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Building Knowledge, Insights, and Networks for the Future
In September 2013, German voters will go to the polls and elect their next chancellor. Around the country—in Lower-Saxony, Bavaria, and Hesse—state parliaments will also be elected. As they cast their ballots, some may recall that the German political constellation was not always so colorful. While the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP have been in existence since the Federal Republic’s founding, the Green Party will celebrate a milestone in 2013: its thirtieth anniversary in the Bundestag.

To say that the Greens have been successful in the past thirty years would be an understatement. They’ve been the junior partner in a red-green coalition on the federal level, partnered in numerous coalitions at the state level, and won their first state majority in 2011 in Baden-Württemberg. At the political level, the Greens demonstrated their electability and appeal and have reshaped the political landscape.

So, too, have they affected policy. The central tenets of the Green Party—environmentalism, equality, pacifism—are embedded in German society today in a way that they were not thirty years ago. The Green Party’s commitment to the environment has led to a country leading in solar technology and phasing out its nuclear power; its mandated gender equality has led even the most conservative parties to promote women in their ranks; and its calls for pacifism have sharpened the debate on the role of German military. The party has left an indelible print on the country at large.

On the occasion of the Green Party’s thirtieth anniversary in the Bundestag, Andrei Markovits and Joseph Klaver examine these and other issues within the party, and within German politics. The following essay discusses how the Green Party built its “brand” and, in so doing, ushered in a fundamental change in German politics and society. It is a useful example of the way in which new political parties enter the scene and exact change in Germany—a situation that continues with the emergence of the Pirate Party.

This essay is part of AICGS’ focus on the 2013 German federal election and the broader political system. The Institute is grateful to Andrei Markovits and Joseph Klaver for sharing their insights, to the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Washington, DC and the University of Michigan for their generous support of this publication, and to Jessica Riester Hart for her work on its editing and production.

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INTRODUCTION
On 6 March 2013, it will be thirty years since quintessential representatives of the European counter-culture, major players in the venerable New Left, the very embodiment of the famed sixty-eighthers—in short, perhaps the most powerful symbolic vanguard of the conclusive finality of the hegemonic bourgeois culture that dominated all public life in capitalist countries since the Victorian age—danced the night away at the Stadthalle in Bad Godesberg celebrating their triumphant entry into the Bundestag while invoking a new age in the political topography of the Federal Republic of Germany and—by extension—in all similar places of advanced industrial capitalism ruled by a liberal democratic order. The Age of Aquarius had finally departed from the campuses of Berkeley, Columbia, Paris, and the Free University of Berlin—not to mention the stages of New York’s Broadway and London’s West End—and entered triumphantly a platform that really mattered: that of the very heart of political life of one of the most important actors in the global order of the modern world, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and—by extension—in all similar places of advanced industrial capitalism ruled by a liberal democratic order. The iconography of the actual entrance into the hallowed halls of the Bundestag on 29 March 1983, still bespoke a clear desire on the part of these twenty-eight new members of parliament to be seen as decidedly anti-establishment. There was Walter Schwenninger with a long hand-woven peasant sweater alongside Dieter Drabiniok and Gert Jannsen with their flowing locks and wild beards; Marieluise Beck appeared with a pine tree pockmarked by acid rain slung over one shoulder; Petra Kelly was also there, carrying a large bouquet of fresh flowers; and then there was Gabriele Potthast sporting a tuxedo-like quintessentially male garment in a clear attempt at gender bending and thus confronting the establishment with its square sense of sexuality and its boring bourgeois habitus and mores, not to mention its evil sexism. The Green entrance into the world of
governmental ministries two years later in Hessen also had a distinctly anti-establishment flair: Joschka Fischer taking his oath as environmental minister in jeans and Nikes contrasted strikingly with Holger Börner, administering the oath of office to Fischer, dressed in a dark business suit—de rigueur for such occasions for German politicians or any member of the establishment. The dark suit with the accompanying white shirt and the not-too-colorful necktie constituted the accepted uniform for men in their public appearances prior to the arrival of the counterculture’s troops on the big stages of public life in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

So what of this? What remains, to speak with Christa Wolf’s well-known dictum of Was bleibt? It is precisely this issue that we address in our present work. Our argument is as follows: On the whole, the Greens’ imprint has been considerable both on the narrower confines of German politics and also—perhaps more important still—on the wider discourse and demeanor of German public life. Put simply, things that have become the norm in the quotidian habitus of contemporary Germany once hailed from a cultural milieu and a political reality that existed only in odd urban spaces and featured almost exclusively in metropolitan as well as cosmopolitan places such as Frankfurt and Berlin, remaining confined to the fringes of German life. They were characteristics merely of Germany’s counter-cultural ghetto. No longer! To be sure, there had to be major costs to the purity of this milieu’s identity by its entering the larger mainstream. In gaining societal relevance and political importance, this world had to alter many of its much-cherished existential icons that defined its very being in a self-sufficient ghetto with little overall societal, political, economic, and even cultural relevance. Gaining such relevance has always exacted compromises in a much-invoked purity that, of course, also masquerades as a clear sense of exclusivity. But we argue that the Greens’ lengthy process of attaining genuine societal, political, economic, and cultural relevance—and thus shedding their original and existential pristineness—has on the whole been a very worthwhile, indeed successful, endeavor.

We argue that, despite some obvious levels of moderation that one can clearly interpret as compromises, perhaps even cooptation, the contemporary Greens have advanced a degree of progressive values upon German society and culture that might perhaps differ in the original purity so dearly upheld by their erstwhile predecessors and early activists of the late 1970s and early 1980s but that have, in turn, attained a much greater relevance in contemporary German political life. Or put differently, we submit that in the past thirty years the Greens have successfully institutionalized in Germany’s mainstream a brand of progressive politics that thirty years ago was at best a fringe occurrence consumed and followed by politically marginal sects. The Greens have become established without being the establishment. Some of their political leaders now wear suits without having become such. The Greens have created a cross-over appeal that they simply did not have thirty years ago.

We intend to develop this theme of depicting the Greens as having had a major effect on the discourse, content, and shape of key elements of German politics and central areas of the country’s public life in the rest of our work presented in this publication. One of the Greens’ immense successes, we argue, consists of their having entered the big leagues of German politics, with a clearly defined and immediately discernible brand which, if anything, they have succeeded to augment and legitimate well beyond their very own confines, thereby having their brand become a common phenomenon. Even though many Greens will most assuredly not appreciate our analyzing their successes by utilizing analogies from marketing—what blasphemy, what travesty—we do so not to affront them or their sensibilities, but precisely because we believe that this analogy works best in terms of depicting our overall argument. Unless one explicitly confines one’s playing field to niches—which the Greens most certainly never intended to do given the large, indeed huge, topics that they viewed as essential to their very existence and identity—any brand’s success will be defined by the scope of its reach, recognition, influence, and imitation which, we argue, still remains one of the markers of success. There can be no doubt whatsoever that key aspects of the Greens’ original brand have attained wide acceptance and legitimacy and have indeed become much appreciated and well liked brands of German politics and public life.

To be sure, this dissemination and acceptance was
not solely due to the Greens’ savvy and marketing genius. Of course, there were crucial processes of mutual give-and-take, of the interaction between agency (the Greens) and structure (the German context in which they operated and existed) that rendered the Greens’ original brand so common in Germany in the course of the past thirty years. Context always matters. Thus, for example, there can be no doubt that the Greens’ deep commitment to ecological improvement and purity found a particularly fertile ground in the long-held German view of nature dating back to the Romantic period of the early nineteenth century, indeed well beyond in history. Please note: We are not arguing that there is a stringent or inevitable linear relationship between the saliency that has been accorded to nature in the mainstream German narrative and the Greens’ commitment to ecology. But there can be no doubt that the Greens in Germany had an easier path to political legitimation on this dimension than did their brothers and sisters across the Rhine in France, for example, or most other parts of Europe for that matter. The same is true of pacifism and peace; by dint of Germany’s immensely bellicose history, particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, and the negative consequences that this bellicosity had wrought, peace attained a centrally important rallying point across virtually all ideological lines for German politics after 1945 that it did not replicate to a similar degree in other powerful countries among Germany’s European neighbors, notably Britain and France. The topics that were to form the Greens’ very core were, on an important structural level, not totally alien to the common German narrative. So clearly context mattered in facilitating but not creating the Greens’ prolific presence.

Bottom line: the Greens’ branding has been immensely successful. To claim being peaceful and environmentally progressive have become core German values that the country proudly touts alongside the industrial success of its *Mittelstand*, its frugality, and its export prowess. While few use the terminology of *Modell Deutschland* these days, we would argue that these core Green values constitute the very core of precisely such a structure that embodies a valuable currency of differentiation and credentialing. Germans well beyond the Greens like to boast with these values which they deem not only morally appropriate, even superior, but which they also correctly perceive as providing them with an advantageous profile in the increasing globalized competition of goods and services, as well as cultures and values. In contrast to rival forms of capitalism, Germany’s is ecological, peaceful, inclusive, moderate, considerate—in short a greenish kind of capitalism, a capitalism with a human touch and face, if certainly not an outright “green capitalism” or the Greens’ capitalism.

We will present our argument in the following manner in this work: First, we will highlight how the Greens’ brand has become common by citing an array of numbers that attest to the Greens’ normalcy as well as importance in contemporary German politics and public life, how the Greens have become solidly institutionalized and “normalized,” how they have become fully established without being fully the establishment. We will then look in some detail as to how the four pillars that defined the very core of the Greens’ being and brand—ecology, feminism, peace, base democracy—have been internalized by the Greens’ political rivals and other players in German politics, none of whom would have done so on their own or from the goodness of their heart but were made to choose such steps of incorporation precisely because the success of the Greens’ brand compelled them to do so. We will concentrate on each of these four pillars and give ample examples to demonstrate how the content of the Greens’ core became a major part, if not the same core, in the quotidian world of the Greens’ opponents and rivals. In this segment of our work, we will look at the world external to the Greens to analyze the changes that they have wrought in the thirty years since their electoral success on 6 March 1983. We then turn our gaze to the internal world of the Greens and highlight some of the changes that have occurred to them in this time span.

And last, in the third segment of our report, we substantiate our statement of the Greens wearing suits but not having become such by providing snippets of the Greens’ contemporary habitus, appearance, and demeanor that we contrast to that of their predecessors who entered the hallowed halls of the Bundestag on the twenty-ninth of March in 1983. We will offer some overarching thoughts in our brief conclusion.
The Greens by the Numbers
Over the past thirty years the German Green Party has developed from a self-proclaimed “anti-party party” into a trusted coalition partner at all three levels of government: federal, state (Land), and local. Due to this self-proclaimed outsider status, integral to the Greens’ very identity, the development of the Greens from a loosely connected milieu of antinomian protesters and system critics into a full-fledged parliamentary party was necessarily tumultuous, featuring much conflict over the future of the party. Despite this somewhat chaotic development the Greens have, at this point, established themselves as Bundestag regulars, as well as extended their institutional presence throughout Germany and the world.

The Greens’ electoral ascent began with their first statewide electoral victory, which came in Bremen in 1979 (up until that point the Greens’ most notable electoral accomplishment came through capturing a large enough share of the vote in Hamburg and Lower Saxony to prevent the entrance of the FDP into those respective parliaments). The Greens won four seats in that election in Bremen; today they control nearly 250 seats throughout the various state parliaments of the Federal Republic. The Bundestag election of 1983 saw the Greens enter the federal parliament for the first time, winning 5.6 percent of the vote and receiving twenty-eight seats. This event embodied a huge accomplishment and undoubtedly played a role in pushing the Greens toward becoming in part a conventional party. From the party’s precursors represented by the various new social movements dotting the Federal Republic’s political landscape of the late 1970s, to its early days as a party in the first few years of the 1980s, the passionately conducted debate as to whether creating a party was the appropriate means to reach this milieu’s desired ends or whether the structures of movement politics would prove better to doing so was conducted around the pivot of conventionality, which most Greens at the time spurned. Still, a sufficient number argued that the attainment of the Greens’ aims was well worth the risk of playing with the dangers of conventionality which accompanied any parliamentary road to political power. But since parliaments, for better or worse, constituted the main loci of effecting policy in liberal democracies, one had to enter them to have a meaningful voice in such political formations.

