WHOSE BRAIN DRAIN?
IMMIGRANT SCHOLARS AND
AMERICAN VIEWS OF GERMANY

Edited by
Peter Uwe Hohendahl
Cornell University
WHOSE BRAIN DRAIN?
IMMIGRANT SCHOLARS AND
AMERICAN VIEWS OF GERMANY

Edited by
Peter Uwe Hohendahl
Cornell University
The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) is a center for advanced research, study and discussion on the politics, culture and society of the Federal Republic of Germany. Established in 1983 and affiliated with The Johns Hopkins University but governed by its own Board of Trustees, AICGS is a privately incorporated institute dedicated to independent, critical and comprehensive analysis and assessment of current German issues. Its goals are to help develop a new generation of American scholars with a thorough understanding of contemporary Germany, deepen American knowledge and understanding of current German developments, contribute to American policy analysis of problems relating to Germany, and promote interdisciplinary and comparative research on Germany.

Executive Director: Jackson Janes  
Board of Trustees, Cochair: Fred H. Langhammer  
Board of Trustees, Cochair: Dr. Eugene A. Sekulow

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

©2001 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies  

This Humanities Program Volume is made possible by the Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program. Additional copies are available for $5.00 to cover postage and handling from the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Suite 420, 1400 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2217. Telephone 202/332-9312, Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: info@aicgs.org Web: http://www.aicgs.org
CONTENTS

Foreword......................................................................................................................v

About the Authors.........................................................................................................x

BRAIN DRAIN AND TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE
   Peter Uwe Hohendahl.............................................................................................1

AMERICAN VIEWS OF GERMAN HISTORY SINCE 1945
   Jerry Z. Muller........................................................................................................14

GERMANS AND AMERICANS
IN AMERICAN GERMAN STUDIES
   Stephen M. Brockmann..........................................................................................28

MIGRATION OF YOUNG GERMAN SCHOLARS TO THE
UNITED STATES AS CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR
GERMAN UNIVERSITIES
   Britta Baron............................................................................................................45
FOREWORD

The influx of German speaking scholars to the United States since Hitler took power has been arguably the largest scientific transfer in the twentieth century. Immigrant scholars have left their imprint on the natural and social sciences and contributed strongly to history, linguistics and other humanities, including the field of German. While much attention has been directed at the refugees from Nazi Germany, subsequent generations of German-speaking immigrant scholars raised much less interest and were usually subsumed under the broad concept of “brain drain,” a feature of postwar American hegemony in the sciences, engineering, and high-tech communication. This volume, based on the workshop, “Whose Brain Drain? Immigrant Scholars and American Views on Germany,” in Washington, DC, on March 24, 2000, attempts to initiate discussion about the trends of academic transfer between Germany and the United States since World War II and the new patterns of scientific migration and communication that are taking shape under the auspices of an unprecedented global mobility and accessibility.

As new patterns become apparent, an assessment of postwar developments allows a more in-depth discussion of the current changes in American-German scholarly relations. After the end of the Cold War, certain restrictions have evaporated; questions regarding the purpose, direction, and benefits of the transatlantic brain drain take on new momentum. Developments in the second half of the twentieth century gain a profile that is more than an appendix to the great migration wave from Nazi Germany, as it was defined for several decades. It was an important signal when Donald Fleming who, together with Bernard Bailyn, edited the influential volume “The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960,” in 1969 and established a special place for this event in modern intellectual history, asked the question in 1996 whether one should continue to view it as “a supremely edifying morality play,” in which “Germany had been intellectually punished for yielding to the Nazis and America and Britain intellectually rewarded for their political and civic virtue.” Fleming did not want to diminish the brilliance of the contributions that the refugees made but rather questioned the perception of this migration in terms of “providential compensation,” a unique morality play of gain and loss because of Germany’s terrible
political blunder. In the foreword to the volume, *Forced Migration and Scientific Change*, Fleming raised the point, “that we ought to stop focusing exclusively on the Nazi era when casting accounts between Germany and the receiving countries. This would entail reframing our topic as the geographical circulation of intellectual elites in the twentieth century, antedating the Nazis and continuing after them, though accelerated, magnified, and amplified to the highest pitch of urgency in the Hitler years.”

The larger story would include, Fleming suggested, the exodus from the Soviet Union, from Hungary, France, Italy and Spain and other European countries. Speaking of the migration of scholars in the larger framework of the expansion of scientific research after World War I, he remarked: “The real point of the whole situation may be that the gradient of opportunities in science was predictably tilting in the direction of the United States as the richest and most powerful nation, and even without the dire tragedies of the twentieth century, many young scientists, though almost certainly fewer and far more gradually, would have been moving from Europe to America for at least part of their careers.” Fleming is careful not to overstate the case. The United States of the Depression years was certainly not exactly the place of booming scientific endeavors. Yet there were activities such as the founding of the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton by Abraham Flexner who had carefully studied the German university system; there were the policies of international scientific advancement by the Rockefeller Foundation which Malcolm Richardson, one of the workshop speakers, explored with regard to the foundations support for German scientists. The draw for social and national scientists, at least on the part of premier institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, and Berkeley, can be traced back into the 1920s, when German and Austrian universities went through a period of financial hardship and political interference.

To situate the scholarly exodus from Nazi Germany and Austria in this broader context of twentieth-century transatlantic scientific transfer seems to open up important insights into motivations and push-and-pull factors before 1933 and after 1945. Peter Uwe Hohendahl of Cornell University, who organized the workshop as an AICGS Senior Fellow in the Humanities, discusses several cases of intellectual transfer since the
Nazi period within a theoretical framework that focuses on conditions, gate keepers, institutions, and media. Interested primarily in philosophical and cultural transfer, Hohendahl questions the wisdom of tightly linking the transfer of knowledge to geographical relocation. The refugee scholar as the quintessential model of scientific transfer has rightly been seen as a feature of mid-century developments, but this model needs to be supplemented or amended by other criteria, of which Hohendahl delineates a sizable number.

Hohendahl’s essay is followed by two contributions whose authors cast a wide net in their attempt to place German-born scholars within the disciplines of History and German since World War II. Jerry Z. Muller, a historian at Catholic University, traces the strongest impact of refugees to the second generation of emigrés who came to the United States as adolescents and who made themselves known—as Fritz Stern and George Mosse did in an exemplary way—in the 1960s. Muller also follows up on a younger generation of non-Jewish German scholars who came in recent decades and contributed, though less prominently, to German history in the United States. In the field of German or Germanics, this younger generation of Germans, who migrated mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, has been recognized as having revitalized the study of German literature in the context of political and social history. As Stephen Brockmann, Germanist at Carnegie Mellon University, asserts in the following chapter, humanities scholarship in the United States benefited broadly from the methodological innovations by the refugees from Nazi Germany; Germanics benefited too, though the full impact was not felt until the 1950s and 1960s. Brockmann’s main focus, however, is on the shift in directions—he calls it the Americanization of German Studies—which can be credited to a generation of American-born scholars and teachers who disentangled the discipline from its dependency on German Germanistik.

As the discussion about brain drain on a global scale has shifted even more toward the natural sciences, engineering, and computer sciences in recent decades, the intellectual fallout has become harder to judge. Immigrant scholars were intensively involved in shaping American views of Germany in the second half of the twentieth-century, though differently in different disciplines and not without illusions about their impact. In her chapter, Britta Baron, Director of the New York office of the German
American Academic Exchange Service, makes no bones about the lack of both information about the current status of German scientists in the United States and of a consistent policy of mutual transfer of knowledge. Baron clearly characterizes the countervailing forces that are at work in a smaller country’s relationship with the United States as it tries, on the one hand, to foster exchange in order to stay in the forefront of scientific research and to prevent, on the other, the hemorrhage of the best and the brightest to the United States. Germany’s situation obviously reflects that of most other nations. Baron hopes that the realization of this quandary will lead to more support for sciences and young scientists on the part of German universities as well as a more open attitude toward attracting international academic talent.

In response to Baron’s presentation at the workshop, Mark Suskin, who heads the Division for International Programs at the National Science Foundation, illuminated some of the problems that are in the way of creating a consistent policy for the mutual transfer of knowledge on the American side. Suskin spoke of the asymmetrical dialogue between the United States and Europe and saw few signs of a changing attitude of the American scientific establishment, including the National Science Foundation, in dealing with the lopsidedness of the transfer. As Malcolm Richardson, of the White House Millennium Council, pointed out, international exchange programs, including the celebrated Fulbright Program, have received less financial support in recent years, though they still fare better than other scholarly programs.

In addition to these momentous debates, the workshop also featured the testimony of one of the most prominent refugees from Nazi Germany who entered the United States as an adolescent and rose to the position of President of The Johns Hopkins University. Steven Muller, founder, chair, and—until 2000—co-chair of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, spoke about the shaping of American views on Germany by reminding the audience that, first of all, Jewish refugees had to negotiate their stance toward the Germans after they learned the full extent of the Holocaust. It was not until a visit to his devastated home town of Hamburg in 1950 that he decided to abandon hatred and take a positive attitude towards Germans, which enabled him to become one of the leading American mediators of American-German
political and scholarly exchange. Steven Muller also reminded the audience that Jewish scholars from Nazi Germany usually had a hard time being accepted by American universities. The story of their great contribution to the American academy notwithstanding, many refugees were, though decidedly anti-Nazi, not uncritical of America and its culture.

As a realistic and effective mediator between the scientific cultures of the United States and Germany, Steven Muller is a great representative of the immense contribution of exiles from Germany to the rebuilding of trust between the two nations after the catastrophe of war and the Holocaust. This volume is dedicated to him.

Frank Trommler                                    Jackson Janes
Chair, Harry & Helen Gray                          Executive Director
Humanities Program                                 AICGS
                                                   November 2000

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., xi.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Britta Baron, Director, New York Office, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), 950 3rd Avenue, New York, NY 10022.

Stephen M. Brockmann, Associate Professor of German, Department of Modern Languages, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890.

Peter Uwe Hohendahl, AICGS Senior Fellow, Jacob Gould Schurman Professor of German and Comparative Literature, Department of German Studies, 183 Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3201.

Jerry Z. Muller, Professor of History, Department of History, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064.
NEW WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT BRAIN DRAIN

The migration of scholars and scientists is nothing particularly new, ever since Renaissance intellectuals and scientists moved from their home country to other countries where they were looking for better working conditions or a safer place to express their convictions. In fact, in the scholarly world of the early modern age, which was still committed to the idea of a common spiritual order and a common language, namely Latin, the idea of science and scholarship as a national property was far from being established. The belief in the common Christian project was more important than the idea that a nation would regulate its intellectual resources. It may well have been the absolutist state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that began to develop a notion of intellectual resources as assets to be controlled for the benefit of the state and its population. After all, in continental Europe universities were essential places for the advanced education of state administrators and professionals.

For the modern nation state the question of intellectual resources is clearly an important issue since the development of scientific knowledge has been closely linked to the rise of state administrations and to the development of technology and its social impact. Even in the humanities, although in a different manner, the development and control of symbolic knowledge has an impact upon social and cultural institutions that are essential for the life of the nation. In short, the modern nation state is aware of the need for the production of scientific and scholarly knowledge as a vital resource for social development and therefore also of the need to stimulate as well as to regulate this process.

It is in this context that the discussion of brain drain has taken place. The conventional understanding of this process assumes that an individual country attracts scientists by offering better working conditions or simply better intellectual and/or financial rewards and thereby diminishes the intellectual resources of the country that supplies the migrating scientists.
In this model the country that attracts these scientists gains in terms of intellectual power. As a result, it is able to advance faster in the international competition. In this conception of brain drain two aspects are most often discussed. The first is a labor market issue. Migrating scientists can either fill existing gaps in the receiving country and thus improve the production of knowledge or they can put pressure on an existing tight labor market, thereby creating tensions within the country to which they migrate. This pressure can still benefit the receiving country, of course, precisely through the increase of competition. The second aspect has to do with the financial cost of training scientists at the university. Given the high cost of producing Ph.D.s, especially in the natural sciences, the modern nation state that has to bear this cost has reason to be concerned about brain drain. The emigration of a fully trained scientist means that the investment of considerable financial resources does not result in the production of new knowledge that will improve social conditions in the home country.

