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AICGS POLICY REPORT

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

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Global governance and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming increasingly more important as the world grows more connected, less state-based, and more multinational. Issues that once fell under the purview of state sovereignty, including peace and security concerns, are now also influenced by NGOs.

The United States and Germany are two—of many—countries with NGOs active in the realm of international peace and security issues. They operate in different causes and arenas, focus on different regions, are regulated by their varying sizes and bureaucracies and government regulations, and are funded in separate ways, but international NGOs still all strive to create and enforce expectations of global governance. Realizing these expectations can prove challenging, however, as NGOs are confronted with moral and ethical, funding, and accountability dilemmas.

In this Policy Report, two experts on NGOs and global governance issues discuss these challenges. Looking at the number, types, and roles of NGOs in the U.S. and Germany, they also examine NGOs on a global level, addressing NGOs’ roles in agenda-setting, negotiation, monitoring and implementation, and enforcement and noncompliance of global governance policies. NGOs are growing in number, especially after 1990, with greater resources, more challenges, and a more open environment after the end of the Cold War. Thus, there are more advocacy NGOs working to influence policy and shape rules and regulations and more operational NGOs implementing programs and policies, striving at improving services “on the ground.”

Even with the increase in advocacy and operational NGOs, more work can be done to improve their effectiveness, both in terms of their own efforts at agenda-setting, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement, and in terms of their efficiency and usefulness in working with governments to achieve the desired goal. The authors offer recommendations for how to improve NGOs and global governance, including:

- Recognizing that global governance includes governing local issues and, in turn, local efforts can have global repercussions.
- Governments and NGOs themselves need to better understand the numbers, people, budgets, and organizations behind the causes and NGOs.
- NGOs need to clarify their own goals, not limiting themselves to framing an issue as it pertains to international conflict (i.e., “human rights and conflict”).
- NGOs’ roles in security planning in unstable regions of the world need to be considered.
- More research on the effectiveness and sustainability of NGOs is needed in order to fully maximize their potential in the field of peace and security.
This analysis will prove timely and useful for policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic as we navigate the multinational challenges of the twenty-first century.

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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Global governance in the twenty-first century goes well beyond traditional inter-state agreements, treaties, and organizations. The transformations in global governance are not just tied to the changing role of the state, but to the accompanying changes in the roles and institutional structures of other political actors—in particular, non-governmental organizations (NGOs).¹ These actors are directly involved in efforts to resolve problems of conflict and security in ways that would have been unthinkable until recently.

Theories of global governance and international cooperation are only beginning to comprehend the complexity of transnational politics beyond the state, even as the demand for governance rises.² This increased demand comes at a time when confidence in governing institutions is in flux, and trust in non-governmental organizations is high.³ Many people are pressing for action by non-state actors to supplement or replace action by governments—or for those non-state actors to step in independently to supply the public goods that traditional governments are unable or unwilling to supply. At the same time as non-governmental organizations become more prominent actors in the international system, they have also come under greater scrutiny from critics, donors, members, and other stakeholders. Three issues have dominated the debates in the early twenty-first century over NGOs. First, who are they? Second, does their action matter, and do they make a policy difference? And third, are NGOs accountable for their actions and to whom should they be held accountable?

This Policy Report examines the role of NGOs in the international peace and security sector. The first part sets the stage by explaining the increasing numbers and visibility of NGOs. This is followed by a review of the different types of NGOs active in the peace and security field: advocacy and operational NGOs. Next we examine their organizational dynamics and incentives. The second part of this Report examines the role of NGOs in policy and global governance. For this purpose we examine the actions and influence of NGOs in four different stages of global governance: agenda-setting, negotiation, monitoring and implementation, and enforcement. We next examine the power of NGOs and how it relates to their different roles in governance. The third part focuses on the issue that is at the heart of the NGO debate in the early twenty-first century—NGO accountability. The Policy Report concludes by outlining a research agenda for the future.

NGOs are and will continue to be an important element in the governance of peace and security issues. Advocacy organizations have played a particularly significant role in putting new issues on the international agenda and pressing other actors to address them. Operational NGOs can be an important complement to state activities, depending on their effectiveness. The sustainability of these actors, however, is inhibited by their dependence on only a few sources for funding: governments, which may change their policies regarding outsourcing of tasks...
to non-profits; major private funders such as a handful of large foundations; or reliance on often-fickle membership dues and individual donations. NGOs will never have the same capabilities as most states, and will not necessarily be the determining force in settling conflicts or addressing issues of peace and security. They will tend to be most effective, however, when they are accountable to all their stakeholders, as we discuss in more detail in the concluding section of this paper.
WHO ARE THEY?
There is no commonly accepted definition of NGOs. We argue that NGOs must have at least five characteristics. First, an NGO must be an organization, as opposed to being a movement—it needs a headquarters, budget, and officers. Second, it must have a public-interest or value-based focus, which is linked to the third characteristic: the organization must have non-profit status, which distinguishes it from private for-profit organizations. Fourth, the organization must be distinct from government and international inter-governmental organizations. Fifth, an NGO must act within the law, which separates it from criminal organizations or terrorist groups.

The line between NGOs and the networks and movements they support may be difficult to distinguish at times, and the boundaries between non-profit organizations and for-profit ones may not always be clear. Similarly, the non-governmental nature of many NGOs is often just a legal distinction. Indeed, many NGOs have close ties to governments. NGOs working in the development and humanitarian sector often receive large amounts of money from governments, and when working in conflict situations often will depend on governments to provide for their security. Nevertheless, we can generalize about the broad phenomenon of NGOs and their participation in the governance of peace and security affairs.

Increasing Numbers and Visibility of NGOs

The number of NGOs grew steadily in the post-WWII era, but accelerated dramatically in the 1990s. According to Anheier et al, one-quarter of the international NGOs existing in 2001 were created after 1990. Interest groups, activists, and their coalitions at local, national, and transnational levels have become important voices in different aspects of governance—particularly in the humanitarian field. Although there are no good data regarding the number of NGOs, the Human Development Report of the United Nations estimated in 2003 that the number of NGOs active in the development, human rights, and peace and security fields ranged between 37,000 and 50,000. A 2003 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs roster estimated that there were approximately 2,500 NGOs in the humanitarian business and 260 major NGOs engaged in relief efforts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has noted that in the 1960s it had between ten and twenty NGOs partnering in the implementation of its work. By the 1990s this number had risen to several hundred NGOs, and 180 of them have framework agreements with UNHCR allowing them to work as operating partners.

Explanations for the growing number and significance of these NGOs vary. There is broad consensus within the literature that six factors have stood out. First, there are simply more resources available, which stimulated the growth in the number of NGOs. Since the 1970s, humanitarian and relief assistance from the major donors has steadily increased. After 1991 it doubled, with record spending in Africa. Official Development Assistance increased from $72 billion in 1990 to $104 billion in 2006. The amount of
money dedicated to humanitarian assistance increased threefold from $3 billion in 1990 to $9.2 billion in 2006 (see Figures 1 and 2). In this period private giving also increased dramatically, and often was funneled through newly created non-profit organizations. A 2007/08 report on humanitarian assistance estimated that $1.8 billion in such aid consisted of voluntary contributions to NGOs. James Fearon has calculated that in the U.S., monies funneled from the government to humanitarian NGOs rose from $1 billion in the 1990s to $2 billion in 2003. At the same time private donations to humanitarian NGOs increased from $1 billion in 1994 to $4 billion in 2003. This is not unique to the United States. In Germany, government agencies such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) allocates significant funds for cooperative projects with German NGOs.