With their ascension to the Bundestag, the Greens gained much in the way of media exposure. However it was the large sums of money that the German government provides parliamentary parties that proved particularly valuable. With the exception of the setback that was the post-unification election of 1990—the Greens failed to reach the 5 percent threshold in the former West, gaining their eight seats due only to their surpassing the electoral threshold in the former GDR—the Greens have gradually increased their seats in Bundestag elections over the decades, achieving their best result in 2009 when they received 10.7 percent of the national vote, amounting to sixty-eight seats.

As its electoral fortunes improved and its internal structures and rules evolved, the Green Party went from occupying a virtually exclusively oppositional role in German politics to serving in governing coalitions. This development was especially notable given the turbulent history of the issue of entering governments within the Green Party membership and the aforementioned contentious intra-movement and intra-party debate about the potential dangers of becoming respectable and conventional. During the 1980s the Green Party’s two wings, on the one hand the more movement-oriented, ideologically radical, conceptu-
ally purist and strategically uncompromising “fundamentalists” (Fundi); and on the other hand the much more realistically and practically oriented “realists” (Realos); clashed frequently over the issue of whether the Greens should pursue a path of fundamental opposition, or if a path toward becoming an available and acceptable player in coalitions with other parties—becoming koalitionsfähig, to use the appropriate German term—was more prudent.

The Greens first served in a coalition in 1985 in the state of Hessen. In many ways, this event broke the ban and barrier to entering the path toward parliamentary politics, which in the meantime has become the norm. The Greens served in ten separate coalitions across Germany at the state level before entering their first government on the national level. In 1998 the first red-green government was formed at the federal level, with Joschka Fischer serving as foreign minister and vice chancellor. This coalition of the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) survived the 2002 elections and lasted until 2005. This coalition featured a wide array of accomplishments, ranging from the reformation of Germany’s citizenship standards to efforts to limit and end the use of nuclear energy in Germany, both issues, one needs to add, that emanated from the core of the Greens’ political identity and belief structure. While clearly having to compromise with their senior coalition partner, the SPD, and while suffering a defeat at the hands of the FDP’s power in the Bundesrat, Germany’s important and potent upper chamber in the legislature, there can be no doubt that the introduction of such fundamental changes in the very center of Germany’s political identity occurred to a great degree on account of the Greens’ initiatives and perseverance. Thus, as became so often the case in red-green coalitions, here, too, it was the tail that wagged the dog instead of the other way around.

During the summer and early fall of 2012, at the time of this writing, there are red-green coalitions governing four German states: Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg, and Rheinland-Pfalz. The coalition in Baden-Württemberg is especially interesting because it represents the first Green-led government at the Land level in the history of the Federal Republic. The Greens received 24.1 percent of the vote in the Landtagswahl in 2011, more than doubling their previous result. This outcome was large enough to make them the second strongest party in the Landtag, where they eventually formed a green-red government, thus making it the very first time that the Greens were not the junior partner in a coalition (not counting arrangements on the local and municipal level) and catapulting Winfried Kretschmann to becoming the first Green minister-president in German history. Events such as these were unthinkable in the halcyon movement days of the Green Party of the late 1970s and early 1980s, back when they claimed much of their identity as an “anti-party party.” What would have been unthinkable nary three decades ago has mutated into complete normalcy and conventionality in today’s Germany as well as Europe.

Poll data show a substantial increase in various measures of ecological consciousness among the German populace. There exists ample evidence that Germans as a whole desire to protect the environment. These sentiments have—not coincidentally, we submit—grown concomitantly with the increasing popularity of the Green Party. While reformist shifts in such attitudes and sentiments cannot be attributed solely to the newfound presence and popularity of the Green Party—after all, it is possible, indeed even probable, that these value changes were in fact the impetus for the growing popularity of the Green Party in the first place—the interaction between these two (surrounding environment influencing party and party influencing surrounding environment) have created a symbiotic entity that created a new political discourse and reality in Germany as a whole which has, in the meantime, become the norm. Between 1986 and 1992 the percentage of Germans describing environmental protection as an “urgent problem” rose 9 percentage points, from an already very high 80 percent to the well-nigh virtual totality of 89 percent. Similar increases occurred with poll questions that were worded slightly differently, e.g., “Is the protection of the environment important to you?” which witnessed an increase from 91 percent to 94 percent between 1989 and 1991. In other words, worries about the environment have attained a veritable and uncontested totality in contemporary Germany. Expressing any disregard for the environment would be downright unpatriotic, un-German,
beyond the pale of accepted discourse and thought. One simply cannot be anti-environment in today's Germany. Being pro-nature is an uncontested common place that borders on uniformity. Impressive stuff indeed for a numerically small party!

Even in areas of Germany where the Greens have been only marginally competitive electorally, they nonetheless have a distinct institutional existence. The national presence of the Greens, as well as the united front that the party provides by dint of standing for such highly-cherished values as the environment and peace, is all the more notable given the diffuse and divided history of the party in which united fronts of any sort were virtually anathema. The proliferation of citizen action groups in Germany—in 1972 there were approximately 1,000 of such groups, by 1977 that number had increased to 50,000—helped create the milieu that would eventually foster and nurture the development first of the West German Green Party and subsequently of the Green Party in the new Germany. While the party's movement characteristics inevitably declined with its concomitant successes in electoral politics and institutional presence, they did not atrophy and continue with a healthy dose of intra-party pluralism. Yet, it is the Greens' core brands that have lent the party its competitive edge in the crowded space of the German political market. By being identified with these highly valued markers, this motley party actually presents what amounts to a successful united front.

Currently, the Greens have more than 400 county or district associations (Kreisverbände) and hundreds more municipal and local formations (Ortsverbände) throughout Germany that form the organizational foundation of their party. Interestingly, and so telling of the Greens' very being in terms of their profound cosmopolitanism and their (at least initially) unconventional approaches to politics, the proliferation of these green institutions even extends to the United States. In 2008 a Green local, an Ortsverband, was formed in Washington, DC, by a group of Germans looking to mobilize other Germans living in the Washington, DC, area to vote in the 2009 Bundestag election, talk German politics, organize green picnics, view Die Feuerzangenbowle, and engage in other social activities. At least as far as we can tell, this is the first such party organization to be formed outside of Germany and is a remarkable step for any political party to make. This is also a telling example as to how the Greens in general have become institutionalized in the conventional and "normal" manner while also maintaining their historical commitment to the salience of an organizational structure anchored in their commitment to grass-roots democracy (Basisdemokratie). Despite the DC Ortsverband's obvious connection to the national party back home in Germany—the website for the American Ortsverband utilizes a template that is repeated constantly throughout all of the party's websites for all of its Ortsverbände—the idea of an outpost of a German political party in America whose goal is to increase awareness about German politics among ex-pat Germans has a distinctly Green and thus democratic feel. Moreover, as our colleague Steven Milder, an expert on the early days of the Greens and Germany’s anti-nuclear protest movements, informs us, the idea for such a structure has an impressive genealogy since, according to Milder, the late Petra Kelly, one of the early Green leaders with particular ties to the United States, had expressed wishes for the Greens to establish some sort of outpost in the United States to establish dialogue with members of comparable milieus in this country. The Green movement has evolved from a loose-knit cultural and political milieu into a conventional, but also substantial, participant at every level of German government, with a broad institutional base that blankets all of Germany.

While a glance at membership rolls of most political parties will serve as a reasonable proxy for their overall development (be it expansion, contraction, or steadiness), the situation with the Greens is somewhat more complex. This stems from the party's (and the movement’s and milieu’s) history as an "anti-party party," and its skepticism, if not actual aversion and outright hostility, to becoming institutionalized and normalized as a party. Thus, from their very beginning, the Greens have consciously (almost programmatically) not been a member-seeking party. Consequently, their most significant gains in party membership have come—tellingly, and perhaps even faute de mieux—during key moments in the party's history: their unification with Bündnis ’90 in 1993, their forming of a red-green government on the federal level in 1998, and the combination of the debate about the extension of the continued viability
and production of Germany’s nuclear energy industry (*Laufzeitverlängerung*) and the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011. It was these exogenous events, rather than the party’s active engagement in any membership drives, that buoyed the Greens’ membership across the board. The Greens currently have nearly 60,000 members. With this number, they are approaching both the FDP’s and Die Linke’s membership tally, which the Greens are expected to surpass in the next few years.

In 2011, the Greens were the only party currently serving in the Bundestag to gain members, decidedly good news for a party that—by its detractors—is sometimes portrayed as representing a bygone era and caricatured as nothing more than a sixty-eighter milieu party merely embodying an outdated and irrelevant “scene” (*Szene*).

Perhaps few indicators reveal a party’s *arriviste* (not to use the more dreaded “established”) nature in German political life than sporting a foundation which—though nominally independent from said party—clearly belongs to its organizational, operational, and ideological purview. Like most other structures related to the party, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the Green Party’s foundation, has also expanded tremendously since its inception in 1997 when it replaced the Stiftungsverband Regenbogen. The Foundation now has offices in each German state and twenty-nine offices in foreign countries, from “expected” and “conventional” cities such as Washington, DC, Paris, and London, to more “exotic” venues such as Ramallah, Santiago, Cairo, and Bangkok. In addition to these offices, the Foundation conducts activities in dozens more countries (sixty in total). In 2008, the Stiftung presided over a budget of about €45 million, up from €36 million in 2004—approximately the same amount of money that the party itself had at its disposal. Education is an important aspect of the Foundation’s goals and to further this end the foundation provides approximately 1,000 university and PhD students with scholarships every year. The Heinrich Böll Stiftung vastly increases the institutional presence of the Greens both within Germany and internationally. It has been the party’s unofficial standard bearer and the equally unofficial but highly effective disseminator of its values. But any visit to this fine institution’s headquarters in one of Berlin’s trendiest and hippest areas visually reveals the Green Party’s current characteristic of being in the establishment with not being quite of it: men and women in roughly equal numbers dressed in casual clothes and conveying the appearance of social scientists at any of Europe’s or America’s large research universities scurrying about a hyper-modern, impressive-looking and anything but modest edifice sporting cutting-edge office technologies. The whole thing reflects the milieu of a big-city architectural firm on casual Fridays—or that of a sociology department on any day.

Party politics in developed democracies is no mean feat. Indeed, it is big business no matter how averse the Greens and others of similar political persuasions might be to the usage of such a near-blasphemous term. It very well fits the Greens’ cultural milieu and their political legacy to view money as a necessary evil, as basically dirty and corrupting, and certainly a medium in which they partake by necessity and default though never by choice and volition. But there simply is no way around the obvious fact that in all liberal democracies parties need big money to run big campaigns, staff their apparatuses, and coordinate other party activities. Similar to other aspects of their existence, the budget and income of the Green Party have expanded significantly over time. In 1983, the first year *Die Grünen* entered the Bundestag, the Greens had a total income of DM 19,757,967. For a fledgling parliamentary party this was a lot of money. Before switching to the euro, the Greens’ highest income in a single year was DM 56,976,167 in 1998—the year in which they entered a federal coalition for the first time. In 2010, the Greens achieved their highest income with €31,240,990. While it is notable that the former “anti-party party” operates with some serious cash, the origins of this money are telling as well. In 1983, for instance, of the approximately DM 19.8 million that the Greens received, upward of DM 11 million came as reimbursements from the government, nearly 2 million marks derived from membership dues, and approximately DM 150,000 from the contributions of the party’s parliamentary delegates’ salaries, the so-called *Mandatsträger*, representing 69.5 percent, 9.5 percent, and less than 1 percent of the party’s total income, respectively. These numbers are markedly different than their equivalent values in 2010 when the
Greens received €11,415,217 from the government as so-called “staatliche Mittel,” €6,597,014 as membership dues, and €6,979,775 from Mandatsträger—this time representing 36.5 percent, 21.1 percent, 22.3 percent of their total income, respectively. These increases, especially in the proportion of the budget comprising money donated from the party’s legislators and parliamentary representatives, demonstrate how the Greens have benefitted even materially from their institutionalization into mainstream German politics. To conclude this section: Even a cursory look at a few telling numbers conveys the Greens’ well-ensconced presence in Germany’s political and public life. By any measure of a party’s successful institutionalization in Germany—the quotidian presence at the local, state, and federal level, be it in the world of administration and bureaucracy on the one hand, and representation and governing on the other—the Greens have become a solidly anchored presence in Germany with no indications whatsoever of any weakening, let alone disappearance. In our assessment, there is simply no other way to categorize such a tally than a decided success.
THE FOUR PILLARS DEFINING GREEN IDENTITY
Ecology

Ecology is the most conspicuous and arguably the most essential of the four pillars of the “post-materialist” value structure that has come to define the very identity of the German Green Party. The mere fact that the party is not named “the Doves,” “the Feminists,” or “the Democrats,” but “the Greens,” amply demonstrates the prominence of nature and the environment as primus inter pares compared to the other three pillars that have been so essential to the Greens’ very existence: peace and pacifism; women and feminism; and grass-roots democracy. The origins of this emphasis are complex and require some explanation. Much has been written about the contributions of the “German traditions of romanticism, love of nature, and anti-modernism” as major contributors to nature’s and the environment’s centrality to the Greens’ identity, including by one of this work’s authors.31 The Green ideal of ecology has a “salience of a political tradition which has advocated similar demands in the past, although frequently in completely different contexts.”32 Indeed, as noted at the outset of this publication, while a clear relationship has existed between nature’s centrality in German thought and politics and the Greens’ successful embracing of these concerns, the novelty with which the Greens approached them created a variance that in many cases trumped the extant overlaps. In other words, despite the already heightened level of environmental concern defining a baseline in Germany that arguably was more pronounced than in other advanced industrial democracies of the 1970s, the Greens have nonetheless transformed the role that the environment plays in German politics as well as expanded ideas and sensibilities about the type of regulations required to protect it. The Greens have also turned the environment into an issue that motivates voters across the political spectrum. No longer are ecological concerns merely the bailiwick of radical ecologists. Indeed, through their strenuous efforts and their continued engagement on behalf of this issue, the Greens were able to transform an amorphous but extant baseline affection for nature that was so widespread in Germany into an enduring commitment to a world defined by solid policies and sound management on behalf of nature’s protection and the larger related complex of sustainability.