In the model that I have sketched so far it is basically assumed that brain drain either diminishes or increases intellectual and economic resources. In other words, the conventional understanding links the migration of scientists with the transfer of knowledge. Where there is migration you have also transfer of knowledge. Consequently, in the final analysis there must be winners and losers. One might argue, for instance, that the United States has basically profited from the fact that at various points of its history it has attracted scientists who have contributed to the advancement of research at American universities. Indeed, impressionistic evidence seems to bear this out: what an outside observer of a faculty gathering at a top American research university would probably notice is the international composition of its faculty.

The traditional conception of this process treats migration and transfer of knowledge as closely correlated if not identical. The gain for the receiving country consists of taking in scientists who do innovative work. Along these lines Sharon G. Levin and Paula E. Stephan proposed in a recent article in *Science* to analyze the impact of foreign scientists on the natural sciences in the United States. They attempt to quantify this impact by looking at citations in leading journals. I suspect that this method would not yield interesting results in the humanities. Therefore I want to
propose a different and more complex model which separates migration and the transfer of knowledge as analytically independent categories.

FOUR PATTERNS OF TRANSFER

Of course, the transfer of knowledge, especially the transfer of theoretical knowledge, has been studied in a number of contexts. The history of philosophy would be concerned, among other things, with the impact of authors and ideas on foreign philosophers. The impact of Hume and Rousseau on Kant would be an example of this type of investigation. Similarly, older literary criticism illuminated influence of one national literature on another – let us say, the influence of the French Enlightenment on Germany and Italy. These examples demonstrate, however, that in this type of research the aspect of transfer is actually taken for granted. Research trends to focus on questions of origin and transformation. One would have to shift the interest to the process of transfer itself, its context and conditions such as media and institutional control, in order to get a more precise understanding of what the actual flow of knowledge would look like. In my discussion of specific historical cases, I will come back to these questions.

In order to facilitate the discussion, I propose to distinguish four situations in which the correlation between migration of scientists or scholars and transfer of knowledge takes on different forms. In the first situation we assume that migration and transfer of knowledge go hand in hand. In other words, the migrating scientist takes scientific knowledge along to his or her new home and makes use of it in this new environment. Of course, the most significant kind of knowledge is theoretical and methodological knowledge that can be employed to produce innovative information. This situation contrasts with a pattern where migration takes place but without transfer of knowledge. Here the scientist or scholar comes to another country in order to receive his or her training but then decides to stay. This situation is not uncommon among young scientists from developing countries who are sent to the United States for further training and after receiving their degree frequently decide to remain in the United States and thereby become part of the American community of scholars. In this case there is no significant transfer of scientific
knowledge, although there may be a significant loss of resources for the developing country, since its government was expecting to benefit from the additional training of the young scientist after his or her return to the native country. The initial investment, as it were, did not pay off.

In the third pattern we make the opposite assumption: there is significant transfer of knowledge but no migration. To put it differently, the transferral of knowledge relies on general media such as books and journals to overcome the distance between two scientific cultures. In this pattern the question of translation may be crucial. In the United States the influx of French structuralist and post-structuralist theory, for example, has depended on highly qualified mediators who were able to translate very demanding theoretical texts written in French into English.2 Without these mediators the impact of French theory would have been rather limited. Only when English departments took over and began to disseminate French theory in translation did this knowledge become a “genuine” American resource.3

The fourth pattern is actually a variation of the third. It refers to a mode of knowledge transfer without migration in the traditional sense, but it is concerned with the transmission and reception of knowledge that is linked to a highly mobile author. More recent theoretical developments in the humanities and the social sciences provide good examples for this pattern. The broad reception of Jürgen Habermas’s social theory in this country, for instance, has been facilitated by the frequent presence of the author as a visitor at American universities. The powerful presence of the author supported by his American mediators has undoubtedly increased the visibility and acceptance of Habermasian theory. The same argument can be made for Jacques Derrida and his American circle. It seems to me that this form of international mobility is characteristic for a globalized intellectual market in which the transferral of theoretical knowledge has become largely detached from the notion of limited resources that can be distributed and controlled by the individual national state. The international presence of major theorists, their global academic fame, which allows them to travel from country to country, has superseded traditional forms of migration and transfer.

The four patterns I have introduced here are not strictly analytical models. Rather, I consider them as helpful heuristic categories for my
discussion of specific historical cases. My first case is the Frankfurt School, in particular its much-discussed migration to the United States. My second case focuses on the confrontation between German Rezeptionsästhetik and American reader-response theory in the 1980s. As one would expect, the specific historical situation contains a much higher degree of complexity than the basic abstract patterns. Both the concept of migration and the idea of knowledge transfer, which we have treated so far as unproblematic, become more layered and more demanding when we use them in particular historical situations. The migration of the Frankfurt school, for instance, was imposed on its members by Hitler’s rise to power rather than the result of a free choice. They were looking for a safe exile and accepted the United States as such a place. By contrast, young Germans who left Germany in the 1950s and early 1960s wanted to come to the United States to take advantage of an open intellectual climate that was not available in Adenauer’s Federal Republic.

**THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL**

The story of the Frankfurt School in exile is well known. Martin Jay and more recently Rolf Wiggershaus have provided a detailed narrative of the encounter between Critical Theory and American culture. Therefore I will restrict myself to summarizing the basic features. First, we have to note that it was primarily Max Horkheimer who wanted to move the Institute of Social Research to the United States as soon as possible to safeguard its survival after Hitler’s takeover in Germany. This decision was determined by political rather than scientific considerations. There was no reason to assume that the intellectual climate in North America would be especially hospitable for the type of theory Horkheimer and his circle had developed in Frankfurt—a version of revisionist Marxism that had learned from Hegel and Lukács without ever thinking in terms of party affiliations. As we know, this distance towards Tagespolitik became even more pronounced in America. The members felt that they were theorists in exile who had to respect the local academic code (for instance at Columbia University) and national political institutions. The limited contact with the American academy increased
somewhat in the 1940 when Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Löwenthal had moved to California and participated in large American research project on the structure and background of social prejudices.\textsuperscript{5} Other members of the group, notably Herbert Marcuse, joined the American war effort in the OSS. This participation in American organizations necessitated the use of English as a medium of communication, which they had resisted in their own work. However, Horkheimer and Adorno’s most important theoretical text of the forties was still conceived and articulated in German. “Dialectic of Enlightenment” was certainly not written for an American audience. The book was later (1947) published in German by a publishing house in Amsterdam. Similarly, Adorno used German for \textit{Minima Moralia}, his most compelling work written in the United States. These decisions indicate that Adorno and Horkheimer thought of themselves as German/Jewish theorists who resided in America. Their own writings between 1940 and 1945, had no immediate impact on the contemporary American discussion, although there were interesting parallels.\textsuperscript{6}

While Adorno and Horkheimer did not change this attitude and returned to West Germany in 1949 to resume their work at Frankfurt University, other members of the group, for instance Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer and Herbert Marcuse eventually switched to English and became an integral part of postwar intellectual life in the United States. Franz Neumann’s analysis of German fascism published under the title \textit{Behemoth} in 1942 provides an early but clearly important example of this transition. But we have to note that this process of Americanization occurred mostly after the war. Even around 1953 Marcuse, as we know, would have liked to return to Germany but was not strongly encouraged by his old friends to join them in Frankfurt.\textsuperscript{7} In the long run, Marcuse’s close affiliations with major American universities (Brandeis, Berkeley) redefined him as an American theorist with a German background. As a result, his later work, for instance \textit{One-Dimensional Man}, became crucial for the formation of the New Left in this country. In fact, these writings that assumed the possibility of a fundamental social revolution in our time were later translated into German and also used by the West German Left to define their own project, while Neumann’s work was not rediscovered by the German Left.
The initial migration of the Frankfurt School to the United States in 1930 was not linked to a substantial transferral of their theoretical achievements to America. When Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany in the late 1940s, this chapter seemed to be closed. It was only during the second phase, mostly during the 1960s and 1970s, that Critical Theory in the narrow sense of the term found a home in the United States and became influential as a radical social and aesthetic theory. Yet the situation is even more complicated since during the early 1970s the work of Adorno and Walter Benjamin was now introduced to an American audience in translation through the journals of the American New Left, in particular via Telos and New German Critique. The most important American mediator was possibly Fredric Jameson who made German Critical Theory available to American intellectuals through his important study “Marxism and Form” (1971). By this time most of the members of the original group were already dead, including Adorno and Benjamin. In short, we are dealing with a transfer that is not connected to migration. At the same time, however, another process took place that would come under the fourth pattern, a presence of the author without traditional migration. The reception of Habermas’s theory in this country, which began during the 1970s, was aided by the author’s close connection with American academics and intellectuals.

This complex constellation deserves closer scrutiny. To begin with, we have to note that as a social theorist the young Habermas was quite familiar with contemporary American sociology and political science, as can be gleaned from The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaft. This ongoing critical dialogue has characterized Habermas’s work throughout and has distinguished him from much of left German theory, not to mention left social theory in France (Foucault, Althusser, Bourdieu). While the early work of Habermas was received in West Germany as an extension of the old Frankfurt School, in the United States his theory and that of his teachers were actually kept more apart. At a later stage they were even contrasted, either to praise Habermas’s advances (Richard Wolin, Thomas McCarthy, Sheila Benhabib) or blame the wrong turn of his project (Jameson, Andreas Huyssen, Rainer Naegele). Briefly put, then, the reception of Critical Theory in this country after 1970 was divided into two more or
less separate strands. On the one hand, we find the interest of social philosophers in Habermas’s work and, on the other hand, we observe the interest of literary critics, art historians, and musicologists in Adorno and Benjamin. Yet this process of transfer is further complicated by the fact that some of the younger American theorists such as McCarthy, Benhabib, and Max Pensky came to Frankfurt when at the same time some of the younger German theorists such as Albrecht Wellmer and Christoph Menke migrated to the United States. In a global intellectual market traditional forms of migration have been superseded by a pattern of circulation where the notion of national resources has become almost meaningless.

RECEPTION THEORY AND READER-RESPONSE THEORY

Compared with the complicated history of the Frankfurt School and its impact on the United States, the fate of Rezeptionsästhetik is less remarkable. Although we can observe a significant amount of transferral of theoretical knowledge, there is no migration in the traditional sense. Neither Hans Robert Jauss nor Wolfgang Iser ever settled in the United States. Similarly, neither Jonathan Culler or Stanley Fish, their American counterparts, ever tried to move to Germany. But we find a similar pattern as in the case of the second and third generation of the Frankfurt school: namely a high degree of mobility among the theorists involved in the production of reader-response theory, encouraged by the internationalization of research universities during the 1970s and 1980s. Jauss visited this country more than once until his former membership in the Waffen-SS was disclosed, which barred him from further entering the country, and Wolfgang Iser held a visiting appointment at the University of California, Irvine, and consequently developed strategies that would make their writings available in English. This was much easier for Iser since he happens to be a professor of English who could translate his own work for an American audience. Of course, the fact that he would probably primarily discuss English literature was an additional advantage in the competition for recognition. Jauss, a student of French literature, on the other hand, had to rely on translators who were fundamentally in sympathy with his theory. Timothy Bahti was such a
mediator. A student of Paul de Man’s, he was well versed in advanced literary theory and eager to introduce the Constance school to this country.\textsuperscript{10}

In the case of German \textit{Rezeptionsästhetik}, the transfer to America was initially encouraged by new trends in American criticism that acknowledged and supported the radical nature of the German theory, but ultimately these very trends turned against Jauss and Iser. The collapse of New Criticism as the dominant model of literary criticism in the United States around 1970, a model that had influenced academic work for at least two decades, opened up the discussion and encouraged revisionist thought. One of the experimental approaches favored a methodological turn in which not the artwork but its reception becomes the center of the investigation. The American version propagated by critics like Norman Holland, David Bleich, Jonathan Culler, and Stanley Fish was termed reader-response theory.\textsuperscript{11} Its features were similar to the approach of the Constance School, a fact that would pave the way for the reception of Jauss and Iser. In the final analysis, however, the Constance School was never fully integrated into American mainstream literary criticism and is by now part of an unredeemed past.

