CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Esther Brimmer
Benjamin Schreer
Christian Tuschhoff

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD
Jeffrey Anderson ................................................................. v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ..................................................... vii

REDEFINING EUROPEAN SECURITY? INSIGHTS FROM UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, AND GERMAN ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1991-2000
Esther Brimmer ................................................................. 1

GERMANY AND U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE:
THE CASE FOR A REAL DEBATE
Benjamin Schreer ................................................................. 35

THE TIES THAT BIND: ALLIED COMMITMENTS AND NATO BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Christian Tuschhoff .............................................................. 71
FOREWORD

AICGS is pleased to present the most recent installment in its German Issues series. Since its inception in 1983, the Institute has devoted deep and sustained attention to the security dimension of the transatlantic relationship. After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, much of the security agenda in the United States, Germany, and broader Europe remains recognizable, yet framed by an altered context and new priorities. This collection of articles, authored by recent AICGS/DAAD fellows-in-residence, is part of an ongoing effort by the Institute to evaluate this evolving transatlantic security relationship. Readers will find a mix of enduring and new security themes addressed in the ensuing pages. Esther Brimmer, for example, presents a comprehensive examination of U.S., German, and European efforts to shape a constructive security relationship with the Russian Federation over the course of the 1990s. Benjamin Schreer traces the changing terms of debate between the United States and Germany over national missile defense in recent years, up to and including the post-9/11 period, and extracts a list of concrete policy recommendations for both governments from his analysis. Christian Tuschhoff takes up the issue of NATO’s continuing relevance after September 11, presenting a spirited and provocative defense of this venerable alliance. I hope you enjoy these recent fruits of AICGS research, which were made possible by a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

Jeffrey Anderson
Director of Studies

February 2002
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REDEFINING EUROPEAN SECURITY?
INSIGHTS FROM UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION,
AND GERMAN ASSISTANCE TO THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1991-2000
Esther Brimmer

INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, the Russian Federation joined the United States and Europe in the fight against international terrorism. Washington, Moscow, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) were on the same side of a major international security issue. This fact suggested that relations among Russia and western countries were evolving. These countries saw common cause in dealing with transnational threats from non-state actors, exemplified by international terrorism. New threads were being woven into the relationship. Yet, months before the anti-terrorism coalition formed, the EU met with Russian officials to discuss social conditions inside a Russian oblast. Even Moscow believed that the social conditions inside the oblast of Kaliningrad—which will be surrounded by an enlarged EU—were legitimate subjects for international discussion. Meanwhile, the United States engaged the Russian Federation on a range of issues through the Northern European Initiative. These programs bespoke of a changed relationship between the West and Russia. However, as analysts explore the future of this relationship, they should understand that many features of the “new” political scene derive from changes in notions of security in the 1990s.

In the decade after the end of the Cold War, policymakers and scholars developed a renewed interest in broad understandings of international security. With superpower rivalry over, war in the Balkans, genocide in Rwanda, and thousands of peacekeepers deployed to hotspots around the globe, leaders found themselves confronting a variety of complex emergencies beyond the purview of international high politics in the Cold War era. Many leaders in western countries had focused on more traditional security affairs. Traditional security focused on the military security of states. Yet western leaders used to managing power relations
Redefining European Security?

were dealing with “new” security issues involving the safety of individuals, refugees, children in war, and other non-state actors. In the 1990s, issues ranging from human rights to landmines to terrorism moved to center stage.

The increased importance of new security issues can be seen in the West’s relationship with the Russian Federation. This relationship had been the crux of the Cold War dynamic. Yet even here, nontraditional security issues became increasingly important. This report will argue that the discussion of a “new” security relationship between Moscow and the West is really the opening of European security to issues usually handled in the global affairs arena. In a sense transatlantic security, the bastion of high politics, has been infiltrated by the types of issues that have preoccupied development specialists and conflict theorists for years.

In the 1990s, specialists in intra-state conflict, peacekeeping, operations other than war, and in development sought to understand the relationship among social conditions, economic development and security around the world. It is not surprising that the end of the Soviet Union should occasion a rethinking of security in the western world, too. However, treating global issues is a departure from traditional transatlantic security affairs. Territorial security of states against invasion from the Soviet Union had been the basis of Cold War politics, especially for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War clearly changed the political dynamics inside Europe. Central and Eastern Europe reemerged from decades of Soviet domination. It also changed the context of conflicts outside Europe. When the superpower rivalry ended, so did support for proxy contests around the world, removing the ideological scaffolding from many situations and allowing other types of security concerns to emerge. Post-Cold War intrastate conflicts became incubators for thinking about new security issues.

Many of these “new” security concerns had been present in the politics of other parts of the world for a long time. For example, anti-apartheid campaigners in South Africa understood that there could be no security without respect for human dignity. Indeed, even during the Cold War, Washington and Moscow talked about refusniks and Helsinki basket three issues, but these were humanitarian, not security concerns. Superpower politics tended to center on traditional military security issues. The end
of the Cold War allowed the strategic tectonic plates to shift and new ideas to bubble forth from latent political fissures. Some governments and organizations began to apply ideas about new security to their foreign assistance programs. Examining assistance programs to the Russian Federation sheds light on the evolution of western thinking about security.

This paper will begin by defining “traditional” and “new” security. It will then outline the security assistance programs of the United States, the European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. The paper explores the type of security issues present in their foreign assistance programs because these programs provide a window into the donors’ political intentions and priorities. The report will then compare the security elements in the programs and conclude with an assessment of “new” security and the West’s relations with Russia.²

An examination of bilateral aid helps highlight donors’ security concerns, because bilateral policies are more reflective of particular national priorities. The United States, the European Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany were the three largest “bilateral” donors to the Russian Federation in the 1990s. In this area, the European Union acts more like a bilateral donor than an international financial institution. Indeed, as the EU’s role in European foreign policy grew, its assistance took on a more political character. Like the United States and Germany, the Commission of the European Communities (EC) has been a member of the principal donor coordination body, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1961.³ According to the OECD, in 1999, the United States provided $905 million in official assistance to Russia, the European Commission $144 million and Germany $82 million. In that year, Russia was the second largest recipient of U.S. aid behind Israel.⁴


TABLE 1
Top Three Official Aid Donors to the Russian Federation, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total OA Amount ($m)</th>
<th>To Russia</th>
<th>Percent OA aid to Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9145</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Comm.</td>
<td>4937</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5515</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This report will examine the Russian assistance programs of these three donors both because they were the largest bilateral aid providers and because of their important roles in western policies towards Russia. In sheer amounts, the international financial institutions (IFIs) were the largest aid providers to the Russian Federation in the 1990s, but the national governments are studied because of their importance in setting strategic policy towards Russia. Although comparisons across institutions risks comparing dissimilar programs, a quick review of the various programs provides a sense of the relative sizes of donor activities. From 1991 to 2000, the EU gave €2.28 billion and from fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1999 the U.S. gave $7.67 billion. From 1992 to 1997, Russia’s net credit with the International Monetary Fund exceeded $18 billion and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) gave $9 billion in soft loans. In addition, EU member states’ contributions may have totaled €25 billion from 1991 to 1997.

TRADITIONAL SECURITY AND “NEW” SECURITY

Traditional Security

An analysis of traditional security serves as a basis for understanding what is or is not “new” about new security. A key question to ask when differentiating various approaches to security is to ask security for whom and from what? Traditional security is concerned with the security of the sovereign state from military or political threats. In this paradigm, the state’s political independence and territorial integrity are paramount.
principles to protect. These principles underlie a definition of national interest that includes defending borders, but has stretched to include protecting economic supply routes. In this view, the internal affairs of states are not the subject of international politics. Yet, this type of security does not preclude cooperation. Indeed, alliances and international organizations can be seen as mechanisms for sovereign states to pool their resources to defend common interests.

The modern notion of traditional security descends from the European states system that emerged in the early seventeenth century and coalesced after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Western scholars have delineated at least three strands of thinking on the states system. The realist school of international relations theory draws on Thomas Hobbes’ “state of nature” in which little cooperation is possible. The idealist school looks to Immanuel Kant’s vision of “perpetual peace” supported by the notion that democratic states do not make war on each other. The third school builds on the work of Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel in which formal and informal rules of state interaction form the framework of an international society.9

The state-centric view of the world dominated western thought from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries. One of the key features of the system was the removal of the individual as a subject of international affairs.10 States became the subjects of international law and politics. The Cold War and nuclear deterrence bolstered the primacy of the state, especially in East-West relations. Despite the dominance of the state-centered view of the world, there were other approaches to international relations. These analyses defined security in a different way.

“New” Security and Human Security

New security paradigms take a different approach. They broaden, but do not discard, theoretical notions of security. This school of thought has different answers for the questions of security for whom and from what. In its widest sense, “new” security covers all security issues other than the military safety of states. However, that is a very broad definition. “Human security” narrows this field to focus on the safety of the individual person. This security paradigm looks at security of agents other than the state, including individuals, ethnic groups, or vulnerable populations such
as refugees and children. It also addresses security from threats beyond military ones and can include hazards for the human being such as infectious disease or environmental degradation.

What is new about “new” security? What is new is making the link between international security and the safety of the individual person from transnational threats. Two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant connected the internal structure of a state (democracy) with its external behavior (perpetual peace) in his theory that democracies do not go to war against each other. Human security enriches this notion, asserting that the well-being of people within a society also affects the external impact of that society on international security.

Human security includes threats to the individual person from transnational hazards within the definition of international security. Therefore, threats to individuals become the subject of international affairs. This notion rearranges politics and connects human rights and security. In this type of analysis, the state can be free of challenges to its territorial integrity yet be insecure because the threats to individuals are so severe. Apartheid-era South Africa is a good example.

Human security is an imprecise but useful category within the larger notion of new security. As Roland Paris notes, human security deals with threats to new actors (people) from new hazards (transnational ones). Other combinations of new security are important, but are not necessarily human security. These combinations are traditional actors (states) threatened by transnational factors or new actors (people) threatened by traditional military might.11

“New” security is not completely new. As Paris explains, there have been many efforts to include nonmilitary threats in the notion of security ranging from the environment to “common security.”12 Policymakers and theorists derived “human security” from these earlier efforts. Still, the idea of “human security” that developed in the 1990s provides a useful framework for understanding a politically salient reorientation in conceptions of security. Even if some western policymakers were not explicitly following a “human security” framework, the paradigm helps explain changes in western aid to Russia during that decade.

The transnational nature of threats is an important element in human security. An issue is transnational if it spills across borders and no one
state can solve the problem by itself. Given this transnational element, not surprisingly, some of the most creative thinking on human security has happened in the United Nations. The term “human security” was first elaborated in the United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report.\textsuperscript{13} UNDP deemed human security to be universal and interdependent and based on the freedom from fear and the freedom from want.\textsuperscript{14} In his speech accepting the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explicitly integrated human and international security:

In this new century, we must start from an understanding that peace belongs not only to states or peoples, but to each and every member of those communities. The sovereignty of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights. Peace must be made real and tangible in the daily existence of every individual in need. Peace must be sought, above all, because it is the condition for every member of the human family to live a life of dignity and security.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the United Nations, national governments have taken up this cause. Under the leadership of then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Canada launched a major diplomatic initiative, the Human Security Network.\textsuperscript{16} The notion of human security underpinned several diplomatic initiatives including the international Land Mines Convention.\textsuperscript{17}

It is not surprising that theories of human security originated among policymakers with a deep understanding of economic development issues. International development assistance is based on the premise that development will lead to stability. Problems such as violent conflict amid prosperity and social tension despite economic progress spurred a reexamination of the bases of healthy societies. Officials and analysts grappling with persistent poverty, hunger and disease recognized that state security did not capture all the elements needed for a safe, stable world. Enter “basic needs” in the 1970s and “human security” in the 1990s, both of which attempted to reintroduce the individual. Indeed,
human security has been described as “an enabling environment for human development.” Meanwhile, the spread of the human rights movement in the twentieth century brought the individual more to the center of international politics. These two waves from the fields of development and human rights crest on the beach of the post-Cold War world. The changing conception of security within the West-Russia relationship has been influenced by ideas developed in global security studies washing over transatlantic security affairs.

**Human security and foreign assistance**

This report argues that security remained important in relations between the West and Russia, but the type of security changed. Western assistance programs included elements of traditional and human security. Although it can sustain progressive policies, human security is based on negative freedom (freedom from). This report defines human security to include: food, health, personal safety, environmental quality, political freedom, economic security, and cultural expression. The first four are the basis of safety for the human being as living organism. The latter three are enabling factors that allow a person to flourish.

**TABLE 2**

**Components of Human Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Human Security in Report</th>
<th>Freedom From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal safety</td>
<td>Crime, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental quality</td>
<td>Pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political freedom (an enabling factor)</td>
<td>Repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic security (an enabling factor)</td>
<td>Extreme poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural expression (an enabling factor)</td>
<td>Genocide, forced assimilation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[8] AICGS German Issues Volume 27 · 2002
The report builds on the work of other analysts and policymakers who have tried to define human security, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the scholars Gary King and Christopher Murray:

### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Definition</th>
<th>DFAIT Definition</th>
<th>DFAIT Definition</th>
<th>Report Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Peace support operations</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health security</td>
<td>Conflict prevention</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Personal safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Governance and accountability</td>
<td>Political freedom</td>
<td>Environmental quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td>Public safety</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Political freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural expression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the subsequent chapters, this report will use the “Report Definition” of human security to analyze the types of security assistance provided by the West to the Russian Federation. The presence of human security policies is an indicator of policymakers’ attention to new security issues.

### UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Remarkably, after five decades of Cold War, the United States became a major provider of foreign assistance to the Russian Federation. Foreign aid is almost never solely altruistic. Rather, it is based on benevolence, the premise that helping you helps me, too, in the long run. The United States Department of State identifies three enduring U.S. policy goals in its assistance to the newly independent states (NIS): “[m]arket reform, democratic reform, and the secure disposition, reduction, and non-proliferation of the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.”

These goals were manifested in programs focused on economic transformation, democratic reform, security, and humanitarian assistance. This report argues that U.S. assistance contained more than
Redefining European Security?

one type of security program. Even outside activities explicitly labeled as “security programs,” there were projects that contributed to security. Aid for democracy and humanitarian affairs included elements of human security. Although the bulk of U.S. security assistance went to traditional security measures, an important portion went to address nontraditional security concerns. The changing balance among the types of security funded evinces a changing notion of the nature of security in the West-Russia relationship.

Although important, security assistance was not the largest component of U.S. aid to the Russian Federation. From fiscal year (FY) 1992 to FY1999, the United States provided $15.58 billion in aid to the New Independent States (NIS). The majority of the money was intended to spur economic and democratic reform. Russia received $7.67 billion or 49 percent of the funds budgeted for the NIS in the 1990s. Major U.S. aid for Russia included the FREEDOM Support Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction, food aid, and nuclear reactor safety and fissile materials disposition. Over half of U.S. aid to Russia went for threat reduction and food aid. In this period, Russia also received $8.89 billion in commercial financing and insurance from the U.S. government, out of a total $18.01 billion provided to the NIS.

