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Religion and Politics: The European Debate

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What challenges do European countries face with regard to the interaction of religion and politics?

What impact may this debate have on the United States in the long-term?

How will Europe's growing Muslim population influence the debate?

The number of books, conferences, and media programs focusing on the resurgence of religion in domestic and international politics is an indicator of how important this issue has become to both policymakers and the public at large. Religion, we are told, shapes our lives at every level—local, national, and international. Christian conservatives on a school board in Kansas vote to include the teaching of intelligent design in public school biology classes, only to have the decision reversed by a new slate of board officials elected by less-conservative voters. The immigration of large numbers of Muslims to European countries has intensified national debates about citizenship laws, the wearing of religious symbols in public schools, and the socioeconomic problems faced by minorities, all of which cast a glaring light on the need for lowering unemployment, addressing discrimination, reducing crime, and improving education. New communications technologies have globalized religious activities and enabled religious extremists to quickly mobilize support around the world.

This revitalization of religion in countries around the world was not supposed to happen, particularly in a secularized Europe. Common wisdom held that the process of modernization in a country was a powerful antidote to religion and religious conflicts; the more a society modernized, the more secular and less religious it became. Nowhere was this model of secularization supposedly as evident as in Europe—and yet, what is evident now is how misguided these long-held assertions about secularization and the role of religion in Europe have been, and how important it has become to find new concepts and a new vocabulary to construct a more realistic picture of the psychological, cultural, and political dynamics of religion and public life in Europe. Most scholars of religion now agree that Europe's pronounced secularization is not the rule, but the global exception. Religious differences—not only among western European countries but also between western and eastern European countries—highlight the diversity and complexity of the relationship of religion and politics.

Understanding the impact of religion on European societies is complicated by other challenges Europe faces. The debate about religion and politics is superimposed upon three interrelated concerns: European enlargement, immigration, and integration. In essence, Europe is still grappling with the question of "who are we?" and "what is Europe?"[1] Religion will play an important role within this process of defining the future identity and composition of Europe. As part of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies' Initiative on Religion and Politics, and with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Foundation, the Institute organized a work-

shop with experts from France, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and the United States to examine the current debate on the role of religion in Europe. This Issue Brief, based on the proceedings of this meeting, takes up the question of secularization in Europe and looks at the mark religion has made on each of Europe's three ongoing challenges, taking into account the restoration of religion as a factor in Europe's future.

A Secular Europe?

Many Europeans are uncomfortable with the reemergence of religion as a force in politics and in public life in Europe. For them the specter of religious conflict was settled through a long and bloody process of separating religion from the state and the public sphere, culminating in the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The Treaty ended the wars of religion and instituted a system by which German rulers chose the religion of their individual state while also guaranteeing freedom of religious practice to individuals whose denomination was not that of the established church. For Europe, then, the separation of church and state meant "freedom from religion." In contrast to other countries such as the United States, where religious traditions played a role in both public and private life, Europeans developed a more publicly distanced relationship to their religion, relegating religion to the private sphere.

The past decade has seen secularization theory challenged in light of a host of factors

On the whole, survey material appeared to support this assumption of secularization in Europe. Indeed, religious participation has steadily decreased throughout Europe since the 1960s.[2] But the only post-modern industrial state that did not fit the model was the United States, which displayed high levels of religious pluralism and activity. For most observers, however, the best explanation for this American "exeptionalism" was America's unique historical development and relationship between religion and politics."

Religion, however, has not disappeared in Europe. Since its relegation from the public to the private sphere, religion has operated at a different cultural and social level. Europeans are distinctly uncomfortable with public displays and revelations of religious faith. But Europe's secularist identity shrouds the reality of strong and persistent cultural-religious identities, a condition Grace Davie has termed "believing without belonging,"—i.e., no longer participating in public religious practices while retaining a strong private religious identity.[3] Although France is considered one of the most secular European countries, many French couples choose to have a church wedding ceremony. In Germany parents want their children to take religion classes in public schools because they feel such classes help build a sound cultural and moral foundation for their children's lives.

