Prophecies of Godlessness

The story of religion in the modern world is the story of failed predictions. From Marx to Comte to Freud, many of the West’s most influential thinkers predicted that modern scientific and technological progress would bring an end to traditional religion. Many religious leaders feared the validity of these predictions and prophesied against their prognosticators, warning that the loss of religion would lead to immorality, divine judgment, and national ruin. Yet religion has not disappeared from the life of even the most “advanced” societies; neither has the world come to an end because religion no longer enjoys its former pride of place (at least not as of this writing). For those of us beholden to either the social science predictions of inevitable secularization or the religious prophesies of a godless decadence—which is to say, most of us in the West—we are likely to be surprised by the unfolding story of religion in the contemporary world, not least with its latest chapter.

The period from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the toppling of the World Trade Center to the present—a period once purported to be “the end of history” and thus presumably free from the atavistic intolerance of medieval religion—appears, upon reconsideration, to be full of jealous gods and their holy warriors. In the United States, movements associated with the Religious Right have asserted themselves in many spheres of public life. Courtrooms and political assemblies are roiled in religious controversies surrounding gay marriage, stem cell research, partial birth abortion, and euthanasia. The hallowed realms of science are preoccupied with the controversy of “creation science” and “intelligent design.” Abroad, the world seems even more afire with the religious zealotry of radical Islam, as evidenced by controversies surrounding Danish cartoons, headscarves in Germany and France, and papal commentary—not to mention the continuing threat of Al-Qaeda and its imitators. The forces of assertive religion appear on the move everywhere, bent on political confrontation in the name of god.

Most empirical research not only confirms, but deepens these impressions. A wealth of survey data gathered by the World Values Survey, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, and a spate of statistical studies reveal a startling, if partial, picture of religion in the contemporary world.2 No matter how one parses the data, one overriding fact stands out: there are more “religious” people alive today than ever before in human history, and they are a larger percentage of the
world’s population than they were twenty years ago. Moreover, these believers tend to be traditional and conservative in their religious orientation, practice, and belief. This is to say that they regularly attend religious services, pray, affirm the integrity of traditional family roles and sexual mores, and the like. To put it starkly, the majority of humanity would qualify, on many common definitions, as religious “fundamentalists.”

Demographics appear to be an important part of the story as traditionally religious people tend to have more children than less traditionally minded or secular people—in fact, a lot more. According to Philip Longman at the New America Foundation, the fertility gap between secularists and religious believers in the United States is nearly 41 percent. Although America is maintaining its fertility replacement rate, thanks mainly to immigration, surveys show that the majority of those immigrating to the United States are Hispanic with traditional religious belief systems. The gap in Europe is even greater. In the face of such evidence, Ronald Inglehart, leading author of the World Values Survey concludes: “Secularization is its own gravedigger.” Paradoxically, Inglehart believes that in the long term, as societies become freer, more institutionally secure, and prosperous, “individual spirituality,” not fundamentalism, will be the religious trend. In other words, Inglehart believes that in the future, the world will ultimately look a lot like Western Europe does today: wealthy, privately spiritual, and publicly secular. Whatever the future holds, few dispute that in the near term traditional, “fundamentalist” religion is ascendant and increasingly politically assertive.

To be sure, this ascendance of conservative religion does not correlate only with radical politics. There are myriad ways that religion is invoked for peace, justice, and humanitarian concern. However, it is the bellicosity of certain religious movements, and the conflicts and violence they generate, that capture our attention and dominate the headlines. In their article in Foreign Policy, “Why God is Winning,” Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft write: “Secularization is its own gravedigger.” Paradoxically, Inglehart believes that in the long term, as societies become freer, more institutionally secure, and prosperous, “individual spirituality,” not fundamentalism, will be the religious trend. In other words, Inglehart believes that in the future, the world will ultimately look a lot like Western Europe does today: wealthy, privately spiritual, and publicly secular. Whatever the future holds, few dispute that in the near term traditional, “fundamentalist” religion is ascendant and increasingly politically assertive.

What surprises most, however, lies beneath the statistics. Despite their many cultural and theological differences, we cannot fail to notice striking similarities in the stories these various movements tell themselves and the world. Nearly all warn of a specter of godlessness darkening our present day, portending divine judgment and wrath, that is, if the faithful do not repent of worldliness and return to the narrow path of godly striving. Since the 1970s, faithful partisans have responded by entering the political fray and claiming a legitimate role for religion in both the public and political life of officially secular countries, in some cases demanding that religion determine the bounds of politics itself. Significantly, this narrative affinity extends well beyond the American Religious Right and radical Islam to militant Sikhs, Hindu Nationalists, radical Hasidic Jews, and even violent Buddhist sects.