Why did this happen? In order to answer this question we have to focus more on the concept of transfer. Within the academy this process relies mainly on traditional print media such as journals and books. Yet these media are by no means neutral; they are controlled by gatekeepers who are in positions of power to open and shut the gate according to their assessment of desirable or undesirable effects. At a certain point in the early stage the initial interest of the American community of theorists turned negative. In the case of Iser this negative response can be dated: it goes back to Stanley Fish’ extremely hostile 1981 essay “Why No One’s Afraid of Wolfgang Iser” in the influential journal \textit{Diacritics}, which had published an extensive interview with the German theorist.\textsuperscript{12} Fish’s intervention marked a turning point in the reception of Iser’s theory. Fish, a leading representative of American reader-response theory, dismissed Iser as theoretically inconsistent and incoherent, as someone who is not radical enough to really matter in the ongoing American theory debate. This was clearly a harsh verdict, moreover a strategic move to exclude the German author from the American discussion. Although Iser’s voice
certainly did not immediately disappear from the American discussion because of Fish’ negative intervention, the fact that an important gatekeeper had interrupted and redefined the process of transfer marked a new phase. While before 1981 the dominant theme had been the similarity of German and American theory vis-à-vis traditional criticism and literary history, now the question was whose theory represented the cutting edge. Iser’s response, which emphasized the unfair nature of Fish’s attack, did not change the character of the debate since he did not fully grasp the meta-critical context of Fish’s polemic. Hence, in the long run, Iser was marginalized and dropped from the contemporary discussion during the 1990s.

This resistance to German literary theory also applies to Hans Robert Jauss. In this case the initially successful transfer was challenged from within the theoretical paradigm. It was Paul de Man’s introduction to Jauss’ Toward an Aesthetic of Reception (1982) that ultimately raised questions about the contribution of the German theorist. Although de Man wrote a graceful introduction which praised the theoretical advancements of Jauss, the second half of his text pointed to some gaps that de Man felt had to be mentioned, namely Jauss’ basic resistance to French deconstruction. To put it differently, acceptance within the American discussion as de Man and his friends at Diacritics understood the debate, presupposed a definition of literary theory that had distanced itself more radically from hermeneutics than Jauss was willing or able to do. In short, de Man’s introduction sets the parameters for the reception of Jauss’ work, defining it as useful at a certain level, but not as central for the American theory discussion. By contrast, de Man recommends Adorno, Benjamin and Martin Heidegger as the authors with whom American theorists really have to be familiar in order to make a difference. This recommendation, by the way, was effective. The 1980s saw a remarkable adoption of these figures within American literary criticism, a reception that differed significantly from the Marxist reception of the 1970s. Put simply, it became more a Heideggerian or Derridian than a Marxist reading.

The migration of Constance Rezeptionsästhetik to the United States was at best a partial success. This raises two interesting questions: first, why was German reception theory blocked by two major American critics
(one of whom was a migrant himself), although it was clearly similar to the American version? And second, why were its main proponents, Iser and Jauss, so keen on penetrating the American discussion? With respect to the first question, the moment of resistance has to be understood in the broader context of the international theory debate of the 1980s, in particular the search for the most advanced and radical position, a search that stressed the distance from traditional hermeneutics. This process of internationalization is also of importance for the second question. Prima facie, the intellectual migration of the Constance School to the United States seems not to be an obvious move. Especially, in the case of Jauss, who was after all a professor of French, this desire was by no means self-evident. One might assume that he would have liked to find acceptance first and foremost in Paris. This was indeed the case; many of his works have been translated into French. Yet it seems that America was at least as important to him. This question brings us back to the problem of brain drain. In Iser’s and Jauss’ mind the American discussion mattered most. This assumption makes sense when we look more closely at the places where this dialogue unfolded. Specifically, we are not talking about a national American debate but rather about a debate that occurred at a handful of leading American research universities such as Yale, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Berkeley, Columbia and Chicago.

The participants of this type of debate are typically a group of international scholars who were partly born and trained in this country and partly came from a variety of countries, including the Third World (Edward Said, Homi Bhaba). In other words, this kind of theoretical discussion is no longer conceived in terms of a national debate based on a national conception of American culture. Rather, these universities are crucial for the global circulation of cultural theory. Leading foreign scholars and intellectuals therefore are not necessarily attracted by the American way of life but by elite universities in the United States, which serve as springboards for international theoretical communication. Access to these institutions makes a real difference, but the prerequisite is no longer migration in the traditional sense. In fact, for the circulation of ideas constant mobility through visits and short-term appointments is more effective than a long-term commitment to a single institution. Although the case of the Constance School and its bid for recognition in
this country is a much more specialized problem compared with the migration of the Frankfurt School, there are ultimately interesting similarities. When we look at the more recent developments, it becomes apparent that migration and transfer of theoretical knowledge gravitate towards the fourth pattern, i.e. correlation between both processes, but without a one-way causal link. Moreover, the conventional assumptions of the brain drain debate about national intellectual resources that have to be defended or can be increased by the import of scholars and scientists no longer apply. To what extent the same is true in the natural sciences where the economic stakes have become much higher would be an interesting question that I am not qualified to discuss.

In closing, I want to underline once more my strategy in dealing with the problem of brain drain. In contrast to the standard approach, I have argued that we have to separate migration of scientists and transfer of knowledge, that we cannot simply treat them as identical in terms of a zero-sum game (there must be winners and losers). Based on the two cases, I have tried to show how much the individual historical situation can differ, depending on the specific historical context, the nature of the discipline, the intentions of the actors involved, and the character of the institutions and media that serve as the venue. I would like to stress two moments: first, the presupposition that brain drain is a zero-sum game is possibly problematic, and, second, in more recent time, let us say after 1970, the character of knowledge transfers and the nature of migration of scholars, at least in the humanities, have significantly changed. I think it is more appropriate now to speak of an international circulation in which the notion of national intellectual resources has lost its significance.

ENDNOTES


2. A good example is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as the translator of Jaques Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). This translation established Derrida’s wider reputation in the United States and also enabled Spivak to introduce herself as an avant-garde theorist.

3. This moment was reached with the publication of Jonathan Culler’s study On Deconstruction (1983), which provided a lucid and succinct introduction of
deconstruction for an American audience that was basically brought up with New
Criticism. For a critical discussion of the Americanization of French structuralism and


5. See Jay, 113-72; Wiggershaus, 171-78.


10. Hans Robert Jauss, *Towards an Aesthetic of Reception*, translated from the German by Timothy Bahti. Introduction by Paul de Man (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). In his own preface, Bahti underscores that until 1982, it was essentially the work of Iser that represented German reception theory for the American reader.


AMERICAN VIEWS OF GERMAN HISTORY SINCE 1945
Jerry Z. Muller

My paper will explore the influence of cross-Atlantic migrations on American views of modern German history. How did emigrants from Germany into the United States influence the writing of modern German history in this country? To what extent was their influence also felt in Germany itself, and how has this changed in the course of the last half century? Let me give you the short answer, which I will then expand upon.

Before 1933, there were almost no internationally significant historians of modern Germany in the United States. Then, as a result of the Nazi rise to power, a small cohort of German-trained historians of Germany arrived in the United States and produced works of German history of international resonance. Far more influential was the next generation, that is, those who left Germany as adolescents, came to the United States as teenagers, and began to produce important works of German history around 1960. (That generation, to the extent that its members survive, is now well past the age of maximum influence.) By virtue of their familiarity with Germany, the quality of their work, and the existence of a receptive audience, this generation exerted substantial intellectual influence not only in the United States, but in West Germany as well. Since then, there have been—and are—a number of historians of modern Germany who are German-born scholars now teaching in the United States. Some have been prolific scholars who have done valuable work, but none have had the influence or resonance of the earlier generations neither in the United States or in Germany. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the most widely resonant and significant books in modern German history produced in the United States were written by American-born historians, mostly not of German ethnic origin. That generation is now within a decade of retirement, and I will not deal with those aged sixty and less, except in passing, on the grounds that not enough time has passed to evaluate their long-term influence. The most significant agency of trans-cultural influence between Germany and the United States in recent decades, then, has not been the actual movement of scholars with permanent appointments; in the terms suggested by Peter Hohendahl...
elsewhere in this volume actual migration has been a very minor factor in cultural transfer. Visiting scholars and translations have been more important, and the internet may, in time, come to play a significant role.

THE FIRST GENERATION OF ÉMIGRÉS

Let me begin before the beginning, so to speak. Perhaps the most influential American-grown view of late nineteenth and twentieth German history came from a social scientist who was neither German nor a historian. I refer to Thorstein Veblen, who in his 1915 *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* put forward the thesis that Imperial Germany was characterized by the gap between the modernity of its capitalist economy and technology on the one hand, and the ongoing hold of its outdated dynastic state and feudal elements, including a subservient mentality, on the other. Veblen, in short, was one of the original sources of what came to be known as the “Sonderweg” thesis. A similar analysis stressing the gap between the economic development of Germany and its political and cultural structure was proffered by Talcott Parsons in his essay *Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany*, published in 1942, a thesis revived and reformulated by Ralf Dahrendorf in his “Society and Democracy in Germany” of 1965, itself one of the most influential books on the interpretation of German history of the 1960s.

But that is the prehistory of my topic. My paper begins more properly with the generation of émigré scholars who had already received their *Doktorat* or *Habilitation* in Germany before 1933 and who migrated to the United States thereafter, often with stops in Britain or France. Perhaps the two most influential scholars in terms of the interpretation of German history—Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt—were not historians in the narrow sense of holding positions in departments of history. Their influence stemmed in part from the fact that they published major interpretive works in the immediate postwar years, when there was an audience with a burning desire to try to understand the nature of the Third Reich. That audience was most intense in New York, where both Neumann and Arendt lived in the immediate postwar years, and where there was a high concentration of Jews, especially Jews of central-
European origin, who were particularly attuned to the issues raised by Nazism.

Neumann’s significance lay in part—but only in part—in his book of 1942, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. There he laid out a conception of the Third Reich as a joint enterprise between the National Socialist Party, the ministerial bureaucracy, the army, and big business, with the relative power of the party increasing at the expense of the other elements. He also asserted, quite optimistically, that the tension between the leadership and the masses would grow over time. Neumann found it difficult, however, to take the anti-semitic ideology of the regime seriously as an actual motive for action. He believed that anti-semitism was significant only as providing an integrative ideology for the regime. “The internal political value of anti-semitism,” he wrote, “will never allow a complete extermination of the Jews. The foe cannot and must not disappear; he must always be held in readiness as a scapegoat for all the evils originating in the socio-political system.” Neumann’s significance came not from this very flawed analysis of the regime, but from the fact that in 1948 he came to Columbia University as a visiting professor of political science. In 1948, he taught a course in German government that was packed by more than one hundred graduate students. When he died, prematurely, in a car accident in 1954, he was the sponsor of some twenty-six doctoral students. Among those who were stimulated by Neumann were two of the most important figures of the next generation of historians, Fritz Stern and Raul Hilberg, both of whom came to the United States as teenagers.

