GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AND THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST TERRORISM
Daniel S. Hamilton

© 2002 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 420, Washington, D.C. 20036-2217. Telephone 202/332-9312, Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: info@aicgs.org, Web: http://www.aicgs.org
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Daniel Hamilton is currently Research Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and the Executive Director of the five-university American Consortium on EU Studies (ACES). He most recently served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and as Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff. He coined the term “Berlin Republic” in his 1993 book *Beyond Bonn: America and the Berlin Republic*. 
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
Daniel S. Hamilton

Do the tragic events of September 11 provide a new framework for German-American and European-American relations? Do they generate a new Gesamtkonzept to help us understand our world and our role in it? In and of themselves, they do not. The issues of September 10 did not disappear on September 12. There are many issues we would have had to face even if September 11 had never happened. The potential significance of September 11 is less that it suddenly heralded a completely new world than that it may have destroyed under a million tons of steel and glass the complacency with which we were confronting the world of September 10.

I use the word “may” because this is an open question. The first phase of the Western response to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan—the American-led war and the German-hosted peace—was a time of renewed German- and European-American solidarity. The second phase, however, has become an uneasy period for the transatlantic partnership. While economic and law enforcement cooperation have improved, there is a growing gap in intentions and capabilities on military aspects of the campaign—all against a backdrop of differences over a series of “September 10” issues that had been put aside for five months but are now reemerging.

GERMAN AND AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11:
WHAT CHANGED? WHAT DIDN’T?

In the immediate aftermath of September 11 Germans and Americans by and large drew many similar conclusions about the short-term implications for diplomatic, economic, military, and domestic action. The spontaneous outpouring of public sympathy in Germany and the many thousands of individual acts of German generosity and solidarity were noticed and appreciated, as was the forthright political, economic and military support offered by Chancellor Schröder, the German government, the EU and the NATO allies, including the German-hosted talks to forge an interim Afghan government. Germans and Europeans, in turn, were gratified that the Bush Administration consulted with its allies, turned to the U.N. Security Council to secure international legitimacy for its subsequent actions, and formed a broad anti-terror coalition to wage a multidimensional campaign.

In the ensuing months, however, new German and American differences have emerged and older apprehensions have resurfaced. Each is looming larger as the anti-terror coalition moves into a new and longer-term phase of the campaign.

Important differences have emerged regarding the scope and nature of the threat. In some ways Americans today are experiencing the daily sense of insecurity that Germans felt during the days of Baader Meinhof, the Italians with the Red Brigades, the Spanish with the Basques, the British and Irish with the IRA. Europeans often express the view that because they have been fighting these forms of terrorism for decades they are as well, if not better prepared to deal with it than Americans. From an American point of view, this ignores a rather fundamental point: on September 11 a line was crossed for which even the European experience with terrorism does not prepare us. In the past, international terrorists typically executed limited attacks so as not to

---

1 Dr. Daniel Hamilton organized this study group project as the DaimlerChrysler Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.
undermine political and financial support for their causes. They wanted maximum media exposure, not maximum casualties. Today’s terrorists have no such qualms. Their capacity to kill is limited only by the power of their weapons. Their goal is not to win minds. It is to destroy societies. They have brutalized us into an age of catastrophic terror.

This age of catastrophic terror makes real what until now was known but considered an abstract threat: the detonation of weapons of mass destruction or mass disruption on European or American soil by states, groups or even individuals. The impact of this realization has also been more profound in the United States than in Europe because of differing historic experience. During the twentieth century Europeans experienced horrific wars that devastated their homelands. But except for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sixty years ago, Americans experienced war as something that happened someplace else. December 7, 1941 may have shattered the powerful notion that isolation could be a policy choice—but it did not end the notion that insulation of the American homeland was a real choice. In fact, Pearl Harbor may have actually reinforced this notion by convincing American decision-makers that the end of isolation meant taking war to the enemy. For the next sixty years America’s global engagement did nothing to challenge the prevailing domestic notion that the American homeland was a sanctuary safe from the world’s troubles – despite the fact that in the nuclear age the United States could be destroyed in seconds. America’s vast network of alliances and forward-deployed forces were intended in part to keep the world’s conflicts far from American shores. It was this notion of American insulation, so deeply rooted in the nation’s psyche, that was so utterly shattered on September 11 and the weeks thereafter. It is uncertain whether Europeans, so accustomed to their mutual dependencies, really understand how much America was changed by September 11.