Regardless of the previous environmental consciousness of the German citizenry, the Greens certainly raised the prominence of the environment as a political issue. They succeeded in forging vague sympathies into concrete steps of politics and administration, not bad for a party that—certainly at its beginning and early years of its activities—was often derided for its excessive emotionalism and inability to resolve issues in a rational manner. The Greens’ success in this realm was so compelling that other parties had to follow suit and imitate them, proving yet again that no flattery is greater than imitation. As noted by Markovits and Gorski in The German Left, “Every party, including the CDU, CSU, and FDP, has been devoting much attention to ecology as a critical issue […] Germany’s stringent recycling law […] is a consequence of the Greens’ influence on the public discourse and ecological awareness of the German population […] Being anti-ecological in contemporary Germany has become nothing short of blasphemous.”33 Nothing defines the Green brand more emphatically to Germans and Europeans—indeed around the world—than their commitment to the protection of the environment. The association Greens = Ecology has become ironclad and immutable. All brands crave such automatic associations. The Greens have attained it in spades, an
obvious marker of success.

In particular, the jettisoning of all nuclear options as a legitimate and viable source for energy, which the Greens were the first among any political party in Germany to bring into the public eye, has received a special salience, even urgency, in German politics. Since the early 1980s the Greens, with their demand of eventual and unconditional departure from nuclear energy, the vaunted Atomausstieg, have maintained a strong anti-nuclear stance that has formed the core of their identity. At its outset, this met with fierce opposition by all other Bundestag parties. However, by 2000 the red-green government passed the "Agreement Between the Federal Government and Energy Companies," which began the process of Germany’s gradual departure from nuclear energy, thus fulfilling one of the Greens’ most long-standing goals. In 2010, the CDU/CSU-FDP government further modified the Atomgesetz to extend the life of Germany’s existing nuclear power plants, the so-called "Laufzeitverlängerung." The fact that the right-of-center government saw fit only to lengthen—rather than confirm, let alone improve—the operations of Germany’s nuclear power plants is telling. The government could have abandoned Atomausstieg in its entirety. However the enduring strength of anti-nuclear sentiment, even among the conservative constituencies of the CDU/CSU/FDP government, precluded this possibility. Thus, what was once central to the identity of a group of post-materialist hippies and formed their core demand in politics had—in the course of two to three decades—mutated into the absolute mainstream of German politics and public discourse.

The institutionalization of ecology and sustainability in the broad arena of German politics is amply demonstrated by the way in which the other political parties have incorporated ecology into their own programs, beliefs, and values. A paper published by several young CSU ecology experts—"Umweltpolitiker"—in 2012 showcases this institutionalization. The document is titled "Out of Responsibility for the Creation" and advocates that "all of Bavaria should become climate neutral, Bavaria should only invest money using social, ethical, and ecological criteria, and Germany should reinstitute the solar program of the red-green administration." In the meantime, the paper has already been approved by the relevant district council (Bezirksvorstand) of the CSU. The types of issues discussed in this CSU document address traditionally green goals, while also making use of distinctly green vocabulary, displaying once again the influence the Greens have exerted over the political status quo, including the very party that one could safely argue to have occupied the German political spectrum’s very opposite from the Greens.

By incorporating longstanding green ideas into their own ideologies, other parties can destabilize the status of the Green Party as the sole protector of the environment and ecology by undermining the Greens’ claim to be the only advocates for this crucial cause. Unlike in the market, where brands can safeguard their originality and authenticity via various copyright laws and other protective measures, such is not possible in the political marketplace where the cooperation of an opponent’s viable ideas—its brand in effect—is commonplace. It is then left to the progenitor of the original brand to fight for its authenticity in front of the voters and hope that they will recognize it as such, then reward the progenitor and punish the imitator. Political markets—unlike their economic counterparts—provide absolutely no protection to innovators and purveyors of originality. Indeed, it is precisely this free-for-all that embodies arguably one of the key hallmarks of what it means to be a liberal democracy rather than some kind of dictatorship.

During the coalition negotiations between the FDP and the CDU/CSU in 2009, there was considerable tension over the cultivation of MONS810, a type of genetically modified corn within Germany, with the CDU and CSU—especially the latter—wanting to ban it. Of course, the Greens have long opposed genetically modified food products and have demanded strict labeling laws for foods that contain genetically modified ingredients, among other policies that promote traditional agriculture and food production. The Greens have consistently opposed policies that support mechanized agribusiness.

Renate Künast, former leading candidate (Spitzenkandidat) of the Green Party, responded dismissively to the various instances of topic theft or Themenzidau, arguing that parties such as the CDU and CSU only pay lip-service to green ideals, but fail
to follow through with green legislation. In other words, the Greens’ rivals only copied the shape of the Greens’ demands without wanting their actual contents. Understandably, the Greens lobbed many accusations of failed authenticity and lack of sincerity at their political rivals, none more pronounced perhaps than their derision of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s perceived penchant for taking photos in front of glaciers while attending climate summits. Political theater or not, the fact that these parties recognize the salience of the environment, specifically saving it, as a political issue is a testament to the premium that has been placed on the appearance of being pro-environment in all of German politics and public discourse, which—and few can doubt this—was first articulated by the Greens. Being openly dismissive of environmental concerns is tantamount to political suicide in today’s Germany. Nobody vaguely sane and with any kind of political ambition would speak ill of the environment. Being green on this dimension has become tantamount to being a good citizen, a good German, a good European.

Another example of the continued salience of ecological thinking is evident in the German political establishment’s reaction to the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan. Days after the disaster, politicians from both the Greens and the SPD were criticizing the CDU/CSU-FDP government regarding the Laufzeitverlängerung. Almost overnight, Angela Merkel reversed her decision regarding the government’s previous policies concerning Germany’s power plants by outlining her new policy of Atom-Moratorium, which in essence committed itself to have the Federal Republic be rid of nuclear energy as a source of power within a decade. If this does not constitute a decided victory for the Greens, we do not quite know what would.

Regardless of the 180 degree change in policy (maybe even in heart) on the part of the German government, the aftermath of the nuclear disaster in Japan saw the popularity of the Greens skyrocket in opinion polls. After the earthquake and ensuing tsunami, the Greens polled as high as 23 percent in various so-called “Sunday query” (Sonntagsfragen) polls, which were accompanied by the much more important and impressive results in several state elections. We have already alluded to the result in Baden-Württemberg, but the Greens achieved similarly remarkable victories in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Rheinland-Pfalz. In the former, the Greens attained 8.7 percent after failing to meet the 5 percent hurdle in 2006. The improvement in Rheinland-Pfalz was more impressive still with the Greens more than tripling their previous tally by winning 15.4 percent of the vote. These results testify to the continuing significance of nuclear and environmental politics in the Federal Republic as well as to the public’s identification of it with the Greens, particularly in periods of crisis. Just as Chernobyl helped the Greens’ cause both in their legislative presence as well as in their other political and social activities throughout the late 1980s, so, too did Fukushima enhance the Greens’ standing in German politics and public opinion almost exactly twenty-five years later. As with all brands, authenticity attains the greatest salience in periods of doubt and insecurity.

Perhaps even more important than these electoral victories, at least symbolically, were the consequences of the coalition negotiations between the SPD and the Greens in the aftermath of the election in Baden-Württemberg. Having done exceptionally well in the election, garnering upward of 24 percent of the vote, the Greens had a strong bargaining position. The Greens were the second strongest party, behind only the CDU, and thus were poised to reverse the nearly three decade old formula of red-green coalitions in which they were always the SPD’s junior partner. Not at this juncture: With Winfried Kretschmann becoming the very first Green minister-president in any of the German Länder, the Greens had emerged as top dogs, as bosses at the executive helm of a very important state. Polls conducted by Infratest-Dimap showed that the Greens in this election had gained a significant number of votes from every other party represented in the Landtag. The FDP in particular suffered significantly, losing approximately 60,000 voters to the Greens. The CDU also had a sizable number of voters abandon it in that the Greens received more than 80,000 votes from people who had previously voted for the Christian Democratic Union. These types of massive electoral shifts from established parties to what had been considered a fringe would have been extremely implausible prior to various core green issues becoming part of Germany’s quotidian political norm.
Even outside the political world, ecology, as well as its accompanying buzzword "sustainability" is very much a brand; appealed to constantly in advertising for an astoundingly wide array of products and services, including food items, building materials, banks, and cars, to name but a few. These claims are so common, and, unfortunately, so commonly misleading, that several websites have been created for the sole purpose of evaluating these claims about their alleged environmental friendliness and sustainability. One of the most popular of these websites is the "Climate Lie-Detector," which asks the following question on its homepage: “Suddenly everyone’s trying to save the climate. Really?” Regardless of the effectiveness of the actual product, merely its label and claim of being green, sustainable, and organic in whatever vague manner this might be the case, enjoys an a priori positive valence and invokes virtue. It is often unclear what exactly these concepts mean and what their actual effect is in practice, but greenness conveys an a priori legitimacy in contemporary German discourse that is priceless and more or less uncontested.

This is any brand’s epitome of success. The Greens’ core value of saving the environment has attained a monopoly of virtue in Germany as a whole, which tolerates no opposing views on a serious scale. The epitome of any brand’s success is its nearly total elimination of opposing brands and the marginalization of rival narratives as legitimate alternatives. The Greens have attained precisely such a state in Germany on their core issue of ecology. This is no mean feat in such short a time. All kudos to them!

Feminism and Women

Women have played an important role in German politics for more than a century. Well beyond the well-known figures of the Left like Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin, women have not been strangers to German political life even if they had been—as in all comparable industrial societies—at its margins, and clearly not by their own choosing. Thus, for example, we would be remiss not to mention here the four “Mothers of the Basic Law”. Elisabeth Selbert, Friederike Nadig, Helene Weber (who also worked on the Weimar constitution), and Helene Wessel. These women were responsible for the portion of the Basic Law that calls unmistakably for “men and women [to] have equal rights,” which would clearly give an important legitimating frame for women’s future participation in German politics and public affairs. Women such as Elizabeth Schwarzhaupt, a CDU Bundestag member who in 1961 became the first female cabinet minister in German history; the SPD’s Annemarie Renger, the first female president of the German Bundestag, elected to this illustrious position in 1972; and Angela Merkel, the first female chancellor of the Federal Republic, are but the most prominent representatives and beneficiaries of this inclusive inclination.

But inclinations and gestures remain distant from and marginal to the norm which manifested itself much more emphatically in the low percentage of women participating in politics on all three levels of German government, none more than on that of the federation. Despite the aforementioned notable achievements, the percentage of women in the Bundestag dipped below 10 percent in 1957 and stayed there until 1983. This underrepresentation of women in public life belied the equality guaranteed them by the Basic Law and was consistently criticized by feminists in general and members of the Green Party in particular.