Second, in the 1980s and 1990s major donors in the U.S. and United Kingdom began experimenting with deregulation and privatization of public services. Governments, along with many intergovernmental organizations, began to channel the increase in resources to the non-profit sector for delivery of a range of projects and programs that would have been performed by the public sector in the past. The Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute estimates that globally, NGOs receive a quarter of their money directly from governments today. In Europe, governments tend to channel between 30-40 percent of their humanitarian funding through NGOs. In 2007 alone, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) contributed almost $50 million to projects of private development and emergency aid providers.

In the U.S., 60 percent of U.S. funds get channeled through NGOs. For example, Care and Save the Children U.S. receive 50 percent of their funding from the U.S. government. For the International Rescue Committee, 75 percent of its funds come from governments. In contrast, Medecins Sans Frontieres receives only 30 percent of its finances from public

Figure 1: Total humanitarian expenditure, 1990-2006 [Source: OECD DAC, Table 1]
In addition, entrepreneurs created many new NGOs in order to meet the increased demand for service provision. Attempts at donor coordination, such as the United Nations Consolidated Appeals for humanitarian assistance, established mechanisms for NGOs to be included in those appeals, thus institutionalizing a role for them.

Third, the number of man-made and natural disasters increased significantly in the years immediately surrounding the end of the Cold War (see Figure 3). Humanitarian crises and civil conflicts focused policy concerns on “state failures” and “fragile states”—phenomena that needed to be countered with peace-building and development projects. After 2001, the concern for weak states became connected to the Global War on Terrorism, which further justified the contribution of more resources to humanitarian, development, and conflict resolution activities. At the same time as there was a significant increase in man-made disasters caused by war and state failure, there was also coincidentally a significant increase in natural disasters. According to Munich Re, a major reinsurer that tracks natural disasters, in the 1960s there were twenty-seven major natural disasters with $76.7 billion in economic losses. In the decade of the 1990s, there were ninety-one major disasters valued at $514 billion. These disasters, including the tsunamis in Asia and earthquake in Pakistan, stimulated a dramatic increase in the donation of more resources toward humanitarian and emergency assistance and development aid. It provided more opportunities for NGOs to become involved, and more need for the kinds of services they provide.

Fourth, the end of the Cold War provided a more permissive environment in which NGOs could become active. During the Cold War, humanitarian assistance was inhibited because of the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War those inhibitions fell away, stimulating calls for the international community to respond quickly and forcefully to humanitarian emergencies. Many advocacy groups and development NGOs took advantage of the new global environment to address peace and security issues that states had been too paralyzed to resolve.
effectively before.

Fifth, the UN global conferences of the 1990s provided new opportunities for NGO involvement in global policymaking. Conferences such as the 1992 Development and Environment Conference in Brazil or the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women conferred legitimacy on the efforts of NGOs and provided a space for their increased visibility and involvement. Technology—in particular, the Internet and cell phones—greatly facilitated the ability of individuals to organize and network internationally, including in the developing world. These global conferences became a focal point for international organizing and activism in the information age.

Finally, in the 1990s, policy and discourse within the previously separate issue areas of security, development, environment, and humanitarianism began to merge in ways that expanded the numbers and reach of international NGOs. The development paradigm in particular expanded to include a range of new policy areas, integrating previously separate policy domains. NGOs that advocated on one issue began to make connections with organizations active in other areas. Organizations that had provided services for one purpose began applying their expertise to a broader range of areas. Scholars, policymakers, and activists began to perceive all these problems as connected along a number of dimensions, which provided a broader arena in which NGOs could participate.

Advocacy and Operational NGOs

NGOs differ widely in terms of focus and reach, both geographically and in terms of the issues they address. Some have broad focus and narrow reach, others have narrow focus but broad reach, and some are either narrow or broad in both. Within the international peace and security field one can distinguish between two main types of NGOs: the advocacy NGO, including those doing education and training; and the operational or service NGO. Their range and focus vary tremendously, but their activities generally fall within these two categories. Certain NGOs will advocate, educate, train, and operate programs, but most NGOs specialize in either advocacy or operational and service activities.

Advocacy NGOs are engaged in policy influence, and do not generally get involved in implementing programs. These are the organizations most commonly referred to in discussions of international
NGO influence because they are the most visible—deliberately so. International advocacy NGOs are "groups of persons or of societies, freely created by private initiatives that pursue an interest in matters that cross national or transcend national borders and are not profit seeking." Organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi, and Saferworld are the modern agenda-setters, as they identify pressing public concerns and publicize them. Many of the peace activist organizations, especially in Germany, are church-based. They campaign on particular issues, targeting other influential actors such as governments, international organizations, and, increasingly, corporations. Their tactics may be confrontational, or they may engage in negotiations and discussions with other public and private actors in order to shape the rules, norms, and regulations addressing issues of concern. It is such advocacy organizations that helped shape the new international focus on human security, and they have been instrumental in broadening the peace and conflict agenda in general. They are often described as “principled” actors, in contrast to more self-interest seeking actors, although we discuss below some ways in which they do not always pursue a values-based agenda.

When we discuss NGOs as organizations with preferences and strategic interests, we often think first of advocacy NGOs. They generally try to establish a more arms-length relationship with states and intergovernmental organizations than other non-profit organizations that contract for services. They are particularly concerned about their reputation, and therefore often are suspicious of close cooperation with states and state-supported organizations. German government efforts to promote civil-military cooperation have been hampered due to the refusal of many German NGOs to compromise their neutrality and impartiality by working with the military, which they fear blurs the boundaries between state and non-state actors. In 2000, an attempt to establish a Coordinating Committee on Humanitarian Aid in Germany as a partnership between the Ministry of Defense and German NGOs failed in large part over the issue of military restraint. Likewise, NGOs are also often reluctant to work too closely with corporations, which are often viewed as opponents of NGO goals.

Advocacy NGOs have been extremely successful, however, in cooperating among themselves. The rise of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and social movement coalitions has been one of the most significant changes in world politics, as we discuss in more detail below. The International Coalition to Ban Landmines and the International Action Network on Small Arms are well-known examples of this. In Germany, the Association for German Development NGOs (VENRO) is a coalition of approximately 100 development organizations, while the Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management brings together about sixty organizations and over 100 individuals. Advocacy NGOs also enter into coalitions to create awareness for general peace-making activities—for example, the Sudan Advocacy Coalition is a coalition of six NGOs set up to advocate international support for the Sudanese peace process.

Advocacy NGOs represent a wide range of political interests and values, from extremely radical leftist organizations to those on the far right. Indeed, in recent years, more conservative NGOs, particularly those based in the U.S., have begun to participate more widely in international debates and negotiations, gaining accreditation at the United Nations and engaging more directly with their opponents. They have taken up the strategies and tactics of the liberal/progressive groups that have dominated the international agenda in recent years. For instance, Clifford Bob has documented the participation of anti-gun control advocates in international discussions of arms control, pointing in particular to the new visibility of the U.S.-based National Rifle Association at UN debates. In Europe, by contrast, the gun control debate is a non-issue.

