making foreigners 17 percent of the total population. In this scenario, major cities such as Frankfurt and Stuttgart would contain 50 percent foreigners within two generations. Other projections of even higher fertility rates among immigrants suggest that Germany will have 30 percent foreigners by 2030.[17]

Turks comprise three-quarters of Germany's entire Muslim population, and studies of the third generation find them less integrated than their parents or grandparents. Their knowledge of German is weak, their high school drop-out rate is high, and this has resulted in considerably higher unemployment rates, crime rates, and social alienation.[18] Mosques have stepped in to fill the gap, providing Koranic education and a sense of community, but in turn the young become even less connected to their larger society. Such a situation, if left unchecked, could leave young Muslims susceptible to radical messages

Cem Ozdemir, the first ethnic Turk elected to the German Bundestag, has spoken of a "sense of alienation among ethnic Turks [that] is creating conditions for a potential social explosion in Germany." Ozdemir's concerns are not unfounded, and their roots extend deep into the Turkish experience in Germany. The problem begins at an early age. Since most Turks in Germany hail from the poorer, less literate regions of eastern Anatolia and, like most immigrants, tend to settle within geographically close communities, the children are raised in homes where distinctive

dialects are spoken, parents are unable to read to their children in German, and less contact with ethnic Germans is available. One Berlin day care worker with twenty-two years of experience described the situation as rapidly deteriorating. In her not atypical class of fifteen pre-schoolers, thirteen are Turks, one is Polish, and one is ethnically German. Consequently, the Turkish children speak mainly among themselves, and they enter the school system with insufficient language skills. For Muslim girls, the situation worsens as they enter middle and high school, as their parents forbid them to attend school trips, participate in mixed-gender sports, dance at discos with their classmates, or go swimming with their peers. Such parentally enforced separation presents serious barriers to integration.

In response to some of these challenges, Berlin and other German cities have created more specialized adult literacy programs for foreign-born workers. When it was discovered that Muslim mothers were only willing to attend such programs if their young children were with them rather than left in daycare centers, the literacy programs were adapted and experienced much greater success. Unfortunately, federal and state funding to such programs has been cut in recent years as the German economy continues to stagnate.

Social standing has not substantially improved for teenage and young Turkish Germans, despite being in the third generation of Turkish residents. Roughly one-fourth of all Turkish Germans are under the age of thirty, and they still are perceived as "guests" or foreigners by many ethnic Germans, even when they have lived in Germany all their lives and speak better German than Turkish. Approximately 17 percent complete the *Abitur*, and only 40 percent obtain vocational training. When questioned about their views on religious matters, a surprising trend appeared. Forty-one percent of eighteen to twenty-five-year-olds agreed that charging interest on loans is against their religion, compared to twenty-six to twenty-nine-year-olds, of whom only 38 percent agreed, and those thirty and older, of whom 34 percent agreed. In contrast, questions regarding the mixing of the sexes found that younger Turks overwhelmingly supported greater mixing in the workplace and in education, while the older generations were more supportive of gender separation.[19]

Despite the problems facing the young, attitudes among the majority of adult Turkish Germans remain favorably disposed toward the German state. In a recent Adenauer Foundation survey of Turkish Germans, 90 percent say that they consider democracy the best form of government. A further 80 percent claim that they are satisfied with the state of democracy in Germany, and nearly half maintain that they would defend Germany if it were attacked by Syria or Libya—a figure higher than among East Germans. On the other side, however, one-third says that Turks are treated as second-class citizens in Germany and that their social contacts with ethnic Germans are extremely limited.

The lack of integration is worrisome, especially if, as some scholars believe, a trend exists among Europe's younger Muslims toward a sense of pan-Islamism.[20] Unlike their parents or grandparents, the younger generations find themselves identifying with Muslims around the world, particularly those seen as under siege, rather than with those hailing from their own countries of origin. As satellite television and the internet bring the suffering of Palestinians to Muslims' living rooms, as news media graphically depict the embattlement of Muslims from Chechnya to Kosovo, from Albania to Bosnia, from Indonesia to Afghanistan, the number of international Muslim relief organizations mounts. While it can aid much needed relief efforts in global hot spots, this rise in pan-Islamism may hinder Muslim integration into European society and may also spur political pressure on European states to limit their cooperation with key aspects of American foreign policy. As interviews with Imam Ucar and others leaders in Germany's Muslim community suggest, America's image within many of these groups is poor.

