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## AICGSPOLICYREPORT

**RECONCILING REALITIES:  
RESHAPING THE GERMAN-  
AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP  
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST  
CENTURY**

Cathleen S. Fisher

**AMERICAN INSTITUTE  
FOR CONTEMPORARY  
GERMAN STUDIES**

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

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ISBN 0-941441-90-3

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**STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION**

AICGS is grateful to the German Marshall Fund of the United States for its generous support of this publication.



## FOREWORD

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Despite periodic intervals of tension, the special German-American partnership endured for over fifty years, underpinned by common interests and values and a dense network of institutional bonds and personal ties. That partnership-and its foundation-have been shaken, perhaps fundamentally.

Amidst escalating German-American tensions, the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies, with the generous support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in fall 2002 organized a study group to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the purpose, value, and future of the German-American relationship. The aim of the project was twofold: to identify and explore the precipitating causes of the current estrangement; and to contribute to the ongoing transatlantic discussion about ways to build a new, forward-looking German-American and transatlantic relationship. In undertaking this project, we were particularly interested in exploring the interplay between political relations and security cooperation; trade and financial relations; and culture, values, and history.

Over the course of the following year, AICGS organized a series of meetings in Washington, D.C. both with the entire group of project participants and with smaller working groups, which focused on security threats and cooperation; commercial and financial relations; and issues at the nexus of culture and politics, respectively. In recruiting members of the group, we aimed to engage individuals from a diversity of backgrounds and expertise. The Institute made a particular effort to engage younger experts and scholars in these discussions-the next generation of leaders that will be responsible for managing the bilateral relationship. All members of the Study Group participated in their private capacities.

We wish to express our deep gratitude to the project participants, who gave generously of their time, thoughts, and insights to this report. This project and report would not have been possible without the sustained engagement and interest of our Study Group members on both sides of the Atlantic:

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The Johns Hopkins University

We also wish to express our sincere gratitude to The German Marshall Fund of the United States for its generous support of this project and report.

While the report is informed by the project participants' perspectives and discussions, the analysis and conclusions presented here represent the views solely of the author. While we do not expect that readers will agree with all aspects of the analysis or recommendations, we do hope that this report will enhance the scope of discussion and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, in keeping with the mission of AICGS.



**JACKSON JANES**  
Executive Director  
AICGS





## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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In the wake of the Iraq war and the U.S. presidential elections, the future of German-American relations is fraught with uncertainty. Cooperation between the two governments proceeds apace but, beyond pragmatism, there is little agreement on how—or even whether—to stem the German-American rift, nor on what a “modernized” German-American relationship would look like.

This report seeks to encourage the creation of a well-considered and more realistic German-American relationship. It is premised on the belief that a positive and robust relationship between Germany and the United States remains both relevant and vital to the interests of both countries and to the U.S.-EU relationship. But this relationship must adapt—to a changed America, a changed Europe, and a changed global strategic environment.

The report is organized into three parts. Part I analyzes the underlying and precipitating causes of change in German-American relations. Part II surveys the stakes and interests of each side with regard to two key dimensions of the bilateral relationship: security and defense; and economic, trade, and financial relations. The concluding section proposes some guiding principles and describes a strategy for managing change and creating a more “European” and modern German-American relationship.

### Part I: The Drivers of Change

Structural changes in international politics, a clash of leadership styles and personalities, societal transformations in Germany and the United States, and enduring cultural influences have all played a role in the recent crisis in German-American relations. The fallout from the dispute over Iraq, in turn, has itself become a driver for change in German-American relations.

#### STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Three types of structural changes have altered the complex calculus of costs and benefits in the German-American relationship. The collapse of the bipolar system and emergence of a new European order have weakened the strategic rationale for the “special” security partnership between the United States and Germany. At the same time, the U.S. and European economies are deeply integrated through direct foreign investment and other structural ties that contribute to jobs, growth, and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. Third, Germany and the United States continue to be linked by a dense network of institutional and individual ties, a reflection both of the special Cold War relationship between the two countries as well as the increasing importance of non-state actors in international relations.

## A CLASH OF LEADERSHIP STYLES

Beyond structural changes, a clash of leadership style and personality has contributed to strains in German-American relations. President George W. Bush's religious beliefs and moral impulses are compatible with American political culture, but strike a hollow note in a German society that has become ever more secular in orientation. By the same token, the confident leadership style of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder reflects the sensibilities of a fully sovereign, unified Germany that has learned the lessons of the past and therefore is justified and able to define its interests independently. Schröder's style may resonate with the German public, but clashes with many Americans' perceptions and expectations of Germany.

## A CHANGING AMERICA, A CHANGING GERMANY

As many have observed, Americans since September 11 feel themselves to be "at war" in a way that Germans and Europeans do not. Americans have accepted changes in their way of life, in their political processes and institutions, and in the way they think about themselves and the world. Across the Atlantic, it is the German 9.11—November 9, 1989, the day of the fall of the Berlin Wall—that has changed Germany forever. Over the last fifteen years, Germany has struggled to unify two disparate political, economic, and social systems, while undertaking structural economic reforms, processes that have coincided with the deepening economic and political integration of the European Union member states, as well as an eastward expansion of the European Union's borders.

## A VALUES GAP?

Despite the common embrace of certain fundamental values—freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and the free market economy—different historical experiences and cultural understandings nevertheless permeate many German-American disputes. History and culture are the lenses through which Germans and Americans perceive and make sense of a changed international system, and affect the ways that both societies have responded to new threats, to economic globalization, and to the challenges of multiculturalism and social pluralism. Although their influence is neither direct nor necessarily determinate, where societal values enter into German-American policy disputes, resolution of conflicts can become more difficult, because values are usually deeply rooted, often unarticulated, and sometimes mutually incompatible, as German-American differences over the Iraq war, the use of force, the role of international institutions and treaties, the value of multilateralism, or responses to terrorism demonstrate. Cultural and value differences are particularly pronounced on issues at the nexus of religion and politics.

## THE LEGACY OF THE IRAQ WAR

Finally, the German-American dispute over the Iraq war is likely to have long-term consequences for the bilateral relationship. America's standing in Germany, as well as Germany's credibility in Washington, are diminished. After decades of avoiding a choice between France and the European Union on the one hand, and Germany's transatlantic links on the other, the red-green coalition would appear to have staked Germany's future irrevocably with that of Germany's partners in Paris and other European capitals, while doubts about the desirability of European integration and value of cooperation with Europe have grown stronger in the United States.

## Part II. German-American Relations After Iraq: The Challenge of Change

These disparate drivers of change do not preordain a lasting split in German-American relations. The two countries still have many common interests, both with regard to their respective security goals and their future economic growth, stability, and prosperity.

### GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION

Despite the absence of a compelling and unifying strategic purpose, the United States and Germany nevertheless share common security interests. Each country is in the process of adapting its armed forces and strategy to the new threat environment, both singly and in coordination with allies. Additionally, although the two countries at times may differ over methods, priorities, and sequencing, they are cooperating in Afghanistan and on global anti-terrorism and nonproliferation measures. While perspectives diverge on key issues in the Broader Middle East, Germany and the United States share a vital interest in seeing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolved, and in preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran or the dissolution of Iraq. Both German and American leaders will need to manage their relations with both China and Russia carefully, although they differ over whether the United Nations can and should play a more important role in the future.

### GERMANY, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Germany, Europe, and the United States share vital interests in the international economic system. The agenda for German-American economic cooperation nevertheless contains significant potential for conflict. The enlargement of the EU, deepening European integration, and the fate of German and European efforts to address structural weaknesses in European economies will change the U.S.-EU relationship. German economic stagnation and the U.S. dual deficits are likely to be high priorities on the German-American bilateral agenda as well. Transatlantic conflicts over legal and regulatory requirements, which reflect domestic political pressures, economic choices, and cultural biases, are likely to become more frequent. For the foreseeable future, effective governance of the global commercial and financial systems will continue to depend critically on the health of the U.S.-EU partnership. Finally, Germany, the EU, and the United States face a common, long-term challenge from new centers of economic dynamism in China and India.

### SUSTAINING COMMON INTERESTS, MANAGING CHANGE

The security partnership that once constituted the core of the German-American relationship has grown fractured and strained. Despite shared foreign and security policy interests, the United States and Germany frequently differ over the means, the timing and the framework for action. To complicate matters, the institutions for managing the new security agenda have been battered by German-American and transatlantic differences and disputes. It remains unclear, however, whether economic “deep integration” can and will constitute the central and stabilizing pillar of the transatlantic relationship.

### Part III: Building a New Foundation for German-American Relations

The German-American relationship remains vitally important to the United States, to Germany and to the European Union. For the United States, Germany matters, because Europe remains the United States' partner of first resort, and Germany will influence significantly the evolution of the European Union and its relationship to the United States. For Germany, the United States remains the "indispensable power" in the pursuit of many German and European goals. For both states, the bilateral link remains a meaningful channel for managing change in the broader relationship between Europe and the United States.

The creation and maintenance of a sober, well-considered relationship should be guided by the following principles:

- The advent of a second Bush term creates an opportunity for a fresh start in German-American relations;
- Trust and political will are necessary but not sufficient to build a new German-American relationship;
- The United States and Germany must begin to adapt their bilateral relationship to an evolving Europe. This means acknowledging that German-American relations are inextricably linked to the U.S.-EU relationship;
- Value differences exist but do not make German-American and transatlantic policy conflicts inevitable;
- Anti-Americanism exists and could pose risks for pragmatic German-American cooperation;
- German-American relations are not the monopoly of governments. The private sector, as well as civil society groups, have a vital role to play in building a new German-American relationship;
- The German-American relationship will remain vulnerable to unanticipated shocks and external influences.

Both sides should begin with small, pragmatic steps. The goal of cooperation should be achievement of concrete results that will demonstrate the continued value and relevance of German-American and transatlantic engagement to both countries' policy agendas. For the foreseeable future, it will be difficult for the United States and Germany to significantly expand their cooperation in Iraq, but fruitful coordination on Afghanistan, as well as developments in Russia and, possibly, in Iran should be possible. Beyond pragmatic cooperation on near-term challenges, the United States, Germany, and Europe should engage in a broad and sustained strategic dialogue about critical security and economic challenges, including: the principles and institutional arrangements governing the use of force in the changed strategic environment; strategies for effectively countering jihadist terrorism while preserving liberty at home; the Broader Middle East; and a rising China. Finally, the United States and Germany must work to "modernize" their mutual perceptions to reflect the profound changes that have occurred in the United States, Germany, and Europe.

## Conclusion

There will be little room for nostalgia or sentimentality in the process of crafting a new German-American relationship. To gain and sustain domestic support, the German-American, as well as the U.S.-European, relationship must be seen as relevant and useful by government leaders and the German and American publics. Herein lies the greatest challenge for the future.

Near-term, reciprocal initiatives to stem the erosion of trust and establish a track record of success are an important first step. Long-term, sustained efforts to manage change and adapt the relationship to new global and domestic realities are critical as well.

Importantly, both sides would benefit from a better understanding of the influence of culture and history on their respective perspectives, priorities, and policies. As in the past, many future disputes will involve judgments, rooted in cultural and historical legacies, about the best means of pursuing shared goals or achieving common values—and of the priorities Germany and America should assign when goals and values come into conflict with one another. Understanding how and why values make themselves manifest in policy debates could be critical to the resolution of existing and future German-American disputes.

Political will and leadership are essential if the uncertainty that pervades German-American relations is to give way to a spirit of cooperation rather than devolving into acrimonious competition. American leaders must be prepared to place renewed priority on cooperation with the United States' long-time allies and to deal with Germany and the EU in a spirit of genuine partnership. Germany and Germans must decide what kind of relationship they want with the United States—and whether they are willing to work within the EU to shape a Europe that conceives of itself as a partner with the United States. The future of the U.S.-German relationship, in this sense, is inextricably linked both to the evolution of a divided America, and to the European Union.

In the absence of a simplifying and compelling threat, both German-American and U.S.-EU relations must be based on greater knowledge of and respect for their differences as well as commonalities. The days of sentiment are over. This need not mean the end of German-American relations or partnership, however, but a new beginning.



# INTRODUCTION

## INTRODUCTION: GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

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For over forty years, German-American and transatlantic relations were of central importance to the United States and Europe. As both sides look beyond the 2004 presidential elections, the future of German-American cooperation appears highly uncertain. While vestiges of the “special relationship” between the two countries have survived the wrenching debate over the Iraq war, the value and purpose of the German-American relationship—and of the U.S.-European relationship in which it is embedded—are in question. In the United States, opinion leaders and publics are divided over the relevance of Germany, Europe, and the transatlantic alliance to the security challenges of the twenty-first century, as well as the desirability and feasibility of a stronger, more united Europe. In Germany, government leaders proclaim the need for a “modern” German-American relationship. But the German public is distrustful of American power, holds overwhelmingly negative views of the Bush administration and its policies, and expresses a desire for a Europe that is more independent of the United States. The important role of conservative values in determining the outcome of the 2004 presidential election, moreover, has left many Germans wondering whether the cultural divide between the two countries is widening irrevocably.

Cooperation between the two governments on Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and other issues proceeds apace but, beyond pragmatic cooperation, there is little agreement on how—or even whether—to stem the German-American rift, nor on what a “modernized” German-American relationship would look like. Transatlantic relations are no longer the focal point of U.S. or German foreign policy. In an America engaged in a “war” on terror and ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, developments in Europe no longer appear as relevant as they did when German troops arrayed along the East-West divide were the first line of defense in a common cold war.

Across the Atlantic, Germans are preoccupied with the completion of the European project.

The German-American relationship nonetheless remains vitally important to the United States, to Germany, and to the European Union. Though it may not be the front line in America’s new wars, Germany matters to the United States, because Europe—increasingly defined as the European Union—is potentially one of the United States’ most important global partners. Conversely, while the EU—not transatlantic relations—is the now defining framework for German foreign and domestic policy, the

European Union is not yet capable, nor may it ever be, of supplanting American power, engagement, and influence in the global system. The relationship between the United States and the EU will increasingly define U.S.-European relations; if they work together Germany and the United States can be partners in helping one another to adapt their relationship in mutually beneficial ways. The United States and Germany, moreover, are joint stakeholders in a \$2.5 trillion Euroatlantic economy.<sup>1</sup> And without effective transatlantic cooperation, our mutual goals will not be achieved, nor common threats averted.

The election of George W. Bush to a second term of office could offer an opportunity to begin repairing the battered German-American relationship. Whether a fresh start can be achieved will depend significantly on the tone and policies of the second Bush term. A refusal to deal with Germany and Europe respectfully, as true partners, will deepen the political and social divide between the United States and Europe and strengthen support for those in Europe who would like to see the EU emerge as a counterweight to American power. A reevaluation of Europe's contribution to American security and prosperity and demonstrated willingness to return to a multilateral framework (even if only out of necessity) could facilitate the healing process and allow the United States, Germany, and Europe to begin building the foundation for a changed transatlantic relationship.

Crafting a new German-American relationship will not be easy, because the roots of the current estrangement run deep. Structural changes in the international system, clashing personalities and leadership styles, and social and political changes in a post-unification Germany and post-9/11 America have eroded the unity of purpose, mutual trust, and common understanding that underpinned the "special" German-American relationship during the Cold War. In their stead, value conflicts, rooted in disparate historical experience and cultural experiences, have resurfaced to shape policy debates, priorities, and choices.

This report seeks to encourage the creation of a well-considered and more realistic German-American relationship. It is premised on the belief that a positive and

robust relationship between Germany and the United States remains both relevant and vital to the interests of both countries and to the U.S.-EU relationship. But this relationship must adapt—to a changed America, a changed Europe, and a changed global strategic environment.