Other factors combine with this persistence of cultural-religious identities to argue for a Europe that may be more religious in the decades to come. Some new members of the European Union, such as Poland, have strong religious traditions that have impacted the dynamics of EU politics. Immigration and demographic trends have contributed to the number of Muslims in Europe tripling over the last thirty years, making Islam the fastest-growing religion in Europe.[4] These factors show that the impact of religion in Europe infuses the broader debates in Europe on such issues as the effects of EU enlargement, immigration, and integration.

Enlargement

Peter Katzenstein argues that European enlargement will intensify the impact of religion, rather than diminish it.[5] There is a growing awareness among Europeans that the ground beneath them is shifting on questions of religion, not only because of growing Muslim minorities, but also because of the ways in which religion is being re-defined in individual European countries as well as in the EU at large.

The new EU member states demonstrate that there is another dimension to this debate. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought the liberation of Eastern Europe and the integration of these states into the European Union. In the wake of these momentous changes,

eastern and central European states have experienced a religious revival. Poland, where the Catholic Church was the social/domestic institution where national sentiment resided, is an obvious example, but there is renewed religious activity in other Catholic as well as in traditionally Orthodox countries in eastern and central Europe.[6]

Within the context of this religious revitalization, these eastern European countries are trying to come to terms with a complex set of social and cultural issues relating to religion in public life, such as homosexuality, women's rights, and abortion as well as the religious and moral implications of biotechnology and stem cell research. The resolution of these social, religious, and

cultural questions in eastern European countries will not be the same as in their western European counterparts, and might not be the solutions that western Europeans may expect or want.

The influence of traditional values in more culturally conservative European states such as Poland, Slovakia, and Malta will be felt in future debates about the role of religion in Europe. Views on many issues run counter to social norms in western Europe. In July 2006 the Polish president, Lech Kaczy ski, called for the EU to reintroduce the death penalty, though banning the death penalty is one of the conditions for EU membership. Slovakia antagonized EU officials last winter when it signed a treaty with the Vatican that provided legal protection to doctors who refused to perform abortions.[7]

The diverging views about religion in an enlarged EU also were reflected in the debate about the draft European Constitution, during which Poland, along with several other countries, lobbied for the insertion of references to God and to Christian values and traditions in the preamble, with France leading the opposition. The final version of the European Constitution did not mention God or a supreme being but did emphasize Europe's cultural, humanist, and religious values, along with the EU's objective of safeguarding its cultural heritage.[8]

Islam is not an issue in the new member states, given the small number of Muslims who live in these countries at present. Negative views of Muslims in these countries appear to be less about religion than about a general distrust of foreigners and immigrants.[9] Eastern Europe may eventually see its share of Muslim immigrants, but for the time being it is western Europe that faces one of the most intensely debated topic in Europe today: the immigration of increasing numbers of Muslims to Europe.

Immigration

Immigration is changing the face and social fabric of Europe. The demographic realities of a declining European population, set against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding Muslim population, are of particular consequence. According to conservative estimates, approximately 13 million Muslims reside in the European Union, making up about 3.5 percent of the EU's total population.[10] Western Europe's birthrate stands at approximately 1.5 children per woman of childbearing age. The Muslim birthrate in Europe is estimated to be three times higher, which would double the Muslim population in Europe by 2015 and contrasts strongly with an anticipated 3 percent shrinkage of the European non-Muslim population.[11]

The expansion of non-Christian immigrant communities in Europe, set against the expansion of Europe itself, has brought to the fore the central question of European identity. Simply put, Europe is having an identity crisis, and religion is one of the factors complicating the situation.