Counterintuitively, Shah and Toft posit that democracy, not demography, might be more helpful in explaining the spread of fundamentalism (of course, democracy and demography are not unrelated). They contend that the increasing legitimacy of democratic ideals and the increase in the experience of actual freedom around the world over the past fifty years has contributed to religious resurgence and, also, to fundamentalism. Where political systems have recently become more open and democratic, religious leaders, religious movements, and religiously oriented political parties have proved to be competitive at the ballot box. In short, in the near future, the world will more likely look like America or even Iran than Western Europe.

Whatever does happen in the long term, the present confluence of demographic trends with the spread of democracy appears to be contributing to the unsettling of long-held assumptions about the place of religion in the modern world. The distinct narrative similarities of the most politically assertive religious movements, moreover, have rekindled an old paranoia about religion within Western publics. Fusing the modern nightmare of religiously-aligned ethnic cleansing to the dark pre-modern histories of the Inquisition, witch-hunts, the Crusades, and inter-religious wars, many cannot help but equate the assertive “fundamentalist” religions of today to the religious intolerance and theocratic authoritarianisms of the past. It is precisely their fearful symmetry that inclines many Western observers to conflate otherwise diverse forms of religion, just as it tempts them to see whole religions through the lens of particularistic and episodic expressions. But does the brutish fact of conservative religion’s resurgence justify such conflations? Does even the fact of religiously-inspired violence justify them? To put it less abstractly, does Al-Qaeda speak for
the Islamic world? For that matter, is the American Religious Right the same thing as the Taliban? What can we possibly mean when we apply the term "fundamentalism" to both?

Given the failure of our past predictions (and prophesies), and given our intellectual predilections—not to mention the sheer complexity of the phenomena under consideration—how are we to make sense of religion’s apparent resurgence in the contemporary world, let alone its place in this world? Does the concept of fundamentalism offer us analytical tools adequate to answer this question?

**Concept and Shibboleth**

The concept of fundamentalism is here to stay. It has become part of the common stock of concepts which we have—for better and worse—settled on to understand ourselves and our place in the world. It is, in short, part of the default vocabulary of our moment. At issue is how to make it an analytically useful and apposite concept.

Any concept worth applying to large-scale social phenomena must pass a basic test: it must be able to illuminate more than distort the phenomena it purports to describe. Even if a concept passes this test, the results remain open to contestation and revision. Social reality never fits as neatly as our theories and concepts would have it. It is no secret that many of our most enduring and privileged concepts—civilization, modernity, democracy, rationality—are often disputed. Such governing terms have their limitations. They do not apply equally well in every instance, and they frequently raise as many questions as they answer. We continue to use them because they ostensibly capture more than they obscure. Still, they do obscure something. The concept of "fundamentalism" is no different. It describes the lineaments of something we recognize genuinely at work in social life, just as it conceals what often lies beneath them.

For fundamentalism to be of any conceptual worth, it is necessary to assess not only what we manifestly recognize in the application of the term, but also what is latently assumed by those who employ it.

On the face of it, fundamentalism has a fairly straightforward connotation: fundamentalism describes the politicization of conservative religion around the world. This journalistic, common-sense rendering of the term is a catch-all, a shorthand for describing everything from traditionally religious people who support conservative politics to fanatical acts of intolerance and violence in the name of some god. In this formulation, the Reverend Jerry Falwell and members of the Christian Coalition, an American political organization, are included along with Osama bin Ladin and members of Al-Qaeda in the category of "fundamentalists." This may seem to some a banal truth, but such superficial comparisons not only mislead us as to the real nature of their commonality, but also do violence to these groups’ immense political differences.

Though scholarly accounts strive for more analytic precision, they are often hampered by secular predilections that tend to be highly reductionist in their own renderings of religion. Social scientific explanations of religious fundamentalism tend to fall along three typical theoretical lines:

First, there is what we can call the **Instrumentality Thesis.** In this account, fundamentalists are best understood as rational actors maximizing their choices, given the particular set of cultural resources at their disposal. In certain contexts, religion becomes functional—that is, instrumental—for achieving non-religious ends. On this score, what may seem like a religious conflict, say, in the former Sudanese civil war between a fundamentalist Islamic North and a largely fundamentalist Christian South, is really a struggle to gain political control over land and oil. This is religion as the “will to power.”