Educational and training NGOs also can be considered within the category of advocacy NGOs. Many of these organizations are engaged in policy influence, although primarily at the local level. Unlike other advocacy NGOs their main targets are often not the policymakers in the capitals but the citizens and leaders in local councils. They seek to educate and influence citizens and provide them with the necessary tools.
and skill sets, for example, to resolve and mediate specific conflicts within their countries. Both Search for Common Ground and International Alert are good examples of NGOs that focus much of their effort on education and training at the local level.

Operational or service delivery NGOs are those that are directly involved in program or policy implementation. For instance, development or humanitarian NGOs are directly involved in supplying services to needy populations by providing shelter, food, and other basic services. They may also work on capacity-building within a country with the aim of improving public delivery of services.26 In the peace and security issue area, they may provide assistance to civilians affected by war with, for example, food aid or health services; they increasingly participate in post-conflict reconstruction programs; and some engage directly in conflict resolution programs in countries with deep political and ethnic divisions. These operational NGOs often work directly with governments and intergovernmental organizations, as in Germany, where development and humanitarian aid NGOs often work under contract to the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Operational NGOs increasingly function under contract to public agencies.

Operational NGOs differ widely in terms of size and scope. Some are very big and operate virtually everywhere, while others are small and focus on particular countries or groups of people. In the late 1980s and 1990s we have seen the emergence of half a dozen large transnational NGOs which intervene in almost all conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. Organizations such as CARE, Oxfam, World Vision International, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and Catholic Relief Services command resources in amounts that dwarf those of international governmental organizations, as in Germany, where development and humanitarian aid NGOs often work under contract to the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Operational NGOs increasingly function under contract to public agencies.

One of the most notable shifts in the delivery of foreign and humanitarian aid and technical assistance to developing countries in recent years has been outsourcing by governments to non-profits as part of the “new public management” that has become popular.28 The delivery of public services through these private non-profits may have many benefits in terms of the expertise, contacts, and field-based experience the NGOs can bring to the table. For governments and international organizations, NGOs can provide a trusted channel for resources that in the past would have gone to often corrupt or incompetent governments.

This shift toward delegation of service delivery to the non-profit sector has not occurred without some controversy. Some observers note that the influence of these organizations goes beyond their immediate project-oriented missions and extends to influencing local politics in often unintended ways.29 The competition for contracts from governments and intergovernmental organizations can often set up perverse incentives, as NGOs compete for attention and resources with other non-profits for the same contracts in a sort of popularity contest, in which each must jump on the latest fad or whim of donors.30 This may drive them to act in ways that are detrimental to their stated missions.31

Given the complex contracting that now occurs, it can become hard to distinguish between the work of NGOs and the work of the public sector. For any NGO trying to establish an independent reputation in the international community, a too-close relationship with particular governments may be perceived as compromising their autonomy and integrity. For governments, any criticisms of the NGOs with which they work can rebound negatively onto the government, particularly when those NGOs are accused of corruption, criminality, or sheer incompetence. In order to avoid potential problems, some NGOs, such as Oxfam, do not accept any government money. In general, European NGOs tend to have greater financial independence from governments than American NGOs, but in the German case, the government directly supports German NGOs through the Foreign Office, particularly in areas such as humanitarian aid.32 The latter tend to be more pragmatic and focused on the logistical and technical tasks of delivering services and less attuned to reputational...
concerns.

NGOs as Organizations: Strategies and Incentives

While NGOs are often viewed as principled or values-based actors, to understand them fully we need to examine their internal organizational dynamics and incentives. The choices they make in terms of policies and strategies are driven by some of the same factors that drive every other organization: competition among individuals within the organization and competition with other organizations; differences between the board of directors, top management, and people operating in the field; the need for efficiency versus the imperative to maintain a particular reputation and mission focus. Models of organizational dynamics, often drawn from analysis of business and government, apply equally well to the non-profit sector despite the sometimes common assumption that they are somehow different.

The professionalization—or corporatization—of humanitarian NGOs was spurred by the increase in the amount of money being funneled through NGOs, and by the growth of their numbers. The demands by funders for financial accountability, particularly after some high-profile financial scandals, plus their tendency to favor short-term projects and immediate results created an extremely competitive market for contracts. NGOs faced an environment in which they had to secure and maintain funding in a results-based market—at the same time as they had to respond to increasing demands for financial accountability.

At a macro-level these donor-driven changes led to the creation of an oligopolistic market dominated by a few large NGOs, including umbrella organizations such as InterAction in the United States and Venro in Germany. At the micro-level it led NGOs to introduce business efficiency models. Mission became the surrogate for profits. Branding and commercial skill became essential for NGO survival and renewal. The NGO may hire professional staff who are not motivated necessarily by a belief in the mission of the organization, but because they can increase the organization’s income, profile, operational capacity, efficiency, while advancing their own careers at the same time. Some people question whether the more professionalized NGOs can retain their public-interest missions while becoming more business-like. Derick Brinkerhoff has argued that “increased transparency and accountability for the use of resources is a desirable corrective to abuse and fraud—which the nonprofit sector is far from immune from—if the demands of funders become too dominant, NGOs risk compromising their programs in order to remain in the good graces of their donors.”

In their analysis of humanitarian NGOs, Alexander Cooley and James Ron also point to the challenge of reconciling material pressures with normative motivations. They believe that this problem can be analyzed through a principal-agent model drawn from the study of industrial organization. The principal-agent framework explores the different incentives facing individuals in different positions within an organization and examines how the lack of complete control by those at the top (the principals) leads to slack behavior on the part of those to whom tasks are delegated (the agents), which can undermine the effective attainment of goals. Cooley and Ron argue that relations between donors, contractors (NGOs), and recipients can best be viewed as a double set of principal-agent problems. NGOs are agents when dealing with donors, but principals when dealing with relief recipients. As agents, they have control over resources and will want to guide projects so that they promote their own goals. Donors often have few means of knowing what exactly is happening on the ground and will frequently renew projects that are ineffective. Similarly, aid recipients may use resources for purposes other than those identified by the NGO, but the latter will be hesitant to report such aid recipient behavior to the donor out of fear that contracts may not be renewed. The need to secure funding easily pushes “other concerns—such as ethics, project efficacy, or self-criticism to the margin." In addition, the presence of multiple NGOs competing for the same pots of money leads organizations to embark on efforts that "seek to undermine competitors, conceal information, and act unilaterally." It also allows aid recipients to play one NGO off against another. The end result is project duplication, waste, incompatible goals, and collective inefficiencies.
In sum, many NGOs suffer from conflicts among their need to pursue a particular mission, maintain fiscal stability, and respond to competition with other NGOs over contracts for work, donor money, members, media attention, reputation, and value attainment. Attempts to reconcile conflicting material and normative goals often lead to failure. These issues play out differently for operational versus advocacy NGOs. The competition for contracts from donors makes these principal-agent problems particularly dire. For advocacy organizations, the “questions of who they represent and speak for, and whether there is a contradiction between taking money from certain funders and their ability to maintain independence and to represent marginalized groups or unpopular positions” are key. They may operate in a competitive “marketplace of ideas,” but because the real material incentives are smaller and the relationship with funders different than that of operational NGOs, the non-profits that engage in advocacy are less likely to face structural obstacles to cooperation among themselves.

