Despite Trump, Germany Should Not Fall for “Equidistance”

Liana Fix


Liana Fix is the Program Director for International Affairs at the Körber-Stiftung. Prior to this, she was a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) with a special focus on Germany’s role in Europe, Russian foreign policy, and the South Caucasus. She was a DAAD/AICGS Fellow from October to December 2015. Previously, she was affiliated with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). In 2012/2013, she was a Mercator Fellow in International Affairs, working on European and transatlantic policy toward Russia at the German Foreign Office, the Carnegie Moscow Center, and the EU Delegation in Georgia. Ms. Fix holds a master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science and is a member of Women in International Security (

She is a 2016-2017 participant in AICGS’ project “A German-American Dialogue of the Next Generation: Global Responsibility, Joint Engagement,” sponsored by the Transatlantik-Programm der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus Mitteln des European Recovery Program (ERP) des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi).

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has sent shockwaves through Berlin. Among others, Trump’s sympathetic gestures toward Russia put Germany in an awkward position: In an ironic twist of events, Germany now suddenly seems to be the hawk in relations with Russia, while Washington wants to cultivate a new friendly relationship with Putin. For some commentators, the logical consequence is to urgently adjust policy toward Russia—in order not to be outrun by Washington—and at the same time to seek more distance to a United States under Trump—the old idea of “equidistance” to Washington and Moscow.

“Equidistance” was used during Cold War times to designate an alternative third way for a country: not to align itself with the bloc formation of the superpowers, but to keep equal distance to Washington and Moscow, for instance through neutrality. For Merkel, the necessity of close German and European relations to the United States is sacrosanct and equidistance is not an option for German foreign policy. But with a President Trump in the White House, the concept could gain renewed attractiveness, in particular in the (center-) left political spectrum. If the United States is no longer the role model it used to be, why not choose a middle position between Washington and Moscow?

This is dangerous thinking for German foreign policy for three reasons. First, Germany relies—as do most other European states—on the United States and NATO for its security. While efforts are underway to strengthen common European security and defense policy, this can only be an addition, not a substitute, for the role of NATO and the U.S. Second, equidistance equates Washington and Moscow in a dangerous relativization. In contrast to Russia, an autocratic kleptocracy, the U.S. is (despite all concerns about the new administration) still a liberal democratic system and the transatlantic relationship is based on values as much as on interests, different to relations with Russia. Last but not least, the idea of equidistance evokes associations of a “third” German way in international politics, which has more than once proven to be a dangerous deviation.

Despite Trump, “Westbindung”—being firmly rooted in the Western community and Western values—must remain the fundamental pillar of Germany’s foreign policy toward Russia and in general. Even more so at times when Western structures seem to crumble, it is the task of German politicians and German civil society to contribute upholding these structures and values, after having benefitted for almost seventy years from the Western liberal order. Although Germany alone cannot provide the military “hard power” in security policy to take on the role of the U.S. as liberal hegemon, there is a lot Germany can contribute in terms of “soft power.” As one of the most popular countries in the world and a powerful economic player, Germany should not become disillusioned or cynical by whatever comes from the new U.S. administration, but rely on its own instruments and strengths and become, if not the leader, at least the core and center of the Western “Weltanschauung.”

In concrete terms, this implies a number of daunting tasks: to continue a principles-based approach in policy toward Russia, and use economic instruments and sanctions to enforce it. Even if the new U.S. administration opts for sanctions removal, Germany must act to uphold European unity on sanctions, despite a potentially sanctions-skeptic new French administration next spring. But the greatest challenge for politicians and citizens alike, in public and private life, will be to contain the “performative effects” of the Trump election and other populist successes for the parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017. A good example how civil society can play an active role is “Die offene Gesellschaft,” a collaborative project supporting and promoting activities for an open, free, and liberal society. We need more such initiatives. Instead of pondering geopolitical options for German foreign policy in a new Trump era, Germany must start fighting for what is worth it: a liberal international order abroad and an open society at home.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.