As the most emphatic institutional representatives of the emancipatory movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and as the most ideal-typical embodiment of the New Left under whose aegis the so-called Second Women’s Movement was to change public life in all advanced industrial societies to a degree that was previously unimaginable, it should come as no surprise at all that the Greens have been Germany’s most emphatic and persistent leaders on the central issue of women’s equal role in politics and society for the last three decades. Thus, it is no coincidence that the first term in which the Greens served in the Bundestag comprised exactly the time period in which the percentage of women serving in that body reached 10 percent for the first time in decades. As the Greens established themselves among the voting public and within governmental institutions, the rights of and for women in their most varied and comprehensive aspects (if not necessarily “feminism” in its explicit and radical manifestations), gained an enduringly higher salience in German political life than it
ever had at any stage in German history.

The Greens were the first parliamentary party in Germany to create rules that were expressly designed to ensure the substantive numerical presence of women as the party’s representatives in the country’s various legislatures (so-called Mandatsträgerinnen) and in leadership positions within the party itself. The party explains the reasoning behind this decision in a special section of its website: “In the women’s statute of the Greens it is stipulated that women deserve at least half of all offices and mandates. In elections to boards of directors or in the preparation of lists for parliamentary elections the odd seats will be occupied by women—the first place is therefore reserved for a woman. This influences our politics and policies: equal opportunities for women and men constitute one of our central policy demands, and there is much left to be done. We want to create a framework to ensure that women have equal opportunities in employment and also that in everyday life, work in a woman’s career as well as her family can (and will) be equally divided between women and men.”

Since this egalitarian scheme’s inception, it has proven very successful in ensuring and further increasing gender parity within the Green Party’s leadership and parliamentary delegation. In fact, this scheme’s immense success and overall legitimacy can once again—just like in matters of ecology discussed in the previous section—be gauged by its being copied by the Greens’ rivals in the Bundestag. With the exception of the FDP, which is under tremendous pressure from within its own ranks to enact similar rules, all parties represented in Germany’s federal legislative body—and thus the pinnacle of the country’s focus of leadership and power—and have adopted reforms and rules that if not mirror the Greens’ gender reforms identically, represent close copies of them. Yet again, imitation is the most confirming and flattering form of success. The Greens’ special commitment to gender equality has gained salience—indeed prominence—within the German political system.

The SPD was the first Bundestag party to follow the lead of the Greens and institute a women’s quota (Frauenquote) for intra-party leadership positions as well as the party’s parliamentary representation. In 1988, the SPD decided to establish a 40 percent women’s quota for both structures. While this policy has significantly increased the percentages of women within the various SPD parliamentary delegations (16.1% in 1987; 27.2% in 1990; 38.4% in 2009, the highest the SPD has achieved thus far), the party has consistently fallen short of its stated goal of 40 percent. That said, 38.4 percent is not bad, especially when accompanied by the equally respectable tally of 37 percent of SPD representatives in the sixteen state parliaments being female in 2011, thus giving clear testimony to the fact that the party’s legislators well beyond the top had witnessed a meaningful influx of women. Add to this that 46 percent of the so-called Federal Presidium (Bundespräsidium) and a whopping 58 percent of the party’s executive committee (Parteivorstand) is female, and there is ample evidence that women do in fact play a key role in this party’s leadership structure. Thus, the myriad red-green coalitions that became commonplace in the landscape of German politics over the past three decades and in which the Greens almost always served as the SPD’s junior partner, left many a mark on the senior partner in a bevy of areas, not least in the gender composition of its central players and crucial representatives.

The Greens and the SPD have also introduced and supported legislation that would have initiated these gender quotas well beyond the immediate confines of their own organizational purview and made them commonplace in the German economy and private industry. Various versions of such legislation have been advanced over time, but the common theme to all involves a legally binding quota regarding the proportion of women in leadership positions at large German companies. While no such legislation has actually been passed into law at the time of this writing, the informal pressure and the increasing societal legitimacy of the demand for gender equality has led to numerous companies instituting such reforms on their own. The largest and most prominent among these has been Deutsche Telekom, which decided that 30 percent of its middle- and upper-level management will be women by the end of 2015. Another prominent organization in Germany that has instituted very similar reforms is the ver.di (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft), the
large trade union for service employees that represents over two million German workers. In recent years the union instituted a 50:50 female-male quota within all of its governing committees. Despite the fact that the red-green governments of the late 1990s and early 2000s were unable to pass legislation of gender equality at the federal level, the fact that this type of legislation is even discussed and remains under consideration at the highest levels of government demonstrates the special salience that women’s issues have attained in Germany over the past three decades, in good part due to the Greens.

Despite the Old Left’s longstanding claim that a proper pursuit—let alone complete attainment—of socialism will automatically and inevitably lead to the liberation of all women from the yoke of bourgeois tyranny and capitalism’s iniquities, we need not belabor in this forum how “real existing socialism” just like “real existing social democracy” added little to the proper liberation of women either within the Old Left’s institutions themselves or in the arena of their operation. Truth be told, by subsuming the liberation of women as a simple epiphenomenon to the liberation of the proletariat, the Old Left made few, if any, efforts in fighting the extant sexism of the societies in which it operated, often abating such sexism like so many other aspects of bourgeois culture.

Thus, there can be not much doubt that the current Frauenquoten utilized by Die Linke in the Bundestag owes its existence to the larger legacy and societal influence of the Greens and their New Left milieu and culture rather than to traditions hailing from the world of the Old Left which, after all, continues to embody the bulk of this party’s identity and history. Since Die Linke first entered the Bundestag in 1990—when it was still known as the PDS before assuming its current nomenclature after the PDS and an entity called WASG merged in the course of the 2000s—the party has never had a female quota in its Bundestag presence lower than 43.3 percent. When the party temporarily lost its status as a full-fledged caucus (Fraktion) in parliament between 2002 and 2005, it was represented solely by two women, Petra Pau and Gesine Lötzsch, both of whom had attained their seats by dint of winning their respective districts in Berlin. Thus, they were both accorded a seat in the legislature regardless of how their party as a whole fared with the electorate, confirming the primacy of the so-called Direktmandat in the framework of German electoral law, constitutional interpretation, and traditions of political convention and culture. The method of ensuring the representation of women that Die Linke has come to use largely conforms to that of the Greens, which, among others, demands an explanation of any deviation from the strict rule of a 50:50 parity in the staffing of positions. Party culture exacts that such discrepancies not only be explained and justified but—more important, of course—avoided.

Despite the notable accomplishments of women hailing from the Christian Democratic Union, as recently as in the late 1980s fewer than 8 percent of the CDU Bundestag deputies were women. This persistent problem did not go unnoticed by the CDU membership and leadership who, in 1996 in Hannover, passed an exploratory women’s quorum (Frauenquorum), which was renewed indefinitely in 2001. The CDU explains this Frauenquorum in a pamphlet distributed by the party in the following manner: “We must strive to intensify the cooperation with and promotion of women at all rungs of our party. This is an important task for all levels of the party. The proportion of women among members of the CDU, approximately 25%, is still too low. Also, among our office holders in the party and among our representatives in the various legislatures, women remain a minority. Our policy is clear: women should constitute at least one third of all party officers and legislators of the CDU.”

During the parliamentary term from 1994-1998, 13.9 percent of the CDU deputies were women. This percentage peaked between 2002 and 2005, when 23 percent of the CDU Bundestag Fraktion were women, before backsliding slightly to 20.1 percent in the most recent Bundestag term. Although there is a continuing disparity between men and women in the Union, the CDU’s Frauenquorum seems to be having a positive effect on women’s placement and promotion inside the party and its purview. Also, despite the different name and comparative moderation of the CDU directive, the gesture is unmistakably related to the policy on gender equality instituted by the Greens a decade earlier. No matter how one twists and turns it, advocating for the substantive representation of
women on equal parity with men on all levels of politics and society is an idea with a distinctly Green lineage.

Even the CSU, the CDU’s more conservative Bavarian sister-party, has had to deal with the type of women-friendly if not explicitly feminist politics originally advocated by the Greens. In 2010, the party decided to institute a system similar to that used by the CDU, demanding—mirabile dictu—a higher percentage of female representation than the CDU. Thus, the CSU directive calls for 40 percent of the offices of the party’s Kreis and Ortsverbände to be occupied by women. It is difficult to evaluate how this change will affect the party, as there have been no elections at the federal level or within Bavaria since this directive’s adoption. However, the CSU certainly has room for improvement: only six of its forty-four Bundestag representatives are women. It is hard to imagine the CSU introducing a women’s quota without the pressure exerted by the actions of the other parties in parliament and without the issue attaining a broadening legitimacy in the German political discourse as a whole.

Even though the FDP, as one might expect pursuant to its philosophical adherence to classical European liberalism (in stark contrast to the American variant of this political label), opposes in principle any formations such as quotas of any kind that favor any collective, regardless how worthy, over the individual, the party has sotto voce nonetheless also significantly increased the number of women within its parliamentary delegation. In 1983, the first year that the Greens served in the Bundestag, three of the FDP’s thirty-five parliamentary representatives were women, accounting for a meager 8.6 percent of the total delegation. By 1990, that percentage had increased to 20.3 percent. In the present session of the Bundestag, 24.7 percent of the FDP parliamentary caucus is female, a notably higher total than either the CDU’s or CSU’s, their respective statutes and directives for the advancement of women notwithstanding.

In 1994 the FDP recognized the Liberale Frauen, founded in 1990, as the official women’s organization of the party. This is significant because in 2011 there emerged substantial disagreement between the Liberale Frauen and the “patriarchy of the FDP higher ups” over the treatment of women within the party in general and the establishment of some sort of inner-party women’s quota in particular. In January, the chairwoman of the Liberale Frauen characterized the party thusly: “The FDP is a men’s club. You face an uncanny headwind if you count yourself among the Liberale Frauen.” This criticism has been echoed by other prominent women within the FDP, including the former deputy chairperson of the federal party, Brigitte Susanne Pöpel. Pöpel, who resigned from her post and left the party in 2012, clarified her departure to the Süddeutsche Zeitung with the following rather unequivocal words: “A tone hostile to women and family prevails in the FDP at the local, state, and federal levels.”

These criticisms leveled against the FDP are similar in tone and content to the charges that the Greens inveighed against the entire German political system in the early 1980s. One small but tangible remedy for the Greens of this societal injustice was their introduction of a quota system designed to help women attain advancement by political fiat that the then-normal state of things would not permit them. We find it a significant indicator of the distance that the Greens’ remedy has traversed in the Federal Republic of Germany’s politics over the past three decades that a group such as the Liberale Frauen would favor such a system, in essence embracing a Green idea and policy as their own. The notion that formal equality for women, as guaranteed by the Basic Law, necessitated the introduction of quotas to attain a degree of substantive representation that still remains far from embodying a real gender equality but that has, at least, commenced the long and arduous journey in the right direction, owes its existence to the Greens who were the very first to have introduced it both conceptually and concretely to German politics—and beyond.