The report is organized into three parts. Part I analyzes the underlying and precipitating causes of change in German-American relations. Part II surveys the stakes and interests of each side with regard to two key dimensions of the bilateral relationship: security and defense; and economic, trade, and financial relations. The concluding section proposes some guiding principles and describes a strategy for managing change and creating a more "European" and modern German-American relationship.





01  
PART ONE  
THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE

## THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE

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The recent crisis in German-American relations has no single cause. The estrangement instead reflects the cumulative impact of a confluence of factors—structural changes in international politics, a clash of leadership styles and personalities, societal transformations in Germany and the United States, and enduring cultural influences. All of these factors played a role in escalating the dispute over the Iraq war. The fallout from the recent crisis, in turn, has itself become a driver for change in German-American relations.

### Structural Changes and the German-American Relationship

Over the past several decades, three types of structural changes have altered the complex calculus of costs and benefits in the German-American relationship: the collapse of the bipolar system and emergence of a new European order; the structural integration of the European and U.S. economies as a result of globalization; and the proliferation and increasing importance of non-state actors in international relations. While many analysts have pointed to the divisive effects of structural changes on the German-American and transatlantic relationships, in fact, their impact has been mixed.

### THE END OF THE COLD WAR SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

The “special” German-American relationship was, in many ways, the child of the Cold War. In the security bargain forged to confront the Soviet threat, Germany maintained substantial conventional forces arrayed along the East-West divide in exchange for security assurances from the United States, including the protection afforded by the American nuclear deterrent. The strategic partnership brought substantial benefits to both states and came to constitute the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship. Although the United States and West Germany at times differed,

sometimes vehemently, over strategy and policy, both governments were committed to working out their differences. In the face of a commonly perceived threat, they were compelled to.

The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union weakened the strategic rationale for the “special” relationship between the United States and Germany. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unprecedented military, economic, and political power. While the United States in the 1990s pushed forward with NATO expansion and engaged in multilateral operations in the Balkans, the strategic focus of U.S. foreign and defense policy was shifting away from Europe toward emerging threats of global dimension—Northeast Asia and the Broader Middle East; the regional and global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means; terrorism and transnational organized crime; and the problems emanating from so-called “rogue” and failing states. The 9/11 terrorist attacks have only accelerated the post-Cold War reorientation of U.S. foreign and security policy. For the foreseeable future U.S. and foreign security policy are likely to remain focused on the nexus of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Fear of future terrorist attacks and a sense of vulnerability pervade the American polity and politics, as seen in the 2004 presidential elections, in which the war on terror often dominated the campaigns.

Germany, in contrast, feels itself to be more secure than perhaps at any time in its history. With the eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO, the “German question” and age-old problem of European security have been largely resolved, although instability in the Balkans remains a source of concern to German and European leaders. Germany’s strategic focus has extended, slowly but steadily, beyond Europe, but German foreign policy has remained embedded in multilateral European cooperation and has continued to reflect a preference for reliance on “soft power”—the tools of diplomacy, economic aid, peaceful conflict resolution, and post conflict assistance. This delicate balance is reflected in the approach of the red-green coalition, which has emphasized the elements of continuity in German foreign policy while nudging Germany into new international responsibilities, including military missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.<sup>2</sup> In a similar vein, the German government is seeking permanent representation in a reformed United Nations Security Council. Germany has become more engaged as well in international cooperation to counter new threats—global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the wider Middle East.

As a consequence of structural changes, the framework of European security and defense has become less transatlantic, and more European in focus. NATO remains the principal channel of U.S.-European defense cooperation, but the European Union is the defining framework for German international engagement and, increasingly, for German security policy. “*Europapolitik*” has come to occupy a unique place in German policy, separate from foreign policy but beyond domestic policy. Fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, German political leaders and publics look first to Europe on a wide range of issues, including on important foreign and security policy challenges.

The new global threat environment, with its asymmetry of power, responsibilities, and vulnerabilities, has left the German-American security partnership—as well as the transatlantic alliance of which it is part—in disarray. Germany and the United States have attempted to adapt to these structural changes, both through the transformation of NATO and its capabili-

ties and in their bilateral cooperation on Afghanistan, global terrorism, and proliferation. But the German-American security partnership, once the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, is by no means viewed as an indispensable, strategic necessity by publics and opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite shared interests and threats faced in common, the German-American relationship has lost strategic direction and purpose. Freed of the constraints of a global cold war, both sides now perceive alternatives to U.S.-European security cooperation.

#### AN EMERGENT EUROATLANTIC ECONOMY

In the economic realm, a different kind of structural transformation has occurred. As catalogued in the recent study by Quinlan and Hamilton, the United States and German/European economies over the last decades have become increasingly integrated.<sup>3</sup> Of far greater importance than trade—which accounts for roughly 20 percent of transatlantic economic activities—are foreign direct investment across the Atlantic, sales from foreign affiliates, and other deep structural links, which contribute to jobs, growth, and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. While the United States, Germany, and the EU at times may clash over whose rules will prevail in the regulation of this common “Euroatlantic” economic space, such problems are less an expression of growing estrangement than of a transatlantic economic relationship that has grown so close that domestic politics collide. When such clashes occur, it is often the European Union, not Germany alone, whom the United States must engage to resolve the conflicts that can be costly to German and American consumers and businesses alike. While disparities in military power, responsibility, and vulnerability define the terms of German-American security cooperation, the structure of transatlantic economic relations puts the United States and EU on relatively equal footing. In the economic realm, moreover, cooperation is more an imperative than a choice.

#### NETWORKED SOCIETIES

German-American relations have never consisted solely of government-to-government ties. Throughout the Cold War, institutions and dense personal networks helped to sustain the German-American

partnership. In both countries, an entire generation of professional civil servants, analysts, and senior military officers devoted their careers to maintenance of strong transatlantic defense ties, while societal, educational, and cultural exchange programs multiplied.

Germany and the United States continue to be linked by a dense network of institutional and individual ties. In addition to governmental and parliamentary exchanges, business and industrial cooperation; scientific, educational, research, and cultural exchanges; travel and tourism; sister city links; and exchange programs involving religious, media, and activist organizations create a societal infrastructure that exists independent of government-to-government relations.<sup>4</sup>

A critical question is whether this societal network will be sustained into the future and what influence, if any, it will have on official government policy and relations. While the cultural ties between the United States and Germany predate World War II, the non-governmental network linking Germany and the United States in many ways reflected the special nature of postwar German-American relations. This network does not appear to have been significantly affected by recent political tensions between Berlin and Washington and, as noted above, economic interdependence has multiplied commercial links between the two societies. On the other hand, certain societal linkages may atrophy as a consequence of the strategic reorientation of the United States and Germany. The closure of certain U.S. bases in Germany, for example, means that U.S. military personnel and their families and the German host population will no longer have the opportunity to gain first-hand experience of one another and their respective cultures.

### A Clash of Leadership

Beyond structural changes, a clash of leadership style and personality has contributed to strains in German-American relations. Even before the dispute over Iraq, the Bush administration's perceived proclivity for unilateral actions—e.g. its rejection of the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—as well as the president's rhetoric and demeanor irrevocably tarnished the pres-

ident's image and standing with much of the German public. The public dispute over the Iraq war cemented negative views of the president and his administration, with the German media doing little to counter hostility toward the U.S. president through their portrayal of Bush in negative or caricatured terms.

The problem goes beyond a purported lack of personal rapport between the two leaders. The distinct leadership styles of U.S. President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder reflect cultural influences and experiences that resonate with broad segments of their respective societies but translate poorly into a different cultural context. President George W. Bush's principles, religious beliefs, and moral impulses appeal to many Americans and are compatible with a political culture that often infuses political debates with religious language, argumentation, and imagery.<sup>5</sup> These same traits translate poorly into the German cultural and historical context. The moral absolutism and religious references frequently employed by Bush strike a hollow note in a society that has become ever more secular in orientation, while the muscular strategic vision articulated by the Bush administration appears to many Germans a rejection of the values and principles of international order that have been internalized in postwar German political culture and institutionalized in German foreign policy and in the European Union.

The confident leadership style of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder similarly reflects the sensibilities of a fully sovereign, unified Germany. Schröder has presented himself as a "twenty-first century German patriot"—the leading representative of a Germany that has learned the lessons of the past and therefore is justified and able to define its interests independently. When Schröder in fall 2002 declared to the *Bundestag* in defense of his government's position on Iraq: "The essential questions concerning the German nation [will] be decided in Berlin and nowhere else,"<sup>6</sup> his words likely struck a chord with Germans long tired of dependence on United States and eager for "emancipation"—a word used in newspaper commentaries to describe the Chancellor's Iraq policy. In the United States, however, Schröder's independent stance clashed with many Americans' perceptions and expectations of Germany, which

continue to be shaped preponderantly by memories of the Nazi dictatorship and a sense that Germany remains indebted to the United States for America's sustained commitment during the Cold War and at the time of German unification.

Such clashes of cultural style and the misunderstandings they spawn may be inevitable. In an age of global and instantaneous communication, messages crafted for domestic ears reach unintended audiences far beyond the nation's borders, where they are reinterpreted through different political, historical, and cultural lenses. In this sense, though President Bush has undeniably been a strongly polarizing political figure; he, like Chancellor Schröder reflect at least a portion of the societies, cultures, and political systems of which they are part. The transatlantic "translation" of these distinct leadership styles into an understandable cultural vernacular has grown more difficult, moreover, because both Germany and the United States are undergoing profound and perhaps lasting changes.

## A Changing America

While experts' concerns about global terrorism and WMD proliferation increased in the 1990s, the threats appeared nebulous and unreal to most Americans, despite the exhortations of several "blue-ribbon" commissions that American leaders needed to do more to counter emerging non-state threats to U.S. national security.<sup>7</sup> The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania made terrorism real to Americans. In the aftermath, the United States has changed, probably irrevocably. As many have observed, Americans since September 11 feel themselves to be "at war" in a way that Germans and Europeans do not. In the months and years following the attacks, Americans have accepted changes in their way of life, in their political processes and institutions, and in the way they think about themselves and the world.

Life in much of America has changed significantly in the three years since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Motivated by fear and the desire to live more securely, most Americans have proven willing to accept new intrusions into personal privacy and freedom and to follow the president's lead in deter-

mining what is necessary to protect the American homeland from renewed terrorist attacks. The balance between individual liberty and security, between the rights of the individual and the prerogatives of government to execute anti-terrorism measures, remains contested nonetheless. For the United States, the choices involve not only changes to Americans' way of life; they go to the very heart of Americans' self-understanding and the sustainability of a vision of America as a nation founded on individual freedom, civil liberties, and a brand of civic patriotism that has facilitated the integration of immigrants of diverse ethnicities and nationalities.

The terrorist attacks have had a profound impact on American democracy and political processes as well. The Bush administration has claimed unprecedented powers and prerogatives for the executive branch, arguing the need for exceptional measures in a time of war. The gravitation of power to the executive branch has been largely unchecked by U.S. legislators, a consequence, in part, of the fact that one party controls both houses of Congress and the White House. Congressional and partisan debate about measures related to the "war on terror" has also been effectively stifled through charges from the president's supporters that such criticism only assists America's enemies. Whether the concentration of power in the presidency will be sustained is uncertain.

Beyond the effects on American political institutions, 9/11 has also facilitated a radical reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. In its National Security Strategy and subsequent pronouncements and actions, the administration has articulated and implemented a muscular strategy that relies on the proactive use of American power to eliminate terrorist threats to the United States, advance the cause of free market democracies, and perpetuate U.S. hegemony so as to preserve international order. In an age of catastrophic terrorism and the global diffusion of WMD, the administration has reasoned, the United States cannot afford to wait for threats to reach American soil or harm American interests before taking action. Arguing that the concept of imminent threat has to adapt "to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries," the administration asserts that anticipatory action, including preemptive military attack, is both legitimate and appropriate to the new threats confronting the

United States. "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community," the National Security Strategy declares, "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary."<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the Bush administration has acted to limit the constraints on U.S. freedom of action posed by multilateral institutions, international law, and alliances. In the now famous formulation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "the mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission."<sup>9</sup>

The public remains divided over the administration's reorientation of U.S. foreign and security policy. Americans share the administration's strong concern with terrorism, but hold contradictory attitudes about the means and measures to safeguard U.S. security in the twenty-first century. Although Americans in principle are more prepared to support the use of force, even without a UN mandate or the support of NATO allies, they would prefer that the United States seek international support rather than acting unilaterally. Terrorism and national security issues played a central role in the U.S. presidential election campaigns, confounding conventional wisdom that elections invariably turn only on domestic issues such as the economy, education, or health care.

The debate about the future of U.S. foreign policy has encompassed fundamental questions about global politics, including the nature of the terrorist threat; the costs and risks, both political and economic, of the administration's national security approach in Iraq and elsewhere; the desirability and sustainability of American empire; and the domestic and foreign policy ramifications of American hegemony. In the wake of the 2004 presidential elections, the debate is likely to continue, dividing not only the two parties, but perhaps also the Republican Party itself. Although partisan differences are more pronounced in election years, recent public opinion polls suggest that the two political parties increasingly represent two distinct approaches to the conduct of U.S. foreign and security policy. Democratic voters tend to embrace views more similar to those of many Europeans. Republican voters are divided, with traditional, Republican realists expressing support for cooperation with U.S. allies and NATO, and European integration, and a significant minority showing more

sympathy with central tenets of neo-conservative thinking in the administration.<sup>10</sup>

Partisan differences on foreign policy reflect a more general trend toward the increasing social and political polarization of the United States.<sup>11</sup> As the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections demonstrate, the United States is a country deeply divided between two roughly equal political blocs. The so-called "red states" tend to be more socially conservative and religiously devout and are concentrated in rural areas and in the states of the southern, intermountain, and mid-western United States. "Blue" America is concentrated in the states of the Northeast and Far West, is more urban and secular, and holds more liberal positions on social issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and stem cell research. The two Americas coexist side-by-side rather than intermingling, as Americans increasingly settle in areas with like-minded neighbors, socialize and self-organize with those who share similar perspectives, and retrieve their news from sources that reaffirm, or at least do not challenge, their perspectives and predilections. The U.S. Congress also has grown more bitterly partisan. This trend is attributable, in part, to redistricting procedures that have created an ever larger number of safe congressional seats—over 400 of 435 Congressional seats in 2004, according to one estimate—a trend that reinforces the tendency of legislators to attend first and foremost to their core political base, rather than seeking to craft centrist positions that could garner support from both political parties.<sup>12</sup>

The longer-term ramifications of the deepening polarization of American politics remain unclear. The 2004 elections reflected a clear rightward tilt in American politics, which some observers interpret as the beginning of a lasting shift in favor of the Republican Party. On the one hand, demographic trends and immigration will increase the proportion of Latino and other minorities in the United States, with as yet unpredictable effects on electoral outcomes and partisan affiliations. Additionally, self-corrective mechanisms in U.S. policy could shift the balance of partisan advantage, as well as lead to a reassertion of Congressional power or more rigorous judicial checks on presidential prerogatives. For the foreseeable future, however, the United States is likely to remain a nation divided.

## A Changing Germany

In stark contrast to the United States, the September 11 terrorist attacks did not mark a significant break in German life or consciousness. It is the German 9.11—November 9, 1989, the day of the fall of the Berlin Wall—that has changed Germany forever.