Some of the most important works on contemporary NGO strategies focus on cooperation with other NGOs in the formation of transnational activist (advocacy) networks (TANs). In the now-classic work by Keck and Sikkink, they propose a “boomerang” model in which local political blockages push local groups to make connections with sympathetic international NGOs, which then bring pressure to bear on the government from outside the country. Sikkink and Risse later proposed a spiral model in which there are five stages of interaction between international and domestic levels that affect domestic policy change. For instance, an analysis of the German branch of the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) indicated that the interplay between international events in the broad global justice movement, and their coverage by domestic media, stimulated a rapid expansion of the German branch from 400 to 4,000 members over the course of 2001.

Observers have also identified a backlash when transnational activists are perceived to be interfering in local issues, or promoting issues that are not the most important ones for local communities. Transnational activism in the peace and security field first became notable over the issue of banning landmines. The Campaign to Ban Landmines successfully pressed for an international ban on landmines (the Ottawa Treaty), and received a Nobel Prize for its efforts. An even earlier initiative we might cite is the global anti-apartheid movement, which pursued multiple avenues to undermine and overthrow the apartheid regime in South Africa.

The literature on transnational activist networks intersects with research coming out of studies of domestic politics that focus on social movements. Prominent scholars have noted the ways in which social movements have become increasingly internationalized. They have elaborated the models of political opportunity structures and framing of issues that was developed in the study of domestic social movements. Tarrow has developed an extensive model of social movement activism, and connected it to the political opportunity structure at the domestic and transnational levels. He argues that the institutional make-up of the contemporary world can provide openings for local actors to connect with international ones in ways that promote their strategic interests. They take advantage of these openings through a number of mechanisms: global framing, internalization, diffusion, scale shift, externalization, and coalition forming.

Framing an issue in terms that resonate with global norms and values can provide links to international NGOs while at the same time, through internalization, also appealing to a domestic audience.
PART TWO: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NGOS
Governance can be seen as a “social function centered on efforts to steer societies or human groups away from collectively undesirable outcomes [...] and toward socially desirable outcomes.” According to this perspective, governance can be viewed as an outcome of bargaining among all relevant actors—not just states—over the agenda of problems to be resolved, the manner of resolving and managing them, and finally how to ensure compliance with proposed and negotiated solutions. It is a process that is iterated over time, and that occurs within an institutional and social context.

NGOs play roles in each of these related but analytically distinct components of peace and security governance: agenda-setting, the negotiation of agreements and norms, monitoring and implementation, and enforcement. Most attention in the scholarly and policy literature has focused on the roles of NGOs in agenda-setting and implementation—that is, advocacy and the delivery of services. Less attention has been paid to how NGOs contribute to implementation, monitoring, and compliance with programs and agreements, that is, the role of NGOs in helping mediate, negotiate, and implement agreements, monitor the ways in which other actors violate those agreements or other norms of behavior, and establish incentives for compliance and ensure there are costs for non-compliance.

Agenda-setting

NGOs have an array of mechanisms through which to pursue their goals and put their issues on the global agenda. They pressure decision-makers through visible and familiar methods such as protesting in the streets and engaging in street theatre. Using modern technology, they launch email and fax campaigns, devise media strategies, and construct websites to educate the public. They also organize attention-grabbing summits that parallel intergovernmental conferences, lobby and persuade policymakers and business leaders to reconsider their stated interests and goals, and float innovative policy proposals for domestic and international action.

Information and expertise are particularly powerful tools through which NGOs can exert influence at the agenda-setting stage. Indeed, the research and information that NGOs provide to policymakers and the public has a significant impact on how an issue is framed and whether action is taken to address it. The research and analysis of advocacy NGOs such as the International Crisis Group or Human Rights Watch have been influential in the debates over what action to take in the Balkans, Kosovo, Rwanda, Darfur, and Afghanistan. NGOs are often a source of new and innovative policy ideas, or they may promote innovations developed by others that may later be taken up by governments and intergovernmental organizations. For instance, the NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada sought to end civil conflict in Sierra Leone by cutting the link between the diamond market and the financing of violence, resulting eventually in an innovative agreement to certify rough diamond from peaceful regions and ban the export and import of non-certified stones.

Broadly speaking, NGOs can pursue individual
campaigns to highlight an issue that is of particular concern to their organization; they can pursue coalition-building among civil society actors, both locally and internationally; and they can seek even broader cooperative arrangements that include working with companies, governments, and IGOs in multi-stakeholder partnerships. These choices about political strategy derive in part from their selection of whom to target or influence. They can campaign against particular actors, exemplified best by anti-corporate campaigns that “name and shame” abuses by high-profile companies. Shell, for instance, will always be the poster child for abuses in Nigeria linked to the government decision to execute Ken Saro-Wiwa and other opponents of the regime. NGOs primarily target public actors, however, in an effort to influence policymaking. International NGOs lobby at multiple levels of government and increasingly haunt the corridors of international organizations such as the UN, the EU, and the World Bank. For instance, the International Action Network on Small Arms, a coalition of NGOs that is pushing the issue of the control of small arms, is active at UN debates in order to try to influence both member governments and the relevant UN staff.

Whether an issue will become part of a global agenda also has to do with the substantive character of the problem. Agenda-setting models have shown that issues of bodily harm, rights violations, issues with short causal chains, and issues with someone to blame tend to generate mobilization and attention. In addition, as Finnemore and Sikkink have argued, issues need to be strategically constructed based on techniques of framing and appeal to values and emotions. One of the reasons why the Ban the Landmine campaign was so successful was that NGOs were very effective in reframing the issue, in this case, from a traditionally military security issue into an issue primarily defined in humanitarian terms. Reframing of the issue also allowed a host of other NGOs, particularly humanitarian and development NGOs, to get involved.

Finnemore has also explored the changing role of norms promoted by NGOs and other actors in redefining humanitarian action and the basis for international intervention in domestic affairs. She argues that problems are more likely to be incorporated into the international agenda when they are congruent with existing moral standards, and when there are political entrepreneurs to champion them. Yet, certain issues do not emerge on the international agenda, and do not become the subject of international NGO campaigns, despite their meeting these criteria. Carpenter argues in a recent piece that our existing models of agenda-setting do not adequately account for instances when an issue is ignored or downplayed, and important “gatekeeping” NGOs decide not to pursue them.

NGOs do not simply set the agenda for policymakers, but are often engaged in an even broader project in which they formulate new norms and foster their emergence and adoption within international civil society. The values at issue in policy debates reflect the underlying norms of different actors and sectors of society. Different NGOs compete for norm influence with other actors. Sikkink and Finnemore have proposed a norms life-cycle approach to analyze normative change over time. Norms are promoted by entrepreneurs, who may be individuals or organizations. They engage in strategic social construction in order to persuade others to adopt the new norms or revise old ones. Once adopted by sufficient numbers of people (or organizations), a tipping point may be reached that leads to a norms cascade. At this point, the norm becomes widely socialized into society.