At the opposite end of the explanatory spectrum from the Instrumentality Thesis is what we can call the **Irrationality Thesis.** In this view, fundamentalists are not rational at all, but dogmatic ideologues whose irrational fanaticism stems from ignorance and fear in the face of social change. They cling to the old ways of a given culture or ethnicity and demonize all cultural innovations as external threats to the established order. Fundamentalists are here reduced to their particular cultural or ethnic origins, which have no rational basis. In practice, however, the Irrationality Thesis contains a kernel of the Instrumentality Thesis. Fundamentalist leaders, according to this perspective, are rational and use their social position as religious authorities to manipulate and exploit their impoverished and uneducated followers (one variant of this account argues that fundamentalist religion is itself highly rational in its promise of moral clarity, stability, and ultimate security to the otherwise insecure, dislocated, and alienated).
Finally, a variant of the Instrumentality Thesis has emerged in recent decades that we can call the Anti-Essentialist Thesis. For fear of essentializing religious fundamentalists as inescapably the product of a given culture, ethnicity, or civilization (a.k.a. “Orientalizing”), this view posits fundamentalists not so much as irrational fanatics, but as freedom fighters resisting Western hegemony in a religious guise. Again, fundamentalists are rational agents; they are merely engaged in a struggle of identity politics with an imperial overload. Violent struggle in the name of religious belief is, thus, really a strategy for liberation.

All three of these ideal typical scholarly approaches have much to offer by way of analysis and explanation. Yet each reduces religion to something else: to rational choices of calculating individuals, to irrational cultural or ethnic prejudices, or to the ideological strategies of the dispossessed. They also bring to mind Edward Gibbon’s famous quip regarding views of religion in the Roman Empire: “The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful.” None of the three approaches take religion seriously on its own terms. In each of these treatments, one can detect the lingering hold of the Enlightenment—if not of Karl Marx—on our social theoretical imaginations. As an Enlightenment-based project, social science long presumed that as the world modernized—that is, as the world followed in the footsteps of the West—it would inevitably secularize and religious faith would gradually fade away. Where religion remained, it could only be interpreted as a holdover, a form of false consciousness. That secularization, in the sense of religion becoming mainly a matter of private conscience, if mattering at all, has occurred only in Western Europe and, in the Western academy, has forced a reappraisal of social theory’s basic assumptions. At least with respect to the issue of secularization, the charge of false consciousness may more aptly describe the mindset of social science itself. As we have seen, the preponderance of evidence suggests publicly assertive religion is here to stay, if indeed it ever really left.

In light of so much journalistic imprecision and scholarly reductionism, it should not be surprising that many have raised strong objections to the use of “fundamentalism” as a fitting concept. There are two major criticisms. The first stems from the term’s origins. Fundamentalism was coined as the self-description for a historically and culturally distinct form of American Protestantism in the 1910s and 1920s. We are simply asking too much of the term, according to this view, by applying it indiscriminately to the manifold forms of religious expression, practice, and belief that exist around the world. Moreover, applying it thus undermines any integrity or conceptual power the term might have when used in its original sense—that is, to describe a brand of early twentieth-century theologically conservative American Protestantism.

The second criticism is yet more common. Many people reject “fundamentalism” because it is often used as a term of disdain and abuse. Labeling some group “fundamentalist” derides more than it seeks to understand. It is here, for instance, that we often get the lumping-together of any person or group identified as politically conservative for religious reasons—American Evangelicals, conservative Catholics and Jews, Mormons, and George W. Bush can all be called “fundamentalists.” The ideological freight attached to the term is great indeed.

Such criticisms make us ask whether the concept of fundamentalism passes the test mentioned above: does it illuminate more than it hides? Is the term too conceptually imprecise, or too normatively loaded, to be useful? Let us return to this question in a moment. What should be clear at this juncture is that fundamentalism is not a neutral identification. What the sociologist of religion José Casanova says of religion is even truer of fundamentalist religion: “What religion is and what it ought to be are inseparable in our conceptualizations.” At its heart, the term “fundamentalism” presupposes the proper place and role of religion in modern political life. It is, in a slightly older formulation, the question of modernity’s relationship to tradition. In this way, fundamentalism is not just an analytic concept. It is a shibboleth, a code word for reaffirming the cultural and political assumptions of those who employ it.

Not surprisingly, many in the West remain deeply ambivalent about the relationship between religion and politics. Their uncertainty stems, in part, from an overall political tradition that assumed the liberal Enlightenment had settled this question in favor of the functional differentiation of church and state and therefore of political and religious authority. To be sure, the prevalence of religious conflict in the West declined. After centuries of religious warfare in Europe, the historical socio-political processes associated with the Enlightenment ushered in centuries of peace (at least with respect to overtly religious violence).