While legal unification of the two German states was accomplished on October 3, 1990, the challenges and burdens of melding two disparate political, economic, and social systems persist. Germany still struggles under the economic burden of unifying two states and economies, which has entailed the expenditure of an estimated \$1.5 trillion since 1990, a factor often cited as contributing to Germany's sluggish economic growth throughout the 1990s.<sup>13</sup> The German political landscape, including the balance of power within and between political parties and the hold of major parties on voter loyalties, has also been unsettled by the process of unification. At the societal level, significant differences in mentality and perspective persist. An August 2004 poll found that a majority of Germans believe that their differences outweigh commonalities, while a quarter of western Germans expressed a desire to have the Berlin Wall back in place.<sup>14</sup> Most eastern Germans, moreover, set different priorities than western Germans when purportedly shared values come into conflict. For example, when asked to choose between freedom and equality, 56 percent of eastern Germans preferred equality compared to 35 percent of western Germans.<sup>15</sup>

The changes brought about by unification have coincided with a period of accelerating globalization, which has fueled growing concerns about the sustainability of the postwar German economic model and generous social-welfare system. After a decade of stagnant growth, the red-green coalition has set in motion a reform process intended to address structural rigidities and restore dynamism to the German economy. Though acceptance of the need for change is growing, many remain fearful of sacrificing the security afforded by the labor protections, social welfare benefits, and pension systems that provided

postwar Germans with an unprecedented degree of security, leisure, and prosperity.

Both processes—German unification and economic reform—have unfolded in the context of deepening economic and political integration of the European Union member states, as well as an eastward expansion of the EU's borders. Many domestic regulations and laws now have their origins in Brussels, and talent and expertise that once remained housed in national ministries is migrating to the European center of decision-making. In opinion polls and through their behavior in the European Parliament elections, Germans register disgruntlement with the European Union's "democratic deficit." The May 2004 expansion of the European Union to include ten new member states, moreover, has heightened German concerns about the "export" of German jobs and industrial infrastructure eastward. On the whole, however, Germans remain strong Europeans and view the European Union, not the United States, as most critical to Germany's future.<sup>16</sup>

German views of the United States and of transatlantic relations have changed as well. The Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan and President Kennedy's visit to Berlin may remain vivid memories for Germans over 60; for younger Germans (ages 16 to 30), American popular culture is the dominant influence in shaping perceptions of the United States, while the Vietnam War and anti-war protests are most important to the German "68ers." An East-West divide is also evident in attitudes toward the United States. When asked whether they liked Americans, 42 percent of West Germans responded affirmatively, compared to only 27 percent of East Germans.<sup>17</sup> Whether recent public opinion surveys reflect growing anti-Americanism remains a topic of heated debate. What is clear is that the number of Germans holding favorable views of U.S. leadership has plummeted in recent years.

All three processes—unification, globalization, and European integration—are confronting Germans with difficult choices regarding their self-definition as a nation. The porous nature of borders and relative

prosperity of European countries have made Germany and Europe natural magnets for those seeking better lives. Immigration could provide much-needed labor in a country facing declining birth rates and an aging population, but poses significant challenges for German politics, society, and self-understanding. Many immigrants come from societies with different religious and cultural traditions. Unlike the United States, moreover, Germany has never understood itself to be a “land of immigration.” Changes in the laws governing immigration and citizenship are recent achievements, suggesting that, in many ways, Germany has just begun to struggle with the challenges associated with being a multicultural society in a globalized world.

Finally, over the last decade, Germany has had to grapple with the burdens as well as opportunities of being a powerful regional state within Europe and an increasingly engaged global actor. Although Germany under the red-green coalition has assumed new international responsibilities, Germans have eschewed any fundamental reexamination of German foreign and security policy. For the most part, Germans remain content to exercise their new responsibilities primarily with tools of civilian power to strengthen international institutions and law and global governance, promote human rights, and advance humanitarian aid and development.

### A Values Gap?

*“The foundation of German and American relations remains our shared commitment to the values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and to economic opportunity and prosperity through free and open markets.”*

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 27 February 2004.

For more than forty years, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have affirmed their belief in the “community of values” binding the United States to Europe. Behind these timeworn phrases is a core truth. Though Germans and Americans often choose different

avenues to implement their common values—freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the free market economy—these differences are, relatively speaking, minor in comparison to those that separate the United States and Germany from many other countries around the world.

Different historical experiences and cultural understandings nevertheless permeate many German-American disputes. History and culture are the lenses through which Germans and Americans perceive and make sense of a changed international system, and affect the ways that both societies have responded to new threats, to economic globalization, and to the challenges of multiculturalism and social pluralism. The influence of history, culture, and values on German and American policy and on German-American relations is neither direct nor necessarily determinate. In the first place, the lessons of history, as well as societal values and culture, can be hotly contested within societies, as seen in the United States, where the polarization of political opinions on many domestic and foreign policy issues reflects, in part, stark value conflicts within American society. Moreover, cultural influences must be channeled through parties, political leaders and institutions, public opinion and the media, or other transmission vehicles before they factor into political debates or policy decisions.<sup>18</sup>

A prime example of such influences is the different role of religion in U.S. and German political life and policy debates.<sup>19</sup> Although the United States’ Constitution calls for a strict separation of church and state, religious perspectives and world views nevertheless permeate much of mainstream public discourse and in fact are frequently employed to justify political standpoints on issues such as abortion, gay rights and marriage, and stem cell research as well as certain foreign policy issues. Six in ten Americans claim that religion plays a “very important role in their lives,” as compared with 21 percent of German respondents.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, a strong majority of Americans (58 percent) express the view that a belief in God is a prerequisite to personal morality, as compared with 33 percent of Germans polled.<sup>21</sup> At

the same time, the appropriate relationship between religion and politics is the focus of increasing domestic debate in the United States, as reflected in recent legal challenges involving the constitutional separation of church and state and the central role of religion and religiously-motivated voters in the 2004 presidential elections.<sup>22</sup>

The infusion of political debates with religious imagery, rationales and rhetoric is largely foreign to most Germans. In contrast to the United States, Germany and Europe appear over the last decade to have become increasingly secular. Many Germans continue to claim a religious affiliation and to pay state-levied church taxes, but political discourse is largely absent of religious world views. On the other hand, Germany is now facing its own set of dilemmas related to religion, identity, and politics—namely, the challenges of integrating a growing Muslim population into German political and social life and, conversely, of arriving at a new consensus on national identity in an increasingly multicultural Germany and Europe. Debates about the wearing of the headscarf (*hijab*) by Muslim teachers or other civil servants, or over the inclusion of language in the draft EU constitution referring to Europe's Christian traditions, or even over whether Turkey, a secular but Muslim state, should join the European Union contain religious inferences and rationales, although they may not necessarily dominate or determine the outcome of political debate.

Where such cultural influences or societal values enter into German-American policy disputes, resolution of conflicts can become more difficult, because values are usually deeply rooted, often unarticulated, and sometimes mutually incompatible, as many recent German-American conflicts demonstrate:

#### THE IRAQ WAR

The German-American debate about Iraq was rife with dissonant cultural references.<sup>23</sup> In his speech before the *Bundestag*, Chancellor Schröder defended German opposition to the war by noting that, “especially in Europe—and most particularly in Germany, a sense of what war means for people is deeply embedded in the collective consciousness of the population.” Following the start of military hostilities, he stated in a television address to the German

nation, “The bombs are falling. Hopefully the sacrifice among the civilian population will be as small as possible.”<sup>24</sup> Such words are testimony to the resilience of war memories in a society in which an increasing number of Germans have no direct experience of the Nazi dictatorship and World War II. In contrast, in defending the administration's policy on Iraq, President Bush used language and imagery that tapped into shared understandings regarding the American experience, character, and role in the world. Declaring that “the cause we serve is right, because it is the cause of all mankind,” Bush touched on the collective belief in America as a nation blessed by “special providence,” destined to be a “city on the hill”—an example for all mankind.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, when Bush vowed that “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country,” his words called upon Americans' self-understanding as a society that emphasizes individual initiative and responsibility and a nation whose exceptionalism necessitates and justifies exceptional behavior—particularly in a post-9/11 world.

#### THE USE OF FORCE, THE RIGHTS OF STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The German-American dispute over Iraq also reflected different experiences with the use of force, and disparate perspectives on the role of states versus the United Nations in authorizing military actions. On this issue, as on many others, however, there are significant divisions of opinion within the United States.

For the most part, Germans are more supportive of the use of military force for humanitarian and peace-keeping missions and are skeptical of the notion that military force can be used to achieve justice. The German government and Germans did, however, support military intervention in the Kosovo conflict, which involved severe human rights violations and evoked conflicting historical lessons, that of war avoidance and of genocide. Germans are most prepared to support the use of force if sanctioned by the UN Security Council.<sup>26</sup> On the issue of preemptive war, Germans reject the assertion that traditional constraints on the use of force have been rendered obsolete by new threats and argue that the decision to preempt cannot be left to national governments alone, a practice that could lead to the complete

breakdown of international constraints on the use of force—with disastrous circumstances, as seen in Germany's history. This different attitude toward sovereignty, the rights of states, and multilateral decision-making has historical roots—not only the disastrous experience of World War II, but the positive benefits of European integration.

In the United States, where the experience of September 11 is seared in the collective memory of the citizenry, the Bush administration has argued that in an age of WMD proliferation and global terrorism (i.e. threats that may involve little or no warning), the United States has the right to act preemptively and even preventively, before a threat materializes and probably long before the UN could be moved to authorize military action. Although the Bush administration's position on the use of military force has come under sharp attack, Democratic critics concede that no U.S. president would be likely to exclude the possibility of unilateral use of military force, but argue that international support is in most cases desirable and possible to obtain. The American people are conflicted on this issue.

There is no clear majority support for preventive war without UN sanction, although many Americans believe the United States has the right to take preemptive action in the case of a imminent terrorist threat—testimony to the lingering effects of 9/11. Yet, while Americans are prepared to give the United Nations the right to authorize military action in a wide range of circumstances, they are also more willing than Germans to bypass the UN altogether if vital interests are believed to be at stake.<sup>27</sup> In general, Americans appear to be less convinced than Germans that the United Nations alone inherently conveys (or withholds, when consensus cannot be achieved) international legitimacy when the use of force is involved. They point as well to democratic deficits in the organization itself and the large number of non-democratic states among the UN's ranks.

#### KYOTO, THE ICC, THE ABM TREATY AND GUANTANAMO

Though seemingly disparate, these German-American disputes share a common threat: they reflect conflicting perspectives, shaped by history and culture, on the role of international law.

Germany's strong, even idealized, commitment to the rule of law, both domestically and in international affairs, must be seen in the context of the country's Nazi past, as well as the postwar success of German foreign policy and European integration, with their common emphasis on diplomatic process, negotiated compromise, and international conventions. For many Germans, the U.S. rejection of a series of international accords, as well as U.S. military actions in Iraq and its treatment of prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay facility, reflect a troubling tendency for the United States to put itself above international law, a perspective that has undermined America's claim to moral leadership. As one newspaper commentary on the prisoner abuse in Iraq concluded: "America is losing its values under the Bush administration," and "can no longer claim to be a champion of a morality to which it can no longer adhere itself."<sup>28</sup>

Americans tend toward a pragmatic and less moralistic perspective on international law. Views of the American public and U.S. leaders, particularly the Bush administration, diverge significantly, however. In general, the American public favors participation in many international treaties and agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto protocol on global warming, and international ban on land mines, and the International Criminal Court.<sup>29</sup> The reports of prisoner abuse and torture in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay were deeply disquieting to many Americans, and provoked Congressional hearings and investigations. At the same time, however, American perspectives on torture appear conflicted as a result of the experience of 9/11 and anxiety about future terror attacks.<sup>30</sup> The Bush administration, in contrast, has been skeptical about the utility of international law and treaties, seeing them as encumbrances on U.S. power rather than useful to the pursuit of U.S. aims. Nevertheless, in conducting the "war on terror," the administration has sought to provide legal justification of its actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo.

#### MULTILATERALISM VS. UNILATERALISM

Germans and Americans are also divided by experience and political culture over the utility and desirability of multilateral action. To be sure, unilateral action is much less of a practical policy option for Germany than for the United States. But the differ-

ence in perspectives is rooted in more than a disparity of power and interest. For most Americans, multilateralism remains a desirable policy option, though not a necessity; for Germans, in contrast, multilateralism has become a value and end in and of itself as well as a moral imperative grounded in German history.

Postwar German political and strategic culture exhibits a deep-seated impulse toward multilateral action. This shared understanding is a product of Germany's Nazi past, the experience of European integration, and the success story of postwar West German foreign policy, which involved the exercise of "civilian power" within the context of multilateral institutions—NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and other international bodies. The unspoken taboo against unilateral German action is strong, as evidenced in the sharp criticism of Chancellor Schröder's "unilateralism" when he staked out Germany's unconditional rejection of war in Iraq even before a decision had been taken by the UN Security Council. Germans' reaction to U.S. actions in Iraq and the Bush administration's impulse for unilateralism may have been so vehement because the United States is seen to be acting in violation of Germany's own normative code, according to which multilateralism is a moral imperative, not simply a sensible and desirable policy option.

Germany's value-driven embrace of multilateralism stands in stark contrast to American perspectives, which reflect competing traditions in U.S. foreign policy.<sup>31</sup> The Bush administration has justified its unilateral actions by underscoring the responsibility of the U.S. president, as the elected head of a sovereign nation, to safeguard U.S. national interests. His rhetorical rejection of a UN "veto" on U.S. freedom of action resonates in a country in which the belief in individual responsibility and American exceptionalism runs deep. Many Democratic foreign policy experts, in contrast, draw on different foreign policy traditions, including that of postwar American international engagement, which resulted in the creation and maintenance of international institutions and alliances that served American interests. In this perspective, Americans should embrace multilateralism and international cooperation because it can help to sustain

U.S. leadership and advance U.S. goals—and because true unilateral action is rarely a real policy option. Americans, in general, favor giving the interests of allies strong consideration in U.S. foreign policy, although partisan differences are evident on this issue as well, with Republicans expressing a greater willingness to base U.S. foreign policy mostly on national interests.<sup>32</sup> Support for international institutions is, however, seldom absolute and unconditional, but rather reflects a utilitarian embrace of the multilateral framework as the most effective means of securing U.S. objectives. For example, while Americans are broadly supportive of a stronger role for the United Nations, they harbor significant reservations about whether the organization is performing its functions adequately and have mixed feelings about other international organizations as well, depending on their performance.<sup>33</sup>

#### RESPONDING TO TERROR

German and American debates about global terrorism contain common elements but also reflect the influence of historical experience and cultural impulses. Among German and American experts, there is broad consensus on the severity of the threat, although views differ over the factors fueling radical Islam and the most effective means needed to combat or roll back the threat.<sup>34</sup> At the level of public debate, however, Germans and Americans speak very differently about the nature of the threat and the policies and tools that are needed to counter international terrorism.

For many Americans, the September 11 attacks were the first salvo in a prolonged global war that will require the full application of American power, fortitude and unity. In his September 20 address before the Congress and the nation, President Bush staked out what continues to be the defining framework for understanding 9/11: "On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country." In other words, the attacks were framed in the context of military conflict, a war being fought not in opposition to U.S. actions in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world, but out of desire to destroy American values and the American way of life. Rather

than being “simply ... a problem of law enforcement,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz asserted, September 11 had taught the nation “at tremendous cost, that the problem goes beyond crime and punishment.”

Consequently, the U.S. approach would encompass a “far-reaching campaign,” whose aim would be “prevention and not merely punishment.” In the tradition of earlier U.S. “wars” against drugs and poverty, the “war on terror” is to be indeterminate in duration and scope, and will be won with the concerted application of “all elements of national power,” including military force, applied preemptively and unilaterally if necessary to eliminate an enemy.<sup>35</sup> The administration’s framing of the terrorist threat appears to enjoy significant support among the U.S. public and media.