TABLE 4
Selected United States Assistance Programs to the Russian Federation
FY 1992-FY1999 (S, Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Administering agency/ies*</th>
<th>Amount Budgeted</th>
<th>Amount Obligated</th>
<th>Amount Spent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREEDOM Support Act</td>
<td>Commerce, EPA, State, Treasury, USAID</td>
<td>2498.75</td>
<td>2445.19</td>
<td>2261.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>1675.63</td>
<td>1224.79</td>
<td>790.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2418.28</td>
<td>2418.28</td>
<td>2418.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear reactor safety, and other programs</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>905.74</td>
<td>721.42</td>
<td>584.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td></td>
<td>7671.49</td>
<td>6983.02</td>
<td>6225.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some programs were transferred from Defense Department CTR to other agencies in FY 1996.
** Amounts in table do not equal the total because not all programs are listed here.
Security and threat reduction

As noted in chapter one, traditional security addresses military threats to sovereign states. U.S. assistance to Russia in the security field focused on reducing the capability of the Russian military to wage war against the United States and its allies. In some ways, even U.S. assistance in traditional areas took a novel approach. The emphasis was on direct threat reduction rather than countering the threat through deterrence, as had been done during the Cold War. From FY 1992 to FY 1999, the United States spent $1.676 billion for Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia. The four most expensive programs were Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($529.6 million), Chemical Weapons Destruction ($280.5 million), the Fissile Missile Storage Facility ($269.6 million), and Weapons Storage Security ($133.2 million). U.S. programs can be divided into several thematic categories:

- Denuclearization
- Demilitarization
- Prevention of proliferation: improving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons control
- Nuclear reactor safety

Denuclearization

Weapons destruction was the central concept in U.S. security assistance to the NIS. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program—called “Nunn-Lugar” in honor of the two U.S. senators who advocated it—was the flagship of U.S. security assistance to Russia and the NIS. The CTR program began in 1992 to address the threat to the U.S. and its allies from weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The goal was “denuclearization, demilitarization, and prevention of weapons proliferation.”

Denuclearization was central to the United States’ relations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in the early 1990s. The notion was to reduce the number of countries with nuclear arms by returning missiles and missile launchers from the three other successor states to Russia. Then U.S. assistance could focus on reducing arms in Russia. Over 3,300
Redefining European Security?

strategic warheads were moved from these three countries and subsequently destroyed.29

The Nunn-Lugar program had an important impact in Russia itself. The largest program was “Weapons Destruction and Dismantlement,” which supported the arms reductions in the START Treaty. For example, under the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program, key components in the nuclear arsenal were destroyed, including submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and SS-18 heavy bombers. This report classifies the CTR weapons destruction programs as traditional security. These programs were conducted by states and were intended to reduce a military threat. The goal was the destruction of military hardware. It was literally a tangible success. Policymakers could hold pieces of the weapons that had been destroyed.

Initially, all of the CTR programs were administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, a fact that reinforced the idea that these were traditional security programs. However, the proposed Russian nuclear reactor deal with Iran and the war in Chechnya made aid to Russia controversial in the U.S. Congress. The Clinton administration mounted a defense of the aid programs.30 As part of FY 1996 reorganization of the program, many activities were dispersed to other federal agencies with the relevant functional specialties. Despite the controversies, in June 1999 the CTR program was extended for seven years. Under the U.S. federal budget system, funds provided in one year may be spent over several years. Programs with long “spend out” rates can continue for many years. From fiscal year (FY) 1992-FY 1999, the Defense Department budgeted $1.6 billion in CTR assistance to Russia. Of that, $1.2 had been obligated (assigned to programs), and $790 million actually spent. The funds budgeted in the 1990s can continue to be spent for years to come (unless limited by further Congressional action). The CTR program continued to evolve. In December 1997, projects were added to support START II and proposed START III reductions.

Security assistance is a sensitive area affected by the overall political relationship. Although Russia was the recipient, it was hardly passive. In March 1999, Moscow suspended its participation in both the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs to protest the NATO campaign in
the former Yugoslavia. The programs were only reinstated at the end of the year; however, the funds had been reprogrammed within the State Department budget, which handled the IMET and FMF programs. Meanwhile, in the 1990s donors were sobered by Russian crackdowns in Chechnya.

Demilitarization

Demilitarization was a complex process of transforming a society and its economy away from warfare. The U.S. programs focused on alternative employment of weapons experts and alternative uses for military facilities. Alternative employment was an important area for donor cooperation. The United States, the European Union and Japan jointly supported the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow (and the Science and Technology enter in Ukraine). Like other activities, ISTC was initially funded under the CTR but in FY 1996 came under the State Department’s FREEDOM Support Act. One of the more innovative programs was the Nuclear Cities initiative that funded jobs for displaced workers in nuclear weapons facilities.

Defense conversion was funded for a few years in the early 1990s. Until its termination in FY 1996, the Defense Department financed programs converting military facilities for commercial uses. Initially there were direct joint ventures, but in FY 1995, these were supplanted by equity investments by the Defense Enterprise Fund in project between U.S. companies and former-Soviet entities that used to make weapons of mass destruction.

Prevention of Proliferation

The U.S. approach to nuclear non-proliferation focused on the “chain of custody.” The projects were designed to improve the handling of nuclear weapons at each stage of destruction, transportation and storage of the remaining fissile material. Projects included the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak in the Southern Urals, the Security Assessment Training Center, and the Nuclear Weapons Automated Inventory Control and Management System. There also was funding to improve the storage containers. U.S. funds also provided funds to destroy chemical weapons,
Redefining European Security?

prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, and reemploy weapons scientists.

U.S. support for non-proliferation gained prominence in the 1990s. While export control had been an element of the Defense Department’s CTR program, in FY 1998 it became its own “line item” within the antiterrorism funding (and was by then within the State Department). The Department of Energy also funded an Export Control Program and the Second Line of Defense project, which provided detection equipment and training for customs personnel. Other bilateral engagement continued such as the U.S.-Russia Subgroup on Nuclear Export Control.

Nuclear reactor safety

Not only nuclear weapons, but also nuclear reactors could be sources of fissile materials. Potential proliferators could target lightly guarded reactors. The U.S. Department of Energy conducted several projects to help the Russians improve the safety of their nuclear reactors. Activities included efforts to use MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in commercial reactors in the United States and to “immobilize” surplus plutonium.32

These efforts to secure nuclear reactors can be classified as traditional security, but they contain an element of new security. They are state-to-state activities managed by national government agencies (traditional security), but they are intended to prevent the theft of fissile material by non-state actors (i.e., terrorists—hence new security).

Northern European Initiative

In addition to foreign assistance programs, the United States sought to engage Russia in regional cooperative ventures. The United States launched the Northern European Initiative in 1997 to work with countries bordering the Baltic Sea.33 It operated in six priority areas: trade and business, civil society, environment, law enforcement, energy, and public health.34 The NEI supported work on several new security issues. For example, the NEI Law Enforcement Task Force cooperates with the Council of Baltic Sea States Task Force on Organized Crime. The NEI also worked with the Council of Baltic Sea States Task Force on Infectious Diseases on an HIV/AIDS strategy developed with UNAIDS (the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS).
Human security and U.S. assistance

The United States managed a broad array of programs to enhance traditional security, but there were elements of nontraditional security as well. Nuclear reactor safety was one such area because it attempted to stop potential terrorists. The effort to combat crime was another. In the 1990s, the Department of State budgeted $30.29 million for anti-crime training and technical assistance to Russia; and the Department of Justice allocated $3.87 million in criminal law assistance. Moreover, within the FREEDOM Support Act, USAID budgeted $100.78 million to fund improvements in health care.  

EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Geography gives the United States and the European Union different starting points for relations with the Russian Federation. The EU gained a long border with Russia with Finland’s 1995 accession to the EU. Accession by EU candidates Poland and Lithuania will surround the Russian city of Kaliningrad with EU member states. This proximity and historical links give Europeans, and EU officials, a security interest in Russia. EU leaders define security broadly to include nontraditional and traditional security. Transnational threats such as infectious disease or environmental degradation within the Russia have a particular immediacy for EU leaders because Russia is adjacent to the territory of current and future EU states.

Not only is Russia physically close to the EU, it has played an important role in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union’s first Common Strategy promulgated in 1999 covered relations with Russia. The Common Strategy is a document by which members agree to follow certain principles and policies in relation to an external state. The creation of Common Strategies represents another milestone in the EU’s development as an international actor. These strategies can have wide reach because accession countries may associate themselves with the given policy. In a sense, a Common Strategy symbolizes closeness and distance at the same time. The U.S.-EU relationship is so profound and multifaceted
that it would be hard to codify in a single strategy. The EU-Russia relationship is important, but not so multidimensional. Still, the evolving EU-Russia relationship is a key element in the EU’s external profile. The EU has very close political and economic ties with the United States but shares a continent with Russia. The Common Strategy states that “Russia and the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe, and in other parts of the world. The Union considers Russia an essential partner in achieving that objective and is determined to cooperate with her.”

EU aid to Russia can be categorized as:

- Technical assistance
- Nuclear safety
- Scientific cooperation
- Humanitarian aid

From technical assistance to political cooperation

As the twenty-first century opened, both the EU and Russia were redefining their roles in international politics. EU assistance to Russia had shaped and been shaped by their relationship in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the EU chose to focus on providing technical aid to Russia. Indeed, the flagship program was called Tacis (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). The program began with a narrow focus but took on a larger political role once the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into force in 1997. Tacis is now seen as one of the ways to implement the PCA.

From 1991 to 2000, the EU provided €2.28 billion to Russia of which €1.39 billion was channeled through Tacis. Help from other European entities complemented EU aid. From 1996-1999, EU member states provided €520.9 million in financial assistance (including €13.58 million in debt cancellation) as well as €1.578 billion in credits from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

EU technical aid may be divided into three phases, with phase I running from 1991 to the 1994 conclusion of the PCA, phase II from
1994 to the December 1997 entry into force of the PCA, and 1998 on.\textsuperscript{39} In December 1990, a year before the end of the Soviet Union, the European Council, which is composed of the representatives of the fifteen member states and gives political direction, decided to provide technical assistance in response to the July 1990 G7 decision to urge donors to support reform.\textsuperscript{40}

The possibilities for aiding Russia expanded after the end the Soviet Union in December 1991. Tacis was divided into the national, small project, and regional programs. According to one analysis, the EU’s initial assumption was that many short-term technical projects would help Russia reform its economy and be less expensive than massive investment in reshaping Russia.\textsuperscript{41} The initial goal was to support economic reform. The first Tacis program supported management training in the public and private sector, financial services, energy, transportation and food distribution.\textsuperscript{42} The program concentrated on transferring technical knowledge on transformation to a market economy and privatization.

In the second phase there was greater emphasis on small and medium sized enterprises, continued work on management training, and new elements—supporting democracy and civil society and trying to ease the social impact of change. By the mid-1990s, political impediments were becoming more apparent than at the beginning of the program. Donors began to realize that well-placed oligarchs were benefiting from incomplete reform. Nationalists such as General Lebed were gaining strength. Russia’s problems became more immediate for Brussels when Finland joined the EU in 1995. The Partnership and Cooperation Act was a way to clarify the relationship with Russia and other countries in the region, which also signed similar agreements.

The EU acknowledges that “the entering into force of the PCA in 1997 allowed a strengthening of the link between Tacis projects and the policy dialogue, whilst increasing the strategic coherence of the programme with other co-operation instruments.”\textsuperscript{43} Phase III saw new features in the EU-Russia relationship: the 1998 economic crisis demonstrated the need for continued assistance, the EU increasingly saw engagement with Russia based on a political cooperation in a medium-term process (rather than just short-term technical aid), and the EU
Redefining European Security?

developed its Common Strategy towards Russia. For example, in response to the 1998 crisis, the EU granted €415 million in food aid, with another €400 million in 1999-2000.44

The Common Strategy on Russia was issued in June 1999 in accordance with the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty. In the words of the European Commission, the Common Strategy coordinated EU member state and European Community policy on four key areas:45

- Consolidation of democracy, rule of law and public institutions in Russia
- Integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space
- Stability and security in Europe and beyond
- Common challenges on the European continent (environment, crime...)

The Commission goes on to state that “The PCA, Tacis, and Member States’ assistance programs are the main instruments for implementing the Common Strategy,”46 thereby linking aid and policy. This is significant because as a large donor, assistance is one of the EU’s more important tools, but it is not always linked to foreign policy goals. The EU has tried to make this link in the case of EU-Russia policy. The political features of EU assistance were articulated in the EU regulation developed in 1999. Indeed, the EU “Indicative Programme,” the political guidance for assistance in 2000-2003, describes Tacis as “[a] programme to promote the transition to a market economy and the reinforce democracy and the rule of law,” an important expansion of initial goal which focused on economic change.47 This financial relationship was reinforced by the fact that Russia owes a significant debt to EU countries, especially Germany.

Nuclear safety

The EU’s nuclear safety assistance programs focused on nuclear power plants. The Commission issued a “Master Plan” evaluating twelve safety issues for nuclear reactors based on the 1992 G7 strategy and International Atomic Energy Agency classifications.48 In 1996, the Tacis
Committee promulgated a “Short and medium term strategy for the Phare and Tacis Nuclear Safety programmes.” The program supported regulation of the nuclear industry via national safety authorities and national and international assessments of nuclear power plants’ competence in priority safety fields. The core elements of the program were:

- Supporting the development of strong and independent authorities that can regulate the nuclear industry;
- Analyzing certain reactor types to identify weaknesses and planning short or medium-term solutions for the reactors concerned;
- Designing an early warning system, safety reviews and seismic design reviews;
- Providing essential safety equipment and reviewing operating procedures, management organization and quality assurance;
- Working with the design institutes to identify potential weaknesses in plant design and to arrange short and medium-term solutions at the reactors concerned.

The nuclear safety program was revised in 1998 to place greater emphasis on reactor safety, managing radioactive waste, improving the energy sector through EU-local industry cooperation projects, and adherence to international conventions. On Site Assistance was focused on “larger ‘Plant Improvement Projects’” since 1994 the Tacis program has also supported a safeguards program that worked to improve technical training in the control of nuclear materials through the Commission’s Joint Research Center and MINATOM. It also included steps to develop an industrial base to make safeguard instruments in Russia. In 1997 Tacis provided €34 million for nuclear safety, €17 million in 1998, €12 million in 1999, and €33 million in 2000. The EU acknowledged that the nuclear safety programs were implemented slowly and that a backlog occurred.

**Scientific cooperation**

Like other donors, the EU understood that providing alternative employment for weapons scientists in the Russian Federation was a
Redefining European Security?

contribution to nonproliferation. The EU supported the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, along with the United States and Japan. The EU allocated a budget of €20 million a year. The ISTC identified several goals:

- To give CIS weapons scientists, particularly those with knowledge and skills related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, opportunities to redirect their talents to peaceful activities;
- To contribute to solving national and international technical problems;
- To support the transition to market-based economies;
- To support basic and applied research;
- To encourage the integration of CIS weapons scientists into the international scientific community.

Humanitarian aid

In addition to technical assistance, some of the most significant EU support was delivered as humanitarian aid by the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) to areas in crisis including Chechnya. From 1993-1998, ECHO gave €60 million in humanitarian aid and from 1999-2001 gave another €50 million for victims of violence in Chechnya. From 1997 to 2000 via the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, the EU gave €8 million to Russia.

Northern Dimension

Security issues are also evident in the Northern Dimension, an EU initiative covering the Baltic Sea, Arctic Sea and North West Russia. The program provides a framework for cooperation including “the environment, nuclear safety, energy, Kaliningrad, infrastructure, business cooperation, Justice and Home Affairs, and social development.” Although the Luxembourg European Council established the Northern Dimension as an EU-wide program in December 1997, it was the December 1999 Helsinki European Council that invited the Commission to develop an Action Plan. Among the topics addressed were nuclear safety and nuclear waste management as well as public health. EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten highlighted the danger
posed by the 300 nuclear reactors near the Kola Peninsula, with 20 percent of the world’s spent nuclear fuel elements. The Northern Dimension was implemented through Tacis and other programs.

**Security and EU aid**

The security elements in EU’s assistance programs should largely be categorized as nontraditional security. The nuclear reactor safety programs were the closest items to traditional security. However, these programs sought to address unintentional transnational spillover from a reactor accident. The nonproliferation programs focused on reemploying scientists and management of dangerous waste materials. These were examples of nontraditional security because they focused on nonstate actors such as individual weapons scientists and potential terrorists who could steal nuclear materials.