It is in part this profound challenge to American national consciousness, and the differing historical experiences that underlie it, that account for why Americans have felt as comfortable using the term “war” to describe the anti-terror campaign as Europeans have felt uncomfortable. On September 11 Americans found themselves at war. Here language can be a barrier to understanding, as both Oliver Lepsius and Karl Kaiser discuss in this volume. For most Germans, the term “war” recalls the utter destruction of German cities and countryside. Since Germany was not attacked directly on September 11, one can understand the German debate as to whether this is really a war or more a horrific crime. But for most Americans, this is a war in two senses. First, it is a war in the truest meaning of the word. The ruins of the World Trade Center evoke images of German and European cities during World War II. We were directly attacked. We are at war. There is a second, particularly domestic American context to the rhetoric of “war” unfamiliar to most Germans: Americans are waging this war on terrorism as we have waged domestic “wars” on drugs, on crime, on poverty – as a way to mobilize our vast and diverse society in a multidimensional campaign of unknown duration.

Despite some of these differences in understanding, there are some important shared perspectives in Germany and the United States. There is broad agreement that the greatest potential threat facing Germany and the United States—nuclear missiles launched from a prominent nation—has receded. Our more likely threats are biological weapons in the mail or an aerosol can, chemical weapons in a subway or ventilation system, or nuclear or radiological weapons in the back of a truck or the hold of a ship, delivered by groups or individuals with no return address. The threat of terrorism and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction are not separate—they are interrelated and reinforcing, and together represent our most urgent security challenge.
We are waging this war, this campaign, against a network rather than a nation, although some nations are involved. Our enemy is not just the perpetrators of this attack or even the states that supported them. It is a system of international terrorism, built up over decades, whose motivations and aspirations, organization and reach have changed dramatically over the past ten years.

Our adversaries include elusive individuals, shadowy organizations and hidden financial links. Today’s terrorism is increasingly networked. It is more diverse in terms of motivation, sponsorship and security consequences. It has greater global reach. The terrorists are both more lethal and harder to detect, predict and interdict. Moreover, the anthrax attacks in the United States following September 11 have blurred traditional distinctions between domestic and international terror. They underscore that rogue terrorist well-wishers can play off of one another and so enhance the mass disruption they each can cause.

Oliver Lepsius underscores the changed circumstances: “Two circumstances were considered as a new threat. First was the dissolution of any individualized connection to terrorist actions. Networked terrorism was de-personalized and de-regionalized. The threat became global and could not be reduced to individual actors. Only by grasping this fundamental perception can one understand the discussion about a qualitatively new threat environment.”

Jens van Scherpenberg traces the emergence of this terrorist-criminal nexus by showing how three phenomena—terrorism, transnational organized crime, and corruption—are increasingly linked to one another. He concludes that even if Al Qaeda is defeated, terrorism as such will survive the current campaign, changing its character and becoming more privatized as both organized crime and terrorism blend in with the legal sphere, whether private firms or charities, religious organizations or public entities.

Jonathan Winer makes an important point in his essay: networking is not just for terrorists. Outside the glare of headlines that routinely focus on transatlantic squabbling, the United States and its European allies have been forming their own complex, almost invisible and somewhat unconventional network of cooperation that has become the foundation of joint efforts to freeze terrorist funds, toughen financial transparency measures, and bring aggressive threats of sanctions to those not cooperating.

Today, our focus is on defending America. Tomorrow, there could be an attack on Europe. Al Qaeda planned major operations in Britain, France, Germany and Italy as well as the United States. We now know that one of the terrorists who crashed into the World Trade Center once flew a precise flight plan over unprotected nuclear installations and key political and economic institutions along the Rhine and Ruhr.

Tony Cordesman underscores that we will continue to face dangers from the interconnected points of vulnerability that accompany the free flow of people and ideas, goods and services, as well as the complex systems on which our way of life depends—global electronic financial networks, networked information systems, economies dependent on imported fossil fuels.