Germans, in contrast, have a different understanding of the challenges posed by 9/11, perhaps in part because of their own experience with domestic terrorism in the 1970s, which causes them to frame the issue of global terrorism differently. Terrorist threats are seen not as a phenomenon to be eliminated through military actions, but a problem that must be contained through comprehensive, long-term political and economic strategies aimed at eliminating the conditions that encourage disaffected peoples to embrace terrorist tactics; this pertains, in particular, to the appeal of radical Islam to the disaffected and alienated in the Muslim world. “What is needed,” Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared before the UN General Assembly in September 2003, “is to address the root causes of terrorism and insecurity.” Counter-terrorism efforts, in this view, must go beyond military action and employ the tools of international law and law enforcement, long-term development aid, and nation building. Consonant with Germans’ overarching belief in the civilizing power of international law and institutions, Germany’s approach to global terrorism seeks an “end to lawlessness” through the strengthening of international courts of justice “and especially the International Criminal Court,” and initiatives to “win hearts and minds for freedom, peace, and the open society.”<sup>36</sup> In the German discourse on terrorism, the imagery invoked and language employed is that of law

enforcement, not military combat, perhaps not surprising in a country without a “good” war narrative.

## The Legacy of the Iraq War

The events of the German-American and transatlantic dispute over the decision to go to war in Iraq are by now well known.<sup>37</sup> Of greater significance for the future are the potential long-term consequences of the choices made in Washington and Berlin and the trends set in motion or intensified by the Iraq conflict. Among the most important results of the Iraq debate:

*American credibility and standing in Germany have suffered significantly while anti-Americanism has strengthened.* Public opinion polls since 2001 record a steady decline in the United States’ standing in Germany. While many Germans appear to distinguish between the Bush administration and Americans more generally, negative sentiment that until now has been targeted primarily at the administration could be transformed into a more diffuse anti-Americanism following the Bush victory in the 2004 presidential elections. It is unclear what effect, if any, growing anti-Americanism would have on the ability of the German government to pursue pragmatic cooperation with the United States. Much may depend on developments in Iraq, which, for the foreseeable future, are likely to remain the prism through which the media and many Germans view and judge the U.S. government and the United States. More troubling in the longer term, U.S. policy with regard to Iraq could prove to have a formative impact on younger Germans’ perceptions of American society and politics—much in the same way that the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War came to define the “*Amerikabild*” of the “68er” generation of Germans. Finally, the central role of religious conservatives and values issues in the outcome of the 2004 presidential race are likely to strengthen German belief in a growing values gap.

*German credibility and standing in the United States and in Washington have been diminished as well.* German contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and to global counter-terrorism efforts are recognized and valued in

Washington, but Germany's standing and reputation as a reliable partner have been damaged. Chancellor Schröder's close cooperation with French President Jacques Chirac, particularly prior to the Iraq war, has bred distrust of Berlin's motives, undermining Germany's traditional role as transatlantic facilitator between Paris and Washington. While a change in government in Berlin might help to restore Germany's standing, fundamental questions about Germany's future orientation and loyalties in a changing Europe remain. This distrust could color political leaders' perspectives on Germany's bid to secure a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council.

*Germany has chosen Europe.* After decades of avoiding a choice between France and the European Union on the one hand, and Germany's transatlantic links on the other, the red-green leadership of Germany would appear to have staked its future irrevocably with that of Germany's partners in Paris and other European capitals, an alignment that a strong majority of Germans appears to support. A CDU-led government might strike a different balance between Germany's "*Europapolitik*" and its transatlantic ties, but it appears unlikely that Germany's transatlantic link will ever again assume the importance it once had. Moreover, a consensus appears to be emerging in Germany that German-American and U.S.-European relations can only be put on a firmer footing if Germany and Europe direct their energies, first and foremost, toward forging a stronger and more united European Union. The election of President George W. Bush to a second term is likely to strengthen this conviction, as well as the determination of Germans to accelerate European integration, including in the sensitive areas of foreign and defense policy.

*In the United States, doubts about the value of cooperation with Europe have grown stronger.* Recent public opinion polls point to significant divisions in American views of the importance of cooperation with Europe and other U.S. allies. In the July 2004 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, solid majorities of Democrats and Independents characterized declining respect for the United States worldwide as a major problem, but Republicans were much more divided on the issue. Americans are also divided over

the importance of Europe to the United States. While in the Pew Poll, 56 percent of respondents favored a partnership between the United States and Europe that is as close as that in the past, the German Marshall Fund found signs of a growing split within the Republican Party over the importance of Europe and transatlantic cooperation and the desirability of a strong global leadership role for the European Union.<sup>38</sup>

### A Changing German-American Relationship

The German-American relationship throughout the 1990s continued to live off of the capital and good will accrued during the Cold War but failed to adjust to structural changes that fundamentally altered the strategic rationale and framework for German-American relations. Yet, the impact of structural change on the German-American relationship has not been uniformly negative. Nor is it self-evident that the current malaise, while in part structural in nature, will prove "incurable," as some have contested.<sup>39</sup> Much depends on how systemic changes are interpreted and acted upon in both Germany and the United States.

The quality of political leadership can make a decisive difference in this regard. Unfortunately, both German and American leaders carry considerable baggage as they attempt to move forward. The policies of the Bush administration and the president's rhetoric and demeanor have engendered deep animosity and disapproval in Germany, while Americans are wary of a German leader who is suspected of playing to latent anti-Americanism to win reelection and who appears prepared to make common cause with France against U.S. interests. Moreover, both political leaders represent cultural influences and articulate perspectives on the new geo-strategic realities that resonate with portions of their respective electorates but are unpalatable in a different cultural context.

Equally important to the future of German-American relations are social and cultural changes in a united Germany and a post-9/11 America. Both the United

States and Germany are societies and political systems under significant strain. Both are confronted with the opportunities but also the imperatives for change that globalization presents—the need for economic reform and restructuring; the challenge of maintaining social and political cohesion—of crafting a nation—in the face of growing ethnic, religious and cultural diversity; the need to devise effective responses to security threats that bear little resemblance to the model of interstate conflict that has dominated international politics since the creation of the Westphalian system.

Societal change in turn has fueled value conflicts, both within the United States and across the Atlantic. A united Germany is far less polarized than a post-9/11 America, but significant East-West differences persist, and the lessons of German history—including that of the former GDR—remain contested. In the United States, the shared cultural understandings that united a large and diverse country and underpinned U.S. foreign policy for most of the postwar period are shattered.

Whether the clash of values so evident in recent German-American disputes spells lasting estrangement is not clear, however. In the first place, value-based judgments have been present in past German-American conflicts. In disputes over changes in NATO strategy or policy toward the Soviet Union, Germans and Americans drew on their unique historical experiences and cultural traditions. In each case, clashes of values were quelled because of the compelling need to maintain a united front against a common enemy. The discipline imposed by the Cold War is gone, however.

Other evidence pertaining to “values” is inconclusive. On the one hand, the apparently central role of conservative values in determining the outcome of the 2004 presidential elections is likely to strengthen the perception in Germany and Europe that the United States, with its rightward political turn, is drifting further away from the shared cultural heritage of the enlightenment. On the other hand, while there are significant differences in German and American attitudes toward religion, the United States, too, is

divided on the appropriate role of religious belief in politics. On domestic and foreign policy issues in which values play a significant role, moreover, German-American differences exist but in many cases are not greater than those that divide a polarized America. In short, if a German-American or transatlantic “values gap” is emerging, then it runs not only through the Atlantic but square through the United States as well. In the final analysis, the issue is not whether differences in values or their implementation exist—they do—but whether Germany, Europe, and the United States have enough in common that they will be able to cooperate on foreign policy issues on which their respective interests and goals coincide.

These disparate drivers of change converged in the debate over the Iraq war, transforming what might have been just another heated policy debate into a turning point in German-American relations. As a consequence of the Iraq war, German public perceptions of the United States have changed in ways that may prove irreversible and could constrain the German government from pursuing pragmatic cooperation. It has also accelerated the strategic reorientation of German and American foreign policy, and provided new impetus for European integration and autonomy. For these reasons, the Iraq war will continue to weigh heavily on German-American relations for some time to come.

None of these factors preordains a lasting split in German-American relations. Unpredictable international events, or a change of leadership style or policy approach in Washington and/or Berlin could create new opportunities for cooperation. Moreover, the two countries still have many common interests, both with regard to their respective security goals and their future economic growth, stability, and prosperity.



PART TWO  
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER IRAQ

02

## GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER IRAQ: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

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For over fifty years, the German-American relationship rested primarily on two pillars: a defense and security alliance to safeguard European security and stability, and global economic cooperation. A broad societal network and cultural and educational exchanges complemented but also helped to sustain these dual pillars of cooperation.

As the United States and Germany look forward, what are the prospects for continued cooperation to meet the security and economic challenges of the coming decades? What are the implications of the structural, societal, and cultural factors described above for U.S.-German security cooperation and for coordination on economic, financial, and trade issues? To what degree do interests coincide or, alternatively, diverge? What are the opportunities for and, conversely, limits on cooperation in these two critical areas?

### German-American Security Cooperation

Nearly fifteen years after unification, German-American defense and security cooperation lacks a compelling and unifying purpose. The terror attacks of 9/11 have not had the galvanizing effect on the German-American security partnership that many might have anticipated following NATO's invocation of the Article V mutual defense pledge in the days following the September 11 attacks. Three years later, the United States and Europe are still struggling to make sense of a confusing array of threats and sources of instability around the world.

Germany and the United States nevertheless have many common security interests. Each country is in

the process of adapting its armed forces and strategy to the new threat environment, both singly and in coordination with allies. Additionally, although the two countries at times may differ over the methods, priorities, and sequencing, they are cooperating in Afghanistan and on global anti-terrorism and nonproliferation measures. While perspectives diverge on key issues in the Broader Middle East, they nevertheless share a vital interest in seeing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolved, and in preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran or the dissolution of Iraq into a terrorist haven. Both German and American leaders will need to manage their relations with both China and Russia carefully, although they differ over whether the United Nations can and should play a more important role in the future.

### GERMAN-AMERICAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

U.S. strategy, defense policy, and force structure are undergoing a fundamental transformation. U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, are likely to keep U.S. resources and personnel focused on the Broader Middle East and the neighboring regions of the Caucasus, Central and South Asia for the coming decades. U.S. security interests in Asia, including

concerns about China's rise and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, also place demands on U.S. resources. In response to the changing nature of conflict and emerging threats, the U.S. armed forces are undergoing a fundamental transformation into lighter, more mobile strike forces that can be rapidly and readily deployed into the theater to undertake joint operations. The process of transformation entails significant restructuring of the U.S. military, but also changes to the structure of U.S. bases abroad, including those in Germany. Over the coming years, a significant draw-down in the estimated 73,000 U.S. troops based in Germany is expected, a move that will lead to the closure of nearly half of U.S. military installations in Germany, although the Ramstein airbase and other select bases are likely to remain in operation.

After a decade of delayed action, the red-green coalition has also begun in earnest with the reform and transformation of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) to meet new security challenges. In May 2003, the German Minister of Defense issued new Defense Policy Guidelines, which detail plans for the restructuring of the German armed forces to facilitate their participation in multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management missions, including the fight against global terrorism. In support of these new missions, the *Bundeswehr* is to be restructured into intervention, stabilization, and support forces, and procurement is to be aimed at enhancing capabilities in six critical areas: command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection. The long-term aim of transformation will be to enhance the ability of the *Bundeswehr* to participate in networked military operations with other nations.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, Germany is working actively with its European partners to streamline and rationalize defense planning, procurement, and research and development through the newly founded European Defense Agency (EDA).<sup>41</sup>

Adaptation of the U.S. and German militaries to the strategic realities of the twenty-first century raises new questions, however, about the future of NATO as the framework for U.S.-German and transatlantic

security and defense cooperation. Despite its historic expansion, NATO appears less salient to both the United States and Germany. In the Bush administration's National Security Strategy, NATO is described as but one of the United States' potential partners in the U.S. strategy of global coalition-building, a shift in priorities that has been evident in the administration's vacillating treatment of the Western alliance. The Bush administration has, by turn, declined NATO assistance in Afghanistan; bypassed NATO altogether, opting instead to rely on a "coalition of the willing" to prosecute the military campaign in Iraq; and appealed to NATO for assistance in addressing postwar conflict situations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. German security policy, by the same token, is said to be grounded on multiple proven alliances, including NATO, but also the European Union, the global and regional security institutions of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Moreover, while NATO remains the principal institution for transatlantic security cooperation, Germany is significantly engaged in efforts to enhance defense cooperation among the EU member states. The European Union's National Security Strategy calls for the EU to assume a global role in combating terrorism, WMD proliferation, organized crime, failed states and regional conflicts, but much work remains to be done to translate the document into operational guidelines, a process that is likely to highlight European differences as well as commonalities.<sup>42</sup> Rather than spending more on defense—an unlikely scenario in the face of the growing budget demands to sustain aging populations—Germans and other Europeans must spend more wisely, a strategy that is likely to require some combination of pooling of German with other European capabilities, specialization, and harmonization of national procurement.<sup>43</sup> The creation of the EDA could be an important step in this direction, but many questions remain about the authority and effectiveness of the new organization and its relationship to the national governments and other EU bodies. It remains unclear, as well, whether efforts to enhance European defense industrial cooperation will further weaken transatlantic armaments cooperation, which has already been severely reduced in recent

years. The result could be the emergence of a "Fortress Europe" to counterbalance "Fortress America" in defense production and procurement.

Whether NATO remains a vital U.S.-European security organization will also depend on the future evolution of the European Union more broadly. The coming years will be critical for the EU, as six, perhaps more, states hold referenda on the European Constitution and decisions are made on further enlargement of the EU's membership. Some observers argue that the expansion of the European Union to 25 and more members spells the end of the vision of the EU as a politically integrated body. In this view, the member states of the EU, inevitably, will move at different speeds. Under this scenario, a core group of states might proceed to deepen its political integration, including on security and defense, while others choose a looser association with the European Union. Without British, French and German participation, however, it will be difficult to create a meaningful European defense capability.

NATO can survive as a meaningful instrument of transatlantic military cooperation and political coordination, but only if it continues to adapt to new strategic realities and a changed European political constellation. The United States and Germany could demonstrate through actions and words that their interests are invested in the alliance. For U.S. leaders, this means acknowledging the limits of reliance on "coalitions of the willing" when sustained engagement is needed to ensure achievement, not only of military objectives, but also of post-conflict, political goals as well. Continued efforts to enhance European military capabilities to perform twenty-first century military missions are critical. Unless the capabilities shortfall can be addressed, the inability of the United States, Germany, and Europe to undertake joint operations over time will further diminish NATO's salience in U.S. and German defense planning and erode support for the alliance among U.S. leaders and publics, ultimately challenging NATO's viability as a military alliance.

Additionally, further adaptation to the emergence of the European Union as a significant actor in European

defense and security policy is necessary. Building on the progress achieved since the November 2002 agreement on the Berlin-plus arrangements, sustained dialogue between NATO and the EU is critical to identify the respective roles and functions of the two organizations as the EU, ESDP, and NATO evolve. In the nearer term, this includes further discussion of the NATO Response Force and the European Rapid Reaction Force, the respective capabilities initiatives of the EU and NATO, standards for interoperability, and planning and command and control arrangements.<sup>44</sup> The common goal of both organizations should be the creation of an effective and workable partnership between NATO and the EU, an outcome that would serve both American and German interests. In the meantime, NATO can and should remain the primary mechanism for transatlantic cooperation on a wide range of defense- and security-related issues. For example, alliance structures and processes could help facilitate coordination between the United States, Germany and Europe on homeland security. In the longer term, it should be possible to conceive of NATO evolving into an alliance resting on two truly equal pillars: North America and the European Union.

#### THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA

Whether through a reinvigorated NATO or other mechanisms, Germany and the United States have a shared interest in effective cooperation to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century. German and American perspectives on the best means to achieve shared security aims may vary, as will the capabilities that each side can bring to bear in addressing shared challenges. Nevertheless, as reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy and European Security Strategy, the United States, Germany, and Europe face many common threats, which will only be averted or eliminated through effective U.S.-European coordination.