Europe is a diverse continent, and generalizations about the role of religion throughout Europe are difficult to make. Surveys of religious beliefs and activities reveal that in charting religiosity in European countries, the picture is decidedly mixed. In some countries religiosity has increased (eastern Europe), while in others it has either decreased (Great Britain, France, Netherlands) or stayed the same (some Catholic countries).[12] But within this context of religious activity, other surveys show that the process of secularization in Europe continues as well, such as in Catholic countries like Ireland and Spain. Thus, it remains clear at some level that growing prosperity can bring greater secularization. And yet, the strong religious culture in some former East European states, coupled with demographic realities of higher birthrates among the growing European Muslim population and shrinking non-Muslim European birthrates, may also mean religion will play a more visible role in the European public sphere in the future—while retaining an overlay of secularism.[13]

The search for a European identity is complicated by these dynamics. There is a sense among some Europeans that the still-fluid contours of a European identity are becoming a weakness, that the inability to outline a European identity that includes Muslim identities makes Europe vulnerable to the influence of political Islam. Growing fears of Islamist groups among Europeans and recent acts of terror (the murder of van Gogh, London Metro bombings) have made dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim communities that much more complicated.

But there is concern in Muslim communities themselves. In researching her book on The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, Jytte Klausen relates a story of a Muslim woman who worries that her son, already socially alienated, will heed the call of radical imams. As he told her: "They all think I am a Muslim, they all expect the worst from me, that I am a radical, so I might as well do it."[14]

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And yet, a Pew Forum survey in July 2006 reveals that the views of European Muslims diverge from those of most Muslims living in the Middle East. European Muslims prefer a

more moderate form of Islam, with substantial majorities in the four European countries surveyed (Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and France) identifying themselves with moderates rather than Islamic fundamentalists. European Muslims remain as concerned about religious extremism as their European counterparts.

Generally, on religion-related issues Muslims diverge from the general population in Europe, identifying primarily with their religion rather than with a nation.[15] This religious identification has led not just to general unease among the more secular European population (and secular Muslims across Europe), but to problems of discrimination and Islamophobia. A recent EU study outlined some sobering findings: European Muslims face discrimination in employment, education, and housing; hostility towards Muslims often spills over into xenophobia, racism, and verbal and physical abuse. Social barriers to advancement produce feelings of alienation and hopelessness; and, most importantly, such discrimination and social marginalization severely impedes efforts at integration.[16]

The deliberations about what constitutes European identity can no longer exclude the hopes and desires of European Muslims. And yet, this in itself is a complicated question: what are the politics of Muslim identity in Europe? European Muslims are divided along many lines: rural vs. urban, secular vs. pious, citizen vs. non-citizen. They are ethnically segregated as well as religiously diverse. Most are also isolated from their home culture and society. Muslims are increasingly assuming a more religious identity not only because they are moved to do so by religious feelings but because they feel pressured to think in more religious terms. Muslims in Germany increasingly remark that one no longer hears Germans speaking about "Turks" but, rather, about "Muslims"—and this in a country in which a majority of the Muslim population is comprised of secular Turks.[17]

The issue of religious identification also raises another question: Is a distinctly European Islam emerging? Some observers believe it is unrealistic to assume that a European Islam can develop from a religion that is not hierarchical but fragmented and fluid. The more plausible outcome, in their view, is that there will be a French Islam, a German Islam, and a British Islam—i.e., a British resolution, a German resolution, and a French resolution to the specific conditions of church-state relations, institutional structures, and the unique set of historical and cultural elements embedded in each country. Other skeptical voices point to the fact that the legacy of church-state institutions and relations varies greatly from state to state in Europe and declare that a Euro-Islam is simply not plausible.[18]

Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist and Islamic scholar of Syrian origin who coined the phrase "Euro-Islam," represents the other side of the debate. He strongly believes that a European Islam is possible because Islam is compatible with Western values and democracy. As Tibi sees it, Euro-Islam is a cultural and political adjustment of Islam to the European values of separation of church from politics, tolerance and human rights, democratic pluralism, and civil society.[19] But Europe must adjust as well. For their part, European governments must construct an integration policy that provides room for Muslim identity and disassembles the feeling of "otherness" that has separated Muslims from European society at large. And, as Olivier Roy has argued, what is most critical is Europe's capacity to embrace Islam as a European religion.[20] By doing so, Europe finds an accommodation with its increasing—and increasingly permanent—Muslim population and helps to diffuse the feelings of exclusion and resentment felt by so many young Muslims in Europe.