Far more influential than Neumann’s book was Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, first published in 1951. More significant than the original book was an additional chapter first published in 1953 as “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,” and included in later editions of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Arendt’s thesis was that the role of terror in totalitarian regimes was not to inspire fear and obedience (as in traditional dictatorships) but to remake the world according to an all-encompassing ideology. The concept of totalitarianism—which Arendt did not invent, but which she helped clarify and popularize—affected the subsequent writing of history of the Third Reich, above all in the work of Karl Dietrich Bracher, beginning with

The two other significant members of this older generation were Hajo Holborn and Hans Rosenberg. Holborn held the most prestigious position of any German émigré historian, at Yale. He was significant less for what he wrote about modern German history than for the many doctoral students which he sponsored at Yale: fifty-three from 1941 to 1968, most with German themes, above all in the fields of diplomatic and political history. Rosenberg taught for many years at Brooklyn College (where his students included Gertrude Himmelfarb, Eugene Genovese, and Raul Hilberg), and from the early 1960s at Berkeley. He pioneered the linkage of economic history and political history, or the social history of politics. Through his publications and stints as a visiting professor in Germany, he was a major influence on the upcoming generation of German historians of Prussia, the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, including Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Gerhard A. Ritter. His influence in the United States, however, was far more limited. Also part of this generation was Fritz Redlich, who helped found the center for the study of the history of entrepreneurship at Harvard, and cultivated the development of German entrepreneurial history. Friedrich Gilbert, also of this first generation, played a mentoring role for many younger historians of modern Germany, but the influence of his actual historical work on modern Germany is more difficult to find.

THE SECOND GENERATION OF ÉMIGRÉS

I now turn to the next generation, the generation of those who came to the United States as adolescents and made their impact beginning around 1960. Among the most important of these are Fritz Stern, George Mosse, Raul Hilberg, and Walter Laqueur.

The initial contributions to the interpretation of German history by Stern and Mosse were in a similar direction. On the whole, the relationship between National Socialism and German cultural traditions had been underplayed, not least because of the common assumption—maintained by many German émigrés—that the Nazi movement was comprised of the relatively uneducated “lower middle class” and exerted...
little attraction within the Bildungsbürgertum. Fritz Stern’s *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the German Ideology* of 1961 charted the genesis and diffusion of the anti-liberal, anti-urban, anti-capitalist, and anti-semitic animus that lay at the heart of völkisch thought, and suggested that it was the penetration of these themes into German culture that made National Socialism plausible to many educated, middle-class Germans. George Mosse’s *The Crisis of German Ideology: The Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (1964) developed related themes. At a time when most historians were still interpreting Nazi ideology as a tool for the manipulation of the masses, Mosse showed not only that Nazi ideas were actually believed by the Nazis and formed a motive for their action, but that those ideas had substantial cultural and institutional roots in modern Germany. The book was also pioneering in its exploration of “sub-intellectual history,” of doctrines and stereotypes that were influential despite their irrationality and crudity. Anti-semitism was not a tool for the manipulation of the masses, as Neumann had suggested, rather it was an actual motivation for action, and one with deep roots in German history. (Mosse’s later work on the role of symbolism and the aesthetic elements of politics was also highly influential.) Stern’s influence among German-speaking historians was felt earlier, mediated by his friend Ralf Dahrendorf, whose book *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (1965) reflected many of Stern’s concerns, especially the relative weakness of liberalism in Germany. Mosse’s influence in Germany came later, from the later 1970s onward, after German interpretations of Nazism had gone through a period of neo-Marxism, during which Neumann’s *Behemoth* was exhumed and translated.

It was characteristic of this generation, that—with one important exception—scholars could not bring themselves to do research on or teach about the Holocaust directly. (Neither Mosse nor Stern did.) The exception, of course, was Raul Hilberg, whose *Destruction of the European Jews* was published in 1961. The book was slow to take effect in both the United States and in Germany, but it was ultimately tremendously influential, both in creating the field of Holocaust history, and by indicating the extent of those involved, a theme that Hilberg pursued in his subsequent investigation of the German railroad bureaucracy. Hilberg’s link to the older generation is instructive. He had
studied as an undergraduate at Brooklyn College with Hans Rosenberg, who impressed upon him the importance of bureaucracy for understanding modern societies. However, Hilberg was struck by Rosenberg’s inability or unwillingness to think through what had just happened to the Jews of Europe.6 Hilberg’s work was an inspiration to subsequent historians of the Holocaust. Moreover, he showed that the murder of the Jews was a central project of the Third Reich, not a side-show, and that it had ramifications for almost every element of its history. (To understand how radical a reorientation this involves, it is instructive to consult older works, such as Gordon Craig’s Europe Since 1914 of 1962, in which the Holocaust merits a few lines.) Even Hilberg, who devoted himself to the study of Holocaust, maintained a certain distance from it by exploring it almost entirely through the lens of the bureaucratic documents left by the perpetrators, and employing a set of conceptual tools and terms that focused on the issue of bureaucratic functioning and motivation. While Hilberg dealt with the Holocaust more explicitly than Stern or Mosse, he too settled on an indirect approach to the subject.

Several other members of this generation should be mentioned. Hans Gatzke, born in 1915, left Germany in 1937 at the age of twenty-two, though he was neither of Jewish origin nor a leftist, and received his higher education in the United States.7 In 1950 he published Germany’s Drive to the West, on the origins of the First World War, in which he put forth what became known as “the Fischer thesis” about a decade before Fritz Fischer did. Three decades later, Gatzke published Germany and the United States: A “Special Relationship”? one of the most useful introductions to modern German history for Americans. Another member of this cohort was Klaus Epstein.8 He did pioneering work on the political history of the Weimar Republic in his 1959 book on Matthias Erzberger and on the history of German conservatism in his seminal book of 1966, The Genesis of German Conservatism. Perhaps his most important role was as mediator between German and American scholarship, both as a visiting professor (from 1955 to 1962 he spent three years as a visiting professor in Germany), and especially as a book reviewer of American works on Germany for German scholarly publications, and of recent German books on German history for American publications. Tragically, Epstein died as the result of a car accident in 1967 at the age of forty. At
Harvard and then at Brown, he taught a number of graduate students who went on to become important scholars of modern Germany. Another member of this generation who has exerted substantial influence on our understanding of twentieth century German history through his books on the Jugendbewegung, on Weimar culture, on fascism, and on the Holocaust is Walter Laqueur. During the 1970s, his writings on “Finlandization” provided an influential paradigm with which to interpret the German present.

From the 1960s onward, a number of scholars of this generation turned their attention to the history of the German Jewry, a subject that until then had been overlooked by German historians of modern Germany. Especially important in this regard was Fritz Stern’s study of Bismarck and Bleichröder and George Mosse’s essays on Jews and German culture. Both men influenced students of German history in the United States, personally and through their writings, to follow up these concerns.

Though not every major American historian of modern Germany in this cohort was an immigrant from central Europe—Gordon Craig comes to mind as a notable exception—most of them were central-European born, and Craig is the exception that proves the rule. In retrospect, the sheer brain-power and historical imagination of those among them who turned to German history is striking. (Peter Gay, although he did not write primarily about German history, should be mentioned in this regard as well.) In some cases, their role as mediators between German and American scholarship was enhanced by an ability to speak and write both German and English with style and verve, a talent that is difficult to acquire for those who move into a new linguistic culture after adolescence.

THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

The picture changes as we move down one age group, to those born between about 1930 and 1940. The most influential American historians of modern Germany of that group were American born and bred. They include:

- Henry Turner, at Yale, whose studies of the funding the Nazi party, culminating in *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* of 1985,
put to rest by the sheer accumulation of evidence the long-held belief that it was German big business that provided the funding for the Nazi party;

- Gerald Feldman, at the University of California at Berkeley, whose studies of the relationship between politics and economics, beginning with the First World War and continuing through the Weimar Republic, and more recently during the National Socialist period, have been path-breaking and influential on both sides of the Atlantic;

- Mack Walker, who taught at Cornell and then Johns Hopkins, whose book, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871*, published in 1971, has been one of the most admired works among German historians in this country, though it has received short shrift in Germany. The book was a remarkable synthesis of social, political and intellectual history that concretizes and ties together many of the great themes in modern German history: the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* and the origins of those concepts, the role of Enlightenment ideas, the state bureaucracy, and the coming of the capitalist market in the destruction of traditional society and the longing for identity which that process created;

- James Sheehan, of Northwestern and then Stanford, whose contribution has come in the form of two major synthetic works, a study of German liberalism in the nineteenth century, and then in 1989, *German History: 1766-1866*, one of the most aesthetically elegant and topically wide-ranging works of synthesis, admired on both sides of the Atlantic.

Compared to these scholars, their slightly younger contemporaries of German origin have been less influential. I am referring to those who were born just before to just after the Second World War, were trained in whole or in part in Germany, and came to North America as adults, including Volker Berghahn, Konrad Jarausch, Michael Kater, and Michael Geyer. Each has made significant contributions to scholarship, often in more than one area of modern German history. However, in none of their cases was there some important interpretive perspective associated with them in particular, a perspective that distinguished their work from that
of other historians and had a broader influence in the United States (at least as far as I can tell).

A highly influential work of historical interpretation that affected debates both in the United States and in West Germany was the book, *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung*, published by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in 1980, and then in an expanded English-language version in 1984, as *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. Blackbourn and Eley called into question the way in which the “Sonderweg” thesis had been formulated, arguing on the one hand that the *Bürgertum* as a class and liberalism as a cultural and political ideal were much more influential in Imperial Germany than advocates of the Sonderweg had let on; and that the failure of the Imperial German regime to become a full parliamentary democracy was very much in keeping with the economic interests of the German bourgeoisie. At the time when the book was published and began to be widely discussed in the United States, neither of the book’s authors, both British, were in the United States. The book’s influence preceded and remained relatively independent of their actual moving to the United States, though both did so in the decade after the book’s publication. Blackbourn has gone on to become one of the major historians of modern Germany of his generation, fleshing out the interpretive framework of his earlier work in a recent synthetic history of modern Germany, *The Long Nineteenth Century*, and focusing attention on the importance of the Catholic minority in Germany politics, both as a force in its own right and as the major object and antagonist of German liberalism.

Having suggested, then, that actual physical migration does not seem to be the determining factor in accounting for intellectual influence, let me turn briefly to some other issues in transatlantic influence.

If actual permanent migration has not been a major factor, what has been important, it seems, is the effect of short-term transatlantic visits by American scholars to Germany and by German scholars to the United States. It was such visits above all that wove a close connection between many German historians of modern Germany and American historians of modern Germany, providing a stimulus for mutual fructification. Take the case of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who spent a year in the United States as an undergraduate and whose interpretation of imperialism in Germany
and the United States bear the marks of William Appleman Williams’ interpretation of American imperialism. Or Jürgen Kocka, who was influenced by and in turn helped to influence the American historians of the corporation around Alfred Chandler at Harvard. Both men were frequent visiting professors at major American universities. David Sabean, to take a more dramatic example, spent seven years at the Max-Planck Institute in Göttingen at a time when other scholars there were engaging in the meticulous reconstruction of eighteenth-century village life; his two books on Neckerhausen may prove seminal in the integration of social, economic, and anthropological modes of historical writing. The German Historical Institute in Washington is too recent a creation for its long-term influence to be felt, but I suspect that it may turn out to be most important in exposing German scholars to their American counterparts (and vice-versa). The new American Academy in Berlin may have a similar influence. The hazard here is the working of what Robert Merton has called “the Matthew Effect in science,” namely that to those that have it shall be given, i.e. if only the most prestigious historians on each side of the Atlantic visit the other country, slowing down the process of broad-gauge cultural exchange.