Yet, the question of religion and political life obstinately persists today: are those forms of religion which seek public influence necessarily authoritarian, oppressive, and violent, or are they amenable to a genuinely pluralistic and liberal society in which religious orthodoxy can participate and contribute to the common good without either compromising its core commitments or those of non-believers? This question is at the heart
of our analysis of the phenomena we have come to call fundamentalism. There is more at stake in its answer than we are often aware. We must take special care that our own presumptions about the place of religion in the modern world do not mislead us. The dangers inherent in our use of the term “fundamentalism” need to be understood. We risk the replication of failed predictions if they are based on wishful thinking. We also risk fostering the very hostilities we fear. There is evidence for this sort of irony—just as the specter of resurgent, politically assertive religion has been undermining long-standing academic confidence in the self-evident inevitability of secularization, the perceived “threat of secularization” has been busy mobilizing the faithful both at home and abroad.

Toward a Working Definition

How do we avoid the dangers cited above? What would a careful application of the term “fundamentalism” look like? We have some very helpful resources to draw from. World-class scholars, led by religious historians Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, have spent years compiling a massive five-volume investigation of religious fundamentalism. Here is their working definition of the term:

Fundamentalism appears as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk, fundamentalists fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved “fundamentals” are refined, modified, and sanctioned in a spirit of shrewd pragmatism: they are to fend off outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic, areligious, or irreligious cultural milieu. Moreover, these fundamentals are accompanied in the new religious portfolio by unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. By the strength of these innovations, the retrieved and updated fundamentals are meant to regain the same charismatic intensity today by which they forged communal identity from the formative religious experiences long ago.11

The definition provided by Marty, Appleby, and their colleagues is helpful as far as it goes. Moreover, it draws from the typical scholarly approaches without explaining religion away. What they leave out (not, perhaps, without reason) are descriptions about the nature of forces threatening the faith and identity of religious believers.

A supplemental version of this definition, then, could be put as follows. From a particularly sociological perspective, “fundamentalism” describes a world-historical phenomenon with three qualifying dimensions: (a) Fundamentalism is one path religious “orthodoxies” take in their confrontation with a secularizing modernity; (b) Crucially, because religious orthodoxies vary in terms of their historic relationship to modernity and its carriers, so too will the political effects of their fundamentalist versions; (c) What each fundamentalist movement has in common, however, is the disorienting experience of radical reflexivity in the face of what seems to be the increasing disenchantment of the world.

While far from exhaustive, this supplemental version offers a working definition of fundamentalism that avoids some of the pitfalls discussed above. Not least, it guards against fundamentalism becoming a shibboleth. In this conceptualization of fundamentalism, we can see what otherwise distinct forms of religious orthodoxy have in common—what makes them genuinely “fundamentalist”—without confusing their significant differences. More importantly, this conceptualization allows us to see how the confrontation between religious orthodoxy and modernity not only transforms religion, but also how it partly shapes the character of modernity itself.

Let us briefly consider the three dimensions.

Fundamentalist religion represents the selective hardening of religious orthodoxies in confrontation with the disruptions, dislocations, and disenchantments caused by the processes of global modernity. These not only include the ever-increasing penetration of quintessentially modern processes like capitalism, scientific innovation, and bureaucratic organization, but also the deterritorializing impact of post-modern communications technologies with their transnational flows of images, symbols, and ideologies. Crucially, all of these complex processes also shape habits of mind. From a sociological perspective, all religious traditions confronting the modern world order—its rationality, its impersonal authority, its pluralism, its public/private dualism, its subjectivism, and so on—are faced with three basic options: withdrawal, accommodation, or resistance. Fundamentalist religions derive their identity principally from a posture of resistance to a modern world order constituted by a panoply of assumptions about nature, human nature, and the cosmos, even if this posture entails inescapable accommodation (however unwittingly). Their public assertive-

Not surprisingly, many in the West remain deeply ambivalent about the relationship between religion and politics.
ness comes as rebellion against the privatization of religion in modern nation-states, again, in some cases demanding that religion determine the bounds of politics itself. According to José Casanova, these movements want to determine “the modern boundaries between public and private spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and morality, between individual and society, between family, civil society, and state, between nations, states, civilizations, and the world system.”12

Yet, global modernity is not monolithic. Not all religions share the same relationship to its “processes”; neither do the fundamentalisms that claim to speak for them. One need only consider the vastly different kinds of status historically accorded to religion within the West to recognize the extent and significance of variation. It is well-known, for instance, that Protestant Christianity, within the orbit of the Anglo-American Enlightenment, enjoyed a decidedly more favorable relationship with early modern American political and civic culture than did Roman Catholicism in France within the orbit of the continental Enlightenment. As Alexis de Tocqueville famously pointed out, by the time of the French Revolution, Roman Catholics and the advocates of secular democracy appeared to many observers (as well as to themselves) as irreconcilable antagonists. It would take another 200 years for Roman Catholicism, a quintessentially pre-modern religion, and modern liberal democracy to reconcile their differences. For the first 200 years of U.S. history, the peculiar, if uneasy alliance of Enlightenment humanism, civic republicanism, and evangelical Protestantism seemed to work well enough to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.” Gabriel Abraham Almond, et al., Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2003).