On September 11 Germans and Americans alike learned that the openness that is our greatest strength can also be used against us. This was not only an attack on freedom, it was, as The Economist notes, an “attack through freedom.” The terrorists not only penetrated our security, they exploited our civil liberties, our education systems, our social services, and the transportation and communications infrastructure of our free societies to advance their murderous ends. As James Woolsey emphasizes in his contribution, it is precisely our freedom that has attracted the enmity of the people who have attacked us.
That is why the issue of how we protect our freedoms as we protect our security becomes so central. Fred Cate and Oliver Lepsius provide a useful comparison of the domestic debate in the United States and in Germany on this issue. Cate documents the changes underway in the United States, and worries that civil liberties will be damaged. Lepsius shows how Germany’s recent anti-terror legislation does not fundamentally change the Federal Republic’s legal framework for these issues, in contrast to the major reforms underway in the United States. He describes how these basic questions were debated in the 1970s in response to Baader-Meinhof and the RAF, and again in the 1990s as Germany and its neighbors advanced the Schengen Agreement on the free movement of people. It was then that Germany grappled intensely with many of the issues preoccupying Americans now; the reactions to September 11 should thus be understood in the context of these earlier debates. Lepsius does share Cate’s concerns about diminution of civil liberties, however. He argues that the trendline in Germany over the past thirty years has been the progressive limitation of civil liberties in the name of security. He shows how the new focus on protecting the freedom of society writ large is affecting individual rights, and he is concerned in particular that rights of minorities could be diminished.

Is the changing nature of the threat is likely to enhance or diminish governmental authority? Here again our authors differ. Kaiser, Cate and Lepsius show how governments are seeking to assert greater authority in the wake of the attacks. Weisser and Woolsey argue that the state needs to go further. But the fact that for the first time a non-state actor has had a major strategic impact, however, does raise the question whether state sovereignty, as we have known it, will remain unscathed, or whether international politics is shifting toward a new polarity between state governance and societal anarchy.

Managing this potentially explosive cocktail of old and new, while preserving and protecting the very freedoms our enemies are threatening, is our common challenge. The potential of September 11 was to help us shake off the complacencies of the September 10 world and to understand that the forces of globalization demand a fundamental reorientation of policy. If we are to seize the opportunity to create a safer world, we must shape something more sustainable than the ad hoc alliance against Osama and the Taliban. A broader strategy must improve domestic preparedness, dry up the money for terrorism, harass and disrupt terrorist communications, and pressure countries to stop providing safe havens. Success will require comprehensive cooperation among intelligence officials, police, diplomats, customs and financial institutions. Karl Kaiser quotes President Bush: it will require a “patient accumulation of success.” As we prosecute this campaign, we must also understand more clearly where and why we agree and where – due to different national and historical experience—our perceptions differ. This phase will be more difficult than the first phase. The coalition is likely to experience severe stresses and strains.

**EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES**

Success means understanding not only what did change on September 11, but what did not change—and that is the core role of the transatlantic community. Events since September 11 should have reaffirmed to us how essential the Atlantic Community is to our freedom, our prosperity, and to our security. The papers in this series underscore that transatlantic cooperation is relevant to every aspect of the fight against terrorism. Together, the United States and the EU possess most of the economic, technological, military and diplomatic resources for waging this
global campaign, and are the two reliable pillars of stability in the world. But to get it right, each partner will have to overcome some relatively serious concerns about the other.

Three paths lie before us. The first would be an effort to develop a true transatlantic global partnership, beginning with but not limited to countering terrorism. America’s relations with Europe remain distinct from our relations with any other country or group of countries in this one essential sense: when we agree, our partnership is the drivewheel of progress on almost every world-scale issue. When we are at odds, we are the global brake. A new global partnership would focus less on what Americans should do for Europeans in Europe and more on what Americans and Europeans are prepared to do together in the wider world. Such a partnership would be freed from cold war references to Russia, and in fact could seek ways to associate and include a democratic Russia.

The second approach argues that the notion of a transatlantic global partnership is too ambitious, our interests and capabilities too diverse. While we remain closely aligned, we should accept our respective strengths and weaknesses and develop a more practical transatlantic “division of labor” to the challenges facing us, with Europeans taking on certain regional and functional challenges and Americans taking on others.

The third path is continued drift, based on a mutual failure to define a common future. The path we follow will depend on what choices we are prepared to make in response to the following core challenges facing the anti-terror coalition.