The combination of increased viewership of Turkish channels on satellite television and Muslim mothers who lack German language skills means that a new generation of Turkish children receive limited exposure to the German language and greater exposure to Turkish and Muslim culture. While both these factors could be hindering integration into and identification with German society, one further indication of a growing sense of pan-Islamism can be seen in the emergence of MeccaCola. Launched by Tawfiq Mathlouthi, a French-Muslim entrepreneur, MeccaCola aims to rival Coke and Pepsi for patronage among Muslims world-wide, and Mathlouthi's market research suggests that Europe's

Muslims are keen to support the cause. Intended as a way for Muslims to support the Palestinian-led boycott of American consumer goods, MeccaCola points to something new and potentially destabilizing in Europe. Regardless of whether MeccaCola succeeds or fizzles, the fact that some of Europe's Muslims see themselves as Muslims first is a marker of weak integration.

Some scholars believe that the pan-Islamic sentiment will not hinder Muslim integration into Europe, but will aid it: by providing a group identity and enabling constructive associations for the peaceful resolution of social inequities, Islamic organizations serve as an alternative to extremism.[21] Others maintain that true integration will not succeed unless Muslims undergo the same process of European identity building that ethnic Europeans are experiencing. Wherever the truth may lie, Germany and the other European states will need to intensify their integration efforts if they hope to avoid the destabilizing effects of an alienated and growing young minority.

Again, there are no guarantees that better integration will necessarily prevent terrorism. However, the experience of other countries, including the United States, suggests that alienated minorities with little or no access to political power, and who feel socially and economically disadvantaged, often produce a fringe element that turns to violence. America's Black Panthers is one such example. In fact, some of the Panther leaders found in Islam a guiding inspiration for their actions. Other disaffected individuals who may not participate in violence themselves may be sympathetic to terrorist groups and may provide them with financial support. German banking laws have been tightened since September 11, 2001, precisely to impede funds within Germany from aiding terrorist groups. The men who planned the September 11 attacks from Hamburg and those who plotted the Strasbourg attacks from Frankfurt drew on the assistance of others within Germany's Muslim community. The purpose of better integrating Germany's Muslims as one tactic in the war on terror is simply to reduce the pool of potential supporters from which extremists can draw.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Both the United States and Germany could do more to narrow their perception gaps and thereby facilitate their cooperation in the war on terror. Below are a few points needing attention.

Emphasize a Coordinated, Integrated Strategy

It is essential that the United States and Europe not employ military means that militate against their political objectives. For example, the campaign in Afghanistan successfully deposed the Taliban, but it left the rest of the nation in disarray, heightened anti-American sentiment, and substantially enhanced the appeal of Islamist parties in Pakistan. An attack on Iraq might succeed in replacing Saddam's regime with one more friendly to the United States, but it could simultaneously lead other Arab states to hate the United States even more and encourage them to support terrorism. When military force must be used, it should be done only as part of a integrated strategy designed to further political stability both within the state and region in question. This means discussing with the European allies the likely political ramifications of military operations and devising plans for stabilizing the target region after operations are complete, whether this requires a degree of "nation-building," or simply public diplomacy campaigns, humanitarian assistance throughout the region, or other non-military measures.

Increase Aid in Kind

American and EU aid to Muslim states, including the Palestinian Authority, should be conditional upon reform and the demonstrated combating of terrorist elements within their societies, but a greater percentage of aid should be given in kind. Rather than providing the funds to purchase computers or schoolbooks, the EU should give the books and computers themselves, thereby precluding the possibility of those funds being mismanaged, aiding corruption, or being funneled toward terrorists. American and EU overseas development aid programs should act in tandem, determining who can provide particular aid in kind to particular states. The Bush administration's new Millennium Challenge Account could be modified to include aid in kind, determined after discussions with EU representatives.