There is a puzzle that I have not been able to explain to my own satisfaction, the phenomenon of what might be called “asymmetrical influence.” By that I mean American scholars whose influence is greater in Germany than in the United States, or conversely, German historians in Germany whose influence in the United States is well below that of their influence in Germany.

As an example of an American historian of Germany with greater resonance in Germany than in United States, take the case of Gerald Feldman, who has done more than any other historian to illuminate the relationship between politics and economics in twentieth-century Germany. Feldman is the only American historian to have headed up one of the *Grossprojekte* that so distinguish the German historical profession in Germany from its counterpart in the United States, and his most recent works have appeared in German before they are published in English. It is also striking that leading German companies seek out Feldman (and other U.S.-based historians, such as Harold James and Peter Hayes), to write the histories of these corporations in the Third Reich, on the assumption that the historians’ foreign origin enhances
their objectivity and credibility. How can we account for this asymmetrical influence? Economic history is difficult, requires a good deal of specialized knowledge, and is not concerned primarily with language, images, or memory, the sorts of “soft” concerns that are now fashionable (not to say faddish) in the American academy. In Germany, at least for now, there is less of a propensity to believe that language, image and memory is everything. (Perhaps this just an expression of cultural lag—I hope not.)

As an example of asymmetrical influence in the other direction, that is of a German historian with far more influence in Germany than among German historians in the U.S., the most striking case that comes to mind is Thomas Nipperdey (1927-1992). Nipperdey was probably the greatest modern German historian of his generation, not only by virtue of his range, but because he was a decade or two ahead of his colleagues in almost every respect. In the 1950s, he was writing about the importance of Vereine; in the 1960s he introduced anthropological perspectives into the writing of history in a study of memorials and their symbolism; in 1976 he published a famous critique of Wehler’s book on the Kaiserreich in the pages of Geschichte und Gesellschaft, an article which put forth many of the arguments made a few years later by Eley and Blackbourn (though without Eley’s Marxist framework). Then, in the last years of his life, Nipperdey published a three-volume study of Germany from Napoleon through the First World War, a masterpiece integrating political, cultural, religious, social, technological and intellectual history. Yet, except for the first volume, the rest of Nipperdey’s trilogy has not been translated, even though it contains a cogent integration of every element of Wilhelmine society, from the role of Jews to modes of sexuality. Why, one wonders, is Hans-Ulrich Wehler—a fine historian, but surely not a better historian than Nipperdey—so much better known than Nipperdey among American historians of Germany? Perhaps because of Wehler’s penchant for strong and pointed theses, as opposed to Nipperdey’s more generalized and nuanced intelligence. American historians of Germany, it seems, love a strong thesis that they can debate and teach in graduate seminars.

Perhaps asymmetrical reception is linked to another tendency of transatlantic reception, namely the tendency of those on each side to be
in search of what is “hot” on the other, such as the Fischer debate, the “Sonderweg” debate, and (much less important in terms of historiography) the “Historikerstreit;” the Goldhagen-debate, and so on. What is “hot” is often what can be reduced to a single sentence or proposition, and is rarely what is most historiographically significant.

How will the transatlantic movement of historical ideas be affected by the internet? It is, of course, too early to tell, but certain pleasures and pitfalls are evident. Some H-Net lists are broad ranging and include the best and the brightest in their field; others attract the marginal or those in search of a publicistic megaphone. It may be difficult for some users, especially younger scholars without a good sense of the field, to separate the wheat from the chaff. These pleasures and pitfalls are evident in the case of H-Soz- und Kult, a German-based list devoted to German history, which is one of the very best among the H-Net lists. It provides a valuable resource for American scholars of Germany, by allowing them to listen in on German scholarly conversations. However, since Americans present in Germany, they may misjudge the representativity of the conversations they encounter on H-Soz und Kult.

A particularly important role in trans-cultural mediation is played by translations. Here, one of the most influential persons in the profession has been Marion Berghahn, first of Berg Publishers and now of Berghahn Books, who has taken a leading role in the translation of German historical scholarship into English. Given the minimal and declining German language skills of American undergraduate students (and even graduate students), translation may take on an even more important role in the future. American university presses are not very oriented to translations from the German, and in any case the costs of translating books well is high. Another problem influencing the rate of translation is that many German scholars ignore issues of style. Add to this the awkwardness that so often accompanies the process of translation, and one has a recipe for unreadable translations, which damage the market for further translations.

German institutions concerned to further the study of German history in the United States might therefore consider the subsidization of translations. They ought also to promote transatlantic visiting professorships, for research and for teaching. Yet this too is becoming more problematic than it was a generation or two ago. Given the rise of
American Views on German History Since 1945

dual-career families, it has become more difficult for many scholars to travel abroad for a year, since it means that the non-academic spouse must leave his or her job for a year. This problem may resolve itself as American historians of Germany or German historians in Germany decide to pursue unmarried lives. I hope some other solution will be found.

ENDNOTES

1. This is a slightly revised version of a talk given at the AICGS Workshop, “Whose Brain Drain? Immigrant Scholars and American Views on Germany,” on March 24, 2000. In preparing the piece for publication, I have maintained its conversational style. I apologize in advance for the many fine historians and works of history that I have failed to mention, some because of limitations of space, others because of the limits of my knowledge. Readers should be forewarned that judgments of influence and significance are inevitably somewhat impressionistic.


GERMANS AND AMERICANS IN AMERICAN GERMAN STUDIES

Stephen M. Brockmann

Over the course of the last two decades, Germanists in the United States have carried out extensive discussions about the history, present constitution, and future possibilities of their profession. Among the most important aspects addressed in these debates have been problems relating to pedagogy, research focus, and the sociology of American German Studies. A fundamental underlying trend in German Studies during this period has been Americanization, defined as the attempt on the part of primarily American-born Germanists in the United States to create a uniquely American approach to their field of inquiry, one that would enable them to respond to and interact meaningfully with their immediate academic and social surroundings. Implicit—and often explicit—in this Americanization of the profession has been a critique of a previous approach perceived as fixated exclusively on Germany and German culture not only as its object of study but also as its target audience, to the detriment of dialogue with and even viability in its English-speaking American environment. In the view of some proponents of Americanization, Germanistik in the United States has, for many decades, suffered from an insularity and parochialism that have prevented conversation not only with scholars in other fields such as English, French, and Spanish but also with the very undergraduate students upon whose eagerness to explore the German world the economic and institutional survival of German Studies in the United States depends. Aggravating the perceived Germanocentrism of the profession in the United States, some argue, has been the domination of the field by German-born Germanisten, all too many of whom have tended to view the United States as a kind of academic hinterland and themselves as benevolent missionaries bringing to deprived natives the sorely lacking gifts and insight of the German Kulturnation.

In the explicitness of its nativism, this particular critique of previous German Studies and its purportedly Germanophile practitioners is relatively rare. However, it does characterize—to give perhaps the most important example—the much-discussed book Remarks on the Needed
Reform of German Studies in the United States, a virtual call to arms for American Germanists published in 1993 by John Van Cleve and A. Leslie Willson. Van Cleve and Willson argue that “any dispassionate analysis” of downward enrollment trends in German courses at American colleges and universities since the 1960s “will support the contention that the field of American Germanics as we have known it is headed for oblivion,” partially because scholars in the United States have failed to reflect on the positioning of their field within the American academy.¹ For economic reasons, Robert Holub of the University of California at Berkeley has called on American German departments to cease hiring German-trained academics and to refrain from aggressive recruitment of graduate students from Germany.² However the critique of Germanocentrism in American German Studies is by no means uniquely a product of the 1990s. In the 1980s Victor Lange had already complained that “American scholarship in German seems largely directed... at an audience of German Germanistik,” and that the profession was filled with “German natives,” characterized by “ignorance of, or indifference to ... the convictions and mores of American society.”³ In 1977, Jeffrey L. Sammons had already remarked upon what he called the postwar “Germanization of American Germanistik,” noting that mediation between American Germanistik and the other humanistic disciplines was not particularly successful in American academia. Indeed, Sammons suggested, one could almost get the impression that “American Germanistik is becoming a branch office of the German university and finds itself in America only by coincidence.”⁴

Beyond Van Cleve’s and Willson’s explicit attack on what they see as an all-too-German American Germanistik, much of contemporary American German Studies has self-consciously defined itself as a critique of both traditional Germanistik and of German national identity itself. As Peter Uwe Hohendahl accurately noted in a commentary on the contributions to one of the most important markers in the development of “Germanistik as German Studies,” the spring 1989 issue of German Quarterly devoted to interdisciplinarity, “the implicit or explicit point of departure” for the new approaches “is a polemical description of Germanistik’s shortcomings, gaps, blind spots, and fixations. The critique of the traditional model of Germanistik serves as a springboard for the discussion of the new paradigm(s).” With respect to the plurality of the
new approaches, Hohendahl suggested in 1989 that their “only common denominator” was a “shared opposition to traditional Germanistik.”5 Not yet articulated in this analysis—perhaps because it was so self-evident—was the underlying association on the one hand between “traditional Germanistik” and its German-born practitioners and on the other hand between the “shared opposition” and a specifically non-German or even American viewpoint: the self-reflexive positioning of many American-born German Studies scholars in the United States as outsiders to German culture. The growing tendency in the 1980s and 1990s on the part of Germanists in the United States to distance themselves explicitly from German identity was perhaps most forcefully proclaimed by Sander L. Gilman, who, in 1989, declared, “I must consciously situate myself as an outsider to the German situation,” and then, even more strongly: “I am not neutral, I am not distanced, for serving as an outsider does not mean to be cool and clinical, it must mean to burn with those fires that define you as the outsider.”6 Although in less forceful language, Jeffrey M. Peck was making a similar point when he argued, also in 1989, that “Rather than trying to become German and to identify with either the native Germans or the native Germanisten ... the Auslandsgermanist/in should preserve that distinction characterized as alienation or strangeness, both from Germany and from his/her own national identity.”7

Much of the critique of traditional Germanistik has proved productive for American German Studies. Because of its greater flexibility and porousness, American German Studies has been relatively more welcoming than German Germanistik to feminist methods and interests, the study of ethnic and social minorities in Germany, film studies, and other contemporary approaches. Frank Trommler has aptly noted that the “American Germanists have been more flexible in opening themselves up on the one hand to poststructuralist approaches and on the other hand to interdisciplinary praxis.”8 Indeed, the very concept of German Studies as an interdisciplinary project involving literary scholars in dialogue with historians, political scientists, art historians, and film scholars—institutionally centered around the German Studies Association, itself a product of the last quarter of the twentieth century—differs fundamentally from concepts of Germanistik as practiced in Germany. However, such a view of German Studies is by no means uniquely American. It is possible
that Keith Bullivant was correct when he suggested, in a 1994 contribution to the ongoing debate in the United States, that American Germanists are in fact becoming more like their counterparts in other non-German-speaking countries, such as Great Britain, with their fundamental mission “of mediating German culture” to their respective publics, “in the first instance our students.” Bullivant’s comments suggest that in becoming more American, American German Studies may, paradoxically, also become more international.

As useful and productive as many of the developments in American German Studies over the last two decades have been, however, they and the critiques of a polemically constructed status quo ante on which they are frequently based do run the risk of diminishing or even defaming the contributions of German-born Germanists in the United States and of simplifying the picture of Germanistik as practiced in Germany itself. Peter Uwe Hohendahl was, I think, fundamentally right when he noted in 1994 that the simplistic opposition between American and German in contemporary U.S. German Studies interprets as fundamental and unchanging categories of identity that are in fact complex, contested, and negotiated. In Hohendahl’s view, nativist critics of traditional Germanistik “frequently posit American culture as an unquestioned standard for the study of German culture and literature in the same way traditional German Germanistik has posited German culture as the only viable standard.” Ultimately, then, for Hohendahl, “the problem of American nativism is ... that it mirrors German nativism.”