**GREATER SOUTHWEST ASIA**

One core challenge is our willingness and capacity to work together to shape the larger environment in which the terrorists operate and devise a comprehensive transatlantic strategy to the broad region of Greater Southwest Asia.

A circle—with its center in Tehran—that has a diameter roughly matching the length of the continental United States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent of the world’s population, 60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. Greater Southwest Asia is the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, fragile regimes, and deadly combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguous energy field upon which Western prosperity depends. The main threat to German, European, American security is no longer invasion across the Fulda Gap but, rather, wanton destruction of our societies or irrevocable damage to our extended interests generated by turmoil in this region. Choices made there could determine the shape of the twenty-first century—whether weapons of mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia will become reliable sources of energy; whether the opium harvests of death in Afghanistan and Burma are shut down; whether Russia’s borderlands will become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together in peace; and whether the great religions of the world can work together.

In the past, we have approached this region through a series of policy boxes—the Middle East peace process was treated separately from the issues of energy. These were treated separately from concerns about proliferation, which, in turn, were treated separately from approaches to North Africa, which were treated separately from our approaches to Iran and Iraq. Globalization has erased these lines, and neither the United States nor Europe can manage these
challenges on its own. We must devise a new transatlantic strategy for this region that is more than a series of compartmentalized policies.

This is a long-term effort. We cannot hope to transform this turbulent region into an area of democratic stability and prosperity anytime soon. But we can act more successfully together to defend common interests, to dampen the negative trends that are gaining momentum, to encourage positive trends, to control crises—and if need be, to win wars.

An essential part of this strategy would be to define what this campaign is really about in the minds of 1 billion Muslims. We must be clear that there is no war against Islam. Western interventions in the Persian Gulf and in Somalia saved hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives. In the Balkans, when Serb nationalists invoked a medieval Christian zeal and set out to massacre Bosnian Muslims, and then turned to massacre and expel Kosovar Muslims, the United States and Europe went to war—twice—on the Muslim side.

We are dealing with millions of people who can only be persuaded, not forced. The transformation of large parts of the culture of the Arab and Islamic worlds can be achieved, if at all, only after many years or even decades in the struggle of ideas.

We must be prepared to make the case together that this is not a clash of civilizations, but a clash between civilized people anywhere—be they Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or anything else—and an extremism that cloaks itself in the language of one of the world’s great religions even as it betrays that religion’s most fundamental beliefs. This is not a clash of civilizations, but a struggle within Islam itself—a struggle between terrorists trying to hijack Islam and those who seek to live by its teachings. This war is not between Islam and the West, but between prejudice and tolerance, between those who would open societies and those who would shut them down.

A related priority is to redouble our efforts at Israeli-Palestinian peace. On their own, Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat cannot break out of their violent downward spiral. Europe and America agree that the Palestinians must have a viable state. We agree that Israel's humiliating occupation should end for the benefit of Palestinians and Israelis alike. But we must also insist that the Palestinians end the terrorism, violence and incitement of the Intifada. Why are we not demanding that the Saudis recognize the Jewish state in return for our recognition of a Palestinian state? And when we demand that the Palestinians stop their anti-Israel incitement, why do we not demand the same of the Egyptians and Saudis who own or control the most influential media in the Arab world, remarkable for their anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism? Momentum towards an elusive settlement will depend in large measure upon consistent and patient efforts by the transatlantic community. The alternative may be too horrible for most to contemplate.

**COOPERATION OR DIVISION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE?**

If we are to drain the sea of people in which terrorists swim—to borrow an image from Mao Zedong—we must address the misery, the poverty, and the disease facing billions in this region and beyond. This will require commitments far beyond what we are doing today, particularly in the area of foreign assistance.

The imperative to do so is only partly related to the fight against terrorism, but the new environment provides an opportunity to promote development as security by other means.
In the United States, foreign assistance programs collapsed with the cold war. The U.S. foreign assistance program today is essentially focused on Egypt and Israel. Measured as a share of national income, we are the developed world’s leading deadbeat.