But NGOs are not simply norm-driven actors. Some of the most interesting recent work on NGOs explores the self-interested strategies of NGOs, and moves away from treating them as somehow “good.” Clifford Bob has furthered our understanding of civil society strategies by exploring the ways in which a local issue-based campaign “markets” itself to the world community. In his book, he examines insurgents and secessionist movements and their efforts to manipulate NGOs and the media. He argues against the view of NGOs as entirely value-based, and instead reveals their need to engage in hard-ball politics to survive. This raises issues not just of strategy, but of character and preferences. In a somewhat similar vein, Prakash and Sell argue that NGOs and corporations are similar in terms of their pursuit of both self-interest and public values.
Agenda-setting is one of the most common and significant ways in which NGOs have inserted themselves into issues of peace and security. They have done so singly and in larger coalitions and campaigns. Their strategies have evolved and changed, particularly with the development of new information technologies and media outlets. Their motivations have been both self-less and self-interested, and their values have ranged across the political spectrum. But there is no doubt that they have been able to influence the agendas of other more powerful actors and to change the nature of peace and security affairs.

Negotiation

NGOs have been present at multilateral negotiations for many years, but it is only recently that their participation has garnered attention. The most famous example of NGO influence on international negotiations dates back to 1945 when they successfully pressured governments to include references to human rights in the UN Charter.

Since the late 1980s, NGO participation in multilateral negotiations has grown and become more formal. NGOs are often given formal observer status, which enables them to interact with government delegations, make declarations, and submit written documents. International organizations such as the UN have generally facilitated NGO access to multilateral negotiations. The UN world conferences have been particularly instrumental in giving NGOs a voice. For example, over 1,500 NGOs were accredited to the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Over 2,500 NGOs have consultative status with the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and some 100 NGOs follow the work of the UN in Geneva on disarmament issues. Similarly, the New York based NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security serves hundreds of NGOs with news on peace and security issues.

The importance of NGOs in the negotiation of the 1997 landmine convention is well documented, as is their contribution to the negotiation of the Statutes of the International Criminal Court. Ironically, some of the same states that supported NGO activity in favor of the landmine ban (for example, France) did not support the activism of NGOs during the 1998 negotiations in Rome on the permanent International Criminal Court. They subsequently condoned initiatives to curtail NGO participation in multilateral negotiations. David Atwood, the Head of the Quaker office in Geneva, notes that "instead of the Mine Ban Convention experiment paving the way for new forms of doing business, it has been very much business as usual since 1997 in nearly all other settings in which multilateral diplomacy takes place." Despite the rhetoric about the importance of NGOs, it has become more difficult for NGOs to have formal access to global negotiations. States have acted as gatekeepers in determining who participates, and have reasserted their sovereign prerogatives as they became less amenable to dealing with NGO actors. In addition, Atwood argues that even if NGOs get access to the negotiating table, they have little influence. The consensus rule prevalent in most multilateral negotiations does not allow NGOs much space in the deliberative process. Atwood believes that NGO influence in multilateral negotiations could be enhanced through facilitation of dialogues with key actors in the margins of the formal negotiations, by providing track-two negotiating space, and by partnering with governments to promote attention to key issues.

There are also examples of NGOs being hosts or facilitators of mediation and negotiating efforts between warring parties. For example, the Quakers were hosting and facilitating talks between the Nigerian government and Biafran rebel leaders in the 1967-1970 conflict. Similarly, during the civil war in Mozambique the Italian NGO Comunita di Sant'Egidio was instrumental in arranging informal meetings between the warring parties, meetings which eventually led to a peace settlement in 1990. Jimmy Carter and his Conflict Resolution Program at Emory University in Atlanta has acted as unofficial mediator in numerous conflicts. For example, in 1994, he traveled to North Korea to defuse tensions between North Korea and the United States. But the direct involvement of NGOs in mediating efforts is not very common and often resented by government officials.
Their direct involvement in peacebuilding and conflict resolution is not always successful. The role of the Sant'Egidio in Uganda in the mid-1990s was believed by one negotiator to be very detrimental and undermined negotiations with the Lord’s Resistance Army. Similarly, the September 1996 Educational Agreement for Kosovo that Sant’Egidio helped negotiate between the Serbian government and the Albanian community in Kosovo was never implemented. NGOs often do not have the resources or authority to make agreements stick and are prone to being manipulated by the parties in question.

More common is NGO involvement in unofficial consultations. Many NGOs run mediation and conflict resolution workshops in which individuals from warring parties are brought together in their personal capacities. Such workshops are often used as fora for “track one and half” dialogues, the aim of which is not to negotiate or agree on a particular line of action but rather to explore new ways of resolving contentious issues. In addition, many NGOs will get involved in track two diplomatic efforts, that is, they will bring together influential but non-official people from both sides to encourage understanding and improve communications. Finally, NGOs will be active in so-called track three diplomacy, which is mediation and conflict resolution efforts at the local grass-roots level. Measuring the effectiveness and significance of these unofficial consultations is not an easy task and is one of the main issues with which many NGOs are grappling in the early twenty-first century.

Monitoring and Implementation

NGOs have emerged as important players in fostering implementation and compliance by states with intergovernmental agreements. Activist NGOs pressure governments from within and without to comply with agreements, and promote societal changes necessary to make agreements work. They supply supplementary and respected information and data on global problems, help to assess the overall effectiveness of international agreements, and provide early warning of new problems. They deliver services and assistance to help states comply with agreements. And increasingly states delegate to NGOs some of the tasks involved in implementation.

NGOs such as the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the International Crisis Group, and Human Rights Watch report from the field directly to government leaders and to the public. Because most global issues do not have institutionalized means for early warning, NGOs often play this role. They regularly monitor situations where violations are likely to occur and raise the alarm in a crisis. On refugee and human rights issues, including human rights issues connected to intrastate violence and conventional weapons flows, NGOs play critical roles in warning about emerging conflicts and potential violations of accepted norms. NGOs are key watchdogs and whistle-blowers whose reporting is crucial to effectiveness. New technology has provided effective resources for monitoring, such as internet communication and satellite technology, that supports efforts to hear about and even see evidence of violations. The UNHCR has even created a hotline that NGOs can use to alert others of an emerging conflict. Refugees International was pivotal in lobbying the United States to deploy ground forces against the Yugoslavian government when it started a conflict in Kosovo in 1999. Large, well-funded NGOs monitor parties’ performance and verify their reporting—sometimes formally with international organizations, often independently.

By and large, international organizations are still the main information coordinators, monitors, and verifiers of intergovernmental agreements, since it is rare that NGOs have both the resources and reach to conduct these functions or the desire to undertake these complex and less glamorous tasks over the long-term. Yet, NGO information flows that were previously informal and sporadic are becoming regularized, sometimes even formalized. For example, the Ban the Landmine Campaign unofficially monitors and verifies the 1997 Landmine Treaty through “citizen verification” with 115 researchers in 85 countries. The campaign reports not only on state compliance with the Treaty, but even on countries that are not party to the Treaty.

The role of NGOs in peace-building activities has also been growing. Most relief and development NGOs see peace-building activities as a logical expansion of their work. They engage in education and training activities, such as the rule of law
programs that many non-profit legal associations provide to societies transitioning to more democratic regimes. They also provide services and post-conflict reconstruction programs, such as the building of schools and hospitals. In this capacity they are often involved in monitoring the implementation of similar programs by other actors.