Hohendahl’s words are important precisely for an American German Studies that perceives itself as critical or even skeptical of essentialist categories of national identity. It would indeed be absurd for a supposedly uncritical previous Germanistik that posited essentialist categories of German national identity to be replaced by an American German Studies positing essentialist categories of American identity. However, it is also important to note that even prior to the 1980s Germanistik as practiced in the United States by scholars born in Germany was not always based on stable, let alone essentialist categories of national identity. The history of German emigration to the United States, particularly in the twentieth century, suggests that any absolute definition of German identity in an emigrant context is fundamentally problematic. No matter what their
personal histories or reasons for leaving Germany, German-born academics living and teaching in the United States have for the most part not, in the eyes of their colleagues in Germany, been simply or unproblematically German. This was particularly true for German Jews and other ethnic and political exiles during the years of the Third Reich. Even today German-born scholars working in the United States are not necessarily perceived in Germany as Germans.

**THE IMPACT OF EXILES FROM NAZI GERMANY**

During the 1930s and later, the contributions of German exiles from the Nazi dictatorship enriched every field of scholarly and scientific endeavor in the United States. Himself a refugee of the Nazi period, the historian Peter Gay is probably right when he calls the German exiles of the 1930s “the greatest collection of transplanted intellect, talent, and scholarship the world has ever seen.”¹¹ Taking just one measure of intellectual excellence, Gay’s colleague Henry Ashby Turner has pointed out that prior to its enrichment via the German emigration from the Nazi dictatorship the United States won a relatively modest seven percent of Nobel prizes in chemistry and physics. After the immigration to America of German exiles and the end of World War Two, the United States won half of the Nobel prizes awarded in those fields.¹² It is hard to imagine postwar American cultural life without the contributions of filmmakers like Billy Wilder, Douglas Sirk, and Fred Zinnemann, architects like Walter Gropius, or musicians like Kurt Weill and Bruno Walter. Science in the United States and elsewhere would have also been fundamentally poorer without the work of Albert Einstein and many others.

The United States benefited from the same enrichment in humanities scholarship, including, of course, the field of German Studies itself. It should never be forgotten that German literary and scholarly exiles from Nazi Germany brought with them a fundamentally more humane and cosmopolitan understanding of German identity than their institutional opponents inside the Third Reich. The category of “Germanness” was precisely one of the issues at stake between emigrants and Nazi cultural officials from 1933 to 1945, as well as between some
emigrants and non-emigrants in the immediate aftermath of the war. Egon Schwarz has suggested that what André Malraux once said about Thomas Mann is also, if in a less exalted way, true of German-born *Germanisten* and other humanists who left Germany during the Nazi dictatorship: “During the passage through the darkness of the National Socialist tunnel they preserved the value and honor of German culture.” Such emigrants frequently saw themselves—like Thomas Mann’s children Erika and Klaus Mann—as representatives of an “other,” better Germany that was more real and more durable than Hitler’s Third Reich. Important emigrant figures in humanities scholarship included Erich Auerbach, whose magnum opus *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* was completed while Auerbach was in Turkey in the early 1940s; the philosopher Ernst Bloch, who worked on his *Prinzip Hoffnung* in the United States during the same period; the theologian Paul Tillich, who came to the United States in 1933, and worked at Union Theological Seminary in New York City; the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, who spent the last years of his life in the United States in the first half of the 1940s; the art historian Erwin Panofsky, who had already joined the faculty at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study in the middle of the 1930s; and the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose interpretations of totalitarianism were to prove immensely influential in the postwar period. Important emigrant figures in *Germanistik* and *Komparatistik* included Leo Spitzer and Richard Alewyn.

Over time, the work of emigrants and so-called “remigrants” (former emigrants who returned to Germany after the end of World War Two, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno) helped to change the face of the humanities in Germany. To take simply two examples, Richard Alewyn’s controversial 1949 argument that the years of the Third Reich had fundamentally altered the relationship of the Germans to their cultural heritage—that “between us and Weimar lies Buchenwald”—has had an important impact on the way in which scholars in Germany view their own cultural traditions. A comparison between the Goethe celebrations of 1999 and the Goethe celebrations of 1949 would show that, over the course of the last half century, Alewyn’s then relatively marginal arguments have helped to alter the perspective of a German *Germanistik* that is now far more critical of its own cultural traditions than it used to
be. Also in 1949 Leo Spitzer criticized what he perceived as Germans’ misuse of Goethe in the creation of “the collective We, which suggests a kind of national mobilization.” Spitzer argued that what was going on in Germany during the year of the Goethe anniversary were “combat engagements in the service of national prestige,” and that Germans were working “on the erection of unavoidable, eternal marble statues or Lenin masks.” Of course, the more critical approach to German traditions that emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century is not solely the work of emigrants from Germany during the Third Reich. On the contrary, non-emigrant Germans, such as the philosopher Karl Jaspers, as well as a subsequent second wave of German-born emigrants to the United States also played an important role in Germans’ postwar reexamination of their cultural heritage. As Frank Trommler has argued, emigrant Germanists’ most important influence on German Studies in the middle of the twentieth century may well, in fact, have lain not so much in a critical reexamination of German cultural traditions but rather in a specific New Critical approach to textual interpretation. The emigrants’ preference for such approaches could be conceived as a reaction to the extreme politicization of German scholarship in Germanistik during the years of the Third Reich. However, both Alewyn’s and Spitzer’s critical interventions in German discussions about the literary tradition during the late 1940s show that the two scholars, as respected representatives of emigrant Germanistik and Komparatistik, were well aware of the historically and politically embedded literary traditions in Germany. There can be little doubt that the arguments of Alewyn, Spitzer, and others have contributed to a more skeptical view of the German cultural heritage not only in the United States but also in Germany itself.

POSTWAR IMMIGRANT SCHOLARS

Alewyn, Spitzer, and the other emigrants from the Third Reich were followed in the 1950s and 1960s by another significant wave of German-born scholars who have had a profound impact on the profession in the second half of the twentieth century. As Schwarz and others have suggested, the second wave of emigration has had a positive and liberalizing effect on German Studies not only in the United States but
also in Germany. Whereas many members of the first wave of emigration to the United States had left Germany primarily for political reasons and/or because of racial persecution, the second wave consisted largely of young Germans who came to the United States for professional reasons. If the first generation of emigrants had developed and perfected close textual analysis, the second generation excelled in historical and political examinations, connecting literature to the many discourses that went unexamined by the previous approaches. Whereas the first generation had tended to uphold idealistic conceptions of a German Kulturnation in their opposition to Nazi notions of ethnic identity, many members of the second generation rejected idealist notions of literature, seeking to show how the German Kulturnation itself had been a central part of the ideology of the German Staatsnation. This second generation often perceived itself as debunking idealistic cultural prejudices and opening literary criticism up to historical and political examination. Given the large numbers of scholars involved in this wave of emigration, it would be pointless here to try to list all of the relevant names. However, among the most prominent members of this second scholarly wave of emigration are Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Frank Trommler, Paul Michael Lützeler, Anton Kaes, Hinrich Seeba, Siegfried Mews, Wulf Koepke, Reinhold Grimm, and Jost Hermand.

Hermand, who was my dissertation advisor, played a major role in the ongoing post-1945 scholarly emigration to the United States, helping to make Madison, Wisconsin, into a kind of Athens-on-the-Mendota for a critical, socially engaged German Studies program. As Trommler has noted, the strategies developed by Hermand and others for opening up the field of German Studies gave many critical young American scholars, particularly during the 1970s, “a new justification for concerning themselves with German literature.”19 Hermand’s work at the University of Wisconsin shows the impact that members of this second emigrant wave had in both Germany and the United States. Hermand’s notion of “synthetic” interpretation programmatically opened the study of literature to interconnections with many other cultural-political discourses that had been largely excluded in the textual-analytical approaches of the earlier emigrant generation. Like other members of his generation, Hermand insisted on the contemporary relevance of German literature. In practice,
this meant two things: 1) Hermand helped to pioneer the study of contemporary German literature, sponsoring major international symposia on, for instance, *Exil und innere Emigration* in 1971, *Fascism and the Avant-Garde* in 1979, and ecological thinking in German literature and culture in 1980 and 1987. At the same time, Hermand was also producing major monographs on postwar German literature and culture, including *Kultur im Wiederaufbau* (1986) and *Die Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (1988), as well as supervising the dissertations of more than fifty scholars, some of whom became pioneers in connecting American German Studies to the emerging fields of feminist criticism, gay studies, disability studies, African-American Studies, and ecological criticism.

2) Hermand sought to make the study even of traditional or received culture more relevant to contemporary cultural politics, writing monographs on Heine (1975) and the Weimar Republic (with Frank Trommler, 1978), as well as sponsoring symposia on *Die sogenannten zwanziger Jahre* (1969) and *Die Klassik-Legende* (1970), just to name a few. In all cases Hermand sought to show the contemporary relevance of the study of prewar and even classical German culture, making unexpected and frequently provocative connections between the cultural past and the political present. In the late 1960s and 1970s, in the context of a literary criticism still largely dominated by close textual analysis and the New Criticism in both Germany and the United States, such critical practices were both pioneering and provocative.

In Madison, these efforts by Hermand and other German-born scholars existed in a fruitful tension with the critical Americanization propounded by David Bathrick and the other founding editors of the *New German Critique*, a journal that continues to be one of the primary vehicles for the Americanization of German Studies. Bathrick’s departure from Madison in the late 1980s suggested that by this time the project of Americanization promoted by the *New German Critique* could no longer cohabit successfully with the German-oriented liberalization of the field as developed by Hermand and others. An American-oriented approach and a German-oriented approach had apparently become incompatible. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that for almost two decades these trends existed side-by-side, in a productive albeit not always peaceful tension.
THE AMERICANIZATION OF GERMAN STUDIES

Just as the scholarly work of Hermand and others was a response to the perceived failings of the scholars who had preceded them, so too was the Americanization that began in the 1980s a response on the part mostly of American-born academics to what they saw as the parochialism of a Germanocentric approach to German Studies in the United States. By the 1980s, most Germanists teaching at institutions of higher learning in the United States—many of them had themselves completed their dissertations with the members of that second wave of German-born emigrants—were in small, relatively isolated departments. Ongoing declines in undergraduate enrollments in German language and literature contributed to a widespread sense of crisis and to the feeling that something needed to be done to stop the downturn. This sense of crisis led to a renewed focus on the relevance of German Studies, now not so much from the German perspective as from the perspective of the United States. The formation and growth of the German Studies Association in the 1980s and 1990s was a response to this trend, as Germanists in the United States sought to overcome their relative isolation by developing a common sense of professional identity and purpose. Thanks to the German Studies Association, American Germanists could become active members of a community of scholars that included not only practicing Germanists at other universities and colleges throughout the United States but also historians, political scientists, art historians, and musicologists. As Frank Trommler has suggested, the German Studies approach to Germanistik “helps in rethinking the discipline as a project in which all members and participants bear joint responsibility for pedagogical effectiveness and scholarly rigor.” At the same time the older Modern Language Association has continued to offer American Germanists a chance to experience community with literary scholars of other linguistic and cultural communities, especially with scholars in American English departments. Given the structure of most American universities and colleges, such interdisciplinary connections are crucial particularly for the intramural networking of American German scholars seeking to strengthen the profile of the humanities generally and literary studies
specifically at their own institutions; while the GSA provides a sense of broader extramural community.

It would be a misperception, however, to conceive of the ongoing Americanization of German Studies in the United States as solely the work of American-born Germanists in opposition to their German-born colleagues or to Germans in general. In fact, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has been one of the primary supporters of the Americanization of the profession, helping to sponsor (through the DAAD or the German Academic Exchange Service) two crucial conferences on German Studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as encouraging, in a great many ways, ongoing dialogue among Germanists in the United States about the future of their discipline. Likewise, the German government has been one of the major supporters of the German Studies Association, and it has helped to set up four Centers of Excellence at selected American universities—two on the east coast, one on the west coast, and one shared by two midwestern universities—in order to encourage the dynamism of the discipline and the training of young German Studies scholars. While the budgetary problems of the German government have unfortunately led to the closing of some American Goethe Institutes in recent years, it appears that the German government’s support for some of the institutions crucial to the Americanization of the profession continues to be strong.