There is a new rhetoric in Washington about foreign assistance. President Bush has said that the war is not only a military one but also a war for global prosperity, and that U.S. security requires that the world’s impoverished children be fed, educated and given health care. Secretary of State Powell has said that he fully believes “that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives.” But neither the White House nor the Congress have turned this new rhetoric into a new reality. The Bush Administration rejected a British-led initiative to increase total foreign aid by $50 billion annually, double current amounts. In the new budget the Administration proposes a $46 billion increase in military spending, compared to a $300 million increase for foreign aid. The result? We deny ourselves a tool to reorient impoverished societies toward modernity and democracy – and let fundamentalist cash fill the void in Islamic parts of Africa and throughout Greater Southwest Asia.

The United States would not have to do much, relative to its income, to accomplish an enormous amount of good. The Marshall Plan cost the American taxpayer more than 2 percent of GNP for several years. Now we do not even provide one-twentieth of that. If the United States raised its aid budget from less than one-tenth of one percent of GNP to two-tenths, we would have an extra $10 billion to fight disease and to provide education, clean water, and other vital needs. The stark contrast between huge increases in defense and nothing for assistance damages our ability to build support for our overall effort in the broad campaign against terrorism.

European leadership in this area remains essential; the EU provides five times more than the United States in global assistance. But EU Europe must find ways to close the stunning gap that has emerged between huge EU aid commitments, which look good on paper, and the years, not months, it often takes before a pledge of assistance actually reaches its intended target.

There are many elements to the foreign assistance debate. Cash alone will not transform the plight of the poor if their own governments do not address issues of corruption and bureaucracy, the rule of law and respect for private property, or if developed and developing nations alike do not lower barriers to trade and investment. Poverty must also be addressed by Arab states themselves, after all, in the Arab region some of the richest countries in the world live next door to some of the poorest. Suffice it to say that September 11 has given us an opportunity to reinvigorate this aspect of our transatlantic agenda—if we are prepared to seize the moment.

**FAILED STATES, ROGUE STATES, HIJACKED STATES**

These issues raise the question whether we are prepared to seek greater convergence in our approaches to both failed states and rogue states, in this region and beyond. One lesson of September 11 is that if failed states are allowed to fester, they can become sanctuaries or even agents for terrorist networks, organized criminals and drug traffickers. Afghanistan is a dramatic example, and the international assistance effort is critical to rooting out terrorism within its borders. It will be a long haul, with setbacks to come.

Our twenty-first century world is littered with Afghans. When these states fail, their neighbors and often the global community are faced with refugee flows, ethnic or civil conflict, and political disintegration. Together we have a compelling interest in working with others to build states that can look after the needs of their people and provide security within their borders.
Europeans have recognized this need for some time; there are signs that the Bush Administration is waking up to this reality as well. But that remains to be seen.

On the other hand, if September 11 underscored the need to deal with failed states, it equally underscored that we must be prepared to confront rogue states that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction or provide know-how or materials to terrorists. Today, this is our most likely security threat. Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement across the Atlantic about the appropriate response.

Some transatlantic dissonance has to do with rhetoric. President Bush’s reference to an “axis of evil” between North Korea, Iraq and Iran astounded Europeans by its lack of reality. “The phrase ‘axis of evil’ leads nowhere,” German Foreign Minister Fischer snapped. Germans and Europeans agree that each of the three states is a proliferator. But they balk at the suggestion that the three countries can be lumped together, and point out that Iran and Iraq in fact used weapons of mass destruction against each other in their long and ugly conflict. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw dismissed the phrase as a largely domestic effort by the President to mobilize Americans behind the next phase of the campaign against terrorism.

Transatlantic differences go beyond bad word choice, however, and reflect differences over substance. The emerging American perception is that we should unite behind a common doctrine that makes clear that any regime that uses nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the transatlantic community or its interests, or that supplies such weapons or know-how to terrorists, will be removed from power. Europeans by and large are alarmed by the prospect that the United States may be prepared to take preemptive action against Iraq or other countries that provide terrorists with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. They are fearful that the Administration is moving inexorably toward a military clash with Iraq. Without evidence of either Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks or of complicity in providing weapons of mass destruction or know-how to terrorists, the Europeans question the legality of military action. They fear it could lead to massive civilian and military casualties, cause chaos in the Arab world, threaten the territorial integrity of some of Iraq's neighbors, create economic chaos by spiking global oil prices, cast the United States as bent on hegemony and spark intense anti-Americanism in Europe. They believe that the Bush Administration’s effort to brand North Korea, Iran and Iraq with a scarlet “E for evil,” coupled with the prospect of an American policy of preemption, has the paradoxical effect of shifting global concern away from Saddam and toward the United States. Finally, many also worry that an invasion of Iraq could provoke the use of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism that it would be designed to prevent.