**GERMAN ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

An examination of bilateral programs offered by EU member states enriches the understanding of European approaches to security. The largest single donor was the Federal Republic of Germany, which had provided significant economic reform aid before the Soviet Union ended. This section will explore the main features of German assistance to Russia in the 1990s, especially after the end of the Soviet Union. Most Germans were quick to point out that German policy towards Russia should be seen in the context of EU policy and not as a separate strategy. With this caveat, it should be noted that having to deal with the disposition of Russian assets in the former East Germany gave German-Russian assistance programs a unique flavor. German security assistance may be divided into three categories:

- Housing Russian forces returning from the former East Germany
- Energy and nuclear safety
- Humanitarian aid and transnational issues

**Housing returning Russian soldiers**

In 1990, there were 380,000 Soviet troops on high alert in East Germany: removing them was one of the highest priorities of the newly
Redefining European Security?

united Germany. The resettlement program was an innovative way to deal with the presence of Russian troops and combined elements of traditional and new security. The movement of troops between sovereign states and the evacuation of occupying forces are traditional security issues because they concern military threats to states. However, paying to house returning Russian soldiers was an example of new security because the program met a human need—shelter for soldiers and their families in their home country.

Initially, Germany agreed to pay the then Soviet Union DM 7 billion for stationing and withdrawal expenses and DM 7.8 billion for construction under the terms of an October 9, 1990, agreement. After the Soviet Union ended, Moscow asked for DM 7 billion more for the resettlement program. In December 1992, Germany agreed to provide an additional DM 550 million in return for a Russian promise to have troops out by August 31, 1994 instead of the December 31 deadline set in 1990. Germany paid DM 8.2 billion to house Russian soldiers returning from the former East Germany. The program ran from 1994-1997. In addition, in this period, Germany paid DM 130 million to retrain Russian soldiers. The benefits of the program may not have reached some lower level soldiers. The housing provided by Germany was a higher standard than quarters usually available to Russian forces. In some cases, senior people moved in instead of more junior ones.

Energy and nuclear safety

Like the United States and the EU, Germany paid Russia to help disarm nuclear weapons sites. From 1993-2001, Germany pledged €6.8 million to dispose of plutonium from weapons (MOX). Of this pledge, €5.1 million has been spent. From 1993-1998, Germany also spent €11.35 million on “safety equipment to prevent accidents at nuclear warheads dismantling facilities.” Germany also gave € 8.9 million for dismantling ICBM launch sites in Ukraine. Germany has funded programs to destroy chemical weapons, safeguard fissile materials and dispose of plutonium.

Humanitarian aid and Transnational Issues

According to ECHO, Germany has provided over €8.2 million in humanitarian relief to Russia in forty-six operations since 1997. The
bulk of the aid went to help victims of conflict in Chechnya, but some was allocated for other purposes, including fighting tuberculosis in the Volga area and floods in Siberia. German assistance included €1.55 million to fight organized crime under the Transform Programme. Much of German assistance in the health field is offered through ECHO and other multilateral programs. Germany also took an interest in the status of ethnic Germans in Russia. During the Cold War, West Germany provided funds to encourage Moscow to let ethnic Germans leave. However, fearing a large-scale influx of ethnic Germans in the early 1990s, at a time when it was grappling with the costs of unification, Bonn offered financial incentives for ethnic Germans to stay in Russia. The War-Related Compensation Act allows 225,000 ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former USSR born before 1993 (when the act entered into force) to go to Germany.

Security and German aid

Germany’s assistance to Russia in the 1990s had both traditional and nontraditional elements. Traditional elements included removing Russian troops and supporting disarmament. However, even in these areas, nontraditional means were used; for example, Russian troops were removed through nonmilitary means. Moreover, as a member of the EU, an important element of German assistance was delivered by a collective entity. Also, Germany was active in both the EU’s Northern Dimension and the U.S.’s Northern European Initiative, both of which addressed organized crime and health issues.

POLITICS AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The United States, the European Union, and Germany all had elements of traditional and new security in their assistance programs. Over the course of the 1990s, several points emerged: the mix of security types in assistance programs changed with new security playing a larger role; for the European Union, but less for the United States, aid programs explicitly became a key channel for implementing Russia policy; and the legacy of the aid experience affected how the United States, the EU, and Russia work together on global issues.
Redefining European Security?

Security issues in the assistance programs can be divided into three categories, traditional security, transitional, and new security. As discussed in chapter one, traditional security focuses on the territorial safety of states, while new security emphasizes the safety of people. Transitional security has elements of traditional and new security because it deals with threats that affect both states and people. In the Russian case, an example of the latter would be nuclear reactor safety. Managing nuclear materials is partially traditional security because of the government-to-government aspect and the existence of international treaties in this area. However, preventing proliferation has a nongovernmental facet because the potential adversaries are often nonstate actors, namely terrorists. Employing weapons scientists also has transitional security elements. Again, managing weapons of mass destruction is traditional security, but focusing on the behavior of specific individuals, the scientists (who are nonstate actors), is new security. The table below categories a selection of assistance programs along the traditional-new security spectrum.
TABLE 5
U.S., GERMAN, AND EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

CATEGORIES OF ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SECURITY</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>EUROPEAN UNION</th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Security</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR, Nunn-Lugar) Weapons Protection Control and Accounting (WPC&amp;A)</td>
<td>Dismantling Russian bases in the former East Germany</td>
<td>Dismantling Russian bases in the former East Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CTR Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&amp;A)</td>
<td>Housing existing plants in Russia to destroy chemical weapons</td>
<td>Housing existing plants in Russia to destroy chemical weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-proliferation, Export Control Assistance</td>
<td>Nuclear non-proliferation/fissile material control/Mayak plant</td>
<td>Nuclear non-proliferation/fissile material control/Mayak plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excess military plutonium disposal</td>
<td>Studies on excess military plutonium disposal</td>
<td>Studies on excess military plutonium disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Security</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Housing returning Russian soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear Cities Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear reactor safety programs</td>
<td>Nuclear reactor safety programs</td>
<td>Nuclear reactor safety programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>Food aid and humanitarian aid thorough ECHO</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid thorough ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Northern Dimension (ND), ECHO aid for fighting infectious diseases</td>
<td>Participates in both NEI and ND, anti-infectious diseases funding given through ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal safety</td>
<td>Anti-crime aid through Justice Dept., Northern Dimension (ND)</td>
<td>Participates in both NEI and ND, participates in crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental quality</td>
<td>Environmental aid programs</td>
<td>Environmental aid programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political freedom</td>
<td>Support for NGOs, civil society</td>
<td>Support, especially through political foundations (Stihlungen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>Economic reform aid</td>
<td>Economic reform aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural expression</td>
<td>Cultural exchange</td>
<td>Cultural exchange, Interest in ethnic Germans in Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AICGS German Issues Volume 27 · 2002 [25]
Redefining European Security?

The United States undertook the bulk of the traditional security tasks. As a superpower and the leader of the Atlantic alliance, for six decades the United States had managed western nuclear strategy towards the Soviet Union. It was not surprising that the United States would take the lead in dismantling of certain Russian strategic weapons in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Indeed, U.S. aid was preponderant on the traditional security end of the scale. However, many European countries provided important assistance in transitional security areas. For example, individual European countries, and the European Union, funded programs to improve nuclear reactor safety, employ weapons scientists, and support other nonproliferation activities. Much of European Union assistance to Russia in the 1990s should be categorized as transitional or new security. This was in keeping with the EU’s unique contribution as a practitioner of soft power.\(^1\) “Soft power” used nonmilitary tools such as economic incentives and political pressure to achieve goals. Increasingly, the EU was trying to integrate its soft power tools to advance policy. In a December 2001 speech, EU external relations commissioner Chris Patten advocated “…adopting an ‘integrated approach’ to our relations with third countries. In other words, co-ordinating our trade, external assistance and (significantly) political instruments so as to make a coherent whole.”\(^2\)

Among European countries, Germany’s aid played a special role. Even before the end of the Soviet Union, Germany was using aid to pay for the removal of Russian troops from the soil of a reunified Germany. Germany’s housing aid can be considered transitional since it dealt with moving military forces (traditional security) by providing for people’s need for shelter (new security). Germany also provided help in nuclear reactor safety and research on plutonium disposal.

The assistance programs not only reflected the donors’ strategic positions, but also changing political circumstances. Western governments, and the international financial institutions that they supported, were overwhelmingly concerned with the economic transformation of the former Soviet Union. Billions of dollars and years of effort were expended to advance economic reform. Yet, by the mid-1990s many donors were questioning the effectiveness of aid and tailoring their programs to better suit the local conditions.\(^3\) In the United States, many in the Republican-led Congress did not want to back the Democratic
Clinton administration’s support for Boris Yeltsin. The fiscal year 1996
distribution of programs from the Defense Department’s Cooperative
Threat Reduction program to other agencies in effect shifted many aspects
of aid away from the purview of traditional security to towards transitional
security. After all, the Departments of Energy and the Environmental
Protection Agency are clearly less associated with traditional security
than the Defense Department.

For the EU as well, political conditions affected aid policy. During
the 1990s, the EU leaders worked to strengthen the EU’s presence as an
international actor. In June 1997, the European Council adopted the
Treaty of Amsterdam, which then came into force in 1999. The
Amsterdam Treaty bolstered EU mechanisms for common foreign and
security policy, created the “common strategy” tool, and created the
position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy
(held by the Secretary-General of the European Council, Javier Solana).
Russia policy became the first case of an EU common strategy, and aid
became a way to support the policy. On-going technical assistance for
economic reform in Russia was recast to support ideas such as a common
European economic space.

The West’s aid programs in the Russian Federation left a bittersweet
legacy for political relations in the early twenty-first century. Within
this complex area, this paper focuses on the legacy in security affairs.
The first legacy was the destruction of offensive weapons.

The second legacy was disillusionment, a spillover from the trauma
of economic reform that should not be ignored. In the early 1990s there
were very high hopes for rapid transition from the old Soviet Union to a
modern European-style Russian state. In April 1992, the Group of Seven
(G-7) countries pledged $24 billion in aid for Russia if it accepted strict
IMF conditions. Yet profound economic and social change proved
long, difficult, and remained incomplete. Corruption remained a serious
issue. For many people, the dominance of oligarchs fostered
dissillusionment with economic reform. Some analysts charged that despite
large aid programs, the United States had missed a chance in the early
1990s to reshape the relationship with Russia in a dramatic way. Still,
Russia was a different place than it was when the USSR ended in 1991.
A third legacy was the habit of interaction among the United States, the European Union and Russia on nontraditional security issues. Talking about international terrorism, corruption, infectious disease and other transnational problems in the Russian Federation and the Baltic Sea deepened the channels for addressing these issues. These discussions helped lay the foundations for building the anti-terrorism coalition in September 2001. American and other leaders were able to draw on the nascent notion that Russia, Europe, and the United States could share the same side in fighting transnational threats. Including nontraditional security issues in assistance programs had helped lay the groundwork for the new antiterrorism coalition.

A fourth legacy is the effort to coordinate U.S. and European policy towards a third party. The United States, EU, and Germany represented three poles of western assistance, but how well were they coordinated? Lily Gardner Feldman has identified three types of cooperation: coordination, the division of labor, and parallelism. While a detailed analysis of these three elements in western aid to Russia must await another paper, here it should be noted that a division of labor in assistance programs has strategic implications. One of the debates in transatlantic affairs in the first year of the presidency of George W. Bush was whether there were—or should be—a division of labor between the United States and its European allies in handling global affairs, with the U.S. handling the strategic military affairs and war fighting, and Europeans handling peacekeeping and nation-building. Elements of this type of division were evident in western assistance programs to Russia. The United States handled much of the weapons destruction. While Europeans did some disarmament, they largely took on other issues. As policymakers consider the larger issue of whether a strategic division of labor among allies is desirable, they should consider the composition of donors’ of foreign assistance programs in their analyses. This would be particularly important when addressing new security issues. Here Europeans and Americans both have tools. There may even be scope for better donor coordination on new security issues as the habits of interaction are newer, and hence less rigid. However, foreign aid programs could reinforce cleavages inherent in a strategic division of labor between the United States and its allies.
CONCLUSION

How did the management of security issues in assistance programs to Russia change over the years? For one, it became more equal. This happened for at least two reasons. Firstly, flow of information became less one-way. Over the course of the 1990s, donors realized that they needed more Russian input to implement aid programs. A major evaluation of the Tacis program conducted in 1999 stressed that the EU needed to work with Russians to develop programs that worked in local conditions.77 Meanwhile, the United States began to place greater emphasis on regional initiatives to have impact beyond Moscow.78 Secondly, after September 11, western leaders decided they needed Russian help in fighting terrorism and in fighting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. A Russia better able to fight crime was a stronger contributor to international security.

In Washington, one of the big changes in the 1990s was that policy became less about relations between the West and Russia directly, and more about what the West and Russia could do together in the rest of the world. In an article published in 1997, Stephen Sestanovich lamented that the U.S.-Russia relationship was derivative of other foreign policy goals.79 This perspective reinforced the notion that the West-Russia relationship has fallen from the pedestal of exclusive high politics and taken on the characteristics of the global issues arena.

Being in the new security arena is not necessarily bad, but it may be unfamiliar for many policymakers. Developing the diplomatic muscles to handle transnational issues is an important skill for countries in the twenty-first century. These topics will continue to grow in importance. Understanding the transnational security issues embedded in foreign assistance programs can yield insights the new security issues that will continue to occupy policymakers’ time.
ENDNOTES


2 In this report, “the West” includes members of NATO and the EU (even though some of EU member states are formally neutral).


5 OECD, “AID at a Glance,” tables at www1.oecd.org/dac/htm/agusa.htm and .../agec.htm and .../agdeu.htm


The following countries participate in the Network: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand.

For a discussion of the Network and its activities see the web-site of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade at www.dfait-maeici.gc.ca.


State, Office of the Coordinator, pp. 2-5.

By the end of FY 1999, $14.52 billion had been obligated, and $12.93 billion spent. State, Office of the Coordinator, p. 6.


State, Office of the Coordinator, appendix tables entitled “Cumulative Funds Budgeted (FY 1992 to Date) for Major NIS Assistance Programs by Country as of 9/30/99,” “Cumulative Obligations,” and “Cumulative Expenditures.”

Ibid, p.177.


State, Office of the Coordinator, p. 55.

State, Office of the Coordinator, p. 212.

The following countries and regions participate in the NEI: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Northern Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Northwest Russia, Sweden and the United States.
Redefining European Security?


35 State, Office of the Coordinator, “Cumulative Funds Budgeted” table.


38 Ibid.

39 Increased EU-Russia anti-terrorism cooperation in the post-September 11 period may occasion a new phase of assistance.


41 United States General Accounting Office, “International Efforts to Aid Russia’s Transition Have Had Mixed Results,” Report to the Chairman and to the Ranking Member, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, GAO-01-8, November 2000, p. 181.

42 Development Researchers’ Network-Linden Consulting, p. 23.


Available at: www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceecca/tacis/ip2003_russia.pdf


45 European Commission, “The EU’s Relations with Russia.”

46 Ibid.


50 Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, “EU and Russia,” available at archived web site of the delegation in Russia at www.eurunion.org.ru/eurussia

51 Ibid, p. 6.


56 European Commission External Relations Directorate-General, “The EU’s Relations with Russia.”


60 The author wishes to thank the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin for assistance in preparing this section.

61 Stent, p.160.


63 Ibid, p. 162.

64 Data from German Foreign Ministry.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.


69 Data from German Foreign Ministry.

70 Stent, 166-167.


72 Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, “Coherence and co-operation: the EU as a promoter of peace and development,” speech to the Swedish Institute for International Affairs,
Redefining European Security?