The better-endowed NGOs extend sizeable amounts of technical assistance as subcontractors to governments, or provide assistance to developing countries to help them implement and comply with agreements. When intergovernmental agreements either do not exist or provide at best partial answers to recognized problems, NGOs increasingly act to help fill the void, alone and in partnership with other willing businesses, states, and international organizations. Using information dissemination, the power of persuasion, public pressure, and their own expertise and resources, they help to change the behavior of government and private players whose actions are not covered by intergovernmental agreements. For instance, they have turned their attention to multinational corporations and put them in the public spotlight to adopt codes of conduct, later monitoring performance to hold them accountable for living up to their pledges. They also push powerful players like the World Bank to reprogram and reconceptualize according to their priorities. They monitor and promote compliance with standards and rules systems negotiated among smaller groups of the willing. They provide goods, information, services, and financing when states and international organizations fail to act. Through all of these activities, they shape market and state behavior in ways intended to alleviate global problems.

Enforcement and Reaction to Non-Compliance

The role of NGOs in response to noncompliance is generally limited to data collection and assessment. NGOs have no enforcement powers, nor can they take remedial action. In some cases, treaty-specific bodies allow NGOs to formally submit information on noncompliance. For example, many UN human rights bodies allow NGOs to lodge complaints and submit information on human rights noncompliance. NGOs, however, never get to vote on international decisions. Their main contribution to enforcement, other than whistle-blowing, is building public support for actions against noncompliant actors.

While NGOs may have limited formal, official leverage, they often can raise the costs for states that violate agreements or international norms. NGO activism and protest campaigns can impose real costs when they are able to gain the support of the broader public. For example, Amnesty International has forced governments to release political prisoners through their campaigns on behalf of individuals. The global campaign against Chinese human rights abuses and the upcoming Beijing Olympics has the potential to turn a source of great pride and status for the Chinese into a debacle.

In some of the most critical areas of security, however, NGOs have limited roles with respect to international enforcement actions. They have little leverage over states such as North Korea and Iran, which have been linked to the proliferation of nuclear technology. They do not have the means to enforce criminal sanctions against terrorists. Nevertheless, to the degree those NGOs provide effective monitoring, they contribute to enforcement actions.

The Sources of NGO Power and Influence

In considering the power of NGOs in the different stages of governance, we need to examine not only the bases of NGO power but their capabilities relative to other actors. The resources NGOs bring to politics include information and expertise; the ability to raise the costs for other actors through their activism; material resources including money and technology; and most of all their perceived legitimacy. Their reputation is one of their most valued assets. They are able to leverage these resources against more powerful actors despite their relative weakness in most traditional measures of power.

Within the NGO community itself we can compare NGOs in terms of their own relative power among themselves. Some NGOs have significantly more resources than others, and play a gate-keeping role in determining agendas. Key international advocacy NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have a critical
influence on which issues are taken up and when and how a transnational campaign is organized. This power is particularly important when comparing local NGOs with transnational ones, and in examining the gulf between NGOs based in the North and those based in the South. Critics of NGOs often point to these inequalities in NGO influence to demonstrate that the international agenda favors only certain values and issues. Supporters of NGOs, however, tend to focus on the power of NGOs relative to other major types of actors: states, international organizations, and multinational corporations.

Power is of course a contested concept, and one that cannot be addressed in detail in this Policy Report. Although it may seem like a very weak resource, the research and information that NGOs provide to policymakers and the public has a significant impact on how an issue is framed and whether action is taken to address it. Major NGOs have powerful research and investigation divisions. Their work is viewed as more impartial than research done in the private sector or even by government agencies or international bureaucracies, and therefore is often taken more seriously. Through their research, and through their search for new ways to achieve their aims, they may develop innovative programmatic ideas or promote new policy choices for governments and international agencies to implement.

One of the critical points of leverage for NGOs is their ability to change the costs and benefits of action and inaction for other actors. Transnational activist campaigns can result in substantial pain to states and firms that violate international norms, as in the case of the Beijing Olympics. In a more positive vein, NGOs may partner with public authorities and facilitate the ability of states or intergovernmental organizations to design and implement desired policies.

NGOs are generally viewed as public-interest/values-based organizations, which gives them a degree of legitimacy that other actors, such as corporations, cannot hope to match. Some argue that the voluntary nature of most NGOs brings them moral authority, while others argue that their status and influence comes primarily from formal or informal delegation by states. Some observers view NGOs as representatives of an emerging global society that brings to the forefront the voices of those who are unheard. Still others view NGOs as partners to government in enhancing the regulatory capacity of developing countries in ways that bypass the regulatory state, promoting a “regulatory society” model instead, in which NGOs and civil society help achieve the objectives of regulation in weakly governed states. However, their legitimacy can be tenuous at times. As noted by Cooley and Ron in their analysis of humanitarian aid organizations, the need to obtain financial resources can cause them to compromise their values in the competition for funding. In recent years, their rising influence has brought increasing criticism and demands for accountability.
PART THREE: NGO ACCOUNTABILITY

The characteristics of NGOs and their operational environment have changed considerably in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As noted by Janice Gross Stein, it was in part the success of humanitarian NGOs in delivering emergency relief that increased “the scope of the humanitarian space and led to increased demand for the services of humanitarian organizations. With the growth in size and complexity of a small number of the largest humanitarian organizations came professionalization, institutionalizations, and measurement.”

Both this professionalization and significant major failures in NGO advocacy and service delivery, such as in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, have led to a greater focus on NGO accountability.

Accountable institutions are “institutions that are transparent and respond to the public interest in an effective, efficient, and fair way.” When thinking about NGO accountability it is useful to determine which audiences and publics NGOs are trying to connect with, and to whom they must report. Building on Adil Najam’s 1996 analytical framework for NGO accountability we have found it useful to distinguish four main types of accountability: outward, downward, inward, and upward (see Table 1). Outward accountability has to do with the responsibility of NGOs toward their donors, while inward accountability has to do with good business and management practices. Downward accountability has to do with their responsibility toward their clients or to those the NGOs claim to serve, and upward accountability has to do with the responsibility of NGOs toward the broader values and the integrity of their mission.

The weight and importance of these different types of accountability problems will vary depending on the type of NGO. Operational or service-oriented NGOs will want to pay close attention to outward and inward accountability issues since they need to be responsive to their major donors and show that they are competitive and efficient. Inward accountability—that is, good business and management practices—should increase their effectiveness and hence increase their competitiveness. Increasingly, however, operational NGOs are also pressured to respond to questions of downward accountability. Criteria for downward accountability are difficult to establish and highly political. Downward accountability may include, for example, considering what is the right service to provide in a developing or conflict-ridden country where local and international interests often collide. In addition, many operational NGOs have weak incentives to seek input from their clients since they are not being paid by them. In response, some donor contracts increasingly include stipulations that require evaluation and feedback from those the NGO is supposed to serve—that is, local populations. However, the methodological problems involved in measuring and evaluating service impact are significant. Giving local people voice in decisions and program implementation can be difficult, although it has become a common standard in development projects. In war-torn countries and in post-conflict situations, more participatory projects can be especially difficult, although they are critical for establishing a stable peace.
Finally, operational NGOs want to be attentive to upward accountability in terms of meeting standards of behavior established by their peers and maintaining the integrity of their mission. They will compare themselves with other NGOs working in the same area with similar operational activities. Upward accountability is important in terms of coordinating among NGOs to avoid unnecessary duplication and waste of resources. It is also important in terms of safeguarding the integrity of the public mission of the NGO. For instance, avoiding duplication became an issue of concern in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, when many NGOs competed for attention from donors by providing the same services—the ones the donors favored—leaving other critical needs unmet.81

Preserving the integrity of their mission became a concern for CARE, one of the world’s largest humanitarian NGOs. In 2007, it decided to forego a yearly amount of $45 million in U.S. federal money, claiming that the system through which it received this money was inefficient and actually hurt some of the very people it aimed to help. Under this system, the U.S. government buys goods from American farmers, ships them to Africa, and then donates the farm products to organizations such as CARE. The recipient organizations subsequently sell the farm products commercially in the African countries in which they operate. The NGOs use the proceeds to help finance development programs, including anti-hunger programs in the very same countries where they are selling donated American food.82 In other words, they sell food in hungry countries in order to finance food aid programs.