Concern is focused especially on the third and fourth generation of young Muslims who, because of persistent discrimination and social-cultural isolation, have turned to religion for support—often to more conservative or radical forms of Islam. What is at issue, says Tariq Ramadan, one of the leading Islamic scholars among Europe's second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants, is "how to be at the same time fully Muslim and fully Western."[21]

Integration

Because the question of immigration is so closely linked to the influx of Muslims to Europe, there is a danger of looking at the problems of integration only through the prism of religion. Olivier Roy, one of the most respected experts on Muslims in Europe, has argued that the two models that have exemplified Europe's integration policies—multiculturalism (as in Great Britain) and assimilation (as in France)—have failed, because both were unable to reconcile the tensions inherent in the relationship between religion and culture—either by assuming that religion was separate from culture or that integration into modern societies would lessen the degree of religious identification.[22] Other European countries have taken a more hands-off approach, preferring to treat Muslim minorities as temporary populations that would eventually return to their native countries, thus ignoring the problem of integration.

Much of the problem stems from the fact that focusing on religion obscures other related factors. The riots in France in the

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fall of 2005, for example, were not religiously motivated, but were a consequence of building frustration and anger among young Muslims for a variety of socio-economic and political problems—unemployment, job discrimination, poor education, and substandard living conditions. "Discrimination," as one AICGS workshop member remarked, "is killing integration."

In some ways, the locus of the problem also has shifted. One has the impression at times that the integration question in Europe has been transformed from one that asked what actions the state could take to encourage integration to one that now asks why Muslims do not want to integrate themselves into European society. Religion—Islam—is somehow held accountable, while the structural hurdles facing immigrants become secondary factors. Grappling with the integration of Muslim minorities in purely religious terms will not provide policymakers with enough accurate information on which to base effective policy solutions.

Indeed, few European countries have found successful—i.e., inclusive and comprehensive—policies for integrating Muslim populations. Nor has it seemed that European countries have developed effective democratic consultative mechanisms that acknowledge the diversity of Islam in Europe. Several key problems need to be addressed if effective integration is to take place.

First of all, there is the problem of citizenship and "being counted" as part of the public sphere. Muslim minorities need to feel they have a stake in the political system.[23] Some problems that inhibit integration were fundamental, such as the granting of citizenship. Turkish immigrants who arrived in the 1960s to work in German industries were called Gastarbeiter, or guest workers, which implied these workers would eventually return home, although by the 1980s it was clear that many were there to stay. Citizenship laws that finally made it possible for immigrants born in Germany to receive German citizenship arrived only in 2000.[24]

Strides also need to be made in the area of political participation and representation. The numbers are telling: of the 13-15 million Muslims residing in Europe, only 25 have been elected to European parliaments. In terms of voters, the figures vary widely:

> "Several things are happening simultaneously in the religious life of Europe. The fact that they are occurring at the same time is partly a coincidence—each, however, encourages the other. The historic churches, despite their continuing presence, are losing their capacity to discipline the religious thinking of large sections of the population (especially the young). Simultaneously, the range of religious choice is widening all the time both inside and outside the historic churches. New forms of religion are coming into Europe from outside, largely as the result of the movement of people. Finally, at least some of the people arriving from outside are offering a significant challenge to the widely held assumptions about the place of religion in European societies."
>
> Gracie Davie, "Is Europe an Exceptional Case?" Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 32.