77 Development Researchers’ Network-Linden Consulting


GERMANY AND U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE: 
THE CASE FOR A REAL DEBATE 
Benjamin Schreer

INTRODUCTION

The plan of President George W. Bush’s administration to push forward the deployment of a missile defense system has been greeted with great skepticism by most European allies. Germany is among those states questioning the U.S. missile defense initiative. What makes the U.S.-German disagreement over missile defense an interesting case is that it reflects many features underlying the general struggle between the United States and its European allies to redefine the transatlantic security relationship.¹

German objections concern potential strategic, technical, and economic implications of missile defense. This paper, however, argues that most of the German arguments made against missile defense are deeply flawed. The German debate still rests on an insufficient understanding of the U.S. missile defense initiative. Moreover, it is burdened by a German unwillingness to acknowledge the profound changes that shape the post Cold War security environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about substantial developments in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, the emergence of China as a major power, changes in the nature of arms control, and the increasing threat posed by rogue states. This paper does not argue that Germany should endorse every U.S. initiative on missile defense. Being critical is not bad policy per se. But what is highly problematic is the lack of strategic depth in the German position. Consequently, German policymakers advance flawed policy responses on missile defense. This paper is, therefore, not so much focused on the missile defense debate in general but highlights the core problem arising from the inadequate German position on missile defense. However, I will also argue that the United States should be more willing to listen to German and other European states’ concerns about missile defense and should integrate its missile defense policy into a broader cooperative security framework with Europe. If unchanged, the United
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

States and Germany are bound to keep talking past each other when it comes to discussing missile defense.

The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will examine the current U.S. missile defense initiative and the German reading of it. Second, it will analyze missile defense against the background of a drastically changed international security environment. In this respect the focus will be on the four main issues advanced by German concerns about U.S. missile defense, namely, Russia’s and China’s reaction to missile defense, the impact of missile defense on arms control, and the threat posed by rogue states. Third, the paper will deal with the German view on the potential impact of missile defense on the transatlantic security relationship. Fourth, German doubts over the missile defense system’s technical feasibility will be addressed. Fifth, economic issues such as technology sharing and affordability are discussed. Policy recommendations for both Germany and the United States will conclude the analysis.

STAR WARS REVISITED?

German decision-makers remember all too well the last time strategic missile defense was high on the U.S. political agenda. President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars,” is seen by most Germans as the failed effort to deploy strategic defenses against a threat for which no defenses existed. Before Reagan, President Johnson in the late 1960s had proposed the deployment of a missile defense shield to protect U.S. territory against a possible Chinese nuclear attack. The antiballistic missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 ended these plans. With the end of the Cold War, the issue of missile defense again captured headlines in U.S. security agenda. In the early 1990s, then U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin initiated bilateral talks on the deployment of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). However, when President Bill Clinton took office he put an end to this initiative. He felt that the build-up of such systems was not justified by a real threat. Moreover, Clinton feared a negative impact of national missile defense systems on U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction talks. Thus, he shifted the focus to the deployment of theater missile defense (TMD)
systems. However, under pressure from a Republican dominated Congress, Clinton signed the Missile Defense Act of 1999, declaring it to be the law of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as technically possible. On leaving office, he left the decision to actually implementing this law to his successor. Clinton’s approach to missile defense appeared to be rather half-hearted, not only to Germans. With Bush in office, German officials still wonder whether the current U.S. missile defense plan is just another fruitless U.S. attempt at invulnerability.²

It is high time for German decision-makers to notice the significant changes that have taken place in U.S. missile defense policy. Even if there is still disagreement on the issue of missile defense within the American political and academic elite, today’s dispute does not touch primarily on the concept of missile defense itself but the specifics of its design. In other words, “not whether, but how.”³ The reason for this important shift within the American debate is that the design and purpose of the proposed system differ significantly from its predecessors:

1. Unlike Reagan’s SDI program, the currently proposed missile defense system is designed to defend only against a limited long-range ballistic missile threat. It is not aimed at neutralizing the Russian or Chinese nuclear deterrent. Rather, it is limited to defending against only a few number of incoming warheads, most likely in the hands of rogue states seeking to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), states that are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation;

2. Unlike Reagan’s ambitious goal to make nuclear weapons “obsolete,” the proposed limited missile defense system is not meant to replace the strategy of nuclear deterrence. As will be discussed in greater detail, the integration of systems of active defense in the overall U.S. military strategy must be seen as a complement and an element of deterrence. Only when deterrence fails do missile defenses function as a substitute of deterrence⁴; and
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

3. The proposed missile defense system is only one component of an increasing U.S. effort to bolster homeland defense to meet new military challenges.

It is imperative for Germany to understand that the current U.S. design for missile defense is not “Star Wars” revisited. Instead, systems of active defense have become an integral part of the restructuring of the U.S. military posture. With George W. Bush in office, the United States has declared missile defense a priority of its security policy. September 11 has only increased U.S. resolve to push forward the deployment of such capabilities. This resolve is evident in two developments. First, Bush announced on December 13, 2001 that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed heavy restraints on the testing and deployment of strategic defenses. Second, the financial boosts for missile defense in Bush’s 2002 defense budget proposal underscores the administration’s political will to pursue missile defense deployment.

It follows that the United States will deploy some sort of missile defense if technically feasible and affordable. German decision-makers should abandon the notion that current U.S. plans for missile defense are just another “Star Wars episode” that will disappear sooner or later from the international security agenda. Otherwise, serious U.S.-German discussions on this issue will be obstructed by Germany entering the debate on the grounds that U.S. missile defense is unlikely to materialize.

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

German politicians are concerned about the potential negative impact of U.S. missile defense on the international security environment. Such a negative outcome would be a nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia and/or the United States and China, and a manifestation of the stalemate in international arms control regimes. Additionally, Germany doubts the threat assessments of the United States concerning the ballistic missile threat posed by rogue states.
Russia and U.S. missile defense

Russia’s position on U.S. missile defense is of prime concern to German security interests. It is noteworthy that the fear of a renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race is deeply embedded among politicians in the current governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens. Many politicians of both parties still cling to the notion that the Cold War was primarily the result of a nuclear arms race rather than a conflict over value systems. Consequently, they perceived the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the ABM Treaty as an assurance to prevent a major nuclear arms race.

Since the logic of MAD holds that missile defense deployment upsets strategic stability between the two major nuclear powers, German politicians remained wary of U.S. missile defense plans after the end of the Cold War. During President Clinton’s years in office, these concerns were not alleviated. Clinton, in the face of strong Russian rhetoric against missile defense, repeatedly stated that the United States considered the ABM Treaty to be “the cornerstone of strategic stability” between Russia and the United States. Doing so, he maintained the logic of MAD as the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy and missed the opportunity to embark on a new security strategy combining cuts in offensive nuclear weapons with the deployment of limited missile defense. In other words, Clinton’s insistence on MAD continued “to pit one against the other.”

In light of Clinton’s muddling-through on missile defense and the stalled START II process, German Chancellor Schröder bluntly warned Clinton in May 2000 that continuing U.S. missile defense plans would trigger an impending arms race with Russia, an unusually strong statement for a German chancellor. These concerns did not vanish with the arrival of the Bush Administration. However, they waned during Bush’s first year in office. The reasons are twofold.

First, President Bush repeatedly indicated his desire to combine missile defense with deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Already during the election campaign, Bush announced that he planned to reduce nuclear weapons. He repeated this position in his speech at National Defense University on May 1, 2001. Bush’s forward approach won approval by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who felt the combination of missile defense and nuclear arms reduction was very much in line with
German thinking. During the U.S.-Russia Crawford Summit in November 2001, Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally reduce its operationally deployed nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700-2,200 within the next decade. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by saying that Russian reductions would be comparable.

Second, and even more important for decreasing German fears of a renewed U.S.-Russian arms race, has been Russia’s decreasing resistance to U.S. missile defense. The U.S. announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty did not trigger any of the negative Russian reactions that German decision-makers and security experts were so frequently predicting. Putin, while calling the abrogation “a mistake,” said, “the decision made by the President of the United States does not threaten Russia’s national security.” He made it clear that Russia would not expand its SNF in response. Instead, Russian decision-makers advocated new legally binding Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control agreements.

A look at Russia’s strategic realities reveals that former German concerns of U.S.-Russian arms races in response to U.S. missile defense were highly exaggerated. Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF) is aging and shrinking. The 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicts that Russia’s nuclear arsenal “will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015, with or without arms control … unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces.” According to experts of Russian nuclear strategy, such a substantial reallocation of financial resources into the Russian SNF is unlikely to happen. To be sure, nuclear weapons will remain essential to Russian military doctrine, given its sharply declining conventional forces. But rather than increasing its SNF, Russia is likely to respond to U.S. missile defense by adjusting its reduced SNF should it feel threatened. Such measures would include countermeasures and ICBMs equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) technology.

Apart from declining economic power, the changes in Russian nuclear strategy reflect President Putin’s shifting political priorities. His approach to foreign and security policy is in line with his overriding domestic goal to “to stabilize, regularize, and restructure the economy to support a twenty-first century Russian society and cultivate a newly confident Russian state.” Stability in U.S.-Russian relations is the key to achieving
this goal. Moreover, Putin needs to find a balance between Russia’s desire to maintain major power status and its actually declining military and economic strength. In other words, Putin needs to secure a degree of stability in U.S.-Russian relations that is not based on equality in terms of power. Since even a drastically reduced Russian SNF of around 1,500 operationally deployed nuclear warheads would not be threatened by U.S. missile defense in the long-term, it is not in Russia’s interest to enter any renewed arms race with the United States.

In light of these developments, Germany’s reaction to the ABM Treaty abrogation reflected a waning fear of new Cold War style nuclear arms races between the United States and Russia:

The decision of the United States of America to withdraw from the ABM Treaty has been made simultaneously with the announcement of deep cuts in Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals. *Even so the German government would have welcomed a Treaty amendment ... it considers the U.S. decision a chance for strategic nuclear threat reduction.*

This reflects a more pragmatic German approach to the interaction between missile defense and nuclear arms races in U.S.-Russian relations. The same approach is needed for Germany’s evaluation of the impact that limited U.S. missile defense would have on Chinese SNF.

**China and U.S. missile defense**

Chinese officials have stated repeatedly that in response to U.S. missile defense deployment, Beijing would increase its SNF. In the past, China has claimed that even a limited U.S. missile defense would neutralize its own strategic deterrent. Thus, it would upset the strategic balance and could lead to a destabilizing U.S.-Chinese nuclear arms race. A closer look at Chinese nuclear strategy and political objectives, however, cast doubt on such a move.

Long before the issue of post-Cold War missile defense emerged on the U.S. security agenda, China started modernizing and expanding its SNF. The 2002 NIE reports that by 2015 “most of China’s strategic missile force will be mobile” and more difficult to target, replacing today’s aging,
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

liquid-fueled, silo-based single-warhead ICBMs. It is expected that the number of Chinese strategic warheads will increase over the next fifteen years, ranging from “about 75 to 100” deployed “primarily” against the United States. Given that Beijing perceives U.S. missile defense to be primarily designed against China, the crucial question is not if China will modernize its SNF as a result of U.S. missile defense but if it will do so to an even greater degree.

To be sure, China is not just modernizing its SNF for the sake of modernization but for the sake of having a secure nuclear second-strike capability vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. The Chinese reaction to U.S. missile defense will thus be “defined by the specific operational requirements it imposes on the creation of a credible deterrent […]”. Should China feel that missile defense threatens its aim of achieving a secure nuclear second-strike capability, it is likely to modernize its strategic forces to a greater degree than currently envisaged. However, the proposed limited U.S. missile defense is likely to generate, at most, modest incremental improvements in Chinese SNF. Such steps would include the deployment of multiple warheads backed by countermeasures. Thus, “most Chinese strategists are not concerned about missile defense for what it might mean militarily—believing that the system, even if technologically feasible, is several years off and can be defeated through qualitative and quantitative improvements of China’s missile arsenals.”

Moreover, given the Chinese focus on economic growth, the initiation of a nuclear arms race with the United States is clearly not in China’s interests. Official statements support this assessment. In June 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that future increases in the Chinese military budget would not be linked to U.S. missile defense plans. And in late September of 2001, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao declared that China would not join any arms race as a response to U.S. missile defense deployment. Additionally, China’s reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty did not contain any threat to engage in a strategic arms race. It seems that despite belligerent rhetoric in both Washington and Beijing about the other side’s intentions, a trade-off between the two is a possibility—decreasing American opposition to China building a secure second-strike nuclear
deterrent in return for decreasing Chinese opposition to limited U.S. missile defense.29

It must be noted, however, that missile defense is, indeed, a potential cause of severe U.S.-Chinese tensions. If the United States decides to extend missile defense to Taiwan, China would consider such a move a serious threat to its goal of reunification with Taiwan. What is important to keep in mind is that the threat perceived by China would not so much be a strategic threat but a political one. It makes no strategic sense for China to attack Taiwan with nuclear weapons. However, Beijing would regard an extension of missile defense to Taiwan as a strong U.S. political commitment to the defense of Taiwan and could even consider such a move to mean the recognition of Taiwan by Washington as a sovereign state. This could end any prospects for further U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. But so far, the Bush Administration has refrained from selling state-of-the-art missile technology such as AEGIS cruisers and PAC-III missiles to Taiwan, indicating that Washington is aware that such a move would end all efforts to ease Chinese resistance against limited missile defense. However, even if Washington conducted a policy of extending missile defense to Taiwan, the result would not be a U.S.-Chinese nuclear arms race but, rather, the end of all U.S. efforts to move China towards ending its proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technology to rogue states.

German concerns that U.S. missile defense might trigger an U.S.-Chinese nuclear arms race, therefore, fails to consider China’s modernization of its SNF and its political priority on economic stability. Neither provides a rationale for China’s leaders to consider a nuclear arms race with the United States as a real policy option.

**Missile defense and the future of arms control**

Another major concern of German decision-makers is that missile defense might spoil efforts to break the deadlock in international arms control regimes. These concerns are reinforced by the growing tendency of the Bush Administration to resort to unilateral action. Germany’s traditional preference for written bi- and/or multilateral arms control agreements, in line with the European goal to “legalize” international affairs as the primary tool to secure arms control and nuclear disarmament,
clash with the Bush’s Administration’s openly displayed distrust in traditional arms control negotiations and agreements.\textsuperscript{30} The Bush Administration did not indicate its desire to sign the ban on antipersonnel landmines, walked out on talks on a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and made it clear that it did not intend to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).\textsuperscript{31}

German concerns about American unilateralism in the context of missile defense point to the alarming tendency of growing European anxiety about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. For what looms behind German and European terminology such as “unilateralism,” “hyperpower,” and “isolationism” is a European sense that the United States is increasingly paying less attention to European security concerns. Thus, the “decline of European confidence in the consistency and reliability of U.S. policy … has had important effects on the way with which the U.S. national missile defense project was initially received, and is still viewed, by many Europeans.”\textsuperscript{32} U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in order to accelerate the development and deployment of missile defense was, therefore, seen by many Germans as just another unwelcome American step to abolish international arms control regimes. However, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and U.S. plans to deploy missile defense are neither the driving factor behind the stalemate in international arms control regimes nor the end of all arms control efforts.

Russia

Consider U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control relations. Russia reacting to U.S. missile defense by abrogating existing arms control agreements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, which banned all U.S. and Soviet land-based ballistic missiles in the 500-5,500 kilometer range, is not in Germany’s security interest. Becoming a hostage of a Russian nuclear threat again, instead of building up stable Russian-European security ties, frightened German decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, with the ABM Treaty gone, Germany feared that the U.S. missile defense initiative would become a major obstacle to further U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons reductions.

Nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence in U.S.-Russian relations is subject to fundamental change. Traditional Cold War style written nuclear arms control agreements between the former superpowers required
equality in terms of power. While nuclear deterrence is still an important component of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the inequality in terms of power between the two states removed the necessity of parity in nuclear arsenals. The United States, well aware of the inability of Russia to maintain its current SNF, announced unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals, regardless of whether Russia reduced its nuclear forces. Its position as the dominant power enables the United States to conduct a “hedge” policy, allowing the United States to increase its SNF to Cold War levels if required.

For Russia, nuclear parity is also no longer considered vital. Russian leaders and military planners understand the changing nature of nuclear deterrence. They realize that the number of nuclear warheads required to inflict “unacceptable damage” is lower than the current huge arsenals on both sides. With U.S. missile defense unable to challenge the Russian nuclear deterrent for a long time to come, “the deterrence value of 1500 Russian nuclear warheads is not really different from 3500 warheads. Similarly, from Russia’s point of view, it does not really matter whether the United States cuts its nuclear arsenal to 1700 weapons or leaves it at the levels of 6000.” To be sure, Russian leaders still consider legally binding arms control agreements with the United States important. But not because it would set limits on nuclear weapons or destroys them, but because it would provide yet another way of showing that the United States considers Russia an equal partner. As a result, the traditional arms control agenda … has been taken over by political issues that have nothing to do with arms control. One conclusion that follows from this analysis is that progress on substantive arms control issues is virtually impossible.

The “death” of the ABM Treaty and the deadlock in START-type negotiations “marks the end of an era of traditional, Cold-War-type arms control, but hardly the end of the arms control process as a whole.” Future progress in U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control will be achieved primarily in areas that are not considered part “of traditional arms control and therefore are not affected by political controversies.” Apart from
unilateral cuts, non-traditional arms control measures comprise areas such as the Nunn-Lugar Program, known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. CTR covers areas such as the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, the disposal of weapon grade fissile materials, and the provision of safe and secure storage of non-deployed Russian warheads and delivery vehicles.\textsuperscript{39}

It follows that during President Bush’s visit to Moscow this May, one should not expect a legally binding document defining irreversible quantitative or qualitative reductions in nuclear arsenals. There will also be no successor to the ABM Treaty linking offensive and defensive weapons, even if Russian leaders would like to see such an agreement. Rather, both sides will codify their unilateral reduction targets in a joint summit declaration or even a legally binding agreement in the form of a treaty approved by Congress or a less formal document.\textsuperscript{40} Reduction in this respect means removing warheads, not destroying them. Such a step will provide domestic leverage for Putin with a legally binding agreement, even if more symbolic than of substance, delivering the “coequal status symbol” that Russia desires.

U.S. limited missile defense is, therefore, not the driving factor for the stalemate in traditional U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov made this point, saying that a future U.S.-Russian accord on strategic weapons reduction “will not be based on a balance between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Now each side will solve this question on its own, proceeding from geographic, economic and other interests.”\textsuperscript{41}

Berlin should adapt to these realities in future U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. This future will not so much be determined by traditional arms control treaties but will be complemented by a mix of unilateral reductions, joint summit statements that codify these reductions, new regimes of transparency and verification to replace imperfect START-type treaties, and measures within the CTR. Indeed, a stronger German effort in this program might be helpful. So far, German assistance to Russia has focused predominantly on areas of transitional and human security; however, Berlin also has funded some assistance in the field of security programs.\textsuperscript{42} However, this paper argues that Germany and its European partners should increase their efforts in traditional security
assistance programs and should evaluate the prospects for joining the United States and Russia in the CTR program. For political reasons, Russia, in response to the U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that aimed at keeping the removed nuclear warheads in storage rather than destroying them, is likely to retain a nuclear “responsive force” in storage. This makes the task of securing Russian nuclear arsenals even more daunting. The participation of the EU requires a detailed analysis of CTR areas in which such a contribution could pay off. But a contribution would be helpful for at least three reasons. First, the direct impact would be a reduction of the risk of “loose Russian nukes,” enhancing Russian nuclear safety. Second, an indirect function would be the political impact of creating stronger incentives for both the United States and Russia to increase cooperation on CTR programs, since Germany and possibly other European partners participating might alleviate the mutual distrust between the two that continues to hamper the program. This could lead to the third effect of a stronger U.S. and Russian political commitment to the program, and thus to its longer and more successful duration.

While German concerns about a negative impact of missile defense and U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control neglect the real factors driving the stalemate in traditional U.S.-Russian arms control regimes, it is equally true that the United States could do much more to alleviate these concerns. The 2002, NPR aims at reducing the number of operationally deployed warheads from 6,000 to 3,800 within the next five years but plans, in line with the idea of strategic adaptability, to keep many of the removed nuclear warheads as a “responsive force” in storage. However, with warehousing removed nuclear warheads and the nuclear targeting philosophy unchanged, this “new” nuclear strategy is, in essence, a continuation of Cold War strategic thinking based on old assumptions about Russia as an enemy. If Russia really is no longer an enemy—as Bush has repeatedly stated—the irreversible destruction of most removed nuclear warheads should be considered a real option by the Bush Administration. This move would not only allow Russia to do the same but would also convince German decision-makers that strategic defense is combined with “real” cuts in nuclear arsenals. Moreover, such a move would meet traditional German and European security approaches to
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

nuclear disarmament and could therefore minimize European concerns about Bush’s “destructive” unilateralism.

China

Chinese arms control behavior is also not likely to change in light of U.S. missile defense. Beijing will not opt out of any existing arms control agreement it is a signatory to. Doing so would deprive China of a political instrument to join international pressure on the U.S. to ratify such arms control agreements as the BWC or the CTBT. China itself has signed the CTBT but has not ratified it. More important, however, is that despite being a party to all major arms control treaties, Beijing continues to pursue the modernization of its NBC weapons arsenal and is a major exporter of WMD technology to rogue states. This behavior can be attributed to the lack of a Chinese arms control doctrine. In fact, the absence of such a doctrine will be the driving force behind restraining future international efforts to move China towards ending proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, and towards agreeing on transparency measures concerning its weapons programs. Since China is aiming at a credible minimal nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the continental United States and Russia, and a limited nuclear deterrence posture with regard to its theater nuclear forces, U.S. limited missile defense is unlikely to negatively affect China’s arms control behavior.45

Rogue states

U.S. limited missile defense can be seen as an element of non-traditional arms control vis-à-vis rogue states. Traditional arms control treaties did not prevent the spread of ballistic missile technology and WMD to states throughout the globe. States such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are prime examples of the difficulties traditional arms control regimes encounter in preventing the proliferation of these weapons.46 Consequently, the U.S. quest for missile defense is a direct consequence of ongoing missile and WMD proliferation and the increasing threat posed by such weapons in the hands of rogue states. Missile defense inherits the function of counterproliferation in dealing with rogue states, since the capability to defend against ballistic missiles minimizes the value of rogue states offensive weapons, thereby decreasing the incentive for these states to proliferate.
Germany needs to assess the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology from a more global angle. So far, Germany and its European partners do not perceive Northeast Asian security as a direct or even future threat to their national security. However, this region is a major player in support of a “world-wide-web of ballistic missile technology.” The direct link of proliferation from the region of Northeast Asia to the Middle East should ring alarm bells in Berlin and other European capitals. Thanks to North Korea, states like Libya, Iran, and Iraq are increasingly capable of reaching Europe with ballistic missiles and WMD. Consequently, Germany, in concert with its European partners, should increase its efforts to support non-traditional arms control mechanisms in Northeast Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Although European states supported the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), more active efforts are needed. Such measures could include a European effort to facilitate the effective implementation of the Agreed Framework program with North Korea.

**Germany and U.S. threat assessment**

The United States justifies the missile defense initiative by pointing to a growing ICBM threat against U.S. soil posed by countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. German decision-makers doubt this threat assessment and regard it as too pessimistic in terms of rogue states’ intentions. Additionally, some German security experts criticize that strategic defense cannot meet the threat posed by rogue states since these states could easily outmaneuver systems of active defense by unconventional means of WMD delivery. They point to September 11 as a prime example. The latter argument can easily be dismissed. Just because missile defense cannot defend against all possible threats, there is no reason not to deploy it against threats it is designed to counter. Put differently, an “automobile airbag may provide no protection if the car is hit from the side, but that is no reason not to have airbags that do protect against head-on collisions.” Moreover, it is inconsistent to argue that there is no threat and at the same time argue that states will find ways to outmaneuver strategic defenses. Germany’s questioning of the rationale of strategic defense deserves more attention since it reflects fundamental...
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

differences in U.S.-German approaches to security and highlights the difficulties in reaching a transatlantic consensus on this issue.

The Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German foreign intelligence agency, stated in its 1999 report that WMD and their delivery vehicles developed in countries like Iran and Iraq “could in the middle or long-term pose a direct threat to Germany and NATO.” But Germany still perceives future ballistic missile threats as, at best, a possibility but not a probability. As Ambassador Ischinger stated, “no real military threats are perceived by most Germans.” With terrorism capturing headlines after September 11, a ballistic missile threat against German territory is likely to be considered even less urgent. Moreover, German politicians point out that even if rogue states acquire ICBMs, they would be deterred from using them against the United States since they would be certain to face complete annihilation in a U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike. This notion reflects the continuing German belief that the strategy of Cold War nuclear deterrence also applies to rogue state leaders. As discussed later, this assumption can be challenged.

The different threat perceptions between the United States and Germany point to different security approaches on how to deal with rogue states. Unlike the U.S. approach of coercive diplomacy that includes the probability of using military force, Germany prefers the diplomacy of “critical engagement.” Germany’s self-perception as a civilian power promotes the German notion that the best approach to moving rogue states towards constructive behavior is to increase trade relations with these countries, thereby weaving them into a system of multilateral commitments. This applies especially for German-Iranian relations, in which Germany’s cooperative approach has “deeper institutional and ideological roots than just mere economic interests.” But Germany’s relationship with North Korea is also influenced by the German preference for critical engagement. Nevertheless, Germany has yet to come up with a clear stance on how to deal with Iraq; its strategic culture as a civilian power favors engagement instead of containment. The strong opposition currently voiced by top German officials against extending the anti-terrorism campaign to Iraq reflects this position. Germany has long been critical of U.S. backed “smart sanctions” against Iraq, with
many Germans regarding such measures as merely hurting the population and not leading to any change in Iraqi political behavior.

In the absence of a perceived rogue state ballistic missile threat, Germany’s attention turns to different security priorities. Germany’s security focus is concentrated on the ESDP Headline Goal to deploy a European rapid reaction force by 2003. This force is to consist of 60,000 troops deployable in sixty days for military operations lasting at least one year. With Germany’s security focus on deeper European military integration, the acquisition of missile defense systems is low on its priority list. To be sure, Berlin has an interest in some form of tactical missile defense. Currently, Germany is cooperating with the United States and Italy to develop the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). But MEADS is still highly controversial within the German government. In late 2000, the German defense ministry officially stated that MEADS no longer met German military needs. After strong U.S. criticism, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping reassured his American counterpart that Germany was not pulling out of the project. But Germany requested to extend the “definition phase” of the project, meaning that the project will now not be realized before the year 2009. Germany’s approach to MEADS continues to be hampered by budget restrictions and only half-hearted political support.

Germany’s “Eurocentric” threat perception fails to take into account that the United States seeks to deploy missile defenses primarily to defend its long-standing security commitments in Asia and the Middle East. With the Cold War over, peace and stability in the international system are determined predominantly by regional stability and deterrence. “While Europe itself is increasingly peaceful, other regions of vital importance to the United States … are either plagued with conflicts (as in the case of the Middle East) or in danger of becoming so (as in the case of East Asia).” The ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD to and from these regions increases the risk of the United States being confronted with such weapons in future regional contingencies. This even more so since traditional nuclear deterrence is more bound to fail in confronting rogue states, making missile defense a vital component of U.S. military capability.
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

In the case of future regional aggression by states like North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, it is the United States that would assume the main risks of confronting this aggression militarily. Missile defenses would suppress the effectiveness of rogue states’ weapons arsenals and would reduce the risk of intervening against aggression by such states, thereby preserving the credibility of formal and de facto security guarantees provided by the United States and others to non-nuclear states. The failure of the United States to engage against a nuclear-backed regional aggressor would cast doubt on U.S. security guarantees, would increase the incentive for other states to acquire such weapons, and would shake the American belief in its role of protecting and supporting the evolution of a peaceful international order. Therefore, missile defense is a vital U.S. military capability for two complementary reasons.

It would help the U.S. to maintain the credibility of security guarantees that are essential if we are to avoid a highly proliferated nuclear world. And because the U.S. is likely to be effectively committed to preserving such guarantees already, it has an overwhelming moral argument that it deserves defenses that can reduce the costs of doing so.

Critics argue that a rogue state’s attack is unlikely since rogue states would be deterred from an ICBM launch by overwhelming U.S. nuclear retaliation capability. However, the age of asymmetric warfare has increased the prospects for the failure of traditional U.S. nuclear deterrence due to “substantial differences between the security-related perspectives of nuclear-armed regional aggressors and those of the U.S. These differences are greater than those that came to exist between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” Far from being irrational as often assumed, rogue state leaders view ballistic missiles and WMD as instruments to threaten the United States with asymmetric warfare in order to alter U.S. behavior in ways favorable to their interests. The asymmetry in perceptions between the United States and potential regional challengers, however, makes the probability of a future regional war involving nuclear weapons highly likely.
In case a rogue state armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles opts for military aggression, he would do so calculating that his stakes and risks favor aggression while those of the United States as the potential protector favor staying on the sidelines. In others words, the “challenger would expect to see his commitment to winning as sufficient to make his escalation to the use of nuclear weapons a serious possibility. In contrast, he would expect that the prospective protectors would not value the stakes highly enough to run the risks of nuclear war.” Additionally, given the lower attention paid to citizen’s lives in non-liberal states, an aggressive rogue state leader might resort to highly risky initiatives, assuming that the United States would be unwilling to confront him because of fears of domestic casualties. However, because of the negative consequences outlined earlier, this is likely to be a serious underestimation of United States’ determination to engage such aggression. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States is likely to confront a regional aggressor armed with WMD and ballistic missiles. Since the potential aggressor calculates that the United States is aware that a nuclear exchange would threaten the aggressor’s own existence but not that of the United States, he might believe that the United States would be deterred from confrontation because it knows that the regional challenger, faced with extinction, would more likely resort to nuclear weapons. Shocked to find out that the United States is prepared to take this risk and influenced by the eccentric personality of its leaders, rogue states are highly vulnerable to the classic “use them or lose them” dilemma. The prospects for the failure of traditional nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis likely regional challengers are, therefore, all too high. To be sure, nuclear deterrence still can contribute to neutralizing the threats posed by ballistic missiles and WMD. But as shown, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation will not always be credible vis-à-vis rogue states.

Given the increased possibility for deterrence failure, missile defense fulfills several functions. First, strategic defense provides damage limitation if deterrence fails. Secondly, strategic missile defense functions as a complement to deterrence if the threat is too modest to “justify” a nuclear response. Moreover, missile defense serves the purpose to deter by denial through complicating the potential aggressor’s calculations on whether he can reach his objectives. Since he can never be sure if enough
warheads will penetrate the defense he could be deterred from launching an attack. Missile defense can also enhance crisis stability since damage limitation in the case of an enemy’s first strike could substantially alleviate the pressure for rapid U.S. retaliation and could decrease the degree of retaliation. In other words, “every U.S. or allied citizen saved by the defense could mean that one of the aggressor’s citizens is saved as well.”

Finally, as mentioned above, missile defense can function as a barrier against proliferation. Missile defense is therefore no substitute for deterrence but is both an element of deterrence and a protection mechanism against “malfuctioned deterrence.”