Establish a Transatlantic Dialogue on Muslim Integration

Relevant officials and scholars from the United States and EU member states with significant Muslim populations (Germany, France, Britain, and Holland) should explore the linkages between disaffected, long-term resident Muslim populations and global/domestic terrorism. This dialogue should examine Muslim identity and integration issues in democratic societies and provide recommendations for engaging domestic Muslim populations. It should draw upon the work already underway by the Network on Comparative Research of Muslims and Islam in Europe (NOCRIME), a transnational organization of academics studying these very issues. By comparing the experiences of various democratic governments with Muslim populations, the dialogue should be able to offer practical solutions to address a common threat—the threat from disaffected Muslim minorities, whatever form it may take, be it domestic unrest, crime, unemployment, or extremism. This panel should also consider the level of integration of America's Muslim populations as a useful comparison.

Define War Aims

Despite German discomfort with the term, the United States is unlikely to modify the phrase, "war on terror," given that the President has committed America to a "war." However, Germany and the EU should press the United States to define its war aims and to outline the conditions under which the war must end. A clear and precise definition, embodied in a new "Atlantic Charter," might enable the Europeans to offer more robust support by knowing America's vision of the war's scope and limits. European qualms over perceived American human rights violations (such as in holding "enemy combatants" without access to due process, in some cases "for the duration of the war") could thereby be reduced and result in greater transatlantic cooperation.

The following are policy recommendations specifically for the German government to better integrate its Muslim populations.

Head Start for Muslim Preschoolers

Launched in the United States in 1964, *Head Start* sought to provide early education for children of low-income families as a means of minimizing the likely future social problems that result from high school drop-out rates. In response to the educational problems described above, Germany should adopt a *Head Start* program for Muslim children, but one adapted to fit the particular needs of Muslims. Teachers must be recruited from within the Turkish Muslim community, teachers who speak fluent German and the dialects common to the Eastern Anatolian region from which many of the children and their parents originate. By providing intensive early language education from teachers who can communicate with the children, many of the later difficulties children experience in school can be reduced. Drop-out rates should decline, as should unemployment and crime rates among young Muslim men. This is a long-term strategy that can have a palpable impact on integration fifteen to twenty years from now, just as the demographic pressures from rising Muslim birth rates will be imposing their greatest strains on German society.

Fund Greater Language and Literacy Training for Muslim Mothers

Since it is the mothers who typically have the greatest contact with their young children during the day, it is critical that Muslim mothers possess the German language skills that will allow them to read to their children and help teach them German from an early age. Berlin had sponsored such programs, but mothers only participated in significant numbers once they were able to keep their children with them during the classes. Funding cuts have reduced the number of such training programs, but these are precisely what is most needed if integration is to succeed. Language training must be given a higher priority and funded accordingly.

Modernize Citizenship Laws

Gaining German citizenship remains extremely difficult for non-ethnic German residents. Unlike in the United States, being born in Germany does not afford one citizenship. It is time to adapt German citizenship laws to a globalizing world. Rather than basing citizenship on ethnicity with some exceptions, citizenship should be based on birth

in the country. The post-9/11 environment makes it all the more pressing that Germany include and embrace its Muslim residents who were born and educated in Germany. But beyond the rising threat from extremism, burgeoning Muslim and falling ethnic German birth rates make clear that large segments of the populace within the next twenty years will be left unable to vote and excluded from the full benefits of citizenship. In order to avoid the almost certain social alienation and unrest, Germany must extend citizenship to those who were born in and work in Germany, and who pay into the social welfare system from which so many aging ethnic Germans will benefit.