#### *The Broader Middle East*

In principle, Germany and the United States share many of the same overarching goals for the Broader Middle East, a region that has become central to the future of German-American relations and of the

transatlantic relationship more generally. Yet, while effective cooperation in the region could give new purpose to the German-American partnership, the potential for renewed conflict over the framework for action, sequencing, and means to achieve shared goals remains considerable.<sup>45</sup>

In the near-term, three issues in the region are likely to dominate the German-American and U.S.-European security agenda:

**IRAQ.** On Iraq, coordination will remain burdened by past differences and fundamentally different views on the war's necessity and legitimacy. The German government and opinion leaders nevertheless recognize that Europe can ill afford the situation in Iraq degenerating further, with uncertain and dangerous consequences for the region and for European security. The German government therefore has offered reconstruction aid, debt relief, as well as limited assistance with the training of Iraqi security forces (though outside of Iraq), but has reiterated that the country will not provide military forces to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. For the overwhelming majority of the German public, the Iraq war remains an illegitimate war and the postwar chaos a situation of the Bush administration's making. For the foreseeable future, the inclination and political latitude of the Berlin government to intensify its engagement in Iraq is likely to be limited. Until or unless the situation in Iraq stabilizes and an elected government appears to be in greater control of the Iraqi territory, any German government, whether headed by the current red-green coalition or a conservative-led coalition, would likely find it difficult to justify more than limited engagement in Iraq.

**IRAN.** The United States and Germany share a strong concern over Iranian nuclear ambitions, but the Bush administration differs with Berlin over the best means to achieve a halt to the Iranian nuclear weapons program and the timeframe for action. Internally divided and unable to agree on a unified approach, the Bush administration in its first term eschewed diplomatic engagement with Iran, arguing that the Tehran regime was only seeking to buy time until it

had succeeded in building nuclear weapons. Washington has instead urged the Europeans to go along with the United States in supporting coercive action. Germany, along with France and the United Kingdom, has supported a policy of diplomatic engagement to persuade Tehran to accept assistance with the development of civilian nuclear power in exchange for a halt to its enrichment activities. In fall 2004, the Bush administration acquiesced to a renewed Franco-German-British diplomatic initiative to avert the referral of the Iran case to the UN Security Council by the IAEA at its meeting in late November 2004. The issue of Iran and nuclear weapons is likely to remain front and center on the German-American security agenda. A compromise approach is possible, if Germany and other European countries are willing to accept the imposition of sanctions or other punitive measures and the United States ceases its policy of diplomatic isolation of the Tehran regime.<sup>46</sup>

**THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.** Despite their shared commitment to a two-state solution, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a source of tension and frustration in German-American relations. Germans and Europeans have been strongly critical of a perceived lack of U.S. engagement in efforts to resolve the conflict and what they see as uncritical American support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The problem is, in part, deep-rooted differences over the framework and sequencing of initiatives in the region. The United States remains indispensable to resolution of the conflict, but U.S. administrations, including that of President George W. Bush, have tended to focus their energies on unilateral initiatives and engagement, while Germany—though it maintains especially close relations to Israel out of strong sense of historical responsibility—works largely through the European Union. German and European leaders have expressed concern that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will not be the final step in the peace process, precluding progress toward the creation of a Palestinian state. Arafat's passing nevertheless could provide an opportunity for the United States and Europe to renew their commitment to coordination and implementation of the Quartet Roadmap. Germany could

play a particularly important role in this regard, given its influence in the EU and its good relations both with Israel and with states in the region.

**AFGHANISTAN.** If ultimately successful, German-American cooperation in Afghanistan could revive faith in the value of the transatlantic security partnership. In addition to reconstruction assistance and humanitarian aid, Germany in fall 2004 had approximately 2,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In Afghanistan, Germany is responsible for two civilian/military "Provisional Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs) in Kunduz and Feyzabad and acts as lead nation in coordinating allied efforts to reconstruct and train the Afghan police force. The United States under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is engaged in military operations to root out remnant terrorist groups in the region, and is also responsible for an additional 13 PRTs.

Several key aspects of the arrangements in Afghanistan have helped to sustain political support for German participation in ISAF. First, international engagement in Afghanistan is seen as legitimate, because it is being carried out in a multilateral framework under UN authorization in accordance with the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, and is now under the umbrella of NATO, which assumed command of ISAF in August 2003. Further, the mission of ISAF—to assist the Afghan Transition Authority in maintaining security to support stabilization, reconstruction and strengthening of civil society—assigns to Germany a mission consonant with the country's priorities and comparative strengths. It is also a mission that is seen to advance Germany's overarching foreign policy goal of strengthening the international order.

German participation in Afghanistan has been beneficial to the United States as well. The participation of Germany and other NATO allies in the post-conflict stabilization of Afghanistan has lent the U.S.-led intervention greater international legitimacy. Additionally, ISAF has freed U.S. forces to pursue the elimination of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and

along the Afghani-Pakistan border. On the other hand, the separation of OEF and ISAF operations has also been viewed critically in some quarters, as reflected in U.S. pressure to merge the ISAF and OEF mandates, a move that German and other European leaders have been strongly reluctant to accept.

Whether German-American cooperation in Afghanistan will prove to be a model for future security coordination depends critically on the outcome of the operation, however. On the positive side, German participation in Afghanistan is perceived in Washington as an important contribution to efforts to combat global terrorism, which over time could help to ameliorate the negative fallout from Germany's limited engagement in Iraq. The relative success of the Afghani presidential elections in October 2004, moreover, would have been inconceivable in the absence of ISAF. On the other hand, NATO's difficulties at the Istanbul summit in securing sufficient European troops and support for ISAF raises questions about the sustainability of the ISAF mission. Concerns about the security situation, political instability, and the burgeoning revival of the drug trade, among other issues, persist.

#### *Global Terrorism and WMD Proliferation*

German-American cooperation to combat global terrorism has expanded steadily since the September 11 attacks and reportedly was unaffected by the escalating tensions between Berlin and Washington over the Iraq war. Former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and German Justice Minister Otto Schily have met regularly, and working-level cooperation is reportedly smooth and intensive. U.S. officials nevertheless have underscored the need for more effective coordination among European law enforcement and intelligence agencies and effective implementation of the EU counterterrorism measures agreed following the March 2004 Madrid bombings.

Germany and the United States agree on the gravity of the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, although they differ on the most effective means of combating proliferation. Germany was strongly critical of the United States' abrogation of the

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and rejection of the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Bush administration's generally skeptical approach to multilateral arms control and nonproliferation treaties. At the same time, however, there is increasing recognition in Germany that existing treaty instruments must be made more effective and, in particular, adapted to address the actions of non-state groups. A particularly contentious issue is what happens when states party to the NPT or other international conventions are in violation of their obligations and diplomacy has been exhausted without effect, as may occur in the case of Iran or North Korea. A compromise between the German and U.S. positions is possible but would require Germany and other European states to accept that coercive measures, including possibly the use of force, might on occasion be necessary and justified to force compliance with nonproliferation obligations; the United States, for its part, would have to admit the value of diplomacy and peaceful engagement, as well as multilateral treaties and existing regimes, and work in good faith to make them more effective.

#### *China*

Although critical of China's human rights record, for the most part, Germany tends to view China's economic dynamism and increasing international political engagement in positive terms. Germany has no strategic commitments in the region and the issue of Taiwan's current and future status only indirectly affects Germany and the EU, while China's huge internal market is a strong magnet for German and European companies. Germans do not perceive China's rise as threatening to their interests or to global stability but, rather, see China as a possible "strategic partner," particularly in efforts to strengthen global institutions. The United States, in contrast, remains divided over China's intentions and the implications of rising Chinese power for U.S. global interests and security obligations and presence in East Asia. Unlike Germany, the United States would be directly drawn into any conflict between Taiwan and China. On the other hand, Sino-American relations were surprisingly stable during the first Bush administration, despite continuing pressure from hardliners

in the administration and the U.S. Congress, particularly on the Taiwan issue. The transfer of sensitive technologies and arms to the PRC nevertheless is likely to be monitored closely in Washington.

#### *Russia*

In contrast to many other issues, German and American differences over Russia appear insignificant, with both Chancellor Schröder and President Bush demonstrating reluctance to be openly critical of internal developments in the country. In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken steps to curtail freedom of the press and suppress democratic forces within Russia, a trend that could stall and even reverse Russia's path toward democratization. While a resuscitation of the Russian military threat to Europe remains unlikely, given Russia's proximity to Germany and now the European Union, Germans and Europeans have a strong stake in whether Russia becomes a stable democracy in Europe, reverts to authoritarian or autocratic rule, or dissolves into chaos. Germany, in particular, has devoted significant effort over the last decade to enhancing bilateral relations with Russia, while the Bush administration has made common cause with Putin in the name of the war on terror. Though motivated by different concerns, the similarity between the governments' approaches to Russia could offer a strong foundation for coordination or cooperation, depending on Russia's evolution.

#### *The United Nations*

The United Nations remains central to Germany's thinking about global governance. As Chancellor Schröder stated in his address to the UN General Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Germany's accession to the body: "The new threats, which no country in the world can tackle effectively on its own, make international cooperation more vital than ever." Recognizing that the new global environment demands new strategies, Schröder continued: "That is why we need to review whether the instruments available to the United Nations are appropriate to these new challenges." Germany is consequently seeking to push forward a restructuring and reform of the United Nations, including the UN

Security Council which, under the German plan, would include the creation of new permanent seats for Germany and other select nations.<sup>47</sup>

The German view of the United Nations contrasts strongly with that of the Bush administration, but also with the perspectives of other factions of opinion in the United States more positively disposed toward the international body. Although a majority of Americans support strengthening the United Nations, the divisive battle in the Security Council over Iraq, the scandal over the UN oil-for-food program, as well as the UN's repeated failures to address international security or humanitarian crises—as seen, most recently, in Sudan—have taken a toll on the UN's standing in U.S. published opinion. Germany's coordinated action with France in the UN Security Council, moreover, could strengthen skepticism in the United States about whether a permanent seat for Germany in the UN Security Council would lead to more effective UN or serve U.S. interests, aside from the more principled question of overrepresentation of European interests on the Council.

### Germany, the European Union, and the United States in the Global Economy

The economic relationship between Germany, Europe, and the United States has appeared relatively immune to negative spillover from the political disputes over Iraq and other issues. The relative resilience of the German-American economic relationship may be a reflection of the significant stakes involved for both countries. In 2003 alone, foreign direct investment in Europe by U.S. companies totaled nearly \$87 billion, or 65 percent of total U.S. FDI. In the same period, European firms channeled \$36.9 billion to the United States in foreign direct investment. Foreign affiliate sales in 2001 were approximately \$2.8 trillion, far exceeding total trade at the level of \$549 billion.<sup>48</sup>

Further, although German-American economic relations are increasingly embedded in and shaped by the larger U.S.-EU relationship, trade and investment linkages between the two countries remain significant. In

2002, U.S. firms channeled \$64.7 billion in FDI to Germany, while German foreign direct investment in the United States totaled over \$137 billion. Germany remains the leading European exporter to the U.S., although only roughly 10 percent of U.S. exports go to Germany, which is increasingly focused on intra-European trade. These commercial and financial ties have remained stable, despite the considerable turbulence in German-American relations in recent years.<sup>49</sup>

When U.S.-European trade, financial or regulatory disputes arise, moreover, transatlantic and multilateral mechanisms more often than not are successful at managing or resolving conflicts. Indeed, although trade controversies make for good headlines, in fact, they account for less than two percent of transatlantic commerce.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, U.S.-European competition in the economic realm is long-standing and largely viewed as natural and rule-governed. Additionally, both sides have worked in recent years to improve mechanisms to resolve disputes before they escalate. These include the creation of an “early warning system” to identify potentially problematic issues or legislative or regulatory developments that might lead to new transatlantic conflicts. In recent years, U.S. and European regulators and private companies also have intensified their exchanges. Among others, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the European American Business Council or, in the financial sector, the American Bankers Association and its national European counterparts, are useful supplements to official U.S-European exchanges on legislation and regulations that affect both American and European businesses. A “stakeholders” exchange on key regulatory issues, agreed at the June 2004 U.S.-EU summit, is intended to expand and intensify the transatlantic dialogue on a significant range of regulatory issues.<sup>51</sup> Such engagement is particularly important with regard to innovative technologies that may be relatively unregulated or for which rules are generally lacking.

Whether economic and financial ties will continue to be a stabilizing factor in the German-American and transatlantic relationships is not certain, however. Domestic economic problems and demographic

trends in the United States, Germany and Europe could weaken growth and productivity on both sides of the Atlantic, weakening the fabric of the Euroatlantic economy. Even if the United States and Europe both manage to address their respective structural weaknesses, the rise of China, India and other new actors in the global economy, will reduce the relative weight of the United States and EU in management of the multilateral trading system and global economy.<sup>52</sup>

In the near to mid-term, however, both Germany and the United States will continue to have significant common interests in the international economic system. The stakes are considerable, and the foundation for sustained cooperation strong. Although the Bush administration has inclined toward unilateral action on foreign and security, on global trade and financial issues it has had little choice but to operate within existing multilateral frameworks and institutions, a position that enjoys strong public support, despite Americans' concerns about the fairness of the World Trade Organization and the impact of multilateral trade agreements on jobs and the environment. The agenda for German-American economic cooperation in the coming decade remains challenging, however, and contains significant potential for conflict.

#### A CHANGING EUROPEAN UNION

German-American economic relations are inseparable from the broader relationship between the United States and the EU. Although the private sector plays a pivotal role in propelling and sustaining the integration of the American and European economies, governments—in this case, the United States and the European Union—create the framework in which they operate, for better or ill.

The U.S.-EU economic relationship is likely to undergo further change in the coming decades. Deepening European integration is extending the scope of EU responsibilities and actions and the "pooling" of sovereignty into additional areas of policy. New European agencies, such as the European Food Safety Agency, Cyber Security Agency, European

Environment Agency or European Chemicals Agency, will play a role in crafting the regulations and laws that govern transatlantic commerce. While the roles and responsibilities of such agencies are still evolving, it seems certain that U.S. and European regulators and regulations are likely to intersect more frequently.

The successive enlargement of the EU will also change the U.S.-EU relationship. For the foreseeable future, U.S. investment appears likely to remain concentrated in the "old" member states of the European Union, with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands topping the list. But U.S. multinational companies were active in eastern and central Europe prior to EU enlargement, and corporate interest and investment in the eastern and central European countries is expected to grow in the coming years.<sup>53</sup>

Beyond investment patterns, the relative success of the EU enlargement project and of German and European efforts to address structural weaknesses in European economies could have much broader consequences for transatlantic relations and for effective governance of the global economy. If the U.S. and European economies remain badly out of step, with one economy prospering, the other stalemated, the Euroatlantic economy will suffer, and the prospects for effective governance of the global trading and financial systems will diminish.<sup>54</sup>

#### PROBLEMS AT HOME: GERMAN ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND AMERICAN DEFICITS

German economic stagnation and the U.S. dual deficits are likely to be high priorities on the German-American bilateral agenda. The United States has chided Germany for failing to undertake the radical reforms that many view as necessary for the country to remain competitive in a global economy and to restore it to a path of growth. The return to growth in the German and European economies and concomitant increase in domestic demand, in this view, would have a salutary effect on the global economy—and on U.S. exports, growth, and trade balance. For many Germans, the perceived extremes of the American market economy—profound income and social

inequalities, insecurity, lack of health care, and the thin social security net, etc. (the so-called “American conditions”) are a model not to be emulated but rather avoided on the path to reform. Germans and Europeans, for their part, decry the administration’s profligacy and voice concerns about the implications of the dual U.S. deficits for global financial and economic stability. At the heart of the dispute are economic interests, but also different perspectives on the relative value of growth, economic reform, and other social objectives. The U.S. deficits, like the “*Reformstau*” in Germany, reflect societal choices, based on different societal understandings of how a market economy should function, and when intervention in the market is desirable or necessary to achieve economic or other goals.<sup>55</sup>

The fate of Germany’s economic reform program and the country’s economic performance will also be critical to the future of the EU as well as to Germany’s influence in an expanded Union. Germany retains significant economic weight in EU, both because of its geographic location and its still sizeable share of European GDP. If German growth therefore remains stagnant and the structural reform process stalls out, the economic growth and dynamism of the EU would be adversely affected. Moreover, stagnation—and the fear that it feeds among Germans—could cause Germany to champion policies within the EU that would retard the more dynamic economies of the central and eastern European member states. Chancellor Schröder’s proposal to eliminate asymmetries in corporate taxation rates throughout the EU might protect German jobs but would also eliminate the comparative advantage of some new EU member states, with negative effects on the process of EU integration. Even in an enlarged EU, Germany is likely to play a critical part in determining whether the European Union successfully achieves the goal, proclaimed in the Lisbon criteria, of becoming a highly competitive global economy.

#### TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY ISSUES

Transatlantic quarrels over tariff barriers to trade have given way to more frequent conflicts over legal and

regulatory requirements, which reflect domestic political pressures, economic choices, and cultural biases. As a consequence, the United States, Germany, and the EU in recent years have been entangled in disputes over product standards, food safety, corporate governance, competition policy, and privacy—in short, an entire range of regulatory issues that Europeans and Americans must address in response to technological innovation and globalization. The fault-lines in such disputes sometimes run through the Atlantic, but just as frequently, the players involved in shaping what has been termed transatlantic domestic policy “jump formal borders, override national policies, and challenge traditional forms of governance throughout the Atlantic world.”<sup>56</sup> A particular point of contention is a perceived U.S. tendency to apply its laws and regulations beyond its territory. Squabbles over “extraterritoriality” preceded the Bush administration but have multiplied in recent years as U.S. legislators and officials have responded to scandals (i.e. Sarbanes-Oxley to improve corporate governance) and to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (i.e. the U.S. insistence on air marshals for certain U.S.-bound flights or the transfer of airline passenger data, new U.S. provisions on port security, etc.).

On these and other issues, distinguishing between economic interests, domestic political pressures, and cultural preferences may be difficult. German and American approaches to product standards or corporate governance, for example, reflect unique historical and institutional influences but also entail huge economic stakes for companies and national economies. Embedded values and institutional impulses may be particularly important when previously unregulated areas are involved, as in approaches to genetically modified foods and organisms.

#### GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

When their combined clout is directed toward common aims, the United States and European Union can determine, for better or worse, the shape of international standards, rules and regimes and the quality of global economic governance. The combined GDP

of the United States and the European Union (15) constitutes approximately 40 percent of global GDP and over a third of global trade.<sup>57</sup> The United States and European Union continue to dominate international economic and financial organizations (e.g. The World Bank, The World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund), and provide the overwhelming share of official development assistance.<sup>58</sup> Although China, India and other developing countries can be expected to play a growing role in directing the international economy, the future of the Doha trade round and achievement of its key objectives regarding trade liberalization will depend critically on whether the United States and Europe work together rather than at cross purposes on such critical issues as agricultural subsidies and trade and tariffs on industrial goods. For the foreseeable future, effective governance of the global commercial and financial systems, in short, will depend on the health of the U.S.-EU partnership.

#### NEW CENTERS OF COMPETITION: THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA

Germany, the EU, and the United States face a common, long-term challenge from new centers of economic dynamism in China and India. "Outsourcing" has already become a topic of heated political debate, as Americans, Germans, and other Europeans worry about the migration of jobs to low-cost labor markets in East and South Asia. Beyond employment pressures, China's rapid economic growth is also likely to fuel transatlantic and European debates about international imbalances, energy and resource use, and environmental degradation, as well as about China's role in the international economic and political system more generally. While the United States and European Union have a shared interest in seeing that China is successfully integrated into the global economy, as noted above, there is significant potential for transatlantic competition over new markets and over specific trade issues, such as the sale of arms or sensitive technologies to China.

#### German-American Relations: A Shifting Foundation?

The defense partnership that once constituted the core of the German-American relationship has grown fractured and strained. Yet, despite far-reaching changes in the global environment, the United States and Germany have significant security and foreign policy interests in common. They share similar goals in the Middle East, are mutually vulnerable to the potentially catastrophic effects of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and struggle to address the myriad problems emanating from weak or failing states. In confronting these and other global problems, however, they frequently differ over the means, the timing, and the framework for action. To complicate matters, the institutions for managing the new security agenda have been battered by German-American and transatlantic differences and disputes. NATO, the European Union, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency have emerged from the bruising debate over Iraq in a weakened state.

It is little wonder, then, that many have begun to speak of economic, financial, and trade cooperation as the new foundation for German-American and transatlantic relations. Neither U.S. nor German and European economic and industry leaders question the relevance or value of this relationship. As Hamilton and Quinlan conclude in their study of transatlantic investment and "deep" economic links, "neither party can afford a transatlantic split."<sup>59</sup> Vital self-interest precludes a transatlantic divorce in the economic realm.

At the same time, however, it remains unclear whether economic "deep integration" can and will constitute the central and stabilizing pillar of the transatlantic relationship, much as security cooperation provided the "glue" between the United States, Germany, and Europe during the Cold War. It is possible that the transatlantic economy has acquired a life of its own,

subject to its own rules and governed by a separate set of mechanisms and impulses that leave it relatively immune to political jolts but also without significant positive influences on security or political cooperation. On the other hand, the possibility of negative spillover cannot be excluded. Reports in October 2004 of declining sales of U.S. consumer goods in France and Germany, and the depiction in a major German weekly of GM's announcement of layoffs at its Opel plant in Bochum as more evidence of American "Wild West" methods suggest that commercial relations may not be immune to growing anti-Americanism and negative perceptions of U.S. leadership.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, demographics and disparate trends in American growth and productivity could undermine the foundation for the Euroatlantic economy and sow further dissension between the United States and Europe.



PART THREE  
BUILDING A NEW FOUNDATION

03

## BUILDING A NEW FOUNDATION FOR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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For the foreseeable future, the defining characteristic and condition of German-American and transatlantic relations will be uncertainty. Much remains in flux—in the United States, in Germany and Europe, and in the world. These changes are likely to set new limits but also open up new opportunities for German-American cooperation.

The German-American relationship remains vitally important to the United States, to Germany, and to the European Union. Without effective transatlantic cooperation, many global problems will go unmet. Only relationships and alliances based on shared values and enduring interests, rather than temporary convenience or expediency, will be robust enough to sustain the prolonged cooperation that will be necessary to guarantee security, promote prosperity, and surmount common transnational challenges.

For the United States, Germany matters, because Europe remains the United States' partner of first resort. Even in a European Union of 25 or more member states, Germany will continue to have significant influence. As the European Union works to define its final borders and internal constitution, Germany will play a pivotal role in determining what kind of Europe emerges—and whether its aspirations, policies, and role in global and regional affairs are compatible with U.S. interests.

For Germany, the United States remains the "indispensable power" in the pursuit of many German and

European goals. Whether the issue is UN reform and the strengthening of international institutions, the resolution of conflicts both within and outside Europe, or modernization and stabilization of the wider Middle East, the ability of Germany and Europe to achieve their goals could be influenced significantly by developments both within the United States and by U.S. policies and actions. Regardless of how Germans feel about the particular U.S. administration in office, U.S. influence and unprecedented power are unavoidable, if sometimes uncomfortable, facts for Germany and Europe.

For both states, the bilateral link remains a meaningful channel for managing change in the broader relationship between Europe and the United States. The United States' relations with Germany will retain an important bilateral component but at the same time become more "European" in character, reflecting the hybrid nature of an evolving European Union. The creation of a new balance between Berlin, Brussels, and Washington, D.C. will not be an easy process. Berlin could play a constructive role in facilitating this process of transition and adaptation.

A more reasoned and modern German-American relationship must be based on a clear understanding of the impact of strategic realities, societal change, and cultural influences on German and American world views, policies, and priorities. Both countries must go back to basics and become reacquainted with the realities of a post-9/11 America and unified Germany in a unifying Europe. It is also important, however, to keep in mind the meaningful societal connections, interests and, yes, values that continue to bind the two countries.

The creation and maintenance of a sober, well-considered relationship should be guided by the following principles.

### Guiding Principles

*The advent of a second Bush term creates an opportunity for a fresh start in German-American relations.* In the past, second term presidencies have often ushered in significant personnel changes and adjustments in tone, emphasis, or even policy. Much depends on whether the Bush administration's recent turn to a multilateral framework for action represents a rethinking of the neo-conservative program or merely a tactical pause necessitated by resource constraints and a close election race. On the other hand, the president could as well view his reelection as an endorsement of central tenets of the administration's foreign policy. Influential neo-conservatives, moreover, are likely to remain in influential positions, but a struggle within the president's party and administration over the direction of U.S. foreign policy should not be excluded. Even if the second Bush term brings new overtures to Europe and Germany, it will not eliminate the structural, societal, and cultural sources of many German-American disputes.

*Trust and political will are necessary but not sufficient to build a new German-American relationship. A renewal of mutual trust and commitment, both at the senior leadership level and between publics, is needed to build a new German-American and transatlantic relationship.* Much damage has been done to U.S. standing in Germany and Europe, and the restoration of public trust in American power and

leadership will not be an easy task. A particular burden of responsibility falls on U.S. leaders and officials, and, in this regard, tone and style matter. The Bush administration must demonstrate through words and actions that it genuinely desires improved relations with Germany and that it is prepared to engage Europeans on different terms. That process can begin during the transition period, in which the administration has the opportunity to signal its good faith intentions through relevant appointments, speeches, statements, and the president's inaugural address. On the other hand, any sense that a new bilateral or transatlantic initiative represented merely a tactical shift, rather than a fundamental rethinking of the value and relevance of the transatlantic relationship, would quickly quell German and European enthusiasm for reciprocity. For their part, German leaders must work to convince a skeptical population of the necessity and value of dialogue and cooperation the United States, regardless of the party or person in power. Appropriate reciprocal gestures from the German government would signal to the new administration and—perhaps even more important—to the German population that a new beginning in German-American relations is possible and desirable. The restoration of mutual goodwill is critical to the successful navigation of the policy differences that will almost inevitably arise.

*The United States and Germany must begin to adapt their bilateral relationship to an evolving Europe. This means acknowledging that German-American relations are inextricably linked to the U.S.-EU relationship.* As long as the European Union continues to be comprised of sovereign member states, the United States can and must continue to engage Berlin on a bilateral basis. At the same time, the German-American dialogue and relationship in the coming years will evolve within a complex set of intersecting relationships—between the United States and Germany; between Germany and the EU member states, above all, France; and between the United States and the European Union. To begin the process of adaptation, the United States should make clear that it embraces European integration and that it is not seeking to halt or thwart the process of deepening European cooperation in foreign, security, and

defense issues. On the other hand, U.S. leaders will feel greater assurance in a more “European” German-American relationship if the emerging Europe does not conceive of itself, nor act as, as counterweight or competitor to the United States, an outcome that Germany could help to avert through its positive influence within the EU. Americans will not trust Germany to serve as a bridge between the United States and the EU unless German leaders demonstrate a willingness to champion an independent vision of Europe’s future vis-à-vis Paris and within the EU.

In practical terms, the transition to a more “European” German-American relationship will require adjustments in the modalities of engagement. This transition is already well advanced in the economic realm. Businesses and U.S. governmental bodies have begun to adapt to the migration of decision-making expertise and authority to Brussels and the diminishing role of national capitals in economic affairs. A similar process of adaptation may be necessary in security and defense affairs, where for the foreseeable future bilateral dialogue, NATO, and the evolving ESDP will continue to coexist uneasily. During this period of transition, it must be possible and legitimate for the United States to engage Berlin or other EU members bilaterally without provoking charges of “cherry picking” in order to “divide and conquer” Europe. In the meantime, American political and corporate leaders, as well as policymakers and the public, would benefit from a greater understanding of the European Union, Germany’s influence within the EU, and the internal dynamics and modalities of EU institutions and decision-making bodies.

*Values differences exist but do not make German-American and transatlantic conflicts inevitable.* Many recent German-American policy disputes reflect conflicts over the means and framework for implementing fundamental *common* values. Moreover, amidst growing talk of a transatlantic “values gap,” it is important to remember that values are not static, but rather change over time and can be hotly contested within societies, as seen in the United States. In the end, rather than predetermining political conflict, social values are perhaps best understood as the lens through which Germans, Europeans, and

Americans view the world, influencing definitions of interest and shaping policy preferences but not determining policy outcomes or preordaining conflict. For the foreseeable future, it would be well for Germans to remember that, in the realm of values, they confront not one, but two Americas.

*Anti-Americanism exists and could pose risks for German-American cooperation.* Governments tend to be pragmatic entities. Although few Germans or Europeans welcomed the election of President Bush to a second term, they must deal with the government at hand. Public opinion, on the other hand, is likely to remain strongly critical of the U.S. president. It is possible that the election of President Bush to a second term will transform the negative attitudes heretofore directed primarily at the Bush presidency and its policies into a broader condemnation of America, i.e. into widespread anti-Americanism. Whether the red-green coalition or the CDU and its possible coalition partners prevail in the national elections in 2006, they must still answer to a public that feels, at best, distance from the United States, at worst, openly hostile. Under these circumstances, the German government could find it difficult to sustain necessary cooperation with the United States.

*German-American relations are not the monopoly of governments. The private sector, as well as civil society groups, have a vital role to play in building a new German-American relationship.* U.S., German, and European businesses are significant stakeholders in a positive and robust German-American and transatlantic relationship, as well as important participants in transatlantic discussions of the regulatory and legal issues that arise from our deepening economic integration. Businesses should work to ensure that different approaches to regulatory, economic, or financial issues do not escalate unnecessarily into fractious crises and should remind political leaders and publics on both sides of the Atlantic that jobs, growth, and prosperity in Europe and the United States are tightly interlinked in a global economy. Similarly, nongovernmental organizations can provide alternative channels for dialogue and the exchange of information. U.S. NGOs, representing a diversity of opinion and perspectives on a wide range

of domestic and foreign policy issues, can be particularly useful in fostering a more nuanced and accurate view of the divisions of opinion within the United States. Universities and research organizations, moreover, can help to illuminate the underlying causes of U.S.-German and transatlantic differences and scope out long-term strategies for putting the bilateral and U.S.-European relationships on a firmer foundation. Educational and professional exchange programs are vital to sustain the “human infrastructure” of German-American and transatlantic relations.

The German-American relationship will remain vulnerable to unanticipated shocks and external influences. Progress toward crafting a more sober, well-considered relationship could be sidetracked by unanticipated events over which political leaders have limited control. A major terror attack on the United States, for example, could have domestic and foreign policy repercussions that would strengthen German concerns about U.S. power and leadership abroad and American civil liberties at home. A worsening situation in Iraq or Afghanistan or a new foreign policy crisis over Iran or North Korea similarly could create new opportunities for cooperation or put German-American relations under renewed pressure, derailing efforts to stabilize the relationship.

### A Strategy for Managing Change

Seizing on the opportunity provided by the end of the U.S. presidential elections, both sides should take small, pragmatic steps to shape the German-American relationship and agenda in positive ways, while working to avert negative fallout from unpredictable developments, both domestic and international, which may affect the German-American and transatlantic relationships. A long-term strategy also is needed to build a solid foundation for a robust and reasoned German-American relationship.