Peace and Pacifism

Similar to the extolling of nature and the key concepts of ecology, so, too, has peace evolved as a distinct political ideology and a significant icon for popular mobilization, particularly in leftist and progressive circles, in the Federal Republic after World War II. From protests against the re-arming of the Bundeswehr and West Germany’s joining NATO, to
the opposition of the stationing of atomic weapons on German soil in the 1950s and 1960s; from the massive opposition to the Vietnam War, to the discontinuation of the compulsory military draft (Wehrpflicht) in 2011; the pursuit of peace and the spurning of all acts of state-led violence, particularly involving Germans, has become one of the Federal Republic’s most distinct political markers, a veritable credo beyond any questioning and doubt. Perhaps in direct response to Germany’s bellicosity in the first half of the twentieth century, Germans have embraced peace as a non-negotiable virtue, deeming themselves among its most valiant practitioners on earth. Even though explicit pacifism in its strictest meaning, i.e., the categorical rejection of any force under any and all circumstances, has, possibly, diminished in ideological importance due to international events throughout the 1990s, there remains a deep-seated skepticism of the use of military force that pervades virtually all of German society and enjoys wide-spread legitimacy among all political parties represented in the Bundestag.88

But in this area, too, the Greens have assumed pride of place. Since its founding, the Green Party has been a consistent advocate for peace, although the absolute nature of this consistency was somewhat compromised by the massacres in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The mass slaughter of civilians caused “many members of the Green and Social Democratic parties to question the degree to which one half of their old mantra, ‘Never Again War,’ was compatible with the other, ‘Never Again Auschwitz.’”89

This dilemma raises another related and equally sensitive issue that has assumed center stage for the Greens from their very beginning as a movement and subsequently as a party: the absolute value and universal applicability of human rights. While the issue of pacifism per se and at all costs has somewhat waned for the Green Party, especially since its first entrance into governmental responsibilities on the federal level in 1999, peace and its maintenance as well as attainment, and the basic opposition to any state-led force, continue to be central tenets of the Green Party. Any use of force needs to be an absolutely last resort and can only be implemented in a strictly confined manner solely for the purpose of preventing a genocide or a humanitarian disaster of similar magnitude.90

The centrality of peace attained a particular salience for the German Greens when compared to their eponymous colleagues across Europe. Until the middle of the 1990s, the positions relating to any acts of military intervention (Kampfeinsätze) advocated by the Greens (and, to be fair, much of the SPD as well, in other words both the green and the red German Left) were “out of line with their ideological counterparts in other European countries such as France and Britain.”91 This attitude experienced a reluctant—and only temporary—modification caused by the massacre of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at the hands of the Serbian army in Srebrenica, making this genocidal act the absolute worst in Europe’s history since the end of World War II. For instance, despite the Greens’ explicit commitment to pacifism within their party platform, half of their parliamentary delegation in the Bundestag voted in favor of German participation in the Implementation Force in Bosnia.92 Indeed, even the party’s left-wing was flummoxed as to how the Bosnian conflict could be resolved peacefully: “In private discussion documents, the party admitted having no answers as to how to stop the Serbs or protect the civilian population.”93 It was in the process of this intra-Green showdown that Joschka Fischer, one of the party’s key leaders from the early 1980s until 2005, formulated what we continue to deem one of the most important public documents of postwar German politics. In a twelve page open letter, Fischer argued that under certain rare, perhaps even singular, historic configurations, which obviously, so he believed, pertained to the genocidal situation in Bosnia as the premeditated and well-planned slaughter in Srebrenica had clearly demonstrated, the sacrosanct belief in peace had to be temporarily suspended for the greater good of saving thousands of innocent lives, if necessary even by military intervention. If the horrors of German history taught young Germans to spurn war and extol peace at all costs, then it also surely taught them to abhor the genocidal murder of innocent civilians at the hands of power-hungry and unaccountable dictators.94 With his letter, Fischer had opened a huge debate engulfing much of German intellectual and political life way beyond the confines of the Greens as party and milieu.
And sure enough, his statement did not remain unchallenged within the Green community. The quartet of equally prominent Green leaders comprising Kerstin Müller, Claudia Roth, Ludger Volmer, and Jürgen Trittin responded to Fischer with a similarly lengthy letter outlining why they believed that continued categorical opposition to the use of force remained not only the strategically wisest but, more important still, the sole morally acceptable response for the Greens, and by extension for Germans and Germany. Their letter carried the telling title, “Where will the demand for obligatory military intervention against genocide lead?” This letter focused primarily on the slippery slope of creating an inevitable obligation to intervene in any conflict that the United Nations labels a genocide, arguing that these types of conflicts are often difficult to differentiate from civil wars and other regional conflicts. The letter expressed profound skepticism concerning the wisdom of sending German troops all over the world and invoked never to allow such a situation to provide a precedent which could then lead to an obligation to engage in such military acts possibly on a regular basis.

NATO’s war against the Serbs over the Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999 would further test and strain the Greens’ pacifist commitments. After all, they were now part of a governing coalition with Joschka Fischer being Germany’s foreign minister as well as vice chancellor. Suddenly, the issues of pacifism versus humanism; peace versus military intervention assumed a dimension of immediacy and urgency about which the Greens had most likely not even dreamed when they entered the Bundestag in 1983. But their political success propelled them right into the heart of German and European power. Gone were the days of the comforts of a hippie-ized milieu in which talk was cheap and actions barely mattered. It was show time! And sure enough, the red-green government, under the leadership of a Social Democrat and a Green, made the unprecedented decision in April 1999 to enter into combat as a NATO ally bombarding a country (Yugoslavia) and a city (Belgrade) that the Nazi Luftwaffe had attacked in April 1941. The missions flown by German fighter jets during this conflict represented the very first time that German troops were actively engaged in actual military combat since the end of World War II.

It would be way beyond the confines of this work to analyze in further detail the intra-Green debates about the moral need to participate in the war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 on the one hand; and the equally salient moral need not to do so under any circumstances. Suffice it to say that seldom have we seen intra-party debates in any postwar European setting conducted with such deep conviction, oratorical brilliance, and unbridled passion—alas, also acrimony, even assault—as was the case that spring with the German Greens. Many Germans and Europeans mouth the now-platitudinous mantras of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz.” However, it was clear to any careful observer at that time that the Greens deeply empathized with and stood for both of these credos, and that the (at least temporal) incompatibility between these two identity-forming beliefs caused a lot of genuine soul searching and pain for many in the party and the movement.

Despite the numerous instances where a German federal government has sent German troops abroad, it has never been an easy decision, always fraught with immense controversy, and meeting with massive opposition bespeaking once again the absolute centrality of peace to German public life way beyond the Greens. As recently as 2012, with the NATO intervention in the Libyan conflict all but a done deal, the CDU/CSU-FDP-led federal government displayed its commitment to peace at virtually any cost by exhausting all non-combative options, which included an abstention by Germany from the Security Council resolution to authorize military action in Libya. Thus, even—or perhaps especially—a conservative-led German government risked angering its allies in NATO and the European Union such as the United States, Great Britain, and particularly France in this case by refusing to publicly endorse, let alone actually join, the military campaign knowing full well that such a move enjoys a massive approval by the German public.

Guido Westerwelle, Germany’s foreign minister at the time of this writing, described the bedrock of his government’s foreign policy spiffily: “German foreign policy is peace policy.” All fine, except this is not new and bespeaks a great continuity in German foreign policy bridging a number of governments bearing different political colors and ideologies.
Indeed, these very words borrow the first sentence of the foreign policy chapter of the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens, secured in the aftermath of the 1998 election. We are not accusing the German foreign minister of plagiarism. Instead, we mean to highlight how multi-partisan and pan-partisan the sentiments of peace have been in German politics in which the Greens, it turns out, are no longer the outliers that they still love to be, but have come to represent the norm and the boring middle. In the same interview in which Westerwelle uttered the above quotation, he also explained that, “German foreign and security policy follow a line in which military operations are only a last resort.”

Despite their continued and probably permanent reluctance to tolerate, let alone accommodate, armed interventions for humanitarian purposes, the Greens remain unconditionally opposed to any armed conflicts that they deem wars of opportunity and choice. Thus, the Greens were quick to reject any German involvement in the most recent U.S. war in Iraq, continue to oppose Germany’s participation in NATO’s U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, and opposed the NATO-led campaign in Libya.

The most significant event in recent years relating to the larger peace-pacifism complex pertains to Germany’s abolishing the compulsory military draft for young men. Despite the fact that an ever-decreasing number of young Germans opted to fulfill this obligation by actually serving in the military, choosing instead to perform tasks in the so-called civilian service (Zivildienst), the de jure suspension of the draft symbolizes emphatically what a decidedly core value and immense legitimacy all things involving peace have come to embody in contemporary German society. The Greens’ impetus for this momentous development cannot be overstated. For them, the passage of this law represented the culmination of a thirty-year committed campaign on behalf of non-violence and peace which—in its contours—became a cherished public good in German society as a whole. Here is the Greens’ welcoming declaration as found on the website of the party’s Bundestag delegation: “On Thursday, the Bundestag, with the passage of the Military Law Amendment Act of 2011, voted for the suspension of compulsory military service as of 7/1/2011. The suspension of compulsory military service in Germany is a historic, long overdue step, which we strongly welcome.”

Polling data suggest that peace is a more prominent and important value in Germany than in Europe as a whole. In a Eurobarometer poll from November 2008, 45 percent of respondents from across the European Union member states named “peace” as the value that was most important to them. In November of 2009 the same question was asked in Germany and in this case 61 percent of those polled said that peace was their most important value. Despite the continued deployment of the German military abroad, most notably in Afghanistan, the scope of these operations has been quite limited and massively proscribed by the government to a point where the actual combat in which these troops engage is quite minimal and most certainly much less than that pursued by British, French, and other NATO troops, let alone the United States armed forces. Put simply, military actions of any kind remain deeply unpopular in contemporary German society with no signs of any change in the near or even distant future.

While a strict adherence to an orthodox pacifist doctrine is no longer part of the Greens’ ideology or political make up, it was largely abandoned only when it came into direct conflict with the Greens’ concomitant obligation to the upholding of human rights. The Greens continue to maintain that preemptive wars, wars of choice, or any wars designed to advance national interests remain ineffective as a political strategy and contemptible as a human act. In a sense, though, the Greens’ radical pacifism has become a moot point because by dint of the German public’s massive disdain for any bellicosity in general, let alone any involving Germany in particular, this pacifism has become subsumed by the society and culture at large. In a sense, just like there is nothing particularly Green anymore about loving nature and fighting to preserve it, so, too, there seems little Green in today’s Germany about extolling peace at virtually any and all costs. Peace and pacifism are not contentious issues in contemporary Germany’s lively democracy. A vast consensus celebrates them as one of post-Nazi Germany’s great contributions to European civilization and culture and offering Germans a moral perch from which they can berate others—Americans and Israelis in particular, in particular with Syrians, Russians,
Sudanese, and other peoples committing horrible atrocities accorded much greater leniency and much more muted outrage by the German public and media—for being beholden to baser values. One need not be a particularly well-versed analyst to realize how—given Germany’s recent history—it must feel particularly rewarding to Germans to be able to lecture Americans and Israelis (meaning Jews, of course) about their moral turpitude from a self-proclaimed moral perch.

**Basisdemokratie: The Stringency of Democracy from Below**

In its early years, the Green Party portrayed itself as the parliamentary representative and the political arm of the new social movements and, by extension, the world of the New Left. More important still, perhaps, was the fact that regardless of the Greens’ self-depiction and understanding, German society at large viewed the Greens as such. Part and parcel of this entire milieu that appeared so forcefully on the political stage of virtually all advanced industrial societies in the late 1960s was that “new” politics entailed not only the introduction of a radically different content, but that such would have remained vacuous and meaningless without a concomitant, and equally radical, change in form. At the very core of both, altered form and content, lay the medium of participatory democracy, which demanded that all politics be the creation of an egalitarian collective in which the whole’s will could never be usurped by an arrogant elite. Any kind of leadership had to be fully embedded in the collective’s active participation, not merely its nominal approval. Politics was to be the very creation of a committed collective and never the product of elites. These convictions as well as practices of radical democracy owed more to the various strains of anarchism than to those of socialism.

The Greens prided themselves on embodying this kind of participatory democracy in their very core, basking in a participatory culture that extolled grass roots democracy, or what they came to call *Basisdemokratie*, as a virtue every bit as worthy as ecology, women’s rights, and peace. Indeed, this term became a veritable “magic word” of early Green ideology and identity. To the best of its abilities, the Green Party sought to avoid establishing any kind of hierarchy within its ranks lest such undermine the party’s democratic existence and mission. For that purpose, the party instituted a number of steps each of which had the explicit purpose to enhance *Basisdemokratie* and impede the formation of and governance by entrenched elites. Thus, for example, top party offices were originally totally honorific with no remuneration whatsoever. Thus while everybody was encouraged to live for politics, nobody should live off it. Whereas this policy was rooted in a genuine, deep mistrust of the inherent elitism and undemocratic nature of professional politics, it obviously carried consequences which, too, were potentially elitist and undemocratic in their own way. By making the top offices in the Green Party unpaid positions, the party essentially ensured that these offices could not be filled by those party members that needed to work for a living, thereby creating a different impediment to a truly democratic order. Party meetings at this time were lengthy affairs since everyone that wished to speak was allowed to do so with virtually no limit placed on the length of her or his contribution. Clearly, some of these practices had to be compromised by the institutional limits and exigencies that the Greens came to experience with their increasing entry into the arena of German politics. None were more curtailing of these initially radical ways than parliaments, both on the state and federal level, with their strict rules, regulations, statutes, and unspoken mores.