The differences in threat perception between Germany and the United States highlights one fundamental problem of reaching a transatlantic consensus on strategic defense. U.S. plans for strategic defense—from a German perspective—are not justified by a common threat in the traditional sense. Such a traditional common threat would only emerge if a long-range ballistic missile threat appears in the Middle East. However, it is somewhat problematic for Germany to conclude from its Eurocentric threat perception that the U.S. threat assessment underlying its decision for strategic defense is inadequate. Doing so neglects the United States’ role as a provider for security in regions in which the future threat of rogue states’ long-range missile attack looms large and the fact that the possibility of an attack on U.S. soil is highly likely.

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE AND ITS IMPACT ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

Assessing the strategic implications of U.S. missile defense, German Foreign Minister Fischer raised the fear of a so-called Zweiklassenschutz, which could create different zones of security for Europe and the United States. The argument goes that if the United States would become invulnerable to a missile attack then Europe might instead become the preferred target of rogue states’ missiles. Thus, U.S. invulnerability could lead to “transatlantic decoupling.” This assumption has both its problems and its merits.

U.S. missile defense is not aimed at invulnerability. As mentioned earlier, the proposed missile defense system can be defeated by both
Russian and Chinese ICBMs. Absolute security or invulnerability is not the purpose or the practicability of missile defense. Additionally, it is somewhat odd for Germany and its European partners to argue that U.S. vulnerability is the prerequisite for transatlantic coupling. During the Cold War, it was precisely the vulnerability of U.S. territory against long-range nuclear Soviet missiles that led Europeans to wonder about the reliability of U.S. security commitment and about potential “transatlantic decoupling.” Indeed, one could argue that U.S. missile defense could have a transatlantic coupling effect. The United States will probably be even more willing to protect Europe if it possessed missile defense than otherwise. Moreover, if deployed, missile defense could set off a shift in European strategic culture, making Europe more willing to acknowledge the threat of missile proliferation and the need to confront it with own missile defenses. Germany and its European partners should also realize that the deployment of U.S. systems and interceptor sites on European soil could provide them with greater political weight vis-à-vis the U.S. Analogous to NATO’s discussions on “sharing risks and responsibilities” in the 1960s, when the stationing of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe increased the influence of hosts on U.S. policy, such a development can be envisioned concerning “Allied Missile Defense.” Finally, Chancellor Schröder’s indication of German troops participating in “out-of-area” military operations increases the prospect of Germany being the target of ballistic missiles and WMD. A joint NATO operation in the Middle East, for example, could likely include a substantial arsenal of these weapons in the hands of the adversary to be addressed. In such a scenario, U.S.-European cooperation on missile defense would be of increasing importance and could have a coupling effect.

On the other hand, U.S. missile defense could also have a decoupling effect on the transatlantic alliance. If the United States does not manage to substantially alleviate the concerns of Germany and others about missile defense, this issue could add to the increasing difficulty within the transatlantic alliance of combining different approaches to security and different security priorities. If Europeans feel that U.S. missile defense is unilaterally “imposed” on them, the result could be an even greater European quest for greater autonomy in security affairs with the long-term potential of eroding the transatlantic security alliance. Thus, German
fears of different security zones in the case of strategic defense deployment resemble not so much strategic realities but a growing uncertainty about future U.S. foreign policy. The case for an increased transatlantic dialogue on the strategic implications of missile defense should therefore be strongly supported.

MISSILE DEFENSE AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY

German leaders join international doubts on whether systems of active defense are technically feasible. Is it technically possible to “hit-a-bullet-with-a-bullet”? Do the test failures not show that missile defense will not work? What about countermeasures that can easily defeat missile defense?

Successful tests have shown that the hit-to-kill technology does work in principle. Missile defense technology is already feasible at the theater level. Systems such as the American PAC-2, the Israeli Arrow, and the Russian S-300 have been deployed. Thus, those “who confidently predict that missile defense will never work should be careful.” Given political resolve and proper financing, logic prevails that within a certain time frame, most military technology that is physically impossible today can be developed. The history of U.S. military technology teaches that the development of vital U.S. missile technology was burdened with multiple test failures at the beginning. To gain some perspective, the submarine-launched POLARIS missile system that became a backbone of U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence failed its first eleven tests. The same could apply to missile defense technology. Additionally, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty only recently removed a major barrier to extensive testing. Before that, the United States had given up a number of tests related to its strategic defense program in order not to trespass on the ABM Treaty. Moreover, in several tests, the “hit-to-kill” technology designed for missile defense and used in PAC-3 and Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) already proved that it works in principle. Thus, reliable non-nuclear hit-to-kill defense of the U.S. against a limited number of unsophisticated ICBM warheads (low-end) appears to be technically feasible within a decade or so.
An additional argument against missile defense is that it cannot provide perfect protection. Missile defense systems, however, are not aimed at perfect protection. No military component has and will ever provide such protection. Given the system’s denial capability, “even taking into account the need to demonstrate that the technology is mature, the program’s success is not critically dependent on its efficacy in real terms. The political impact of strategic defense, namely to show to America’s citizens, allies and adversaries that the United States is protected, is more important than its marginal success rate vis-à-vis the ‘last’ incoming object.”

A final objection against missile defense technology is that offensive missiles equipped with countermeasures such as decoys and chaffs can easily defeat it. Efficient and reliable countermeasures are, however, not easy to devise. They complicate the offensive missile design and require testing, which would not be left undetected. Only technological advanced Western states as well as Russia and China are thought to have developed countermeasures. It is doubtful whether Russia and China find it in their long-term interests to sell such sensitive technology to rogue states.

In sum, German skepticism concerning technical feasibility still clings to the days of “Star Wars” in which defenses against an overwhelming Soviet offensive nuclear force indeed faced serious technical challenges. Even though technical challenges remain today, the assumption that missile defense technology will not work is premature and remains yet to be proven.

**ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MISSILE DEFENSE**

A final source of German skepticism on missile defense concerns economic aspects, namely the issue of technology sharing and the question of financing the missile defense program.

In case missile defense components were deployed in Europe, German officials expect core missile technology to be retained by the United States. This negative expectation dates back to the days of the Cold War, when German companies were invited to the United States to gauge the extent to which they might benefit from technology sharing in Reagan’s SDI program. Last year, German officials indicated that the
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

German delegation returned unconvinced of the spin-off benefits. Thus, Germany shares the suspicions of many European states that the United States is “jealously guarding” its technological superiority for both military and economic reasons. On the other hand, Americans often assume that the Europeans are interested in technology sharing only to avoid heavy investments in their own military research & development (R&D) sector. Both sides should seek ways to overcome their mutual distrust. Deeper cooperation in joint missile defense programs such as MEADS would enhance trust on the German side that the United States is truly interested in missile defense cooperation and is not just pushing Germany towards off-the-shelf purchase of missile defense systems. Otherwise, the technology gap between the United States and Europe, already a transatlantic problem, will widen even more.

Germany is also concerned about the potential costs should missile defense be extended to Europe. As one senior German diplomat asked in February 2001: “How would we explain to the German people why we are spending millions on NMD rather than on health or the environment?” Given the already strained German defense budget that struggles with meeting Germany’s under-funded Bundeswehr and Germany’s commitment to contribute to the build-up of the European Crisis Reaction Force, additional costs for missile defense systems will be hard to secure. This increases the need for German decision-makers to make up their minds on missile defense. If they decide that missile defense must be a component of German military capabilities, it is high time to start a public debate on missile defense. At the end of the day, voter willingness to spend money on defense depends to a great degree on the skills of the political leadership in advocating for such military capabilities.

As for the U.S. side of financing the development and deployment of missile defense, it is solely a question of political support. For perspective, even “if the system’s annual costs triple, the price tag will still be less than 3 percent of what the Pentagon spends each year. Should NMD ever be used to defend a major American city, this investment will look modest indeed.” Nonetheless, since the Pentagon already needs a real-dollar increase of up to $50 billion in its annual budget in the years ahead because of its force structure and modernization programs, even such a
modest increase in defense budget for missile defense might prove difficult to achieve. Currently, the Bush administration is throwing its weight behind missile defense. The proposed budget for FY 2002 spends $7.8 billion on missile defense, $2.5 billion more than appropriated in FY 2001. Whether this level can be sustained remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“Germany hopes it will go away”— as one German observer put it— is still an apt description of German views on U.S. missile defense. However, it will not go away but will become an integral part of U.S. military strategy. Thus, it is critical for Germany to come up with a clear stance on this issue. Most of the German strategic arguments made against missile defense do not qualify for a serious transatlantic discussion on this issue. They still are partly stuck in Cold War style strategic thinking and appear to be guided by an “opposition reflex.” This reflex faces a fundamental problem. As one commentator put it, “the artificial inflation of the risks associated with missile defense development is wrong if not outright dangerous. It neither provides compelling arguments against missile defenses nor helps decrease those risks.”

The United States, on its part, should consider steps to reassure Germany and its European allies that missile defense is not just imposed on them but is implemented within an overall strategy that includes European security concerns. This is important since Germany’s critical view of U.S. missile defense, supported by most European countries, touches the fundamental debate within the transatlantic security alliance on U.S. security commitment to Europe and the future of NATO. Otherwise, the unresolved transatlantic dispute on missile defense could have an erosive impact on the transatlantic security relationship.

Recommendations for Germany

1. Germany should do away with the Cold War-type arguments against missile defense. SDI memories should no longer guide German evaluation. To be heard across the Atlantic, Germany can no longer oppose missile defense by using arguments that no longer reflect strategic realities. In order to increase its weight in
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

the debate vis-à-vis the United States, a “dispassionate” German position is needed based on its interest in a dramatically changed security environment. Among others, this requires one to address the unavoidable question: “What kind of missile defense, if any, will Germany/Europe need in views to potential threats to European territory and to European forces participating in international peace operations and regional crisis management?”

2. Germany should start a substantive debate on the impact of various missile defense designs on its security and strategic stability in the international system. Doing so should alleviate German concerns about the destabilizing effect of “any” missile defense design. It would demonstrate the different strategic implications of a limited U.S. strategic defense compared to a large-scale missile defense including space-based weapon systems.

3. Germany should undertake an effort to promote a European consensus on strategic defense. Thus far, Germany’s position lies somewhere between the French and the British stance. Paris and London are far from reaching a consensus. Indeed, they seem to drift further apart. The British government, to avoid a strain in its “special relationship” to the United States, reversed its formerly skeptical view of strategic defense when British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in July 2001 stated that Britain had accepted the rationale for strategic defense. France, on the other hand, still remains outright opposed. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine even branded strategic defense as “high-handed American unilaterism.” A European consensus on missile defense is a prerequisite for a German stance on this issue given its preferences for multilateral European security approaches.

4. In concert with its European partners, Germany should evaluate the assets Europe can gain from granting access to missile defense radar and interceptor sites. The assets Europe can get both in terms of a transatlantic coupling effect and in terms of increased influence in the transatlantic debate on strategic defense must be in the German interest. Germany should foster a discussion on this asset, since otherwise it runs the risk that Great Britain gets the net benefit from cooperating with the United States without
consulting its European partners. This in turn would not help Germany’s aim of deeper European security integration.

5. Germany needs a review of current deterrence doctrine and a review of the role of arms control. A review of nuclear deterrence strategy in the light of post-Cold War security environment should include the prospects for moving beyond deterrence by retaliation to a more cooperative, non-adversarial strategic relationship with Russia. Moreover, it should include an assessment of the prospects for the failure of traditional nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis rogue states and for effectively stemming the further acquisition and potential use of WMD by these states. The possible contribution of missile defense to such a strategy should be part of the analysis. A German review of the role of arms control also needs to be concluded in a “dispassionate” manner, including a discussion on the limits of traditional arms control regimes in future U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions and in preventing or discouraging rogue states’ proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD. This includes a debate on the problems stemming from the factor that some arms control regimes are substantially flawed. This should lead to the notion that a stronger participation of Germany and its European partners in non-traditional arms control efforts such as the CTR is required. The notion of missile defense as an obstacle to arms control regimes should be abandoned, and it should be acknowledged that missile defense can function as an instrument of non-traditional arms control.

6. End the German “wait-and-see” approach. Germany is at a crossroads on this issue. Since it is in Germany’s interest to influence U.S. missile defense design, it should end its current approach of “reflexive opposition” and start a real debate on the issue. Otherwise Germany and its European partners run the risk that “the Americans will decide for them.”92 It would be counterproductive for the transatlantic task to adopt the security relationship to the changing security environment in the international system. In fact, the danger exists that the issue could lead to a serious strain not only in the transatlantic alliance but also among Great Britain, France and Germany in case Britain
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

decides to go along with the United States without consulting the other two major European powers.

Recommendations for the United States

1. Parallel efforts to strengthen certain non-proliferation and arms control regimes, and non-traditional arms control mechanisms. Germany would certainly evaluate the issue of missile defense much more positively if the United States would bolster such regimes as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). A formal U.S.-Russian agreement on the irreversible destruction of removed warheads and not just warehousing them would also alter German perception. In this respect, U.S. non-traditional arms control mechanisms with Russia should be increased, and a close U.S.-Russian dialogue on missile defense should be initiated. Both would reassure Germany of increasing U.S.-Russian understanding on strategic defense. Beyond U.S.-Russian arms control relations, U.S. bolstering of regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would lead Germany to evaluate the issue of missile defense much more positively. The future of the CTBT should also be discussed as a mechanism to alleviate German and other European states’ concerns about missile defense and its impact on arms control.

2. “Real” cuts in U.S. nuclear arsenals. The United States should consider destroying the removed warheads instead of warehousing them. That would reassure Germany and its European allies of a true shift in U.S. nuclear strategy. Moreover, such a move would decrease Russian and possibly Chinese opposition to U.S. limited missile defense.

3. Even if the prospect of success appears to be rather remote, the initiation of a frequent U.S.-Chinese dialogue on the issue would ease German worries about a negative impact of missile defense on Chinese nuclear posture. Such talks could focus on issues such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Demilitarization of Space, issues that worry Chinese military thinkers much more than U.S. missile defense does.
4. The Bush Administration should end uncertainties surrounding the system’s architecture. The ambiguous stance of reassuring China and Russia that the systems are not targeted against them, and at the same time maintaining that “all options are being considered” does not reduce German concerns about missile defense being the starting point for an extended system. A clear stance on the system’s design would reassure allies, Russia, and China about U.S. intentions.

5. The United States should listen to Germany and its European partners and should start an extensive dialogue on strategic defense. In as much Germany and European allies should not lecture the United States on the issue, the United States should also be more willing to listen to European concerns. U.S. demands to participate in the program and to share financial burden are counterproductive if posed to Europeans before a substantial transatlantic dialogue has taken place.

ENDNOTES

1 A good analysis of the current transatlantic problem to combine different approaches to security is given by Jessica Matthews in her article, “Estranged Partners,” in: Foreign Policy, November/December 2001, pp. 48-53.


Germany and U.S. Missile Defense


9 Ibid.


12 The text of Putin’s speech on December 13, 2001 is available at www.hsfk.de/abm/ausland/russland/ru131201.html.


16 See for example Sokov, Modernization of Strategic Forces in Russia, op. cit.


19 Unofficial translation of the official statement of Andreas Michaelis, Speaker of the Auswärtiges Amt, on December 13, 2001. Italics mine. The original German version is available at www.hsfb.de/abm/kongress/docs/13122001/aa131201.html.


24 Ibid.

25 China has already tested multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) and is expected to have the capability to MIRV its ICBM in a short period of time. Some military experts even report that China has already tested a version of the DF-51 ICBM with a MIRV capability. See www.cns.miis.edu/research/china/coxrep/wwhmdat.htm. Additionally China commands the technological expertise to deploy countermeasures. See Lindsay, O’Hanlon, Defending America, op. cit., p. 58.


Germany and U.S. Missile Defense

30 For example, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton expressed the desire of the United States government to avoid complex U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations when he testified: “…these are not going to be traditional arms control negotiations with small armies of negotiators inhabiting the best hotels in Geneva for months and years at a time…while we hope, expect, are optimistic for cooperation with the Russians, the president is determined to have an effective missile defense system. If we can do it together, that would be great. But if we can’t, we will do it ourselves.” Testimony of Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Panel 1: Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, July 24, 2001.