As risky and costly as an invasion of Iraq would be, Bush and many other Americans seem convinced that the risks are outweighed by the prospect of allowing an aggressive dictator in Iraq to develop nuclear weapons. “I will not wait on events,” the President has declared, “while dangers gather.” They want to destroy the enemy before the enemy destroys them. The Administration also seems increasingly of the view that international law will play a smaller role in conflicts as wars became increasingly unconventional and undeclared. In this volume James Woolsey advances forceful and controversial arguments for taking on Saddam.

In short, the United States is unlikely to be dissuaded from a unilateral course by European hand-wringing. If America’s friends and allies want to dissuade the United States from unilaterally attacking Iraq, they should be prepared to work closely with Washington to roll back Iraqi missile efforts and development of weapons of mass destruction, deter it from supporting terrorism, rigorously enforce their own export controls, and develop an approach that focuses on regime change. This requires a new international consensus against Saddam’s efforts, sanctioned
by the United Nations, that presents him with a true choice. If he does not let the inspectors in, the international community will force him out. If he provides know-how or materials to terrorist groups, the international community will force him out.

The debate over Iraq is related in part to growing disparities between United States and European military capabilities, which lead not only to different perceptions regarding the utility of force but perhaps even the value of the Alliance itself. European Union External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten expressed what many Europeans, including many Germans are thinking: “The stunning and unexpectedly rapid success of the military campaign in Afghanistan was a tribute to American capacity. But it has perhaps reinforced some dangerous instincts: that the projection of military power is the only basis of true security; that the United States can rely only on itself; and that allies may be useful as an optional extra but that the United States is big and strong enough to manage without them if it must.”

The new generation of U.S. military technology on display in Afghanistan is years ahead of what Europe has today – or is willing to pay for tomorrow. This strategic imbalance fuels the view that America does not need Europe to help fight its wars, and that Europe could not do much even if it wanted to. John Vinocur labeled the Afghan conflict the “don’t-call-us-we’ll-call-you-war.” The Alliance invoked its mutual defense clause under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history in response to September 11. But NATO itself has only played a limited, largely political and symbolic role in the war against terrorism. CDU Foreign Policy spokesman Karl Lamers declared that “NATO did not work after September 11.” Europeans were disappointed by the initial U.S. rejection of their offer of direct military support. As Senator John McCain has commented, with all due respect to Europe’s offer of military assistance in Afghanistan, the United States did not really need any help.

The transatlantic capability “gap” is likely to turn into a gulf by the $48 billion increase proposed for the U.S. defense budget, which has impressed and quite overwhelmed the allies. The growing gap is illustrated well by the fact that the increase alone in the President’s proposed Pentagon budget is double the budget of the entire Bundeswehr. It is close to the entire $54 million in global development assistance provided by the world’s developed nations. The United States military is simply pulling away from its own allies.

The clear challenge now is to manage these asymmetries in U.S. and European forces. The divergence is not only due to September 11, but also to the technological and organizational changes occurring as part of U.S. force transformation. EU states are simply not prepared to spend the requisite money to keep pace with U.S. transformation, even if the EU succeeds in meeting its own 2003 Headline Goals. The challenge is no longer how to keep up with the United States, but how to develop European power projection and niche capabilities in ways that can provide value-added in coalition warfare, and secure stability in the European region. If Europe is unable to move ahead in these areas, it runs the risk of becoming a “military pygmy,” in the words of Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General, and faces a rather unattractive division of labor: the U.S. conducts wars from the air and the Europeans clean up the aftermath of battle on the ground.

This new strategic situation requires serious adjustments in German force posture and capabilities. The continuing legacy of the Bonn Republic and its focus on the Fulda Gap means that German armed forces remain the least deployable and projectable of NATO’s leading powers. The shift towards more mobile, projectable forces poses greater challenges to Germany than to any of the major European allies. Reforms have been sluggish and uneven. The
**Bundeswehr** is being reduced and reoriented to new missions outside of Germany, but a considerable gap remains between the **Bundeswehr’s** capabilities and the threats it faces.