Part of the larger complex of any grass-roots democracy, and most certainly the Greens’ radical *Basisdemokratie*, entails an *a priori* negative view of power, regarding it with fear, suspicion, and disdain by dint of its being an inherent threat to popular participation and the people’s will. Radical democrats dislike power of any kind, and most certainly as conventionally construed in politics, by virtue of its inherent elitism, exclusiveness, secrecy, and, of course, its drug-like addictiveness in that any power creates a craving for more. Thus, the Greens remained immensely uneasy with their early electoral successes as a party. They feared—perhaps presciently—that these very successes will bring...
them closer to real power which in turn was going to have an inevitably corrosive and corruptive influence on their very being and mission as a party and movement that were to offer a real alternative to the status quo and the establishment.

Petra Kelly voiced this fear of power following the Greens’ early electoral successes with the following telling words: “I am sometimes afraid that the Greens will suddenly get 13 percent in an election and turn into a power-hungry party (Machterwerbspartei). It would be better for us to stay at 6 or 7 percent and remain uncompromising in our basic demands. Better to do that than have Green ministers.”

One would be hard put to find an equivalent statement from a leading politician belonging to any other party in the Federal Republic—or any other liberal democracy for that matter. Typically, party elites rejoice when voters reward their organization with unexpectedly high tallies at elections. Indeed, most would express hope to grow even further at subsequent polls rather than voice fear and skepticism about the potential ills associated with the already attained tally. But then again, the Greens in the early to middle 1980s were not a normal party. Emanating from a milieu that extolled smallness with virtue and derided size with evil—just remember the slogan “small is beautiful” coined in a Zeitgeist and by an environment of which the Greens were prototypical representatives—becoming a large and normal party did in fact appear threatening to the very core that defined being Green at the time.

For reasons beyond the purview of this work, the Greens decided to forge ahead along the parliamentary path, despite the concerns of Kelly, Jutta Dittfurth, and other prominent members of the party at that time. But completing the transformation from an original “anti-party party”—a protest and niche party—into a party that was to become fully apt to join a coalition with the big boys and run a government (becoming what the Germans call koalitionsfähig) required a good deal more than a simple ideological battle within the party between those that wanted to pursue politics via the parliamentary and thus party-dominated route and their adversaries who feared that such a path would sell the Greens’ very soul, thus preferring to view the party’s primary role as being anchored in a movement whose core existed outside of established institutions such as legislatures and governments. In addition to necessitating a clear and decisive conceptual and programmatic victory for the commitment of pursuing politics in a more or less conventional parliamentary manner, the internal rules and structures of the Green Party also required a significant overhaul from the party’s early days before the Greens could truly enter the political establishment at the national level.

In the early days of the party, a fundamental opposition to participation in government was prevalent among the membership and leadership of the Green Party. Such ideological maximalism regarded any compromise with “the system” as undesirable, regardless of immediate benefits such compromise might have brought to the party. As the ideology and internal practices of the Greens evolved from such maximalist tendencies toward a much more pragmatic view of politics, many of these reforms were fought wholeheartedly by ideological purists: “This sort of argumentation was mustered by fundamentalists to reject categorically almost every proposal or attempt to deploy or increase the Greens’ political influence by their participation in a governing coalition, professionalization of the party, expansion of the electoral basis or countless other issues.”

With the exception of the still-extant women’s quota, already discussed two sections previously in this work, most of the intra-party practices from the “halcyon” days of the West German Greens designed to enhance democracy within the party and diminish elitism and power holding at the top either no longer exist or have been massively diluted. Among such core measures were: the separation of party position and legislative representation (Trennung von Amt und Mandat); the existence of a compelling congruence between party decision and legislative behavior and voting by the party’s representatives in all deliberative bodies of legislation (imperatives Mandat); and the rotation principle, a strict term limitation, in which a Green legislator could not retain her or his office for longer than two years, having to make way for another person waiting in the wings (Rotationsprinzip).

The separation of party position from representation in a legislature, or the “separation of office and
mandate” to use the nomenclature of German politics, is one of the first principles that the Green Party employed to avoid the undemocratic structure but totally common habit of accumulating offices that have defined all European parliamentary systems. Just think of how virtually every French cabinet member is not only a bigwig in her or his political party in terms of occupying a crucial position in it, but is also likely to hold various other regional offices such as mayor of her or his town. Indeed, it would not be erroneous to argue that the linkage between the two represents the very foundation of conventional politics in liberal democracies since, after all, the leader of the executive is furnished by the leader of the party with the largest number of legislative seats. And she or he assumes both of these crucial positions by dint of being the leader of a party. Or put differently, the executive’s very being hinges on its representation in the legislative institutions of the country’s polity. So, in effect, there exists a triple accumulation of offices that define the crux of parliamentary democracy.

The Greens attempted to counter this convention by forbidding any of their party’s members to hold more than one office at a time. Specifically, their new principle required that members of the Greens’ parliamentary delegations not hold an office within the internal structure of the party, e.g., as members of its executive council (Bundesvorstand) or any such decision-making bodies. This measure would ideally give the party’s grassroots greater access to their elected representatives; disperse power within the party between its leaders outside legislatures and within them; prevent accumulation of offices, thus entrenched elites; and inhibit the creation of a caste of party apparatchiks so derisively labeled “professional politicians” (Berufspolitiker) by the Greens at the time. Thus, for example, in 1998 there was much controversy over whether or not the newly minted Green ministers in the federal government could continue to hold their seats in the Bundestag, as was naturally the case for their colleagues from the SPD who comprised the senior membership of this red-green governing coalition.

The intra-party debate about this issue remained so relentless that in 2003 it was submitted to a general vote of all members of the Greens, a so-called Urabstimung, which was only the second such measure in the history of the Green Party. After the vote, in which nearly 25,000 Green Party members participated, the hitherto strict separation of party office from legislative representation was replaced. The new rule stated that two of the six members of the party’s executive council could maintain their seat in the Bundestag while continuing to serve in the party leadership. In addition to succumbing to the grueling demands of governing under the structural exigencies of a modern liberal democracy which ultimately necessitated that the Greens compromise their original measure emanating from their belief in the virtue of a radical (as opposed to a liberal) democracy, the Greens instituted this reform for more immediate and less lofty reasons as well; namely their correct realization that leadership talent is not only a scarce and valued good in any political context, but that it is incumbent to a party participating in the contact sport called politics to utilize its talent as profusely and proficiently as possible. The Greens came to realize that leadership talent—though perhaps unfair, and most certainly undemocratic, especially pursuant to Green standards—constituted major currency that a party had to use wisely and not squander.

The so-called “imperatives Mandat” was designed to hold the Green members of parliament accountable to the party membership as a whole. This rule, solidly emanating from the conviction that collective leadership and action was always morally preferable and more democratic than its individual (liberal and bourgeois) counterpart, basically annulled the decision-making sovereignty that any member of a legislature possesses in terms of deciding for whom or what or how or when to vote; and replaced it with a rule that demanded that Green members of legislatures are not to proceed according to this conventional adage but vote solely and always in accordance with the party’s decision. “The deputies were thus, metaphorically speaking, regarded as intellectually indentured members of the Green Party base in parliament.” This attempt at enhancing the Green membership’s and electorate’s power and influence at the direct expense of its parliamentary representatives—a clear device confirming the party’s extolling of grassroots wishes and people’s preferences and its deep suspicion of entrenched leadership power and elite deci-
Thirteen years of Bundestag presence—proved sufficiently controversial to exact an extensive debate about its constitutionality since, according to the Federal Republic’s Basic Law “members of the German Bundestag commit only to their conscience and are not subject to outside instruction.” In other words, an explicitly demanded and party-imposed voting discipline on legislators robbing them of their freedom to vote as they please and as their conscience commands them has been nothing short of unconstitutional in the Federal Republic of Germany—as it is indeed in many other liberal democracies. In actuality and the quotidian conduct of parliamentary affairs, this issue attained in practice nowhere near the importance that it had in intellectual debates. And let us not forget that in Germany, as well as other parliamentary democracies, there exists a good amount of party discipline in which legislators faithfully vote the party line strictly imposed on them by their parties’ whips and their ideologies. To be sure, there exist instances in which the conscience of a legislator clashes with the mandate of her or his party, leading to a discrepancy in voting preferences. But such deviation remains relatively rare and confined to certain special issues in all parties operating in parliamentary democracies, in notable contrast to presidential ones where such party discipline is not a sine qua non for governance by dint of the strict separation of legislative from executive powers. Thus, practically speaking, where the unconstitutional imperative mandate begins and the constitutional party discipline ends will remain forever blurry.

Despite the constitutional controversy concerning the “imperative mandate,” the Green Party’s so-called “rotation principle” proved much more problematic in its practical implementation. Designed to insulate the Green Party from the perils of professional politics, the rotation principle mandated that Green representatives had to leave their posts after two years in office, only to be replaced by a substitute (Nachrücker). The party expected each of the term-limited representatives to work extensively with her or his replacement throughout their two-year incumbency to make the transition between the two as smooth as possible. In addition to minimizing the disruptions that occur inevitably in any transition between incumbents of any office, this required measure of cooperation testified to the Greens’ commitment to involve as many people within the political process as possible.

And yet again, one could witness in this instance, as in many others of the Greens’ measures, a clash between democratic impulses and participatory inclinations on the one hand, and the exigencies of efficiency demanded by complex institutional frameworks on the other. While the rotation principle undoubtedly reflected the premium that the Green Party placed on Basisdemokratie, it greatly hindered the ability of Green parliamentarians to maximize their efficiency as legislators in the Bundestag. The stringent term limits of the Green Party impeded the formation of professional relationships within the Bundestag with other parties’ delegates, thus often leaving the Greens’ representatives isolated and without the trust of their fellow Bundestag deputies. Simply put, it takes a great deal of time to learn the ins and outs in all complex organizations, of which the Bundestag most certainly is one. Most time consuming of all, of course, is the mastery of the informal codes, the unwritten rules, the quotidian nuances—in short, the organizational culture—that all complex institutions possess and which are the real fuel that makes them run. But the learning of this invisible medium of meta communication not only takes time, but it inevitably produces those in the know and those left askance, insiders and outsiders, in other words a world that the Greens with their inherently democratic impulses distrust and dislike.

The Greens’ party convention in 1991 in Neumünster set the tone for their subsequent development as (almost) regular members of the German political establishment. Occurring just months after the Greens failed to enter the Bundestag in the first election in then recently unified Germany, this electoral defeat became a catalyst for pragmatic change for the Greens, just like it would have in the case of any other political party eager to succeed in the electoral arena. The Neumünster convention would lead the Greens to undertake numerous measures to streamline their internal practices. These reforms are summarized thusly on the website of the Green Party itself: “The Party’s spokespeople were limited from three to two […] In addition, the political and organizational management was distributed over two shoulders, the rotation was abolished and the Länderrat [state
council] was set as a ‘little party-day.’”

Despite the narrowing of the top party office—the party’s “spokespeople,” please note the consciously chosen nomenclature avoiding the usual “chair-person” or “president” or “chancellor” or any such appellations denoting a position of clear leadership—from three to two, the Greens have remained the only party in the Bundestag not to have invested the party’s parliamentary leadership in one single individual. Even more important, perhaps, in demonstrating the Greens’ still-continued commitment to serious societal reforms that may no longer enjoy the sobriquet of “radical” but remain significant all the same, is the fact that at least one of these spokespeople has to be a woman, with having had both of these leaders be female on occasion.