Advocacy NGOs face similar pressures even though their outward and inward accountability issues are of a different nature. Their donor base is often more diversified and hence the pressure for outward and inward accountability is more diffuse. However, for membership organizations it is imperative for them to maintain a principled reputation, since that is what draws large numbers of people to donate, even in small amounts. Some NGOs were founded by committed activists or are funded by only one or a handful of ideologically driven donors, which means the NGO must be very narrowly accountable. Advocacy NGOs have few downward accountability pressures. NGOs may claim to be speaking for populations in far away countries but often are meeting their own or others’ perceptions about what is important, rather than meeting the actual needs and desires of local populations. Advocacy NGOs are in the market place of ideas and often represent no one but themselves.

For all NGOs, inward accountability has become more of an issue since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. For example, the FBI has targeted charitable NGOs such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development to end the flow of funds they send to organizations on the U.S.
terrorist watch list. Concern about the role of NGOs in financing terrorism has led to new legislation requiring NGOs to monitor their donors, be more transparent about their financial base, and establish effective accounting practices.

In all these discussions of NGO accountability we are faced with different principal-agent relationships. As Stein has argued these "kinds of relationships have inherent tensions; agents always seek to maximize their autonomy, and the principals seek to constrain the agents as much as possible so that their preferences are maximized. That is why accountability is so attractive to principals. They specify outcomes, establish benchmarks, and hope to constrain their agents."83 Ron and Cooley have also pointed to these tensions in their study of humanitarian NGOs.84 Ultimately, any discussion of accountability is about power and the trade-offs between different stakeholders.85 The debate on NGO accountability should help all stakeholders become more conscious about their choices and priorities.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Integrating NGOs into existing models of global governance introduces enormous complexities at multiple levels. One cannot simply “add actors and stir,” as if this is a recipe in a cookbook. For one thing, NGOs, unlike states, operate at more than one level or space; they are not territorially defined. Through partnerships, coalitions, and modern communications technology, even the smallest and most local organization can attain global reach today.

An activist group can be rooted in a particular community while lobbying at the same time in international institutions. Analyses of governance drawn from international relations scholarship such as regime theory are bounded by a territorial conception of issues and actors. Global governance may need to include the governance of local issues, and local efforts to supply governance may have global repercussions. Our mental map of where the different actors “belong” needs to be revised to take account of the increasingly de-territorialized forms that are a central element in globalization.

From an analytical perspective, we also face the problem that these actors cannot always be treated as if they are unitary in terms of motivation and policy. They are collective agents, with organizational dynamics that influence how they respond to their environment. In the field of international relations, scholars have begun to erase the artificial line separating domestic from international politics, opening up the “black box” of the state to explore how different aspects of domestic politics influence international outcomes. The model of a “two level game” in which states bargain with each other, and at the same time bargain with domestic constituencies in an effort to create a winning set of options has become well accepted. These models typically explore domestic political interests and institutions and their influence on interstate bargaining. To understand “the state,” in other words, we need to include local and regional politics in our framework. To understand “the NGO” we must disaggregate in similar fashion.

Such disaggregation starts with better aggregate and individual data on NGOs themselves. While it may not be possible to get a complete and comprehensive picture of the NGOs involved in peace and security affairs, currently we have too incomplete a picture to draw any conclusions. We need to have a better handle on the numbers, budgets, and personnel. Without a better empirical map of the universe of NGOs, our conclusions will remain sketchy and contradictory. Along with these data, we need deeper exploration of the organizational character of different NGOs: how are they governed, are they membership organizations, what are their funding sources, and other features of their own self-governance. Finally, we need to disaggregate the issues themselves. Some NGOs have peace and security issues as their central mission, and others participate in these issues as a complement to their other more central goals. Within the arena of peace and security affairs there exist a wide range of sub-issues, and they are linked to other policy domains. Some NGOs are active on small arms, while others address issues of nuclear
non-proliferation. Some NGOs are dedicated to providing services in complex humanitarian emergencies, while others have a more narrow focus on, say, providing micro-credit. The integration of multiple issue areas into the peace and security agenda has led to the development of what might be called the “... and conflict” policy debates: environment and conflict, human rights and conflict, corporations and conflict, etc. We do not have a good grasp of which NGOs fit into which pieces of this complex picture of multiple overlapping issues.

NGOs are increasingly participating in various aspects of conflict resolution and prevention in unstable and conflict-ridden societies. One area that has the potential to change our understanding of security affairs in the future is to consider the impact of NGO security planning. Given the dangerous conditions in places where many NGOs now operate, they are beginning to develop security systems and consider ways to protect their mission, personnel, and facilities. By the choices they make in this realm, the NGOs are determining the distribution and character of security on the ground in many countries. This is an area ripe for future research, as there is almost no information or analysis yet of this aspect of NGO activities.

Further research also needs to be conducted on two related issues: effectiveness and sustainability. There are a number of case studies examining and evaluating NGO effectiveness in advocating for a cause and/or providing operational services. Certainly, the latter NGOs are subject to evaluation by their funders. But we do not have a more systematic understanding of how to evaluate the results of their efforts and under what conditions they are more or less likely to be successful. For example, in evaluating a conflict resolution NGO, do we really expect them to end a civil war? Probably not, which means we must develop some more reasonable measures of what they can accomplish. If we had a better basis for evaluation, we would also be more able to draw generalizations regarding the factors that are associated with effective NGO action.

The issue of effectiveness is linked in part to the sustainability of the organization. Although there is widespread agreement that the phenomenon of NGO participation will remain a feature of international politics for the foreseeable future, NGOs come and go—some organizations fail completely, or sometimes they simply withdraw from particular issue areas, countries, or projects. We can assume that the most significant factor is the reliability of funding sources, but we speculate that other features of the organization may also be important: leadership, effective organization, successful promotion, competitiveness, and others. The impact of NGOs on peace and security affairs in the long run will be tied to the sustainability of their efforts in this area.