In only a few countries does the census ask people their religion. In one of them, the UK, it is estimated that about 1 million (out of 1.6 million) Muslims were eligible to vote in the May 2005 election. In other countries, estimates are derived from immigration statistics and estimated fertility rates. In France, there are perhaps 5-6 million—some estimate only 2.6 million—Muslims, few of whom vote. The Netherlands has the highest proportion of Muslims —about 6 percent of Dutch residents, about half of whom can vote. In Germany, 0.5 million of the estimated 3 million Muslims can vote. In Italy, Muslims, like other immigrants, are overwhelmingly illegal, and so only an estimated 50,000 of Italy's 2 million Muslims can vote.[25]

But in order to increase voting participation, efforts must be made to reach out to the young Muslims who feel isolated and unwanted in order to assist them with the contradictions of living as both a cultural and a religious minority in the larger mainstream culture. Secular Muslim communities and religious communities alike must be buttressed as they navigate the uneasy waters between radical Islam and an increasingly distrustful non-Muslim population.

Another concern both inside and outside the Muslim communities is the dominance of imams trained outside Europe. There is a growing consensus that the practice of importing imams from countries outside Europe—who are often extremely conservative, rarely speak European languages, and have little understanding of the social-cultural context in which European Muslims live—should be proscribed. In its place, a system of training imams in Europe must be instituted so that the spiritual development of European Muslims emanates from within Europe, not from without.

Prospects for finding a balance between European secular societies and Islam thus depends on governments and their ability to find solutions to these problems, but such accommodation also depends on the active involvement of Muslim communities themselves. Non-Muslim Europeans are increasingly impatient with and distrustful of Muslim communities because moderate Muslims are not perceived to be forcefully condemning acts of religious violence.

Conclusion

Many of the long-standing preconceptions about religion and politics in Europe must be reconsidered. Jose Casanova has written that "When it comes to religion, there is no global rule."[26] All religions will be transformed by globalization and modernization, and therefore all of these issues remain contested and in flux. Religion—or a Judeo-Christian tradition—will not be the only glue that holds European identity together. Islam will be a permanent feature in the European cultural landscape, which means that the relegation of religion to the private sphere in Europe cannot continue on the old terms.

The past decade has seen secularization theory challenged in light of a host of factors, some that have to do with the growing role of religion globally, but others that have to do with the growing role of religion in Europe itself. The enlargement of the EU brought in new member states that retained strong religious traditions or that had experienced religious revival in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The influx of non-European immigrants, most of them Muslims, added another layer of religious identity and complexity. Finally, the need to integrate large Muslim minorities into religious-cultural traditions and institutions has brought yet another layer of complicated relationships and challenges to Europe.

Europe must create a pluralist civil society that immigrants have a stake in and that they feel a part of.

Optimists predict that Islam will accommodate itself to European culture and society, and over time European culture and society will absorb Islam, creating a new European culture in the twenty-first century. Others are more pessimistic, arguing that the cultural and political resistance to an expanding Muslim population in a Judeo-Christian Europe can easily lead to a real social collision.[27]

The problem of religious violence has only exacerbated efforts to arrive at some resolution to the problems of integration. One of the consequences of radical and violent Islamism is that non-Muslim Europeans are increasingly impatient with Muslim communities because moderate Muslims are not seen as doing enough to curb religious violence, nor to condemn it. Al Qaeda-style terrorism has re-shaped views of Muslims both in the United States and in Europe. The failure of integration has encouraged radicalism, because these forms of Islam offer certainties, moral guidance, simple answers to complicated global problems, and provide a sense of belonging that the surrounding secular society is not able to provide.

To answer the challenges of integration, Europe must create a pluralist civil society that immigrants have a stake in and that they feel a part of. If Europe can't give Muslims a sense of belonging and of shared community, then current tensions will only increase. Young disenfranchised Muslim youth are not motivated by theological fervor but by the political radicalization that underlies it, and building the framework of pluralism which takes European Muslims in as full citizens will go far in addressing the aspirations of Muslims throughout Europe. Likewise, European Muslims must become involved in resolving these conflicts, and in finding ways to constitute their communities as declared members of European society.