31 Additionally, the Bush administration also walked out of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and announced that it would not ratify the agreement on the International Criminal Court (ICC).


33 See Dettke, German Views on Missile Defense, op. cit.


35 Ibid., p. 44.

36 Ibid., p. 45.


38 Podvig, “The End of Strategic Arms Control?,” op. cit., p. 45.


For details on the concepts of traditional, transitional and human security, and Germany’s assistance to Russia in these areas see Brimmer, *Redefining European Security*, op. cit.


45 See Gill, “Can China’s Tolerance Last?,” op.cit.


48 See Pincus, “U.S. Alters Threat Estimate,” op. cit. For more insight in the ballistic missile programs of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq see Lindsay, O’Hanlon, *Defending America*, op. cit., p. 58-74.

49 See Dettke, *German Views on Missile Defense*, op. cit.

50 See Stellungnahme von führenden deutschen Rüstungskontrollexperten zur einseitigen Aufkündigung des ABM-Vertrages durch die Bush-Administration: Abschied
Germany and U.S. Missile Defense


51 Daalder, Goldgeier, Lindsay, Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How, op. cit.


64 Ibid.


72 Ibid.

73 See Dettke, *German Views on Missile Defense*, op. cit.


75 Ibid.

76 See Bundeskanzler Schröder auf dem NATO-Sonderrat in Brüssel, op. cit.

77 Tertrais, “U.S. Missile Defence,” op. cit.


80 Tertrais, “U.S. Missile Defence,” op. cit.

81 Ibid.


85 Daalder, Goldgeir, Lindsay, *Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How*, op. cit., p. 12.


Germany and U.S. Missile Defense


89 Gompert, Arnhold, Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 28.


THE TIES THAT BIND:
ALLIED COMMITMENTS AND NATO
BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

Christian Tuschhoff

INTRODUCTION

NATO’s decision to invoke the mutual defense clause (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon surprised the world. No one expected the Alliance would take such a bold step without a debate among allies, national governments, political parties and the public. Yet, it took the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives (not ministers) only two meetings and a few hours to determine that the attack on the United States was an attack on all allies, provided that further evidence proved it was an attack from abroad. This step came at a time when most experts had lost faith in the value of the alliance in light of the Kosovo experience, during which it had seemed more sensible to abandon NATO in favor of other security institutions such as the European Union or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), institutions geared more toward the post-Cold War security environment. At a time when states had every reason to run for the exit because they risked becoming the next target, governments decided to honor their treaty commitments to which they had agreed under very different circumstances and expectations. This decision is strong evidence for the endurance and vitality of the alliance. Despite academic predictions that its years are numbered, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization persists and adapts.

Furthermore, it has been argued that since the September 12 decision, NATO appeared to be marginalized because the United States neither asked for substantial support nor did NATO substantially contribute to the war effort.

I challenge these assessments by making a number of arguments. First, the September 12 decision to invoke Article 5 – the mutual defense clause – had been prepared for in advance, in decisions agreed on after the Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO’s swift and decisive action
not only demonstrated the managerial effectiveness of the alliance but also the mutual commitment among allies. The mutual defense reflex proved strong enough to silence objections to the invocation of Article 5 in national capitals. Second, contrary to some newspaper reports since April 1999, NATO allies have been engaged in a process of reforming their military capabilities in accordance with the requirements of the new strategic concept. I do not argue that NATO has achieved all its force goals and capability objectives. Due to limited financial resources allocated to defense, progress has been slow and often disappointing. However, the process of modernizing and adapting forces and command structures was and still is well under way. It is hard to imagine what additional programs beyond the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), Headline Goals and different capabilities would have been required to counter a terrorist attack. NATO may have moved with frustrating slowness, but it was on the right track. Third, NATO’s decisions to modernize its armed forces guided national programs of military reform. This is a first “second image reversed” effect by which international relations affect domestic policies and/or politics. Fourth, the decision to invoke the mutual defense clause triggered a number of responses in national capitals, demonstrating the strong impact of NATO on national policymaking. I particularly point to how governments, including the United States, proved willing to play along. In addition, the analysis of the parliamentary debate in Germany proves another “second image reversed” effect of NATO, i.e. how the invocation of Article 5 shaped the discourse of the political debate and forced the chancellor to take unprecedented constitutional steps. Multilateralism on the part of NATO can reach deep into the member states. This mechanism helps the alliance to remain an important instrument of international cooperation.

This paper analyzes and explains NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 and subsequent steps. It argues that previous decisions to institutionalize the response to terrorist attacks as a trigger mechanism for the invocation of the mutual defense clause predetermined NATO’s September 12, 2001 action. At the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, NATO had installed a trip wire over which Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda stumbled on September 11. The allies had no choice but to invoke Article 5. In addition, the alliance had engaged in substantial reforms of their military
posture in an effort to cope with these new types of security threats and contingencies. Furthermore, the pre-determined activation of the mutual defense clause in case of an armed attack by terrorists framed the domestic debates and decisions in all NATO member states in such a way that the option of exiting from NATO was not seriously considered. The decision to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is an example of how international institutions determine national foreign and defense policies. The example nicely fits into the international relations literature on the “second image reversed.”

However, institutions guaranteeing NATO’s cohesion and commitments in the post-Cold War era are not nearly as strong as their Cold War predecessors. I have argued elsewhere that previous NATO arrangements would have made responses to armed attack, as outlined in contingency plans, automatic. The mutual defense of NATO allies was not left to political consideration but was written into military arrangements such as the layer cake deployment of military forces. As we have seen, modern trip wires trigger political solidarity but no automatic military reaction.

THE DECISION TO ACTIVATE THE MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE

The history of the decision to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is instructive. The initial idea did not originate in any national capital but in the NATO headquarters in Brussels. NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, claimed it was his. He drafted a resolution and broached the idea in a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell by asking, “Have you considered invoking Article 5?” Mr. Powell said he had not. Robertson sent a copy of the resolution to the State Department in Washington and received an approval only eight minutes later.

The short time frame did not allow for extensive consultation in Washington at the time when political leaders were extremely busy and were struggling with a wide range of issues simultaneously. When the U.S. Department of Defense found out about the plan to activate Article 5, it opposed it because it feared that U.S. military operations would be
NATO Before and After September 11

constrained. However, it was not able to stop the process. Eventually, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was persuaded that NATO’s support was an asset rather than a liability, and he accepted it. National governments in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were also concerned but chose not to oppose the decision. The Belgian government debated whether a broad or narrow interpretation of Article 5 applied. However, it authorized its ambassador to NATO, Thierry de Gruben, to vote for the interpretation proposed by NATO.

In addition, Robertson’s draft resolution was not formally introduced by the United States but by Britain and Canada. It took only two meetings of the NAC and about thirty hours to approve the resolution invoking Article 5. After the first meeting on September 11, NATO issued a press release condemning the barbaric act and assuring the United States of solidarity, assistance and support. Several hours later the NAC issued a statement saying: “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty...” The NAC changed only two words in Robertson’s draft. After the decision Lord Robertson forwarded the statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his information and for circulation in the UN Security Council as Article 5 of the Washington Treaty requires.

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT 1999: PREPARING NATO FOR THE TERRORIST CHALLENGE

The NAC statement of September 12 explicitly referred to the Washington Summit of NATO in April 1999 when it said: “When the Heads of State and Government of NATO met in Washington in 1999, ... they also recognized the existence of a wide variety of risks to security... More specifically, they condemned terrorism as a serious threat to peace and stability and reaffirmed their determination to combat it in accordance with their commitments to one another, their international commitments and national legislation (emphasis is mine).” Former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, explained that the alliance was obligated to invoke Article 5. Indeed, the documents agreed at the Washington summit support the interpretation that the
alliance was obligated to invoke Article 5 after the September 11 attack on the United States.\textsuperscript{25} While the “Washington Declaration”\textsuperscript{26} itself remains rather vague and may have led to some confusion in the press\textsuperscript{27} about the serious nature of the commitment, the final communiqué and the strategic concept are much more explicit. The communiqué first reiterates the tasks of deterrence and defense “against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state…” and later states “Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation” (emphasis is mine). This language became a standard wording that has been repeated in NATO documents\textsuperscript{28} and was a significant departure from previous treatments of the threat of terrorism,\textsuperscript{29} indicating that the alliance considered it now a threat against territorial integrity.

Article 3 of the Washington Treaty obligates the members “to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks.” The strategic concept of NATO adopted in Washington in April 1999 thus explains that allied forces must be “capable of deterring any potential aggression, of stopping an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states.” These missions are covered by Article 5 when the strategic concept stated: “Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies … would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty … Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”\textsuperscript{30} It is crucial to understand that the wider security risks are treated in the same paragraph as armed attacks that refer to Article 5 of the Treaty.

The precise meaning of the documents adopted in 1999 can be appreciated only when key terms such as territorial integrity are properly understood as cross references to statements of commitments, including those of the treaty. In addition, the proper interpretation is supported by comparing the new standard wording against previous statements treating
terrorism as a criminal offense rather than as a threat to territorial integrity or an armed attack.

The fact that NATO’s new strategic concept changed the nature of the alliance including mutual commitment is further underscored by the fact that the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) challenged the Federal Government in the Constitutional Court, arguing that such fundamental changes altered the substance of the Washington Treaty and thus required parliamentary consent. In its response to this challenge, the German government admitted that the new strategic concept was indeed a significant change that blurred the lines between various military missions. In its analysis, the Court concluded that NATO’s military posture (Streitkräf tedispositiv) no longer distinguished between missions but served the purpose of a general asset. It also acknowledged that the new concept set guidelines for the military headquarters to plan for a broad range of missions, which redefined the meaning of collective defense, too. The plaintiff, the defendant, and the court all agreed on the political and military significance of the changes for the nature of the alliance and the mutual commitments. However, the court ruled that these changes did not violate the rights of the German parliament and the plaintiff because they were within the realm of executive powers and did not require parliamentary consent.

Political Preparations after the Washington Summit

Even in the absence of direct evidence, it is reasonable to assume that after the Washington Summit, NATO defined the criteria by which Article 5 applied to terrorist attacks. The Article itself indicates that activation of the mutual defense clause requires an “armed attack” on one or more member states. Apparently, it was also essential to make a distinction between attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and attacks directed from abroad. This distinction became necessary to reassure states such as Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey that domestic terrorism would not lead to NATO interference. Finally, the geographic limitation of the NATO treaty applies. Consequently, Article 5 was not activated after the attack on the warship USS Cole because the U.S. navy ship was located in Aden, Yemen, outside the perimeter of the NATO area, when it was attacked on October 12, 2000.
It is important to understand the standards for the application of Article 5 as well as the fact that they had been discussed and decided upon before the September 11 attacks. The standards allowed the NAC to limit its considerations to whether or not the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building were met. Without such standards, decision makers would have had to engage in lengthy considerations of the circumstances under which they were willing to meet their mutual defense commitment and of the limits of their national constitutions and laws. These questions already had been decided when the terrorist attack occurred on September 11, allowing the NAC to limit its discussion to the issue of whether or not the predefined standards for Article 5 activation applied. The limits on required deliberations and decisions enabled the alliance to act as quickly and unanimously as it did. The agony of alliance decision-making regarding its involvement in the Balkans shows how difficult it is to reach a consensus and make decisions in the absence of such simplifying standards.

Military Preparations after the Washington Summit

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has engaged in adapting its specific assets to more general ones. This process has also affected military capabilities. The new strategic concept with its supporting decisions and the subsequent changes in NATO’s posture were significant steps within this fast-moving and important process of alliance adaptation. It explains above and beyond previous realist and institutional accounts why NATO persists.35

Based on this new mandate, NATO members individually and collectively continued to reform the command and force structures of the alliance to generate the very capabilities necessary to deal with a much broader range of threats and security risks.36

The principal idea behind a series of reforms, including the command and the force structures, was written into the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) and also adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999. As Robert Bell, NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense cooperation explained, DCI seeks to improve capabilities that are particularly useful as the alliance works together in the military and diplomatic campaign against terrorism.37 The new military structure should be joint, i.e., allow
for operations including more than one armed service, and it should be combined, i.e. multi-national. The idea was to develop the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)\textsuperscript{38} concept approved at the Brussels summit in 1994 into multi-national tri-service headquarters based on deployable self-contained NATO elements. These improved headquarters would provide NATO with the capability to conduct two simultaneous corps size operations in and beyond the alliance’s territory.

More specific actions after the Washington Summit included streamlining the command structure and increasing its flexibility. It now consists of twenty headquarters at three different levels. The new force structure aims at establishing nine Corps headquarters with highly mobile and easily deployable forces of 50,000 troops each. Three of these headquarters would be on a stage of readiness deployable within weeks. The other six would be at a lower level of readiness.\textsuperscript{39} NATO’s new command structure was implemented on September 1, 1999.\textsuperscript{40} Its first Article 5 exercise with the restructured headquarters was entitled Constant Harmony and carried out in November 2000.\textsuperscript{41}
Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure Allied Command Europe (ACE)
Some experts have argued that NATO does not have the right kind of capability. A closer look, however, reveals that they were mainly talking about special forces, which are in very short supply in all militaries, including that of the United States.

Following the Washington Summit, NATO moved to implement the new strategic concept and the Defense Capability Initiative in conjunction with the ongoing process of reviewing its command and force structure. Most importantly, the principles of the strategic concept and the capability goals of the DCI were included in the Ministerial Guidance of 2000 that directs national military forces and the Annual Review that evaluates national militaries’ progress in implementing commitments with respect to force goals. In December 2000, the Defense Planning Committee stated: “The Alliance’s force structure is undergoing a wide-ranging review. This is one of the most important elements of
Alliance restructuring in response to the challenges identified in NATO’s Strategic Concepts.45

In the process of restructuring NATO’s armed forces, military commanders recognized that the new guidelines blurred the distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. In addition, they realized that the Cold War tripwires had been removed. For example, the former commander of AFNORTH, General Joachim Spiering, writes: “the traditional notion that all NATO nations would automatically be committed militarily to an Article 5, is, I believe, an outmoded one, as indeed is the view that an Article 5 would always be exclusively a NATO operation.”46 This statement almost prophetically predicts later events and NATO’s decisions after September 11. In addition, NATO commanders concluded that developing contingency plans for the new type of missions and operations was impossible. Thus, they reorganized their headquarters to meet requirements of compressed planning cycles.47

However, to make NATO capable of responding to the new threats and risks of the post-Cold War era and to implement the DCI, the alliance headquarters focused specifically on the needs of interoperability. As Thomas Durell-Young has explained, when alliance forces form multi-national units below the corps level they face much stricter requirements of interoperability.48 Furthermore, in order to prioritize goals from a regional perspective for the nations to fill these capabilities gaps and shortfalls, the alliance headquarters must be engaged in the process of identifying their operational requirements and the nation’s shortfalls in meeting them.49

Finally, following the Washington Summit decisions, NATO engaged in a review of the role of civil emergency planning in support of Article 5 operations.50 This was also a clear sign that the Washington summit had changed the meaning of Article 5 and that NATO took action to revise civil emergency plans and procedures accordingly.