Still, despite the important differences that persist between religious fundamentalisms with respect to their relationships to the processes of modernity, a deeper commonality reveals itself. This deeper commonality is seen most clearly in the narrative similarities religious fundamentalisms share. Careful attention to the stories fundamentalists tell themselves and the world reveals what otherwise alien movements have in common: the disorienting experience of radical reflexivity in the face of what seems to be the increasing disenchantment of the world.14 However tarnished the social theory of secularization may have become, the old Weberian language of disenchantment remains pertinent. Max Weber predicted that as the world became more rationalized under the dislocating forces of modern capitalism and science, it would lose metaphysical grounding for personal meaning and collective moral order. Today, it is precisely the plausibility of transcendentally legitimated social orders and the institutions that once underwrote them that has been called into question as the processes...
of globalization penetrate more deeply (if unevenly) around the world. Religions everywhere confront this threat, if not to the same extent or effect.

If it is not quite the “iron cage” of rationality Weber predicted, the disenchanting effects of modernity are both globally pervasive and locally acute. The believer confronts a world where the plausibility of traditional faith and the ways of life it sanctions are either threatened or already lost. The impact on fundamentalists is not hard to see. Amid all the god-talk, one detects something not quite the same with the old-time religions everywhere on the move. However resilient, however renascent, religion has been changed by its encounter with the modern world order. What has changed is not whether, but how people believe. Belief becomes explicit and individually chosen—of course this can, and does, lead as much to forms of religious spirituality as to fundamentalism, as much to quietism as to radicalism.

Less obviously (certainly less remarked upon), the encounter has also marked modernity. The fragmentation and individualization of religious authority, as well as the increasingly acultural character of fundamentalism, is evident, but so is its sophisticated use of communications technology to proselytize and spread the word. Their radicalization of traditional belief and practice—very often, its militancy—shows fundamentalists to be both products and agents of global modernity.

The mutually constitutive aspect of religion and global modernity is perhaps most clearly seen in a fact commented upon above. As the resurgence of publicly assertive religion forces conventional political wisdom and standard social scientific analysis to reconsider its latent secularist bias, the fear of secularization, in terms of the experience of disenchantment, contributes to that religious resurgence. Put differently, the specter of religious fundamentalism will no doubt continue to undermine the old confidence in secularization just as the experience of disenchantment keeps secularization’s specter alive.

The question of religion and public life—the question at the heart of fundamentalism—will have to be asked against the backdrop of a worldwide religious resurgence in the contemporary world, and it will inevitably require modification of long-standing habits of mind for all involved. The modern world order has been changed by its encounter with religion, not least by the resistance of assertive religious fundamentalisms. The full nature of this change remains largely nascent, and we are too close to fathom the extent to which such change is already shaping our lives. What seems indisputable is that both the phenomena of politically assertive religion and the concept of fundamentalism are here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. For better and worse, secular and religious forms of modernity will continue to inform and antagonize each other, even as their interactions shape our world.

NOTES

1 This subheading is borrowed from Charles T. Mathewes and Christopher McKnight Nichols, eds., Prophecies of Godlessness: Predictions of America’s Imminent Secularization, for the Puritans to Postmodernity (forthcoming), which provides an excellent and innovative historical examination of the “recurrent, and recurrently wrong” predictions of secularization in American history.
4 For more discussions of the issues of Hispanic immigration and the fertility gap in Europe, see Eric Kaufman, “Breeding for God,” The Prospect, no. 128 (November 2006).
5 Ronald Inglehart commented, “Although church attendance is declining in nearly all advanced industrial societies, spiritual concerns more broadly defined are not. In fact, in most industrial societies, a growing share of the population is spending time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life.”
6 Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft, “Why God is Winning,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2006).
8 Shah and Toft point to Turkey, Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico, the Palestinian territories, Brazil, and India.
9 For thinking about standard social science treatments in terms of both the Instrumentality and Irrationality Theses, I’m indebted to John Owen and Judd Owen in Religion, the Enlightenment, and the New Global Order, unpublished manuscript, pg. 5.
10 For a particularly insightful discussion of these issues, see José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” The Hedgehog Review 8, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 2006).
Disturbing Fundamentalism

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