All the moderations that we discussed brought the Greens closer to the norms of Germany’s established party topography, while—we would submit—still maintaining the Green commitment to an enhanced democratization of traditional party structures. Indeed, the gathering in Neumünster witnessed the Green Party’s redefining itself as an “ecological reform party,” removing the “anti-party party” moniker from its program. As such, these changes made the Greens a more likely coalition partner and a more conventional player in German politics, even if they also caused the departure of numerous notable members from their ranks whose contribution to this party’s formative decade of struggle and its lasting legacy of success may remain controversial but seems undeniable in our eyes. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, this fourth pillar of Green identity remained by far the least imitated by any of the Greens’ party rivals in German politics. Unlike the topical realms of ecology, women, and peace that constituted crucially new areas of substance that came to define the content of German politics and public debate, the area of intra-party democracy—though of great importance to the Greens’ self-understanding and identity—embodied a less urgent and more form-related concern whose wider applicability to German political life seemed less compelling.
CHANGES IN GREEN APPEARANCE
In addition to all its programmatic changes and conceptual alterations, which we discussed in the previous section of our work, the Green Party as a whole as well as its main protagonists have experienced significant stylistic shifts that are worth mentioning since they bespeak a kind of visual and appearance-related accommodation without in any way undermining the Greens’ commitment to their causes. We are actually convinced that wearing a three-piece suit with a stylish tie in no way bespeaks some kind of automatic sell out to the establishment and a loss of enthusiasm for progressive politics. The Green Party’s Bundestag representatives that assumed their seats in that illustrious chamber in early spring 1983 stood apart from the established parties both in terms of their avowed political beliefs as well as their physical appearances. The party loved to embody a wholesale provocation of existing bourgeois mores and established institutions that ranged from its members’ policy preferences to their hairstyles and haberdashery. Outward appearance embodied a powerful visual symbol that demonstrated a clear yearning for change and an extolling of a wholesale rejection of established bourgeois culture and mores, as well as the institutions that represented them.

When the Greens first entered the Bundestag in 1983, their representatives stood in stark contrast with those of all the other extant parties. The members of the Green delegation had debated for hours as to whether they should all carry flower arrangements when entering the chamber or whether each member should be free to choose her or his own green accessories. Der Spiegel’s issue of 4 April 1983 describes the Green entrance into the Bundestag thusly: “As the delegation appeared on Tuesday, everyone stood behind something else; one person behind his dead pine tree, Klaus Hecker behind a bright green tie with a button protesting the census. Gabriele Gottwald, at 27 the youngest representative in the Bundestag, demonstrated on her bosom ‘For the free people of Nicaragua.’ The Green parliamentary delegation’s spokesperson Otto Schily stood behind nothing: ‘I’m bringing myself.’”

The article further describes the importance of individual freedom and democratic debate that surrounded this novel collective’s grand debutant appearance at the very heart of German power. The Greens had entered the big leagues and they very much wanted to do so on their own terms. The event as a whole was emblematic of the values and practices of dissent, protest, and alternative views of politics and life that the Greens tried to portray to German society but which had, of course, come to define their own lives throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.

The sartorial tendencies of the “regular,” i.e., non-Green, Bundestag representatives in the early 1980s could best be described as “business formal,” a pattern that has continued more or less to this day: roughly speaking some sort of jacket with dress slacks or a suit with a shirt and necktie for men; and non-descript, conservative dresses or suits featuring skirts or slacks for women, with Chancellor Merkel clearly being partial to the latter version, joining Hillary Clinton as arguably the most loyal wearers of the pant suit. Only in the wake of the Greens’ sartorial challenges that commenced in the early 1980s and their push for a greater informality have appearances that we in the United States call “business casual” (meaning jacket but no tie, or even a cardigan or sweater in lieu of a jacket for men) emerged in the hallowed halls of the Bundestag.
The Green representatives in 1983 were easily distinguishable from their colleagues on looks alone. Dieter Drabiniok and Gert Jannsen, for instance, possessed more facial hair between the two of them on 29 March 1983, than perhaps the entire delegations of all the four parties represented in the chamber, but also—tellingly—the entire parliamentary delegation of the Greens in 2009. Photographs from the 1980s reveal that many members of the Green Party’s parliamentary representation wore hand knitted sweaters and indulged in something one might call the “peasant look” which, of course, reflected a value bespeaking the rejection of modern industrial and urban society rather than the wearer’s social reality or actual origins since none of these representatives were ever close to being peasants in any meaningful manner of that term—even if they would have loved to have been so. (It would be well beyond the scope of this work to discuss the extolling of peasant-like tropes by what has remained arguably Germany’s most urban-based party. Needless to say, it all converges in the Greens’ reconceptualization of nature’s role in an advanced industrial society.) And we would be remiss not to mention the constancy of fresh-cut flowers on the desks of the Green Party’s representatives in the Bundestag’s chamber.

Let us use Joschka Fischer’s sartorial transformation over the two decades of his immensely impressive public career as one of the Greens’ leading figures in German, but also European and indeed global, politics to illustrate our point about changed appearances. Fischer caused a minor stir with his clothing when he entered the state of Hessen’s parliament in Wiesbaden as that state’s first Green Minister of the Environment (Umweltminister), which made Fischer the very first Green Party member to have been accorded such a high-ranking executive position anywhere in Germany and for the first time in German history. Wearing white Nike tennis shoes, jeans, and a light grey textured sport coat, without any sort of neckwear, Fischer looked somewhat out of place, especially in sharp contrast to the uniformity of dark suits, ties, and black shoes found on the other (almost exclusively) male legislators, none more conventional in appearance than Holger Börner, the Social Democratic minister-president of the state of Hesse and Fischer’s immediate superior in the cabinet. Fischer’s sartorial rebellion earned him the nickname “Minister of Sneakers.” However, by the time Fischer began serving as Germany’s foreign minister in 1998, his fashion sensibility had changed significantly. By this time he had come to wear his hair much shorter and more stylish, while he had forsaken the jeans-with-sport-coat look for a more traditional but spiffily tailored dark suit accessorized with a stylish neck tie. Fischer also developed a taste for expensive watches, having been photographed sporting such fancy brands as Rolex and Glashütte, famous luxury watchmakers from Switzerland and Germany, respectively. Queried about such expensive tastes, Fischer explained that prior to purchasing such watches, he “saved for a long time.”

In concluding this brief section on the Greens’ sartorial transformation, we would like to quote from an article published in Der Spiegel in the aftermath of the Pope’s visit to Germany in 2011, during which he praised the Green Party and the environmental movement: “This papal endorsement finally elevates Germany’s Greens to the status of a party that is incapable of horrifying or provoking anyone. It has served its time as a party of protest.” We demur whether this is so in all phases of German public life. But there can be little doubt that in terms of the appearance of Green Party politicians and leading figures, the days of shock and awe so front and center in 1983 have long disappeared.

The campaign posters used by the Greens have also undergone significant and telling changes over the past thirty years. In 1983, the posters featured cartoonish flowers—the beautiful and iconic sunflower being perhaps the most prominent among them—an allusion to a coming “political spring,” as well as a stylized imperial eagle, a la the iron eagle that hangs within the main chamber of the Bundestag and constitutes the Federal Republic’s official emblem. Eagles, after all, are fierce predators, ruling the skies as their unchallenged domain. They often constitute symbols of state authority in many parts of the world, not least, of course, the United States with its majestic bald eagle. As such, they are meant to invoke respect, pride, power, independence, and sovereignty. But the Greens’ erstwhile eagle of the early 1980s invoked none of these lofty and majestic ideals. Instead, this was a most friendly, almost
cuddly, decidedly cute, perhaps even smiling and dancing eagle, cartoonish in nature and devoid of instilling any fear or projecting power of any kind.144

In a complete flaunting of conventions, none of the Greens’ posters featured any human images. Nowhere to be found were pictures or portraits of Green candidates, which had been a staple of every other party’s electoral campaign in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. The decision not to use the likenesses of Green candidates on campaign posters was related to the party’s distaste for professional politics and the distance such hagiographic posters extolling individuals creates between the leaders and the led, between elites and mass, dichotomies that were anathema to the Greens at the time.145 Indeed, posters featuring the likeness of Green politicians of any kind remained taboo until the mid-1990s.146 But then things began to change quite rapidly.

In 1994, for instance, Joschka Fischer was featured prominently on campaign posters for the Bundestag, wearing a white shirt and striped tie, casually holding a sport jacket slung over his shoulder.147 The posters used in 1998 and 2002 mirror the transformation observed in 1994, with Fischer featured yet again in 2002, along with Claudia Roth and Renate Künast.148 Posters of this type brought the Greens in line with the established parties’ conventional campaign tactics.

Similar to the campaign posters employed by the Green Party, the logo used by the party’s parliamentary delegation has undergone a noticeable evolution. Both the logos and posters of the 1980s appear much more cartoonish and colorful than those that came to succeed them in the 1990s and the ensuing years. The parliamentary delegation’s current logo maintains the iconic sunflower, so thoroughly associated with the Greens, and such a pervasive symbol of their brand; but the colorful rainbows and butterflies of logos past are gone, replaced by a trim, green rectangular background that contrasts the bold white text that reads: “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Bundestagsfraktion.”149

As the habitus of the Greens has shifted from a provocative stance of protestation toward one more friendly to and tolerant of established norms, the party left a vacuum in its former space. Since the state parliament elections in Berlin in 2011, the Pirate Party has risen to fill precisely this voided space abandoned by the former “anti-party party.” Are we witnessing the arrival of the new Greens? Might the Bundestag election of 2013 experience the entry of a new and rather unconventional party into the locus of Germany’s power in Berlin’s Reichstag parallel in form and content the Greens’ entry into the Bundestag thirty years before, at that time still in Bonn?
On a train ride from Prague to Vienna in June 2012, Markovits sat with one of his dearest friends, a lifelong Green activist, employee of the Green-affiliated Heinrich Böll Foundation, and an immensely astute observer of German, European, and global politics whose opinions Markovits has come to respect immensely over their lengthy friendship. At one point, Markovits asked his friend what his opinions were of the Pirates in German politics. The response was prompt and unequivocal: disorganized, immature, aimless, chaotic, simplistic in their views, unsophisticated in their theories, hopelessly out of touch with their aims. When Markovits responded that his friend’s characterization of the Pirates sounded literally identical, verbatim so, to the views that Markovits had repeatedly heard many activists in the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions—both of which Markovits was researching in the late 1970s and early 1980s—profess about the Greens, his friend started to laugh and replied: “Touche! You are spot-on correct!”

The Green response to and characterization of these political newcomers sounds very much like establishment talking to challenger, insider referring to outsider, elder communicating with younger. Could indeed the very recent and still short-lived successes of the Pirate Party be the byproduct of the sustained and now established successes of the Green Party? Could the spunkiness and funkiness of the Pirates bespeak the stodginess and normalcy of the Greens? Could the latter’s transformation from its former identity as the enfant terrible of German politics into its current being as Germany’s goody two shoes “ecological reform party” have yielded the opportunity space for a new challenger of the status quo to emerge and become successful—and thus established—in doing so? Are we merely witnessing a rondo in general politics, a political “Reigen” to use the unforgettable words of the wonderful Viennese dramatist Arthur Schnitzler? Who is to know?

But there are some things that we do, in fact, know, with some modicum of certainty. First, generation in all its variants greatly matters in politics. In terms of its sheer biological dimension, it is safe to say that youth—let us say up to the age of 35, precisely Social Democracy’s erstwhile threshold that separated “young” from “old” Social Democrats—is more conducive to all kinds of experimentations in life, and thus in politics as well, creating a situation in which the engagement with extremes, or deviations from and challenges of the norm, are more common than in middle or advanced age. It is merely an empirical reality—though not a conceptual exigency or some kind of theoretically compelling generality—that young people in most advanced industrial democracies of the post-World War II period tended to be more engaged in and attracted to the left side of the political spectrum than the right. Just think of how this was clearly not the case in the interwar era when fascism in its varied guises attracted millions of youth and was—explicitly—extolled as a revolt of the young against the staleness and conformity of the old and established. This is not to say that youths have remained immune to right wing politics in the postwar era in these advanced industrial democracies: Again, just think of football hooliganism, the pre-eminence of young people—mainly, though not exclusively, men—in various neo-Nazi and far right movements and organizations in Germany as well as other European countries. But in terms of the preponderant ethical values and political directions that informed the bulk of 18 to 35 year olds in Europe, North America, and similar societies in the postwar period, it would be safe to label them left-of-center. The presence of
leftism among these youth also increased massively with the quantity and quality of education. Thus, universities were the bastions of right wing reaction and fascism in Germany and Austria from the late nineteenth century until the end of World War II, and even quite possibly the beginning of the 1960s. It is precisely in this dawning of the era that spawned the Greens in the altered world of universities and their immediate environment that became loci of protest and mounted serious challenges to the extant orthodoxies of capitalism as well as conventional leftism as manifested by social democracy and communism. After all, it is not by chance that the Greens in Germany became especially powerful and prominent in places in which universities played an important role, and that their functional equivalents in other countries, like the United States, flourished in exactly parallel environments. It is not an accident that our very own college town of Ann Arbor with the University of Michigan at its core became the cradle of SDS, arguably the most important conceptual progenitor and organizational representative of the American New Left which—with its famed Port Huron Statement authored mainly by Tom Hayden in June of 1962—also exercised great influence on the European and German New Left. Thus, it is merely logical that Ann Arbor’s sister city in Germany is Tübingen, in which the Greens have played a crucial role over the past three decades. Ann Arbor and Tübingen represent prototypical milieus that fostered the post-materialist politics expressed by the Greens in Germany and their structural equivalents in the United States. Were the American political system a parliamentary one with an electoral arrangement similar to that in continental Europe, Germany in particular, we can state with reasonable certainty that Ann Arbor, too, would sport a city council that had 30 percent Greens as its representatives instead of being run by a virtual monopoly of Green-like Democrats. Indeed, the catch-all nature of the Democratic Party in the United States makes it all but an iron-clad requirement that the American equivalent of the German Greens operate within that party. And it is precisely this wing of the Democratic Party that has enjoyed a near-hegemony in governing Ann Arbor for many a decade.