*In the near term, both sides should have modest expectations, and work on achieving concrete results that will demonstrate the continued value and relevance of German-American and transatlantic engagement to both countries' policy agendas.*

This means, first and foremost, tackling issues with positive prospects for successful coordination. In the absence of a significant change in country or in U.S. policy, it will be difficult for the United States and Germany to expand their cooperation in Iraq. Concerns about insecurity and instability and German perceptions of the Iraq war as illegitimate and unnecessary will continue to constrain the German government's ability to lend greater assistance to the U.S.-led effort, although more assistance with training, strengthening of civil society, and similar tasks might become possible if the international community were to become more engaged in Iraq.

A more positive agenda for U.S.-German cooperation could focus on Afghanistan, as well as developments in Russia and, possibly, in Iran. The challenges of post-conflict stabilization and reform in Afghanistan remain formidable. Although the separate mandates of Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led ISAF operation may have operational disadvantages, the arrangement has allowed Germany to take on a role compatible with legal and political constraints on the German armed forces. Both the German and U.S. governments have been reluctant to openly criticize Russian president Putin, but both countries have a vital interest in Russia's future evolution. Iran will remain a difficult issue, but enhanced U.S.-European coordination is not only possible, but also vitally necessary. The Bush administration has been divided over both Iran and North Korea; personnel changes in a second term could provide an opportunity to forge both domestic and transatlantic consensus in support of a policy combining diplomatic engagement—which hardliners in the administration has so far eschewed—and the threat of coercive or punitive actions.

*Beyond pragmatic, cooperation on near-term challenges, the United States, Germany, and Europe should engage in a sustained strategic dialogue about critical security and economic challenges—before divisive issues escalate into political crises that further weaken the transatlantic relationship. Some will argue that there is little to be gained from a “philosophical” debate that could highlight fundamental differences and expend time and resources*

unproductively. Yet, while targeted, pragmatic initiatives can help to restore mutual belief in the utility of German-American and transatlantic cooperation, concurrent exchanges on more fundamental, “first principle” issues of the international order—with which governments on both sides of the Atlantic are grappling—is essential if the two countries, and the United States and Europe more generally, are to move beyond tactical coordination and forge a strategic consensus. Such exchanges can also help to provide “early warning” of areas or issues on which German and American values, perspectives, or approaches are likely to collide. Intelligence and research as well as planning capacities in both governments should be engaged in this dialogue, but nongovernmental organizations should contribute to this exchange effort as well.

Among the fundamental issues that merit more extensive exchanges:

#### THE USE OF FORCE

The conflict over Iraq revealed deep fissures in German and American perspectives on the utility and legitimacy of the use of force—particularly preemptive or preventive use—and who is empowered to make those determinations. The issue is unlikely to go away. Further national debate—both in Germany and the United States—as well as bilateral and U.S.-European exchanges on the utility, legitimacy, and intelligence requirements of military intervention in a changing threat environment is needed. A central issue concerns the locus of decision-making for authorizing military action. Americans are likely to remain more wary than Germans of assigning the UN Security Council the sole responsibility for such decisions, but Germans and other Europeans are equally uneasy with the notion that the United States alone will make decisions about when to use military force. Additionally, thorough consideration of what happens after military force has been employed is essential, particularly if the United States continues to champion forcible regime change as a response to terrorism or WMD proliferation.<sup>61</sup> The aim of a dialogue on the use of force should be to forge a new consensus on the

principles and institutional arrangements that will govern the use of force in the changed strategic environment.<sup>62</sup> Resolution of German-American and transatlantic differences over the use of force is essential if the German-American and transatlantic defense partnerships are to be sustained and remain relevant to the changed threat environment.

#### TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM

Three years after the September 11 terrorist attacks the German-American cooperation on terrorism is not underpinned by societal consensus on the strategic framing of the problem.<sup>63</sup> In particular, the United States, Germany, and Europe need a coherent, consensus-based strategy for countering jihadist terrorism. The problem is, in part, different strategic perspectives on terrorism, its root causes, and therefore its remedies. The Bush administration has framed global terrorism as a war rooted in hatred of American freedom and in which all possible means, including proactive military action, must be used to eradicate the al Qaeda leadership. Germany, in contrast, has stressed the importance of non-military tools to address the conditions and incentives that fuel jihadist terrorism. In addition to a discussion of strategies abroad, both countries could benefit from exchanges on their respective experiences in striking the appropriate balance between freedom and security.

#### ISLAM, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE WEST

The United States, Germany, and Europe have strong common interests in the Broader Middle East. The region also unfortunately carries significant potential for renewed transatlantic political clashes. The aim of bilateral and transatlantic dialogue should be a sufficient degree of coordination in U.S., German, and European policies such that states in the region are prevented from dividing the United States from Europe in ways that are counterproductive to their shared aims. Given the rising tide of anti-American sentiment in the region, Germany and Europe may be tempted to distance themselves from U.S. policy and actions in the region. In the long term, however, the United States remains an indispensable partner in

the region, particularly with regard to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In light of EU division over Iraq, there will also be a strong tendency to insist on the primacy of the EU as a vehicle for U.S.-European cooperation in the region. Recent experience—e.g. the initiative of the European three vis-à-vis Iran—would argue for a less ideological approach to U.S.-European cooperation in the Broader Middle East. The dialogue should also address the broader issue of western relations to the Muslim world and, conversely, of Muslim perceptions of the United States, Germany and other European countries.

#### THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND ASIA

The rise of China will pose significant economic and political challenges to Germany and the United States and could provide further fuel for conflict in U.S.-European relations as well. The migration of manufacturing jobs but also, increasingly, R&D capacity to China poses economic challenges to the German and American economies and is bound to be a contentious political issue in both countries. Competition for the China market, moreover, may entail new disputes over regulations that have trade impact and transfer of sensitive “dual-use” (i.e. those with both civilian and military application) or military technologies, particularly if EU embargo on arms trade with China is lifted in 2005, as many observers anticipate. More generally, both the United States and Europe will have to adjust to the increasing engagement of China in global affairs. On the other hand, the United States, and Germany and its European partners all have a shared stake in achieving the smooth integration of China into the global financial and trading systems and in ensuring that this giant's rise does not provoke a conflict with Taiwan or otherwise undermine stability and security in Asia and beyond.

In the long term, the United States and Germany must also work to “modernize” the mutual perceptions that Germans and Americans have of one another. For too long, Germany and the United States have lived off of the intellectual and emotional capital of the Cold War. Perceptions have lagged far behind the profound

changes that have occurred in the United States, Germany, and Europe.

Governments, the media, and nongovernmental organizations each have a part to play in creating more informed and nuanced views of American and German-European realities. U.S. public diplomacy efforts should be directed at explaining the cultural, historical, political, and institutional factors that shape American politics, perspectives, and policies. While the rationale for official government policy is important to convey to German audiences, U.S.-sponsored informational programs should also feature other voices and perspectives that reflect the full spectrum of opinion in a divided America. German information efforts, in turn, must be directed toward informing Americans about the reality of a modern, unified Germany and, in particular, the pivotal role of the European Union in shaping Germany and German policy. Both U.S. and German public diplomacy and education efforts will be more successful to the degree that they take into account the media landscape in both countries. A concerted effort must be made, in particular, to engage younger opinion leaders in all facets of public and private life.

Programs to update the American and Germans' mutual perceptions are of course no panacea for what ails the German-American relationship. They are also likely to be slow-working and perhaps only latent in effect. Further, greater understanding of our respective perspectives, institutions, and values will not eliminate conflicts. Education, information, and dialogue could help, however, to halt and even reverse the trend of demonization and gathering ill will that has beset German-American relations over the last several years.

#### Conclusion

There will be little room for nostalgia or sentimentality in the process of crafting a new German-American relationship. To gain and sustain domestic support, the German-American, as well as the U.S.-European, relationship must be seen as both relevant and useful,

not only by government leaders and officials but also by the German and American publics as well. Herein lies the greatest challenge for the future.

Near-term, reciprocal initiatives to stem the erosion of trust and establish a new track record of successful, pragmatic cooperation are an important first step. Long-term, sustained efforts to manage change and adapt the relationship to new global and domestic realities are critical. This means strategic engagement on the fundamental issues of the twenty-first century that entails a true give-and-take rather than public posturing and rhetorical duels that play well with domestic audiences but fuel alienation across the Atlantic.

Importantly, both sides would benefit from a better understanding of the influence of values and the historical, cultural, and institutional forces that shape them—in German and American politics and in German-American relations. As in the past, many future disputes will involve judgments, rooted in cultural and historical legacies, about the best means of pursuing shared goals or achieving common values—and of the priorities Germany and America should assign when goals and values come into conflict with one another. Understanding how and why values make themselves manifest in policy debates, as well as the limits of their influence, could be critical to the resolution of existing and future German-American disputes, from the use of force and the role of the UN in global politics, to data privacy, global warming, or food safety. Mutual respect and knowledge of the role of values in shaping policy responses will not ensure resolution of German-American differences, but it can provide a clearer picture of the possibilities and limits for coordination or consensus.

Political will and leadership are essential if the uncertainty that pervades German-American is to give way to a spirit of cooperation rather than devolving into acrimonious competition. American leaders must be prepared to place renewed priority on cooperation with the United States' long-time allies and to deal

with Germany and the EU in a spirit of genuine partnership. Germany and Germans must decide what kind of relationship they want with the United States—and whether they are willing to work within the EU to shape a Europe that conceives of itself as a partner with the United States. The future of the U.S.-German relationship, in this sense, is inextricably linked both to the evolution of a divided America, and of the European Union. Adjustment and adaptation at the bilateral level must go hand-in-hand with the crafting of a new U.S.-EU relationship.

In the absence of a simplifying and compelling threat, both German-American and U.S.-EU relations must be based on greater knowledge of and respect for their differences as well as commonalities. The days of sentiment are over. This need not mean the end of German-American relations or partnership, however, but a new beginning.

## NOTES

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- 39 Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113 (June 2002), <http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>
- 40 *Defense Policy Guidelines* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 21 May 2003); Stephen F. Szabo and Mary N. Hampton, *Reinventing the German Military*, AICGS Policy Report 11 (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2003), pp. 17-19.
- 41 Szabo and Hampton, p. 10-11. In recent opinion polls, a majority of Germans have expressed support for the idea of a European Union "superpower" that could function as an equal to the United States, but support declines if a global role for the European Union would necessitate increased spending for the military. See *Transatlantic Trends 2004*, p. 17; *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, pp. 9-10.
- 42 "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," (Brussels: 12 December 2003) <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. On the implementation and operationalization of the European security strategy see Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, *A European Defence Strategy* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004).
- 43 Despite several NATO and EU initiatives to improve European capabilities, a group of senior U.S. and European military commanders in August 2004 concluded that "efforts to close the gap between European defense goals and capabilities have yet to produce meaningful changes in available military capability." See the joint statement by leading European and U.S. former military commanders, "Joint Declaration on European Defense Integration," CSIS Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, 19 August 2004. On strategies to advance the ESDP, see Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, *A European Defence Strategy* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004).
- 44 Lindley-French and Algieri, pp. 35-39.
- 45 Jon B. Alterman, *The Promise of Partnership: U.S.-EU Coordination in the Middle East*, AICGS Policy Report 10 (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2003); Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Middle East as Fulcrum for the Transatlantic Relationship," AICGS Advisor, 28 October 2004, <http://www.aicgs.org/c/feldmanc2.shtml>; William Drozdiak, et al., *Partners in Frustration: Europe, the United States and the Broader Middle East*, Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2004).
- 46 *Partners in Frustration*, pp. x-xi.
- 47 "Address by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," New York, 24 September 2003, available on the Germany Info website.
- 48 Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, *Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins University, 2004), p.xii, 15.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 108-111. As Hamilton and Quinlan report, in 2003, when the war of words raged across the Atlantic, U.S. companies invested some \$7 billion in Germany, a rebound from 2002, when \$5 billion had been withdrawn. German stakeholders in U.S. ties are concentrated in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westfalia, Hesse, and Bavaria, when both investment and trade flows are taken into account.
- 50 *Ibid.*, xi.
- 51 The framework of U.S.-EU regulatory cooperation-the 1997 U.S.-EC Mutual Recognition Agreement-has facilitated the successful conclusion of multiple "Mutual Recognition Agreements," but disputes persist.
- 52 W. Bowman Cutter, Paula Stern, Frances G. Burwell, and Peter S. Rashish, *The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?*, Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, November 2004).
- 53 Hamilton and Quinlan, pp. 135-143.
- 54 Cutter, et al.
- 55 For an alternative, more positive view, see Olaf Gersemann, *Amerikanische Verhältnisse: Die falsche Angst der Deutschen vor dem Cowboy-Kapitalismus* (Munich: Finanzbuch Verlag, 2003).
- 56 *Ibid.*, 163.
- 57 Hamilton and Quinlan, 164.
- 58 Cutter, et al., 1.
- 59 Hamilton and Quinlan, 164.
- 60 Following the GM announcement, the cover of the German weekly, *Stern*, carried a picture of a red, white, and blue cowboy boot, stamped with the GM logo, crushing Opel workers. See Mark Landler, "Resentment Toward G.M. Is Growing in Germany," *The New York Times*, 26 October 2004; "Well known US brands see sales in Europe fall," *Financial Times*, 25 October 2004..
- 61 As former Ambassador James Dobbins has argued, "regime change as a response to state supported terrorism will remain a credible strategy only if the United States demonstrates the ability not just to take down odious regimes, but to build up better ones in their place." See James Dobbins, "The Effect of Terrorist Attacks in Spain on Transatlantic Cooperation in the War on Terror," Testimony presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, 31 March 2004.
- 62 Ivo H. Daalder and James B. Steinberg, "New Rules on When to Go To War," *Financial Times*, 2 August 2004. See also Walter Slocombe, "Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy," *Survival*, vol. 45 no.1 (Spring 2003).
- 63 Daalder and Steinberg.



## ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

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Im Kielwasser des Irak-Krieges und der U.S. Präsidentschaftswahlen ist die Zukunft der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen voller Ungewissheit. Zwar schreitet die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den zwei Regierungen stetig voran, aber über den Pragmatismus hinaus gibt es wenig Übereinstimmung darüber wie—oder auch nur ob—die deutsch-amerikanische Kluft zu überbrücken wäre, noch kann man sich darauf verständigen, wie eine „modernisierte“ deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung auszusehen hätte.

Dieser Bericht zielt darauf ab, den Aufbau einer gut-durchdachten und realistischeren deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung zu fördern. Er setzt den Glauben, daß eine positive und robuste Beziehung zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten sowohl relevant als auch grundlegend für die Interessen beider Länder und der U.S.-EU Beziehung bleibt, voraus. Aber diese Beziehung muss sich anpassen—an ein verändertes Amerika, an ein verändertes Europa und an ein verändertes global-strategisches Umfeld.

Der Bericht gliedert sich in drei Teile. Teil I analysiert die zu Grunde liegenden und auslösenden Ursachen des Wandels in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. Teil II untersucht die Einsätze und Interessen beider Seiten im Hinblick auf zwei Hauptdimensionen der bilateralen Beziehung: Sicherheit und Abwehr/Verteidigung; und Wirtschafts-, Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen. Der abschließende Teil schlägt einige Richtlinien vor und bietet eine Strategie, die Veränderungen bewältigen und eine „europäischere“ und modernere deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung schaffen kann.

### Teil I: Antriebe zur Veränderung

Strukturelle Veränderungen in internationaler Politik, das Zusammenprallen diverser Führungsstile und Persönlichkeiten, soziale Transformationen in Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten, und fortdauernde kulturelle Einflüsse haben alle eine Rolle in der neuesten Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen gespielt. Die Nachbeben der Irak-Kontroverse sind ihrerseits selbst zu einem Antrieb für Wandel in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen geworden.