Sponsor Citizenship Drives

Opening German citizenship to those born in the country is a change that will require considerable public debate over time. A more immediate step toward including Muslims in German society would be for the German government to launch proactive citizenship drives, through public service announcements and advertisements in target media, to encourage eligible applicants to become citizens. According to a law passed in 2000, non-ethnic Germans born in Germany and possessing at least one parent who has lived in Germany for at least eight years are eligible for citizenship. By reaching out to the descendants of guest workers and urging them to become full members of German society, the state will take a significant step toward reducing the alienation that many resident immigrants currently experience. Naturally, extending voting privileges is not a panacea for alienation. African-American citizens in low income, crime-ridden areas may feel alienated even though they can vote, but restricting their access to the ballot box imposed a second-class status upon them and was duly resented. After political rights are obtained, strategies for social justice and greater economic security must be found.

Allow Limited Dual Citizenship

Since many Muslim residents do not hold citizenship, few can vote in federal and local elections and have no peaceful, democratic means for redressing grievances. Since the new citizenship law passed in 2000, the number of Muslim applicants for citizenship has begun to rise slowly, indicating that there is interest in gaining greater political rights. The

law does not, however, permit for dual citizenship, thereby forcing immigrants to renounce their other citizenship and forfeit voting and property rights in their country of origin. Many Turks are understandably reluctant to take this step, and consequently a great many cannot participate in German elections. This leads to a further sense of alienation from the larger society, exacerbating an already strong sentiment of exclusion. Enabling Muslims who have lived the whole or much of their adult lives in Germany to exercise voting rights will foster integration by giving Muslims a stake in their country's political direction. This offer of dual citizenship, however, should be extended only to those already living and working in Germany for a substantial period of time, such as twenty years, thereby enfranchising those who came as guest workers and their offspring. Citizenship would not be extended to those who simply wish to move to Germany and work there, thereby precluding the possibility that Germany would be flooded by migratory laborers (such as from Turkey) seeking the benefits of dual citizenship without having been born there.

Demographics can be cold equations. States ignore them at their peril. Unless trends are reversed, Germany will have to address the implications of a sharply rising Muslim population in order to reduce the likelihood of social unrest and Islamic extremism. The United States and Germany can jointly combat the threat of extremism by increasing cooperative measures, including those outlined above. Current perception gaps need not prove insurmountable. The issue of Iraq has complicated the transatlantic relationship and collaborative efforts to deal with the issue of Islamic extremism. The time to advance cooperative initiatives is now, before the rift widens. Solutions exist, and new ones can be found. Only the will is needed.

ENDNOTES

[1] Survey by the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, released September 4, 2002, www.gmf-us.org.

[2] Timothy Garton Ash, "The Capital Makes up its Mind," *New York Times*, December 12, 2002.

[3] Interview with German Foreign Ministry diplomat, speaking off the record, not for attribution.

[4] Cited in Peter Rudolf, "Krise der deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung? Über den Umgang den USA", November 2002, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*.

[5] See in particular Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, No. 113, June-July 2002.

[6] Walter Mondale, for example, argued in his recent campaign for Senate that the United States is strengthened, not constricted (as many Republican leaders have maintained), when it works in conjunction with its allies.

[7] Author's interview with Carsten Geier, America expert in the German Foreign Ministry, November 26, 2002.

[8] Rudolf, "Krise der deutsche-amerikanischen Beziehung," further articulates these points.

[9] Karl Kaiser, "German Perspectives on the New Strategic Landscape After September 11," *Fighting Terror: How September 11 is Transforming German-American Relations.* American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2002.

[10] Christian Hacke, "Foreign Policy of the Schroeder/Fischer Administration: Interim Balance and Prospects," AICGS web commentary, 2002, pp. 11–12.

[11] Daniel S. Hamilton, "German-American Relations and the Campaign Against Terrorism," *Fighting Terror: How September 11 is Transforming German-American Relations.* American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2002.

[12] The office has a separate budget of 8.8 million Euros for school construction and educational programs in Afghanistan.

[13] See *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, vol. 81, no. 4, particularly the responses to David Dollar's claims regarding globalization and inequality.