Another area for future research is to gain a more nuanced conception of NGO interests and values. NGOs—particularly humanitarian NGOs—value their “humanity,” which they seek to dispense in neutral and impartial fashion to all the people they serve. They are embedded within a social and normative context, but organizationally must pay attention to their interest in surviving and achieving their stated goals. The contest between values and mission attainment, between norms and organizational continuity, creates a constant tension in the choices made by these entities. They are brought into sharper focus when NGOs operate in weak and failing states. When they operate in relatively ungoverned spaces, and administer relatively large resources that in some cases much outstrip anything that local governments or international organizations have to dispense, they have to make choices that have a significant impact on the local community. The NGOs must set priorities not just for themselves but for the larger society in which they are operating.

Beyond these more substantive and empirical needs, future research needs to elaborate better analytical frameworks to capture NGO activities and their impacts in societies. Thus far we made a fairly simple distinction among NGOs based on their functions—advocacy and operational—and to some degree on issue areas. We have used this distinction to capture some of the differences in the accountability issues they face. Yet we also need to capture current trends that lead NGOs to greater integration in terms of issue areas and more fragmentation in terms of their base. This Policy Report has focused on international
and transnational NGOs, but future research must examine and distinguish between local (community-based) NGOs, national NGOs, and international and transnational NGOs. What impact does the growth of these different types of NGOs have on societies and how are these different types of NGOs related? Ultimately, these are questions about resource distribution and power, a subject that has been taboo in the NGO literature for far too long.
1 Governance as a process and not as an endpoint is central to the evolution of governance activity at the global level. This process generates heated debate over central values, including sovereignty, democracy and accountability. Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005).


3 Globescan polls over time show a declining trust in governments after 2001 (with some rebound a few years later), but the highest level of trust is in non-governmental organizations, with the United Nations coming in second. CSRWire, CSRWire, April 1, 2004 (2004).

4 For example, in 2007, the U.S. military and Interaction—an umbrella organization for U.S. NGOs—negotiated and endorsed guidelines for relations between them in hostile environments. These negotiations were facilitated by another organization, the U.S. Institute of Peace, which is a federally funded NGO. The Guidelines can be read at www.usip.org or interaction.org


13 www.bmz.de


15 Ibid.


20 At the same time, however, this blurring of boundaries has created problems. For instance, the adoption by Germany of policies promoting civil-military cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian aid became a flash-point for debates over the neutrality and independence of NGOs.

21 Although the discussion here is limited to advocacy and operational NGOs, these terms are used broadly. For instance, some might separate out the religiously-based NGOs, but these generally operate as either advocacy or operational organizations. Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehner, “Development-Military Interfaces: New Challenges in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations,” German Development Institute, Reports and Working Papers 5/2004.


23 They may also not advocate on certain issues, as noted in recent work by Chari Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 1 (2007).


26 Brown and Moore, in their analysis of NGOs, separate out service-delivery and capacity-building NGOs, but both are forms of program implementation and for my purposes here are combined. L. David Brown and Mark H. Moore, “Accountability, Strategy, and International Nongovernmental Organizations,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2001).


28 For a general overview of the new public management, see Kate McLaughlin, Stephen P. Osborne, and Ewan Ferlie, eds., New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects (London: Routledge, 2002).


30 Note that in Germany, there are concerns that the increased participation of the military in post-conflict reconstruction sets up a competition for government funds between the armed forces, the development and technical assistance agencies, and German NGOs. Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehner, “Development-Military Interfaces: New Challenges in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations,” German Development Institute, Reports and Working Papers 5/2004.

31 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational
34 Ibid., 112.
37 Ibid., 17
40 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.
45 The social movement literature is too vast to cite here, but see Sidney Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” (2002) and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, eds., Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
46 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, eds., Dynamics of Contention; Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism; Andretta Massimiliano et al., Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks (University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
47 Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism.
56 Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law.”
57 Finnemore and Sikkink, ibid.
60 Rarely, though, have NGOs had voting power. There have been cases, however, when NGOs “bought” voting power. In the late 1970s, membership in the International Whaling Commission (IWC), set up by the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), sharply increased. NGOs opposed to commercial whaling actively lobbied countries to sign and ratify the ICRW and in some cases paid membership fees for these countries. According to some experts, NGOs took charge of the IWC and staged an institutional coup d’etat. Greenpeace is said to have invested millions of dollars in this effort. Steinar Andresen, “The Making and Implementation of Whaling Policies: Does Participation Makes a Difference?,” in The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, ed. David G. Victor, Kai Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 439-440.
61 In 1996 the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted two resolutions: one broadened consultative status for NGOs, the other called on the UN General Assembly to consider the possibility of wider NGO representation throughout the UN system.
62 For eligibility requirements, rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status see ECOSOC Resolution 1996/3. See also the NGO Database maintained by the UN NGO liaison office in Geneva.
63 NGO access to disarmament negotiations is very limited and their access to the review conferences of the Non-proliferation Treaty or the Biological Weapon Convention are similarly circumscribed.
65 For example, NGO participation at the 2000 conference on the advancement of women, commonly known as “Beijing plus Five,” was curtailed. Similarly, NGO participation in the UN Commission on Human Rights and in the Conference on Disarmament was restricted. States have also curtailed NGO participation in the 2001 negotiations on a small arms convention. Ann M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo and Washington, DC: Japan Center...

66 See Atwood, “Ngos and Multilateral Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits and Possibilities.” The scaling back of world conferences by the UN, under U.S. pressure, and UN financial troubles are also to blame for diminishing NGO access. However, the threat of denying NGOs access to multilateral negotiations comes from states influential in the UN.


68 See Atwood, “Ngos and Multilateral Disarmament Diplomacy,” 41-43.

69 Interview with Betty Bigombe, one of the Ugandan negotiators. The role of NGOs in Sudan in trying to bring a halt to the civil war is well documented and was successful in 1972 to bring the civil war to a temporary halt. Similarly, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone has facilitated and assisted in mediation efforts in Sierra Leone that helped to end the civil war. NGOs, particularly faith-based NGOs, are frequently active players in post conflict reconciliation efforts. See for instance David Smock, “Faith Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding,” in USIP Special Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001) and Branka Peuraca, “Can Faith-Based Ngo’s Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia Herzegovina,” in USIP Special Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003).


71 The role of NGOs in the domestic realm is more important. For example, some states allow citizens and businesses to sue (without having to show a personal or property interest) when international environmental obligations are not implemented by that state, raising the possibility of similar action on peace and security issues. See Philippe Sands, “Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: Existing International Legal Arrangements,” in Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, ed. James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, and Peter Roderick (London: Earthscan, 1996), 53, 65-68.

72 NGOs have no authority to enforce international rules because they do not make such rules

73 Chamovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law.”


76 Cooley and Ron, “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action.”

77 Streeten has argued that NGOs are not even very good at what they claim to be good at—they are not participatory, often depend on government support, and do not reach the disadvantaged people they often claim to represent. Paul Streeten, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Development,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 554 (1997). Others view them as unrepresentative and undemocratic. Anderson, “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society.”


81 Cooley and Ron, “The Ngo Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action.”


84 Ron and Stein, “NGO Scramble.”

85 Traditionally, NGOs in the international peace and security field like to measure their power in terms of higher moral standards—not resources. Their insistence on the neutral and impartial nature of their activities conflicts with the highly political nature of the space in which they deliver services. This is particularly true when relief is provided under battlefield conditions. Although many NGOs tend to see humanitarian relief as non-political, such assistance is often seen as highly political by local belligerents and can affect the balance of power on the ground.


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