To accommodate new NATO requirements, national member states took steps to streamline, restructure, and reform their armed forces and command structures.51 Most importantly, they created multi-national units to allow for extremely deep forms of integration below the corps and in some instances the division level. Furthermore, they adjusted armed forces to allow combined joint task forces similar to those used by the U.S.
Central Command for operations in Afghanistan. These reforms following the Washington Summit of 1999, the revision of the strategic concept, and the adoption of the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) were only the latest steps in a series of reforms of national armed forces during the last twelve years. Particularly the German armed forces underwent significant changes. It consisted of some 480,000 troops in 1990. This number was reduced further to 370,000 and finally to 280,000 in June 2000. The original Cold War force structure was revised in favor of a new concept dividing the armed forces into crisis reaction forces and main defense units. These units were included multinational forces of NATO. This reformed structure of armed forces has been revised again. The distinction between crisis reaction forces and main defense forces has been eliminated, and a new service – the base armed force – has been added to the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Its main purpose is to serve the other three services by providing those tasks that all three share. The German parliament authorized funding for thirty-seven big modernization projects, including the procurement of a new frigate and submarine, the SAR-Lupe satellite reconnaissance system, the Euro-fighter, and new attack helicopters. After several years of decline, the investment portion of the German defense budget is rising again. This brief summary of reforms over the last twelve years shows how the Bundeswehr has continuously adjusted to new demands and reform requests despite falling defense expenditures.

**SHAPING DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE IMPACT OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE ACTIVATION ON GERMANY**

The decision of NATO to invoke Article 5 also yielded important effects in Germany. Most importantly, it shaped the discourse of the domestic debate. The following analysis will show that concerns that the war on terrorism might divide the alliance, drive a wedge between the United States and its coalition partners, or evoke opposition and protest in Western societies were unfounded. Supported by the main coalition
and opposition parties, Gerhard Schröder spoke of the terrorist attacks as a “declaration of war” against the civilized world and assured President George Bush of the “unlimited solidarity” of Germany. In addition, the German commitment compelled Chancellor Schröder to discipline dissenting members of his governing coalition parties by forcing a vote on authorizing the use of military force.\textsuperscript{59}

The debates in the German Parliament (\textit{Bundestag}) accurately reflected the national discourse. The content of the arguments, the strength of the support, and the focus of the discourse on reputation rather than interest point to the importance of honoring international commitments. A brief analysis of the speeches in the German Parliament and its adopted resolutions proves this point.\textsuperscript{60}

With the exception of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), all speakers built their support for the United States and NATO on motives of international multilateralism. Even when they referred to Germany’s (self-)interest they defined it in strong multilateral terms. The multilateralist motive can be subdivided into several arguments: (1) Germany is obligated by its prior commitments and it has to meet its growing international responsibilities. (2) Germany’s partners expect it to meet its obligations and commitments. (3) It’s pay-back time. Germany owes its security, democracy, and welfare to prior support by its partners particularly the United States and must demonstrate its gratitude by contributing to the international efforts against terrorism.\textsuperscript{61}

The (self)-interest motive can also be summarized in three basic arguments: (1) The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are considered attacks on the civilized world and its values; the demonstration of solidarity with the United States is an act of self defense. (2) Germany’s future and security depends on its solidarity with its allies. It cannot afford to isolate itself at this crucial juncture in history even though meeting its international commitments means taking certain (unspecified) risks. (3) By meeting its international commitments Germany uses all opportunities to co-determine the outcome of international action. It preserves its rights in the alliance and insists on information and consultation.

NATO’s Article 5 invocation helped German policymakers change the focus of the discourse to concentrate on multilateral motives. No one
engaged in a debate about how to define “self-defense.” The risks involved in military operations were not considered. And no one kept insisting on requesting limited, let alone comprehensive, information and consultation. Instead, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, Friedrich Merz, explained: “NATO triggering the mutual assistance clause (...) is the expression that it is in our own interest to participate without hesitation in the battle against international terrorism.” Gerhard Schröder emphasized: “in short, the reliability of our policy is at stake (...). We must meet the expectations of our partners.” Peter Struck, the leader of the SPD parliamentary party, added that mutual defense in NATO is a constant. “This constant may not be eliminated when our solidarity is required for the first time.” Using different words, all speakers argued that the invocation of Article 5 redefined German national interest by putting its reliability and reputation as an ally on the line. “In such a situation,” Schröder explained, “it is also indispensable that the chancellor and the government can count on the support of the majority by the coalition parties.” Therefore, he combined the vote to authorize the German military contribution to the war in Afghanistan with a vote of confidence (Article 68 of the constitution). He considered it necessary to demonstrate to Germany’s allies that the German government would do whatever it takes to maintain its reliability, and that he personally was not afraid of risking his own political future. Maintaining the perception of being a reliable and predictable partner who meets responsibilities and commitments in times of crisis became the overriding priority of German foreign policy after NATO voted on Article 5. This concern dwarfed all other arguments and considerations in the debate and pushed the critics inside and outside the coalition parties to the fringes. The chancellor and party leaders twisted the arms of pacifist members of the coalition parties who grudgingly bowed to the pressure. The Bundestag voted 336 to 326 to express its confidence in the Chancellor.62

NATO’s invocation of Article 5 changed the German discourse from interest to reputation. It forced the chancellor to use exceptional constitutional means, the vote of confidence, to silence the critics in the coalition parties. And they, too, were forced to demonstrate their reliability as supporters of the government. Those who did not bow to the pressure, such as Hans-Christian Ströbele, a member of the Green party, most likely
lost their chances of being re-nominated for the next Bundestag. The four dissenters of the Green party chose not to provide an oral or written statement explaining their vote. Several days after the vote in parliament, a convention of the Green party approved the voting behavior of the majority of their representatives.

THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF ARTICLE 5 ACTIVATION

Once NATO made the decision to invoke Article 5, it asked the United States to provide evidence that the terrorist attack was directed from abroad. In a special briefing by the Ambassador at Large, Francis X. Taylor, the United States provided that evidence. It is important to note that the evidence was based not only on American intelligence but also on evidence collected by some allies, such as Germany.63 Apparently, the September 12 decision already obligated member states to share their intelligence on the attack. After Ambassador Taylor’s briefing on October 2, the North Atlantic Council decided that the evidence was conclusive proof that the attack was directed from abroad and it reiterated its activation of the mutual defense clause.64 Two days later the NAC agreed to take eight measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. This time the United States made a request which was fully met by the allies.65 These measures included deployment of AWACS for the protection of U.S. cities and the Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean among other things.66 Again, the process was straightforward. The United States requested the assistance that it considered necessary and received instant approval by the allies.

Very early on, Colin Powell had expressed the expectation that NATO’s activation of Article 5 would “tee up” possible collective military action.67 However, he cautioned that under Article 5, NATO and individual allies were obligated to assist the United States, but the Article did not mean they have to take part in any future military action.68

The U.S. Department of Defense was not as eager to include NATO in its planning and operations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul A. Wolfowitz, explained that it was unlikely the United States would turn to NATO. “I think it’s safe to say we won’t be asking SACEUR to put
together a battle plan for Afghanistan.” The U.S. preferred to request support from individual allies and limit the involvement of NATO as an organization in order to avoid becoming bogged down in the NAC decision-making process and lose its operational flexibility. Wolfowitz met with allies bilaterally and discussed potential contributions.

Any decision to embark on joint military action would have required further deliberations and national decisions to place forces under the joint command. Under the arrangements preferred by the U.S. Defense Department, allied forces would remain under national command. Faced with a trade-off, the United States chose to maintain operational flexibility unconstrained by the requirement of NAC approval and accepted that allied forces would not become part of a unified command. This choice was only possible because the military role of the allies was very limited anyway. Any larger role for allied forces would have required a joint command, and the United States would most certainly have made a different decision. One military problem that might have affected the course of U.S. decisions is the lack of coordination between the regional commands of the United States and NATO command headquarters. Operations in Afghanistan are under the authority of U.S. Central Command. The planning of these operations of this headquarters is not linked to the U.S. European Command let alone the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Forces in Europe. Establishing these links on short notice would have increased the complexity and complicated military operations. Improved cooperation among command headquarters throughout the planning processes would certainly facilitate cooperation capabilities and lead to converging expectations and military needs.

Following NATO’s invocation of Article 5, allies took several steps to implement their commitments. These steps included meeting the requests by the United States to NATO as well as individual measures. Some measures were requested by the United States but some allies also decided that they wanted to do more. In Italy, for example, Prime Minister Berlusconi put his country on a state of alert and set up a crisis center at his office under the command of a general. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium pledged to send troops if necessary. Some even actively asked for an operational assignment. Hungary and Poland followed suit.
CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to the often-heard argument that the September 11 terrorist attacks marginalized NATO, I have argued that the alliance proved its purpose and functioning. It was able to respond quickly and effectively to the attack. NATO members did not run for the exit, but engaged in collective action when they invoked Article 5. Swift decision-making provided strong evidence for the functionality of NATO’s general assets such as decision-making procedures. NATO’s institutions still provide the binding ties among allies that have significant “second image reversed” effects on member states. Multilateralism by NATO reaches into member states and can change their policies and politics.

NATO’s mutual defense reflex points out the political preparedness and value of the alliance. The Washington Summit in April 1999 laid the ground for the September 12 decision by committing the allies to mutual defense in case of a terrorist attack. The initiative for the invocation of Article 5 did not come from Washington, D.C., but from NATO headquarters in Brussels. All allies, including the United States, played along with NATO’s plan without hesitation. Washington did not choose to veto the invocation of Article 5 or ignore NATO’s condition to submit evidence because the attack was directed from abroad. Also, it submitted a list of requests as to how NATO could assist its war efforts effectively. In addition to meeting multilateral and bilateral requests for assistance, other allies chose to take unilateral measures after Article 5 was invoked.

NATO also had prepared militarily for a wide range of Article 5 contingencies that encompassed terrorist attacks. It engaged in a fundamental restructuring of its armed forces and command structures. Furthermore, it guided the planning process of national military reforms in member states. While considerable defense deficiencies remain, it is important to note that NATO was on the right track even though the process was frustratingly slow. Even if anyone had anticipated the terrorist attack on September 11, NATO would not have prepared differently. Priorities and programs would still have been the same. However, the planned reforms might have been moved up.

Finally, NATO’s decision shaped the domestic responses to the attack by establishing a new balance in the debates between national interest on
the one hand and international responsibilities and reliability on the other. Allies became aware that their reputation as a partner was on the line, and they had to prove how they could meet their commitments. The Article 5 decision shaped the discourse of political debates in member states. Political leaders, like Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, put their own political futures on the line to discipline domestic opponents and to demonstrate their unwavering commitment to NATO and the United States as the attacked ally.

In sum, NATO is far from being marginalized. It has demonstrated its political and military value. It responded automatically to the attacks with the mutual defense reflex. Its response shaped national decisions and behavior in two distinct second image reversed effects. First, and long-term, it had guided national military reforms in accordance with its revised threat assessment based on a new strategic concept. Second, and short-term, its Article 5 decision shaped national responses and domestic debates to ensure that previous commitments to mutual defense were honored.

ENDNOTES

1 I gratefully acknowledge comments by Lily Gardner Feldman on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 By contrast it took several days and a strongly worded letter to President Kennedy by Mayor Willy Brandt before the three Western Powers and subsequently NATO issues a measured protest after East Germany build the wall in Berlin on August 13, 1961.


8 The general impression is that NATO might accelerate existing reform programs but does not fundamentally change its capability in order to meet new contingencies. The most recent regular meetings of the NAC at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defense in December 2001 confirm this impression.


10 I do not argue that the decision to commit to the Washington Treaty, including Article 5, and to include terrorist attacks into the definition of attacks triggering the mutual defense clause have not required national decisions in the first place. However, making these broad commitments did not precisely determine the consequences. Rather, the allies wrote a blank check not knowing how it would affect them later. Rather it was up to others to determine the amount of the national checks and cash them. In other words, second image reversed effects of international institutions require that these institutions exist in the first place.


13 In a series of articles titled “10 Days in September” and published between January 27 and February 3, 2002 the Washington Post offers the most detailed account of the decision making process in Washington after September 11. It is significant that NATO’s Article 5 invocation was apparently not discussed at these high level meetings. The available evidence indicates that the decision was considered in the normal course of events that needed a lot of deliberation and discussion.


15 “German NATO official: Hasty reaction to attacks ‘makes absolutely no sense.’” *BBC Monitoring* September 18, 2001.


22 Personal communication from NATO.

23 See also Matthew Kaminski, Paul Hofheinz, Brandon Mitchener, Geoff Winestock and Dan Bilefsky, “NATO Allies Back Bush in War on Terrorist ‘Evil’.” *Wall Street...*


27 Matthew Kaminski, “NATO is unprepared to fight terrorism.” Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2001 p.A14; Matthew Kaminski, “Cold war is over, but NATO is still stuck in its ways.” Wall Street Journal Europe, October 5, 2001 p.1. Kaminski contends that the strategic concept mandated no changes. He quotes a NATO official stating: “People did not leave the Washington Summit with the sense that we need to take terrorism much more seriously than we have done in the past.” In addition General Naumann is quoted as recalling a Military Committee meeting in which Turkey, Britain and Spain quietly backed by France refused to support proposals how NATO can play a role in fighting terrorism. First, these two quotes in the same newspaper article are very hard to reconcile because in fact Naumann contradicts the unnamed official by implying that the Military Committee discussed the issue even though some allies voiced their opposition. Second, Turkey insisted that it made terrorism a NATO issue a long time ago. “Turkey’s NATO envoy welcomes invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” BBC Monitoring, September 13, 2001.


29 Previous documents used similarly standardized language when treating acts of terrorism as criminal offenses that violated human dignity and rights. In coping with it NATO promised more cooperation in this field. See, for example, Declaration on Terrorism, North Atlantic Council December 10, 1981.


34 “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: 1 on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 2 on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces
of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, October 22, 1951. http://www.nato.int/docu/basic(txt/bt-a1.htm#Art02.


53 The latest major reforms of the German armed forces followed immediately after the NATO decisions in April 1999. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Zeitleiste der Reformen http://www.bundeswehr.de/ministerium/politik_aktuell/ zeitleiste_reform_gross.jpg. The timing is an important indication of the close link between NATO and military actions by the member states.

54 The Army reduced its size from 225,000 to eventually 93,000 troops. Its original twelve divisions with 36 brigades were downsized to five divisions (plus one air mobile division and one special operations division) with nine mechanized and one mountain brigades. 111 of the original 261 battalions will be dissolved by 2006.
NATO Before and After September 11


59 The German response to NATO’s decision was extremely different than in 1990. Back then, Turkey preemptively requested alliance solidarity should Iraq attack it during the Gulf war. Key leaders of the Social Democratic Party argued at the time that Germany was not obligated to assist its ally Turkey in case of an attack by Iraq because such an attack were provoked. Gordon, P. H. (2001-02). “NATO after September 11.” Survival 43 (4); Baumann, R. and G. Hellmann (2001). “Germany and the Use of Military Force. ‘Total War,’ the ‘Culture of Restraint,’ and the Quest for Normality.” German Politics 10 (1): 61-82.

60 The Bundestag debated the issue several times. Quotes and references are taken from the following meetings: session of the 14th Bundestag 186 (September 12, 2001); 187 (September 19, 2001); 192 (October 11, 2001); 202 (November 16, 2001). All translations are mine.


62 To pass, a motion of confidence requires more than 50 percent of the members of the Bundestag (in the 14th Bundestag the required number is 334 yes votes).


The more recently established liaison between the U.S. Central Command and other national forces may help the current operations but does not compensate for the general lack of coordinating the military planning processes of command headquarters. Inacker, M. (2002). Grosse Worte, kleine Muenze. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 3.


However, in U.S. Senate committee hearings Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, pointed out that NATO members and EU members have been in generally very supportive of US efforts in a wide range of areas including tracing financial support systems for the Al Qaeda organization, intelligence cooperation, nation-building and the like. Militarily, they had offered more capabilities than the United States were able to request or found useful to request. Powell emphasized the usefulness of the alliance. It would be a mistake to look at NATO’s immediate military contribution to the war in Afghanistan when evaluating the role of the alliance. U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, February 5, 2002. See real video http://foreign.senate.gov/menu.html. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing February 6, 2002 (quoted from memory of CSPAN broadcast, transcript or video not yet available).
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