[14] Peter Finn, "Preaching Democracy, Teaching Islam: Turkish Group Promotes Tolerance in Germany, but Skepticism Remains," *Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 2002. Ramazan Ucar's sentiments were expressed to Zachary Shore in interviews conducted earlier in 2002.

[15] U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research polling data reveal that between one-third and one-half of ethnic Germans, French, Britons, Austrians, and Italians hold negative views of immigrants. Reports on anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, Sept. 11, 2000, and June 28, 2002.

[16] "Structuring Immigration, Fostering Integration," Report by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany, Berlin, July 4, 2001. p.1

[17] Philip L. Martin, *Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration*, AICGS, 1998.

[18] Stefan Luft, *Mechanismen, Manipulation, Missbrauch: Auslaenderpolitik und Auslaenderintegration in Deutschland*, Koeln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 2002,

pp. 99-126. Luft reports that 40 percent of foreigners admit that they do not speak German well, only 34 percent said they speak primarily in German everyday, and only 20 percent of Turkish immigrants speak mostly German on a day-to-day basis. In 1997, only 19.4 percent of foreigners completed their secondary education, compared to 7 percent of ethnic Germans (p. 102). Luft details criminal statistics (pp. 104-5), showing the high percentage of crimes committed by foreigners relative to foreigners' percent of the total population. He also shows that from 1984-1997 in West Germany, violent crimes committed by those aged 14-20 tripled, two-thirds of which were perpetrated by foreigners (p. 113). A 1998 study of youth crime conducted by Lower Saxony's Justice Minister concluded that crime is lower where foreigners are better integrated (p. 114). Most federal statistics do not use religion as a category. It is therefore unclear precisely what percentage of these statistics on foreigners Muslims comprise.

[19] "Kulturell-Religiöse Einstellungen und Soziooekonomische Lage junger turkischer Migranten in der Bundesrepublik," June 2000. Polls performed by the Deutsch-Turkisch Studien in Essen, under the direction of Gulay Kizilocak. The authors surveyed 2,014 Turkish Muslims.

[20] Dr. Jocelyne Cesari of Harvard University expressed this opinion in interviews with the author in October 2002. Dr. Cesari has been studying trends among Europe's Muslims for more than ten years and heads the Network on Comparative Research of Muslims and Islam in Europe.

[21] Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam in the West: Modernity and Globalization Revisited," in Birgit Schaebler, ed., *Muslims and Islam in the Age of Postmodernity and Globalization,* Syracuse University Press (in press). "Sociological analysis of Islam at the global level in a comparison with other religious systems will overcome the Orientalist's sharp and artificial contrast between Orient and Occident. It will demonstrate that world religions can actually accelerate the process of globalization by promoting shifts from communal to associative structures across nations. Religions will be shown not only to reinforce and recreate communal ties in response to globalization, but also to offer resources for new forms of individualization and modernization." (p. 1)

AICGS POLICY REPORTS

#1. Martin, Philip, Hans-Dietrich von Loeffelholz, and Thomas Straubhaar. *Managing Migration for Economic Growth: Germany and the United States in Comparative Perspective.* Washington, D.C.: AICGS, 2002.

#2. Krause, Joachim. *Prospects and Limits of Transatlantic Arms Cooperation in Extended Air Defense: The Case of MEADS.* Washington, D.C.: AICGS, 2002.

#3. Stent, Angela. *A New Security Agenda for U.S.-German-Russian Relations: Interim Report.* Washington, D.C.: AICGS, 2002.

#4. Graham, Robert and Haig Simonian. *Prospects for the Franco-German Relationship: The Elysée Treaty and After.* Washington, D.C.: AICGS, 2003.

#5. Shore, Zachary. *Uncommon Threats: Germany's Muslims, Transatlantic Relations, and the War on Terror.* Washington, D.C.: AICGS, 2003.

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

The Johns Hopkins University

1400 16th Street, N.W., Suite 420
Washington, D.C. 20036-2216

Phone: 202.332.9312
Fax: 202.265.9531
Web: www.aicgs.org