Germany’s forthright response to September 11 means that German support for collective military action in out-of-area operations may no longer be a question of whether but when, where and how. Germany is clearly shifting from being an importer to an exporter of security. It has also had an important domestic impact in the sense that the German public strongly believes the German military, in the words of one senior official, “is finally on the right side.” That means growing public support for the notion that the **Bundeswehr’s** mission is not just to defend German soil but to defend others and to contribute to crisis management outside the NATO area. But it will take time before the serious deficiencies in military capabilities, which characterize Germany’s possible role beyond NATO’s borders, will be overcome.

The Berlin Republic is weighty enough today so that Germany’s ability to transform its military has become an important bellwether of overall European will and commitment to military transformation. Smaller allies are happy to hide behind Germany, asking why they should engage in difficult and controversial reforms if Europe’s central power does not. If Germany can help forge a new European consensus to enhance European defense cohesion based on greater capability to project force, it will be easier for Americans to deal with Europe as a global partner. If the **Bundeswehr** does not keep pace on reform, neither NATO nor the EU will meet their goals. Without much further adaptation in European forces, our militaries will lose the ability to fight together, which would only reinforce Europe’s relatively weak capacity to project power, exacerbate the very American unilateralism Europeans find so unsettling, and decouple the mission of the U.S. military in Germany from that of the **Bundeswehr**.

**A NEW CONCEPTION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY**

President Bush has announced that he wants to replace the existing strategic architecture of arms control and nuclear weapons agreements with a new strategic “framework” for the twenty-first century. Updating these policies is long overdue. But a new framework must do more than simply cut old nuclear weapons in favor of new missile defenses. What is needed is a more comprehensive and integrated approach that includes expanded arms control efforts, better antiterrorist efforts and nonproliferation measures, joint efforts to cope with both failed and rogue states, and new, balanced defense capabilities. And it must seek to include new partners, particularly Russia and China. In this volume Karl Kaiser makes a worthwhile proposal to expand the Group of 8 to include China as the core of a new global alliance for mutual security.

As a first order of business such a coalition must engage on a new understanding of strategic stability. For thirty years two superpowers preserved stability despite their animosity because they felt equally at risk, they shared the view that the prospect of suicide would deter anyone from actually using weapons of mass destruction, and they were willing to negotiate certain rules of the road together and with other nations.

Today, all three premises have vanished. Other nuclear powers have emerged – and the rules of their road are unclear. Terrorists are not deterred by suicide, and they’re not at the negotiating table. They have nothing to protect and nothing to lose. In short, as Kaiser also outlines, cold war deterrence will not work as it once did, and in some cases it will not work at all.

Al Qaeda had a major effort underway to examine chemical and biological weapons and was examining nuclear terrorism in terms of attacks on power plants, radiological weapons and crude nuclear devices. Tony Cordesman describes how terrorists and rogue states alike may draw the
lesson of September 11 and its aftermath that there is value in giving proxy aid to develop weapons of mass destruction and may see acquiring such weapons as a key deterrent to U.S. action in asymmetric wars. They may also see that the ability to launch against U.S. allies and friends, including in Europe, may either deter the United States or force it to limit its range of attacks and goals in any conflict.

A new conception of strategic stability must weave what have been separate strands – the fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, nonproliferation, and efforts at defense – into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction – in any form, from any source, on any vehicle, whether triggered by intent or accident, by a rogue state or a terrorist group. Each of these strands influences the others. That is why they must be considered not separately, but jointly. A new coalition should advance a broad-based effort at protection in depth that includes four mutually reinforcing elements: prevention, deterrence, defense, and societal protection.