For these and many other reasons, it would be incorrect to view the Americanization of German Studies as a battle between German-born and American-born scholars for institutional turf and prestige. In addition to national origin, personal inclination plays an important role, since there are German-born scholars who support and contribute to the ongoing Americanization, while there are also American-born scholars whose primary intellectual frame of reference continues to be Germany. Furthermore, generational factors also play a crucial role: younger Germanists entering the profession at a time of economic and institutional crisis have generally been quicker to grasp the necessity for change than their older colleagues.

Although nativists such as Van Cleeve and Willson consciously seek to break out of what they see as the insularity of traditional Germanistik, they themselves have perhaps unwittingly helped to promote such
insularity by viewing the crisis in contemporary German Studies in isolation from larger academic developments in the humanities and larger political developments in the world. To start with the latter, the United States in the contemporary world can hardly be defined as a colonial outpost. Militarily, economically, and also culturally, it is the most powerful nation in the world, and even the American-born practitioners of a relatively small academic discipline such as German Studies should never forget that their status as self-defined or even other-defined Americans vests them with considerable discursive power. For Germans in Germany it is anything but a matter of no importance how they are defined and perceived in the world’s most powerful, most influential, and richest nation. From the perspective of an African nation, Germany is rich, powerful, and dominant; but from the German perspective it is the United States that is vested with genuine power in the world. Nativist American Germanists seeking to change the profession run the risk of appearing as intolerant imperialists if they are unaware of these power relationships.

Furthermore, anyone examining the contemporary status of German Studies in the American academy needs to take into account the situation of the humanities as a whole. The German Studies profession is in no way isolated from the larger trends in the academy, and it will rise or fall with the other humanities, including the other modern languages, history, philosophy, and even the classics. It is this sense of larger community and purpose that institutions like the German Studies Association and the Modern Language Association help to promote. If universities and the American public decide that interpretation, reflection, and disputation are unimportant in the contemporary world, then no amount of nativist revolt in American German Studies will save the profession.

One further problem with any bipolar opposition between Germans and Americans in American German Studies is that it leaves unaddressed at least two important categories of Germanists operating in the United States: 1) Austrian- and Swiss-born Germanists; and 2) Germanists working in the United States who were born neither in a German-speaking country nor in the United States. The picture becomes even more complicated if one begins to differentiate among American Germanists, distinguishing, for instance, Jewish and non-Jewish, male and female,
black and white, etc. Carried to an absurd extreme, such identity distinctions could make it virtually impossible to speak about the kinds of broader trends and questions of national identity at issue here. It would be possible to conceive of sets of identity categories so specific and exclusive that every Germanist operating at an American university would be in his or her own unique subset.

On balance, the Americanization of German Studies over the past two decades has been an overwhelmingly positive and constructive force both intellectually and institutionally. As complex and contested as the German-born emigrants’ conceptions of Germanness may have been during and after World War II, many emigrants have nevertheless continued to orient themselves primarily toward such conceptions, rather than toward a cross-cultural or even primarily American mode. Like a German-born academic exile to the United States described in Wolfgang Koeppen’s novel *Tauben im Gras* [Pigeons on the Grass, 1951], some of these academics may have helped create an anti-Nazi “other Germany,” but they do not always like America or want to participate in its discourses. To use Alewyn’s turn of phrase once again, many emigrants may have recognized that “between us and Weimar lies Buchenwald,” but they have frequently failed to take into consideration the obvious fact that between us and any place in Germany, whether Weimar or Buchenwald, lies the Atlantic Ocean. It is this crucial distinction that contemporary trends in American German Studies have sought to incorporate.

In general, the destabilization of categories of national identity and the focus on American academic and other audiences as the primary target for German Studies work in the United States has helped to enrich the field, bringing it perhaps more in line with patterns in other fields in which scholarly emigration from Germany to the United States has played an important role. When German-born economists and computer scientists come to the U.S., for instance, they do so not in order to communicate primarily with scholarly audiences in Germany, but in order to communicate to a global intellectual world in which the United States and its academy are perceived to be fundamentally dominant. They are moving, as it were, from the periphery to the center. German-born scholars of German literature have tended to be an understandable exception to
this trend, perceiving themselves for the most part as moving from the center to the periphery. If American German Studies is now aiming primarily at an American-defined audience and publishing in the English language, then it is in fact following the dominant trend in other scholarly fields, in which the English language and an American-defined international audience have long since become standard. The extent to which this is the case became particularly clear to me during a research visit to Germany in 1999 courtesy of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, when I came into contact with scholars and scientists in many different fields from all over the world. Many of them could barely speak German; and some showed little desire to learn. As an American-born Germanist, I sometimes became the primary linguistic and cultural interpreter between the international scientists and scholars and our German hosts. If David Bathrick had, in the 1970s, defined American-born Germanists as existing in a state of dual exile in the United States, I was, at the end of the 1990s, existing in Germany in a state of double at-homeness. From the perspective of the native Germans I was a privileged American able to communicate freely with the international scholarly community; and from the perspective of the international scholars and scientists, I was privileged in my ability to communicate with the native Germans. In this context, I may have been playing a mediating, service-oriented role, but that role was hardly peripheral.

In spite of the intellectual, institutional, and economic factors that favor a continuation of the Americanization of German Studies in the United States, the German-born scholar Christian Rogowski is probably right when he argues that “a certain presence of natives of German-speaking countries ... is essential for the health of the field,” and that “native speakers still have something unique and useful to offer,” even if most of today’s German-born scholarly emigrants to the United States are, as Rogowski acknowledges himself to be, economic and not political migrants. American students who elect to study the German language and German culture do so, fundamentally, not just because they are seeking future professional advantage but also because they want to explore a culture and way of thinking that is different from their own. Hence any purported identity between American-born pedagogues and their students can surely be just as problematic as it may be promising. In the study of
difference and the analysis of identity the place of one’s birth is surely not the most important factor; nor is the place of birth crucially important in one’s ability to mediate such analyses to American students. I distinctly remember a conference in East Lansing, Michigan, almost a decade ago at which a successful African-American German teacher from an inner-city Detroit school explained that one of ways she taught her African-American students about German identity was to have them put on Lederhosen and celebrate American stereotypes of the German. I remember many of the German participants at that conference cringing when they heard about this teaching method. The African-American teacher was beginning with inner-city American students’ actual stereotypes about German identity, no matter how wrong-headed and outdated such stereotypes may have been. She was seeking mentally to meet students exactly where she thought they were; the German-born participants would probably have preferred a more complex and negotiated analysis of the precariousness and problematic construction of German national identity as they perceived it. Neither approach, I think, should be rejected out of hand in an inner-city Detroit school or anywhere else in the United States. Both contain important aspects of what a successful pedagogue would do: acknowledge the fact of students’ actual mentality, no matter how deficient such a mentality might be deemed to be or how difficult it is even for American-born teachers to gain access to that mentality; but also seek to transform stereotypes into more complex understandings of identity and difference. This example demonstrates that concepts of identity are by no means based exclusively on the place of one’s birth, and that teachers born in Germany are sometimes far more willing to question notions of German national identity than their American colleagues. This is a project on which we can all fruitfully work together.

Finally, we should always be cautious about arguments for Americanization that are based purely on pragmatism and mainstreaming. Like all educators, we need to be aware that there is and should always be a tension between our efforts to train students to function successfully in contemporary society and our efforts to give students the tools to criticize and stand outside that society, at least theoretically. It may well be that “mainstream” society—no matter how we define that problematic
term—precisely needs what are perceived as educational and cultural backwaters like the humanities in general and German Studies specifically as a measure and a critique of its own otherwise unquestioned “progress.” If we abandon our outsider status and seek complete integration into what we view as an American mainstream, we may, paradoxically, be betraying our students even as we seek to give them what we think they want.

ENDNOTES


MIGRATION OF YOUNG GERMAN SCHOLARS TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR GERMAN UNIVERSITIES
Britta Baron

Facts and figures in regard to the current mobility of young German researchers and scholars targeted on the United States are surprisingly difficult to establish. While this issue has become increasingly relevant in Germany, there is very little comprehensive information available as to the numbers of immigrant scholars, their distribution by subject area, motives for mobility, duration of stay, staying-on–rates, etc. In the past few years, policymakers and experts in Germany have focused on “the international attractiveness of German universities and research institutes” in terms of the numbers of foreign students and scholars coming to Germany. Relatively little effort, however, has gone into assessing the international attractiveness of German higher education and research to young Germans. If it is true that university education and research activities are undertaken in a more and more global environment, it stands to reason that movement to the outside can be understood as much as an indicator for perceived quality and standards of a given national environment as the flow of incoming students and scholars.

The picture of the mobility of young German scholars aimed at the United States offers a fair degree of conflicting, maybe even contradictory findings: Fear of falling behind in international scientific developments goes hand in hand with the growing concern about the loss of young German talent to the “big brother” on the other side of the Atlantic. Government initiatives to strengthen international experience in young German scholars are being discussed in the same government departments that are also analyzing the need to cap the presence of young German academics in the United States. With a multitude of conflicting publicly sponsored programs in this area there is no coherent political strategy. Academic mobility to the United States might be linked to complex and largely unresolved problems in German academia altogether, maybe even more generally in German society at large.

Three aspects of the current German experience of international academic mobility will be investigated more closely in this paper: a) the
debate about a perceived brain drain to the United States, b) assisted mobility of scholars and students to the United States and c) Schröders’ red-green card initiative. These three facets reveal some of the problems and controversies which German academia is faced with as it is tries to come to terms with the implications of globalization for German universities and research institutions.

IS THERE A “BRAIN DRAIN” FROM GERMANY TO THE UNITED STATES?

In an article published in Science last August, Sharon G. Levin and Paula E. Stephan report findings of their study in the role of foreign-born researchers and scholars in American universities and research institutes.¹ The authors discovered that foreign-born scholars and researchers were not only strongly represented in American academic life, but that they also formed a particularly large share of the most productive and successful scholars. Taking into account citation indexes of highly cited patents, membership in learned societies and founder/chairs of biotechnology companies, Sharon Levin of the University of Missouri and Paula Stephan of Georgia State University found that “although there is some variation by discipline, individuals making exceptional contributions to S & E in the United States are disproportionately drawn from the foreign born. Individuals making exceptional contributions are also disproportionately foreign educated, both at the undergraduate and the graduate level.” They conclude that “the United States has benefited from the inflow of foreign-born talent and that this talent was more likely to have been educated abroad than one would have predicted given the incidence of foreign-born scientists and engineers in the population,” and they state that thus, the “United States has benefited from the educational investment made by other countries, presumably to their own detriment.”²

In Germany this article caused considerable irritation and concern among government officials and experts in the field. It was the publication of another article in The Economist that summarized the same findings published by Science and stirred German sensitivities. In the analysis of The Economist the high quality brain drain to the United States was
primarily fed by two countries: Germany and the United Kingdom, more recently joined by China and India. According to *The Economist*, “The main victims … are Germany and Britain.” Indeed, some circles in Germany feel victimized by this development.

An unpublished study preparatory to a larger project, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Science, established the following data: According to the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), approximately 70,000 German-born residents in 1998 had immigrated to the U.S. at an age of twenty-three or over and hold at least a Master’s degree. About 10,000 of the German-born residents came to the United States between 1990 and 1998 and thereby potentially qualified as “young scholars.” More than 50 percent of this group had qualifications in the natural sciences, mathematics, engineering, medicine or computer sciences. The study concludes that approximately 6,000 young German scholars and researchers had moved to the United States in the period mentioned, i.e. 1990-1998. Based on NSF data, the study gives a figure of between 1,500 and 2,500 for the number of German post-doctoral students currently working in the United States.