Second, we also know that in addition to the physical and biological dimensions that give age its power as a social and political variable, its generational attributes are at least as powerful, if not more so. After all, Karl Mannheim’s fine writings make it amply clear that certain common events which people experience bond them together for the rest of their lives. The more marked such experiences are, the more powerful a bond it generates that shape a certain age’s generational commonality. And few experiences have created a greater commonality of such kind than the late 1960s: Just think, this age has given an entire generation its name in at least three languages of which we know, perhaps many more: Achtundsechziger, Soixandhuitards, Sixty-eighters! And it is precisely this generational experience—this age in the Mannheimian sense—that provided the very foundation and also the common glue for the political formation called the Greens.

Third, it appears that Maurice Duverger’s brilliant insight of the “contagion from the left” pertains in terms of the Greens’ demonstrable and immense influence on German society and culture of the past three decades. While writing about a very different epoch—namely the 1950s and the early 1960s—and confining his argument to the internal structure of political parties in the advanced industrial democracies which, so Duverger, witnessed the rise of the modern mass party largely emanating from the Left to which the Center and the Right had to respond by adapting their respective party structures to that of the Left’s to compete electorally in the political market place; Duverger also viewed this contagion to be a thematic one meaning that the Left’s placing issues on the political agenda obligated the other parties to commit what the Germans have so aptly termed Themenklau. Remember, flattery in this case, too, bespeaks the highest form of compliment. There can be no doubt that in terms of the agenda-setting dimension, the contagion from the Greens (if not ipso facto the Left) has informed virtually every important facet of German politics. Entire areas owe their salience to the Greens. As we argue throughout our work, nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the four issue areas that define the core of Green identity: ecology, women, peace, and, perhaps to a lesser but still considerable extent, grass roots democracy. Indeed, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that these topics became the very core of what it means to be “Left” today. It is along these axes that
left-ness is debated, constructed, and lived. Thus, while Markovits was on the one hand not very happy when his book *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond* appeared in German under the title *Grün schlägt Rot* [green beats red] because he was well aware that many would interpret this to pertain merely to the electoral realm of politics where clearly this was not the case when the book appeared in the 1990s and has remained erroneous—with notable exceptions on local levels and the aforementioned Green success in the state of Baden-Württemberg—to this day; he was very happy, on the other hand, because the German title captured spiffily the essence of his overall argument: that in terms of defining the leading topics and key identities of what it has meant to be left in Germany and comparable advanced capitalist societies of the past three decades, the Greens had a massive edge over the Reds. This is not to say that core red topics had become irrelevant or that the ills that caused them to emerge had all been cured; far from it. It is merely to state that in terms of their being cutting edge, in terms of their innovative form and content, the core axes defining Green politics and identity have enjoyed a greater salience and relevance than their red counterparts in defining what it means to be left—i.e., progressive—today in Germany and other comparable places of advanced capitalist countries with liberal democratic political systems.

Have the Greens attained their articulated goals in all four of their central topics? Not even close! Have they earned the right to celebrate a few successes in some of them? Absolutely! Above all, the Greens’ success as agenda setters remains uncontested. All of the above-mentioned four concepts have entered Germany’s political vernacular; all of them remain at the heart of the country’s political debates. And there is no sign whatsoever of any disappearing in the future, near or far.

Finally, in a political culture where colors have attained a political significance that remains second to none and has been unparalleled when compared to other comparable countries (with the possible exception of Austria which, too, is part of this German-speaking political tradition); a place where colors in political discourse have assumed unrivalled iconic characteristics that literally everybody recognizes and knows—just think of the blacks, the reds, the yellows, the browns—the Greens are the only ones whose color in contemporary global discourse attains a clarity that none of the other political actors can even approximate. Put differently, when Markovits lectures about German politics all over the world, including his young undergraduates enrolling in a European politics course for the very first time at any of the many American universities where he has taught in his thirty-nine years as an academic, he would completely lose his audience were he to speak of the blacks or the browns or the yellows, even the reds when describing German parties, ideologies, approaches, or values. Nobody would understand what these colors were to connote, what they meant. This, however, is never the case with the Greens. His first-year students—or audiences in distant lands—may not know anything about *Fundis* and *Reales*; most likely could not name even one Green politician, perhaps not even Joschka Fischer, nor would they know how many seats the Greens have in the current Bundestag. But they all know what the color green connotes way beyond the German Greens and Germany; they know that it stands for sustainability, for protecting the environment, for organic farming, for protecting the earth, for being kind to animals, for being humane and thus human. In a sense, the color green has become the only one of the many colors of German politics that is truly international and widely recognized well beyond the confines of Germany. The color green has attained an international presence and recognition that the color red clearly had until the late 1960s: not only instant recognition and affinity among like-minded people on an international scale, but also a sense of being progressive, of being in the forefront of ideas and of a certain struggle. Put it this way: When impartial non-experts think of the ideal-typical social democracy, they think of Sweden. Most neutrals and casual followers of politics would associate the Tories as the prototypical conservatives. Communism is still mainly identified with the defunct Soviet Union and not the regimes that continue to bear its name, least of all China. Nazism continues to crowd out any potential rivals when it comes to the representation of fascism. Just think how contemporary Russian, Polish, and Greek fascists have appropriated the symbols of the very regime that brutalized their countries during World War II. But when the world thinks of Greens as a concrete political entity,
as a political institution, as a political actor functioning in real time and space, it thinks of the German Greens. There can be no doubt that the German Greens’—much more than any other country’s—very being and activities over the past thirty years have best embodied the amazing shift in conscience and consciousness that the world has come to associate with the term “Green.” There can be no greater praise for a brand’s immense success! Our hearty congratulations for a job well done! Here is to thirty more!
NOTES

1 This paper emerged from Andrei Markovits’s preparations for being the keynote speaker at a workshop entitled “Creating Participatory Democracy: Green Politics in Germany since 1983” to be held on 28 February and 1 March 2013 in the German Studies (NCGS) Seminar and Workshop series held at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill. We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance by the University of Michigan; the Heinrich-Boell-Foundation in Washington, DC; and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, without which this publication would not have been possible. Indeed, it is our great honor and delight to be also celebrating with our contribution the Institute’s thirtieth birthday as well. AICGS’s existence has enriched our lives immeasurably! Here is to thirty more!

Throughout this text, we will be referring to the “Greens,” which in most cases will denote the party officially called Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen. But we will also use this term when discussing the party Die Grünen prior to its merger with Bündnis ’90 in 1993. We defer to the intelligence and attentiveness of our readers to discern in each case what we mean by “Greens.” We are reasonably certain that our catholic, liberal, and free-floating usage of the term will in no way hinder the readers’ fine comprehension of the particular passage or the text as a whole.

2 Markovits was right there in the Stadthalle in Bad Godesberg, celebrating with the Greens, just as he was in January 1987 in the Biskuitenhalle in Bonn, welcoming their triumphant return to the Bundestag nary four years later. Klaver was not yet born for either of these momentous events.


5 This exceptional result was the consequence of a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court to suspend the nationwide 5 percent electoral threshold—Fünf-Prozent-Hürde—for the 1990 election only, choosing instead to require parties to obtain 5 percent of the vote in either the former East or West.


12 ibid.

13 ibid.


15 Filmed in 1944, the film remains popular to this day, despite its NS provenance. Viewings traditionally happen in the winter, with theatergoers drinking Glühwein or Feuerzangenbowle.


17 ibid.


19 ibid.


23 ibid.

24 ibid.

25 Full disclosure: Markovits has greatly benefited from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s generosity over many years, for which he remains immensely grateful.


32 ibid., 27.

33 ibid., 272.


36 ibid.


39 Translated from “Aus Verantwortung vor der Schöpfung”; ibid.


41 ibid.

42 Dagmar Dehmer, “CSU und FDP Streiten über Genmais,” Der


45 Ibid.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.


62 It would lead far beyond the scope of this work to discuss how and why most of the Old Left’s institutions not only came to accept bourgeois culture, but in fact reveled in it, including in its oppressive and confining dimensions. Just remember how audiences used to dress for the opera and theater in the capitals of the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and how much more straight and square and bourgeois they were in their dark suits and boring ties when compared to their counterparts in the West.


83 “Männerriege der FDP-Oberen”
84 Oliver Klassen and Ramon Klein, “Liberale Chauvism.”
85 ibid., 74.
86 ibid., 75.
92 ibid., 74.
93 ibid., 75.
96 ibid., 76.
97 Roger Cohen, “Post-War Pacifism Ends for Germany,” The New York Times (1999). Of course, German troops had previously engaged in various missions outside of Germany. But all of these entailed rescue efforts, disaster relief, and supply deliveries. None of them entailed actual combat.
102 ibid., 76.
106 “Zauberwort”
108 Ibid., 88.
109 In Düsseldorf in 1987, the Greens modified their statutes regarding Ehrenamtlichkeit. After the ninth Bundesversammlung of the Green Party, top party positions would receive a salary, thus providing for a leadership composed of more heterogeneous socioeconomic backgrounds.
110 In this instance, of course, the party engaged one of the key predicaments of democratic theory and practice so prominently discussed by Max Weber in his legendary essay on the state and professional politics entitled “Politics as a Vocation.” Therein, Weber raises all the conceptually relevant points—both pro and con—of having professional politicians receive remuneration for their job as opposed to having offices filled by wealthy amateurs who do not need any remuneration for their livelihood.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 90-91.
116 Ibid., 97.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 92.
122 The Rotationsprinzip was modified from two years to four years in May of 1986, before being done away with entirely in 1991.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
127 Ibid. “Die Sprecher/innen wurden von drei auf zwei begrenzt. Außerdem wurden die politische und organisatorische Geschäftsführung auf zwei Schultern verteilt, die Rotation abgeschafft und der Länderrat als ‘kleiner parteitag’ eingerichtet.”
129 Ibid., 96.
131 For photos, see Spiegel Online: http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/30-jahre-gruene-baerte-blumen-turnschuh-eid-fotostrecke-50344-2.html
133 Ibid.
134 The sartorial appearances, habits, and conventions of the Bundestag entered the news in the summer of 2012. Süddeutsche.de describes this incident as follows: “For some it is the ‘most superfluous article of clothing in the world,’ for others it goes to the Bundestag’s very core and value: two parliamentary representatives may not sit next to the president of the Bundestag—because they do not wear ties.” The necktie as a dress code for men is ostensibly designed to protect the dignity of the Bundestag.
135 For photos, see Spiegel Online: http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/30-jahre-gruene-baerte-blumen-turnschuh-eid-fotostrecke-50344-5.html
136 For photos, see Spiegel Online: http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/30-jahre-gruene-baerte-blumen-turnschuh-eid-fotostrecke-50344-6.html
137 Ibid. “Turnschuh-Minister”
138 For photos, see www.boell.de: http://www.boell.de/alt/de/13_archiv/4374.html
139 Interestingly, this passion for luxurious watches has a long history among left-leaning politicians of a very different orientation than Fischer. Leonid Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara all owned at least one Rolex.
141 Ibid.
143 For photos, see www.boell.de: http://www.boell.de/alt/de/13_archiv/4416.html
146 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
151 It is interesting that when the Greens did indeed attain electoral successes in 2010 and 2011 that surpassed the returns attained by the Social Democrats, a number of articles in German periodicals praised Markovits’s and his colleague Gorski’s presumed prescience and alleged clairvoyance in predicting just such a scenario fifteen years in advance.
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