This is a subject worthy of more detail. Suffice it to say here that the last element – homeland security – deserves considerably more transatlantic attention than it has received. The U.S. effort is likely to be a grand national project on the order of the Apollo project that sent a man to the moon. What is the German response? Ulrich Weisser and Klaus Jansen address the issue, and find German efforts wanting. Are authorities in Germany and Europe prepared to cope with a cyberattack on air traffic control systems in Frankfurt as scores of commercial aircraft are trying to land safely in morning rain and fog? Jansen says no. How about an airplane taking off from Paris and crashing into the Deutsche Bank tower in Frankfurt? Again the answer is no. Much EU effort has been directed to the realm of law enforcement. But there is a need for integrated response plans that can rush capabilities from one country to another, and deal with any kind of outbreak of human and agricultural disease. Cordesman urges transatlantic efforts to stockpile vaccines and antibiotics, develop common travel and quarantine procedures, common public health approaches, common standards for the protection of critical infrastructure could prove critical in preventing, containing and treating an emergency. Through NATO, the United States is also affected by the state of European preparedness. What challenges would arise for the United States if similar attacks were launched against the homeland of any of our allies? It is unlikely that the effort to strengthen homeland defenses will be successful in isolation from one’s allies. Is there a “NATO Homeland?”

TRANSATLANTIC GLOBAL STRATEGIES, DRIFT, OR DIVISION OF LABOR?

Are Americans, Germans, and their European partners ready to align their policies on the core challenges outlined here? Will Americans have the patience or the inclination to assemble the types of coalitions suggested? Will Europeans have the capacity or the will to generate the coherence of action that will be required? And are Germans, more than a decade after unification, prepared for what Karl Kaiser terms the “third great reorientation” of their foreign policy since 1945, from Adenauer and Westbindung through Brandt and Ostpolitik to Schröder and Fischer and the Berlin Republic’s global responsibilities?

These are open questions that will test the leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. Starting down that road will require Americans to work with others wherever they can, and only alone when they must. Until September 11, the Bush Administration and many in Congress were pursuing the opposite approach. Since September 11, they have been quite adept at multilateralism, but so far this has reflected more of an instrumental effort than a principled
conversion. It is unlikely, for instance, that the Bush Administration’s coalition-building efforts would lead it to shift its positions on such issues as climate change, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty or the International Court of Justice? Not likely. On the other hand, as Jonathan Winer outlines, transatlantic cooperative networks, forged beyond the glare of political squabbling, are being used more effectively to combat the new threats we face.

Many Germans and other Europeans will argue that the challenge of a global partnership is too much too soon for a Europe overwhelmed by its agenda at home. Others will argue that the best way to enhance European cohesiveness and influence is not through closer Atlantic partnership but through greater European independence.

Both of these arguments only feed the very American unilateralism about which Europeans profess such concern. The real imbalance in the transatlantic partnership is not that there is too much America, it is that there is too little Europe. And if the true impulse for further unity only comes when Europeans define themselves in terms of what they are not—that is, not Americans—than what they are, then that is a declaration of the bankruptcy of the European ideal.

The most serious repercussions of such developments would unfold in Germany, for after the next round of EU and NATO enlargement the Berlin Republic will be transformed from Europe’s front line to its heartland, the crossroads and central power of a dynamic continent. Chancellor Schröder has called for “a new conception of German foreign policy.” Germany’s friends are confident that this new conception will be built on the successes of the Bonn Republic. But they wonder at times whether their confidence in Germany is matched by German confidence in themselves.

Of course, it is understandable to argue that greater German roles in the past have only brought grief to Germany and to the world. But there is a difference between learning from one’s history and hiding behind it. When the Germans achieved unity in freedom, they succeeded not only for themselves, but for people on every continent. For decades American soldiers served in Germany as trustees of German unity. Now German airmen are patrolling the skies of North America as stewards of American freedom. Germany’s ability to adapt its foreign and security policy will be an important pacesetter and barometer of Europe’s political will and commitment to a more global Atlantic Community.

There will be important implications for our central institutions. In the end, however, the real question is not that of institutions but of shared perspective and determination. We can be proud of our accomplishments. But one clear lesson of September 11 is that our real enemy is our own complacency.

If the United States and Europe are to forge a successful transatlantic strategy for dealing with these issues, they must do more than simply respond to this particular crisis, they must look toward a future in which they will face a constant threat of asymmetric attacks from both terrorist groups and states.

This is a time of tragedy but also of immense opportunity. Are we prepared to shape the future as we did in the past? Before September 11 it was an interesting debating point. Today, the stakes could not be higher. Americans are unlikely to change their ways unless their European partners do as well. The danger is that each side points to the other to justify why it is not they but others who have to change. And as so often in the past, the nature of the German-American partnership could prove decisive.