“Open Doors,” the statistical review produced by the IIE, for 1998/99 reports a figure of 5,161 German scholars in the United States, which is by far the largest group among Europeans in the U.S. (ahead of the Britain with 3,154 scholars and France with 3,015 scholars). According to the IIE report, Germany maintained the third largest group overall of scholars in the U.S., after China (11,854 scholars) and Japan, a rather close figure to that of Germany with 5,572 scholars. German scholars are primarily attracted to the high-tech centers of Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco/Silicon Valley. Health Sciences, Physical Sciences, Life and Biological Sciences and Engineering account for two thirds of their disciplines. Most of the German scholars in the United States work exclusively in research and live here on J or H-visas; and the above-mentioned unpublished study thus concludes that it is likely that relatively few German scholars are regular faculty members of American institutions.

In an article published in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Carola Hanisch, while acknowledging the lack of any comprehensive data, sees clear evidence of an “Export der hellen Köpfe” (export of brilliant minds) to
Migration of Young German Scholars to the United States

Based on a number of interviews with scientists in Germany and the United States, she reports about a very sizable presence of young German scholars particularly at the elite research universities in the United States. The overall number of German academic immigrants in the United States might not yet be of dimensions giving cause for worry, Carola Hanisch argues, but the phenomenon still gives reason for concern. According to Hanisch, the evidence is that the best young German scholars are drawn to the life sciences, bio-sciences and the information technology in the United States. These areas are of particular strategic importance for science and industry.

GERMAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE “EXODUS” OF GERMAN TALENT

Government officials and experts in the various academic and research organizations feel a considerable degree of unease about the rising numbers of young German scholars in the United States. These feelings might well have historic roots and might be linked to the traumatic loss of so many of Germany’s best and brightest to the forced immigration during the Nazi regime. The Ministry of Education and Research has indeed recently been considering the launching of “Rückgewinnungsprogramme,” where individual scholars would be approached with particular offers to attract them back to Germany; such programs bear similarities to the unsuccessful initiatives undertaken by Germany in the early postwar era.

The supposed German “brain drain” to the United States is now being used as an argument for greater efficiency, better flexibility, more openness, and last but not least increased funding for science and research in Germany. It is commonplace to lament the extent to which higher education and research in Germany have resisted for decades any calls for substantial change and comprehensive restructuring. Whereas Germany does not differ very much in that respect from some of the other European Union member states, it is interesting how different national environments are now being spurred into a reform mode by different arguments. If a momentum for change is currently building up in German higher education and research, which is unparalleled in the
previous two or three decades, the assumption of a “brain drain” of Germany’s most talented young scholars has played a relatively decisive role. Thus, for instance, the latest higher education framework law has abolished the Habilitation as a standard requirement for professorial appointments. This long overdue step was not so much induced by a concern for a lack of efficiency of the system as such, but rather by concern about the migration of young German talent moving to places where careers can be built faster and in a more straightforward way. Special programs launched by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft which specifically target talented young researchers, and allow for more independence and better financial conditions, are also meant to prevent the most successful young researchers from “voting with their feet.” The Max-Planck-Gesellschaft has introduced various measures to ensure that the Max-Planck-Institutes will not lose out in the recruitment competition for high achieving young German scientists.

With all the trumpeting about the threat to German universities and German international scientific standing posed by the assumed “brain drain” to the United States, the importance of the phenomenon is not even universally accepted. The Anglistenverband recently argued in a position paper against the supposed attractiveness of American universities and defended German universities which are, in their opinion, not only as efficient as their counterparts in the United States, but also produce scholarship of at least equal quality. The Anglistenverband straightforwardly denies that the American universities are perceived as more attractive than universities in Germany. The “brain drain” to the United States is mostly addressed by those groups, institutions and individuals in Germany who want to make a political case for speedier and more radical reforms of German universities and research institutions. Proponents of a more conservative attitude towards the status quo in German science and higher education policy, on the other hand, rather tend to attribute lesser importance to this issue.

Wherever the “brain drain” is addressed, however, it is associated with the terms of “loss” and “threat.” The presence of a sizable number of young German scholars in the United States is largely seen as a problem, a not so surprising interpretation surely, since immigration is also in other contexts mostly associated with individual trauma and the notion of an
undermining of national pride. Interestingly, however, mobility of young Germans to the United States for purposes of study and research has for many years also been seen as a public good and has been for decades at the receiving end of very substantial sums of taxpayer money and public support.

ASSISTED MOBILITY OF GERMAN STUDENTS, YOUNG RESEARCHERS AND SCHOLARS TO THE UNITED STATES

There is such a multitude of institutions and programs which offer financial assistance to German graduates and young scholars from Germany for study and research in the United States that it would be a research project in its own right to calculate the overall figure of young Germans who move to the U.S. every year with official financial support. Based on the figures of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Alexander-von-Humboldt Stiftung and DAAD, the overall figure can conservatively be estimated at around 2,000 students and scholars.

These programs generally work on the basis of individual awards: students and scholars apply to some central funding agency and are chosen for an award based on their previous academic achievements and the scholarly merits of their project. For most of these programs the principal rationale for funding is a general belief in the merits of broadening horizons and improving the ability of students and scholars to function in an international environment. Organizations like the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft would typically put greater emphasis on the perceived value of a period abroad for improving the research credentials of young German scholars, the argument being that a period abroad would allow a young German Ph.D. student or postdoctoral fellow to benefit from scholarly expertise and / or scientific facilities which he or she would not be able to find in the home environment.

In a few cases, the rationale for funding is primarily directed toward foreign policy or foreign cultural diplomacy goals, as would be the case for instance for young German scholars supported by the German Historical Institute’s or by DAAD’s own German Studies Professorships. Public support for these programs is predicated on the expectation that the active presence of young German scholars in the American academic

[50] AICGS Humanities Volume 9 February 2001
environment would contribute to enhancing the knowledge and understanding of Germany’s history, politics, society and cultures on the part of the future elite in the United States. The DAAD program is an interesting exception insofar as it is one of the very few initiatives where the purpose of the period abroad is not primarily targeted toward research but toward teaching in an American environment.

What many of these programs have in common is a reliance on the individual student or scholar to make best possible use of his or her time in the United States. Very little effort is generally made to direct or monitor the way scholarship holders use their time in the U.S. They typically receive little if any guidance from funding organizations or home universities. Normally their projects are not part of larger research efforts by groups of academic colleagues at their home institutions, or such integration is, at least, not a mandatory requirement for a fellowship award. Assistance with the reintegration into the academic life in Germany is generally not part of the program design.

In general these programs can be characterized as either outright philanthropically motivated, or at least as largely untargeted and not goal-oriented endeavors. The rationale for their existence is very strongly influenced by the German desire, born out of post-1945 and Cold War politics, to be accepted as an international partner and to link up with the world-wide academic community. The United States, for a variety of academic and political reasons, has assumed the role of the most important and most attractive partner.

Germany has also been for decades considerably more generous than other similar industrialized countries when it comes to supporting young foreign academics to spend some time on study or research in Germany. Much in the same vein as the scholarship programs for Germans to study and undertake research abroad, these programs were largely inspired by undirected philanthropic and cultural diplomacy objectives. Human resource requirements and research policy goals have hardly played a role in the support schemes, which in the past fifty years have brought hundreds of thousands of young foreign students and researchers to Germany.
GERMANY JOINING THE “GLOBAL MOBILITY MARKET”

Gerhard Schröder’s “Red-Green Card” initiative has fundamentally changed the policy discourse in Germany about matters of international mobility of young scholars, researchers and technology experts. The Schröder initiative, which has been implemented with surprising speed given the usually long gestation time for any major policy measure in science and educational matters, marks an interesting paradigm shift in Germany’s attitude to the global marketplace for scientific talent. Germany is now actively seeking to position itself on the international playing field of research recruiters in the same way that American universities and research institutes do vis-à-vis young German scholars and researchers. Twenty-thousand highly qualified technology experts from abroad will receive visas for up to five years.

More limited DAAD experience has precluded the red-green card initiative. On a relatively small scale, DAAD started an international recruitment program for university professors some years ago. The program aims at attracting foreign professors to German universities to provide additional input into the teaching of subject areas where there is a lack of qualified German academics and to assist with internationalizing university curricula across the board. Close to three hundred foreign academics have been recruited for temporary appointments to German universities. It was assumed at the outset that the pool of applicants for this program would primarily come from Eastern European academics and scholars and from some of the emerging economies. In fact, as it turned out, the majority of recruits have so far come from the United States.

OUTLOOK

Germany is now beginning to show that it is prepared to act both as a provider and a recruiter of talented and highly qualified human resources. The three facets of mobility as outlined in this paper seemingly reveal contradictory attitudes in Germany to academic migration today: a philanthropic belief in the general good of scholarly exchanges and academic mobility, a reticence if not defensiveness about the supposed
“loss” of young German talent to the United States, and a targeted approach to the opportunities of a more global academic marketplace. In reality, these facets are, of course, themselves interlinked. A certain percentage of the “brain-drainers” are former scholarship holders. The Humboldt-Foundation estimates that twelve percent of their German grant-holders who come to the United States on a Humboldt award will stay on. About every fourth former Humboldt award holder from Germany works outside Germany. The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft assumes that the percentage of non-returnees is even somewhat higher among their grant holders. This is due to the higher percentage of scholars in the fields of life sciences, biological sciences and medicine where there is considerable demand for additional talent from abroad in the American job-market. The “red-green card” initiative aid to the supposed brain drain away from Germany and directed mostly to the United States can also be interpreted as interdependent: as more and more German academics benefit from career opportunities abroad, German science and German industries is increasingly dependent on the import of highly qualified human resources from other parts of the world.

As for future trends, all the indications are that Germany will increasingly take into account the possibilities as well as the requirements inherent in the globalization of research and university studies. In this light, the following changes can be detected, some still in their embryonic stages, some further developed already:

1. Active and positive attitude to scholarly immigration. On a national level, the very substantial mobility to the United States from Germany will have to be taken seriously as a bench-marking exercise for German universities and research institutes. The challenges implied in the attractiveness of American institutions to German academic talent will have to translate into a major reform impulse for German institutions. The “Rückgewinnung,” however, of individual scholars is probably best left to individual German universities and research institutes.

2. Publicly funded scholarship schemes will undergo substantial revision. Changes now under discussion, for instance, comprise a more targeted approach in terms of focusing on particular subjects areas, better interaction between research groups in Germany and
grant-holders in the United States, and more monitoring and liaison work for German scholarship-holders in the United States.

3. German immigrants will be encouraged in more strategic ways to create better networks and liaisons between American and German institutions.

4. German institutions will themselves have to learn how to draw in international academic talent and act with self-confidence and competence in the international recruitment markets.

In the larger context, the perceived “brain drain” from Germany is only part of a trend towards a “globalization” of the human resource markets. Much of Germany will have to pay attention to the implicit criticism of the increasing immigration trends of young German scientists towards the United States. Defensive protectionism will hardly be a viable answer. Germany will have to face the challenges inherent in the growing opportunities for international study and research. As part of this process Germany might also have to accept that it will, on its own, not be able to keep up the competition with the United States across the board of all academic fields. It will increasingly have to rely on pooling its resources with its European partners, but also with universities and research institutes in the United States. As for young researchers from abroad, Germany will have to adapt to multicultural research environments. It will be important not to look at scholars from abroad as mere substitutes for lost or unavailable young German talent. These scholars will need to be understood and respected for their different cultural backgrounds and also valued for the “otherness” of their approaches and methods.

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., 1214.


American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program Series