### STRUKTURELLE VERÄNDERUNGEN

Drei Arten der strukturellen Veränderung haben das komplexe Kalkül der Kosten- und Vorteilsanalyse in der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung geändert. Der Kollaps des Zwei-Pole-Systems und die Entstehung einer

neuen europäischen Ordnung haben das strategische Fundament der „speziellen“ Sicherheits-Partnerschaft zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland geschwächt. Gleichzeitig sind die U.S.-amerikanische und europäische Wirtschaft durch direkte Auslandsinvestitionen und andere strukturelle Bindungen, welche auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks zu Arbeitsplätzen, Wachstum und Wohlstand beitragen, eng miteinander verbunden. Drittens sind Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten weiterhin durch ein dichtes Netzwerk institutioneller und individueller Bindungen verbunden, welche sowohl die besonderen, aus dem kalten Krieg stammenden, Beziehungen der zwei Länder als auch die wachsende Bedeutung nicht-staatlicher Akteure in internationalen Beziehungen widerspiegeln.

#### DAS AUFEINANDERPRALLEN UNTERSCHIEDLICHER FÜHRUNGSSTILE

Über strukturelle Veränderungen hinaus hat ein Zusammenprallen der Führungsstile und Persönlichkeiten zu den Spannungen in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen beigetragen. Die religiöse Überzeugung und moralischen Impulse des Präsidenten George W. Bush lassen sich mit der amerikanischen politischen Kultur vereinbaren, werden aber in einer Gesellschaft, die in ihrer Orientierung immer sekulärer geworden ist, eher als Mißklang vernommen. Ebenso spiegelt der selbstbewusste Führungsstil des Bundeskanzlers Gerhard Schröder die Sensibilitäten eines völlig unabhängigen, vereinten Deutschlands wieder, das die Lektionen der Vergangenheit gelernt hat und daher gerechtfertigt und in der Lage ist, seine Interessen unabhängig von anderen zu definieren. Schröders Stil mag zwar Beifall in der deutschen Bevölkerung finden, harmonisiert aber nicht mit den Vorstellungen und Erwartungen, die viele Amerikaner von Deutschland hegen.

#### EIN SICH ÄNDERNDES AMERIKA, EIN SICH ÄNDERNDES DEUTSCHLAND

Wie schon oft bemerkt wurde, fühlen sich Amerikaner seit dem 11. September „im Krieg“ in einer Weise, wie es Deutsche und Europäer nicht tun. Amerikaner haben Änderungen in ihrer Lebensweise, ihren politischen Prozessen und Institutionen und in der Art und Weise, wie sie sich selbst und die Welt sehen, akzeptiert. Auf der anderen Seite des Atlantiks ist es der deutsche 9.11.—der 9. November, 1989, der Tag an dem die Mauer fiel—der Deutschland auf immer verändert hat. In den letzten fünfzehn Jahren hat Deutschland damit gerungen, zwei ungleiche politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Systeme zu vereinen, und dabei gleichzeitig strukturelle ökonomische Reformen durchzuführen—Abläufe, die mit sich vertiefender wirtschaftlicher und politischer Integration der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, sowie der östlichen Erweiterung der Europäischen Union, zusammenfielen.

#### EINE KLUFT DER WERTE?

Trotz der beiderseitigen Annahme einiger fundamentaler Werte—Freiheit, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und freie Marktwirtschaft—durchdringen verschiedene historische Erfahrungen und ein unterschiedliches kulturelles Verständnis dennoch viele deutsch-amerikanische Streitfragen. Geschichte und Kultur sind die Linsen, durch die Deutsche und Amerikaner ein verändertes internationales System wahrnehmen und verstehen, und die die Weise, in der beide Gesellschaften auf neue Bedrohungen, auf wirtschaftliche Globalisierung und die Herausforderungen von Multikulturalismus und sozialer Vielfalt reagiert haben, beeinflussen. Obwohl ihr Einfluss weder unbedingt genau festgelegt ist noch direkt spürbar ist, wird, wo soziale Werte in deutsch-amerikanischen politischen Streitfragen auftreten, eine Konfliktbewältigung weitaus schwieriger, da Werte meist tief verwurzelt, oft unausgesprochen und manchmal gegenseitig unvereinbar sind. Dies wird unter anderem in den deutsch-amerikanischen Differenzen über den Irak-Krieg, den Gebrauch von staatlicher Gewalt, der Rolle von internationalen Institutionen und Verträgen, dem Wert von Multikulturalismus oder der Reaktion auf Terrorismus deutlich. Bei Themen am Schneidepunkt von Religion und Politik sind Kultur- und Wertunterschiede besonders hervorgehoben.

## DAS VERMÄCHTNIS DES IRAK-KRIEGES

Letztendlich wird die deutsch-amerikanische Kontroverse über den Irak-Krieg wahrscheinlich langfristige Konsequenzen für die bilaterale Beziehung haben. Amerikas Ansehen in Deutschland, sowie Deutschlands Glaubwürdigkeit in Washington, ist vermindert. Nachdem sie jahrzehntelang eine klare Entscheidung zwischen Frankreich und der Europäischen Union auf der einen Seite und Deutschlands transatlantischen Bindungen auf der anderen vermieden haben, scheint die Rot-Grüne Koalition Deutschlands Zukunft unwiderruflich auf Deutschlands Partner in Paris und anderen europäischen Hauptstädten gesetzt zu haben, während Zweifel an der Wünschbarkeit europäischer Integration und dem Wert einer Zusammenarbeit mit Europa in den USA stärker geworden sind.

## Teil II: Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen nach Irak: Die Herausforderung des Wandels

Die ungleichen Antriebe der Veränderung schreiben keine dauerhafte Kluft in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor. Die beiden Länder haben noch viele gemeinsame Interessen, sowohl im Hinblick auf die jeweiligen Sicherheitsziele als auch auf ihren zukünftigen wirtschaftlichen Wachstum, Wohlstand und ihre Stabilität.

## DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHE SICHERHEITSKOOPERATION

Trotz des Mangels einer zwingenden und verbindenden strategischen Zielsetzung teilen die USA und Deutschland dennoch gemeinsame Sicherheitsinteressen. Beide Länder sind dabei, sowohl allein, als auch in Zusammenarbeit mit Bündnispartnern, ihre Streitkräfte und Strategie an ein neues Gefahrenumfeld anzupassen. Zudem arbeiten Deutschland und die USA, obwohl manchmal Meinungsunterschiede im Hinblick auf Methoden, Prioritäten und Reihenfolge bestehen, in Afghanistan und an globalen Anti-Terrorismus- und Atomwaffensperr-Maßnahmen zusammen. Obwohl die Sichtweisen in Hauptpunkten des Themas „weiterer Naher Osten“ auseinandergehen, teilen Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten ein grundlegendes Interesse daran, den Israeli-Palästinenser Konflikt gelöst zu sehen und das Aufkommen eines atomar aufgerüsteten Irans oder die Auflösung Iraks zu verhindern. Sowohl deutsche als auch amerikanische Politiker in Führungspositionen werden ihre Beziehungen zu China und Russland mit Vorsicht handhaben müssen, wenngleich sie unterschiedlicher Meinung darüber sind, ob die Vereinten Nationen in Zukunft eine grössere Rolle spielen können und sollten.

## DEUTSCHLAND, DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION UND DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT

Deutschland, Europa und die Vereinigten Staaten teilen wesentliche gemeinsame Interessen im internationalen ökonomischen System; das Programm für deutsch-amerikanische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit enthält dennoch erhebliches Potential für Konflikte. Die Erweiterung der EU, vertiefte europäische Integration und das Geschick deutscher und europäischer Bemühungen, die strukturellen Schwächen in den europäischen Wirtschaftssystemen anzugehen, werden die U.S.-EU Beziehung verändern. Die deutsche Wirtschaftsstagnation und die U.S. Defizite werden wahrscheinlich ebenso Priorität auf der deutsch-amerikanischen bilateralen Tagesordnung haben. Transatlantische Konflikte über juristische und behördliche Auflagen, die innenpolitischen Druck, wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen und kulturelle Befangenheit widerspiegeln, werden vermutlich häufiger auftreten. In der unmittelbaren Zukunft wird die effektive Steuerung der weltweiten Handels- und Finanzsysteme weiterhin hauptsächlich vom Stand der U.S.-EU Partnerschaft abhängen. Letztendlich sehen sich Deutschland, die EU und die Vereinigten Staaten einer

gemeinsamen langfristigen Herausforderung durch die neuen Zentren wirtschaftlicher Dynamik in China und Indien gegenüber.

#### DIE ERHALTUNG GEMEINSAMER INTERESSEN, BEWÄLTIGUNG VON VERÄNDERUNGEN

Die Sicherheitspartnerschaft, die einst den Kern der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung bildete, ist heute bröckelig und angespannt. Trotz gemeinsamer außen- und sicherheitspolitischer Interessen sind sich die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland in Fragen der Methode, des richtigen Zeitpunkts und dem Rahmen für Handlungen oft uneinig. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass die Institutionen, die das neue Sicherheitsprogramm steuern und regeln, durch die deutsch-amerikanischen und transatlantischen Unterschiede und Streitigkeiten stark gebeutelt wurden. Es bleibt jedoch weiterhin unklar, ob wirtschaftliche „Tief-Integrierung“ den zentralen und stabilisierenden Stützpfeiler der transatlantischen Beziehung ausmachen kann und wird.

#### Teil III: Aufbau einer neuen Basis für deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen

Die deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung ist weiterhin von grundlegender Tragweite für die Vereinigten Staaten, für Deutschland und für die Europäische Union. Deutschland ist für die USA von Bedeutung, da Europa für die Vereinigten Staaten ein Partner der ersten Wahl bleibt, und Deutschland in maßgeblicher Weise die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union und ihrer Beziehung zu den USA beeinflussen wird. Die Vereinigten Staaten bleiben für Deutschland die „unabkömmliche Macht“ im Streben nach vielen deutschen und europäischen Zielen. Für beide Staaten bleibt die bilaterale Verbindung ein bedeutender Weg mittels dem die Veränderungen in der weiteren Beziehung zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten bewältigt werden können.

Die Bildung und Erhaltung einer nüchternen, gut-durchdachten Beziehung sollte von folgenden Prinzipien geleitet werden:

- Die zweite Amtszeit von Präsident Bush bietet die Möglichkeit eines Neustarts in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen;
- Vertrauen und politischer Wille sind notwendig aber nicht ausreichend um eine neue deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung aufzubauen;
- Die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland müssen beginnen, ihre bilaterale Beziehung an ein sich entwickelndes Europa anzupassen. Dies heißt anzuerkennen, dass die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen untrennbar mit der U.S.-EU Beziehung verbunden sind;
- Werte-Differenzen existieren, machen jedoch deutsch-amerikanische und transatlantische Konflikte nicht unumgänglich;
- Anti-Amerikanismus existiert und stellt ein Risiko für pragmatische deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit dar;
- Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen sind kein Monopol der Regierungen. Der Privatsektor, sowie Gruppen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, spielen im Aufbau einer neuen deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung eine wesentliche Rolle;

- Die deutsch-amerikanische Beziehung wird weiterhin anfällig für unvorhergesehene Erschütterungen und fremde Einflüsse bleiben.

Beide Seiten sollten mit kleinen, pragmatischen Schritten beginnen. Das Ziel einer Zusammenarbeit sollte das Erreichen konkreter Ergebnisse sein, die den fortgesetzten Wert und die Relevanz des deutsch-amerikanischen und transatlantischen Engagements in den politischen Programmen beider Länder aufzeigen. In der näheren Zukunft wird es für die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland schwierig sein, ihre Zusammenarbeit im Irak in bedeutendem Maße auszuweiten, eine erfolgreiche Koordinierung in Afghanistan, sowie Entwicklungen in Russland und, möglicherweise, im Iran sollten jedoch möglich sein. Über eine pragmatische Zusammenarbeit bei kurzfristigen Krisen hinaus, sollten die Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland und Europa sich zu einem groß-angelegten, anhaltenden strategischen Dialog über kritische Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsherausforderungen verpflichten. Dieser Dialog sollte Themen wie die Prinzipien und institutionellen Maßnahmen, die den Gebrauch von Staatsgewalt in einem veränderten strategischen Umfeld regulieren, Strategien, die erfolgreich dem jihadistischen Terrorismus entgegen während sie gleichzeitig Freiheiten zu Hause bewahren, der weitere Nahe Osten, und ein aufsteigendes China beinhalten. Schließlich müssen die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland darauf hin arbeiten, ihre gegenseitigen Wahrnehmungen zu „modernisieren“, um die tiefgreifenden Änderungen, die in den USA, Deutschland und Europa stattgefunden haben, wiederzuspiegeln.

## Fazit

Im Prozess der Fertigung einer neuen deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung wird wenig Raum bleiben für Nostalgie oder Sentimentalität. Um innenpolitische Unterstützung zu erlangen und zu erhalten, muss sowohl die deutsch-amerikanische wie auch die U.S.-Europäische Beziehung von führenden Politikern und der deutschen und amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit als relevant und nützlich betrachtet werden. Hier liegt die größte Herausforderung für die Zukunft.

Kurzfristige, gegenseitige Initiativen, die Aushöhlung des Vertrauens einzudämmen und eine Erfolgsgeschichte der Zusammenarbeit zu erstellen, sind ein wichtiger erster Schritt. Langfristige, anhaltende Bemühungen, Veränderung zu steuern und die Beziehung an neue globale und innenpolitische Realitäten anzupassen, sind ebenfalls kritisch.

Bedeutenderweise würden beide Seiten von einem besseren Verständnis des Einflusses, den Kultur und Geschichte auf ihre jeweiligen Wahrnehmungen, Prioritäten und Politik haben, profitieren. Wie schon zuvor werden viele zukünftige Streitfälle Urteile beinhalten, welche in kulturellem und geschichtlichem Erbe wurzeln und die über die beste Weise, gemeinsame Ziele zu verfolgen oder gemeinsame Werte zu erreichen, sowie die Prioritäten, die Deutschland und Amerika setzen sollten, wenn die Ziele und Werte miteinander in Konflikt treten, gefällt werden. Zu verstehen, wie und warum sich Werte in politischen Debatten offenbaren, könnte entscheidend für die Lösung existierender und zukünftiger deutsch-amerikanischer Streitpunkte sein.

Politischer Wille und Führung sind unerlässlich, wenn die Unsicherheit, die die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen durchzieht, dem Geist der Zusammenarbeit weichen soll, statt in einen erbitterten Wettbewerb zu versinken. Amerikanische Politiker müssen bereit sein, erneut Prioritäten auf Zusammenarbeit mit den langjährigen Partnern der Vereinigten Staaten zu setzen und sich mit Deutschland und der EU im Geiste einer wahren Partnerschaft zu befassen. Deutschland und die Deutschen müssen sich entscheiden, was für eine Beziehung sie zu den USA haben wollen—und ob sie bereit sind, innerhalb der EU daran zu arbeiten, ein

Europa zu schaffen, das sich selbst als Partner der Vereinigten Staaten begreift. Die Zukunft der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, in diesem Sinne, ist beidseitig untrennbar mit der Entwicklung eines geteilten Amerikas und der Europäischen Union verbunden.

Mangels einer vereinfachenden und zwingenden Bedrohung müssen sowohl die deutsch-amerikanische als auch die U.S.-EU Beziehung auf besserem Verständnis und Respekt für ihre Unterschiede sowie ihrer Gemeinsamkeiten basieren. Die Zeiten der Gefühle sind vorbei. Dies muss jedoch nicht das Ende der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung oder Partnerschaft bedeuten, wohl aber einen Neuanfang.

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