There are many fault-lines in Europe: secularism vs. religiosity; religious identity vs. European identity; integration vs. segregation. But what the debate on religion in Europe points to is the need to find a balance between Muslim Europeans integrating into European civil society while retaining their religious identity, and Europeans adapting to and embracing immigrant communities that will be a permanent fixture in the European landscape.

NOTES

1 See Slavica Jakeli , '"Secularization, European Identity, and 'The End of the West,'" Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 134-135.

2 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 86-87.

3 Gracie Davie, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). See also her discussion of what she has termed Europe's "vicarious religion," where she argues that churches have not lost their function as a marker of religious identity, and that a small minority of believers in a sea of secularists take on the role of performing religious rituals, etc. and also "believe" on behalf of others. See Gracie Davie, "Is Europe and Exceptional Case?" Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 24-25.

4 "An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe," The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, December 2004: 1.

5 Peter Katzenstein, "Multiple Modernities and secular Europeanization?" in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 2.

6 For an extensive examination of Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Europe, see Timothy A. Byrnes, Peter J. Katzenstein, editors, Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

7 See "Polish Leader Backs Death Penalty," BBC News, 28 July 2006,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5225406.stm; and "In Europe, a search for what defines the EU's moral identity," Christian Science Monitor, 6 September 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0906/p01s04-woeu.html.

8 The other countries included the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, and Slovakia. The opposition was led by Great Britain, France, and Sweden. See "Merkel resurrects EU "holy" EU constitution row," 29 August 2006, http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200608/49897b90-609f-465b-826b-2f48a5e07ab8.htm; and

"God's Place in the EU Constitution Continues to Divide," Deutsche Welle, April 30 2003, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,985271,00.html.

9 Timothy Garton Ash asserts that what is often considered "Islamophobia" is simply "plain, old-fashioned racism or xenophobia" that is frequently directed against other ethnic minorities. See "Islam in Europe," New York Review of Books, vol. 53, Number 15, October 5, 2006.

10 Highlights of EUMC Report "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, EUMC 2006: 8. Available at: http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN.pdf.

11 Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," Foreign Policy, no. 135 (March 2003).

12 See Greeley, Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003): xi. Peter Berger is also skeptical things in Europe will change dramatically. The data show some upward movement in religiosity, but not enough to be significant. See "Secular Europe and Religious America: Implications for Transatlantic Relations," Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life event transcript, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C., 21 April 2005.13 See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: 240-241.

14 Interview with Jytte Klausen, Spiegel Online, 25 November 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0.1518.386823.00.html.

15 See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concern about Religious and Cultural Identity," July 6, 2006. Executive Summary: 1.

16 Highlights of EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) Report, "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," EUMC 2006: 1, http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/EUMC-highlights-EN.pdf. For the full report, see: http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN.pdf.

17 Doug Saunders, "Muslims find their voice outside religion; Secular movement stirring controversy across Europe," The Globe and Mail (Canada), 10 March 2007, p. A1.

18 Sabine Riedel, "Muslime in der Europäischen Union: Nationale Integrationskonzepte im Vergleich," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Studie S-10, April 2005: 37.

19 Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001): 226-227.

20 Quoted in William W. Finan, Jr., "Wrestling with Euro-Islam," Current History, March 2007: 142.

21 Quoted in Mirjam Dittrich, "What Place for Islam in Europe?" European Policy Centre, Issue 10, "Charting new paths for Europe at home and abroad: new strategies for Europe's future challenges," 2003.

22 Olivier Roy, "Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Culture," Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 127-129.

23 Olivier Roy, "Europe's Response to Radical Islam," Current History, November 2005: 363-364.

24 For a comprehensive survey of Muslims in Germany, see "Islam and Identity in Germany," International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 181, March 14, 2007.

25 Jytte Klausen, "Counterterrorism and the Integration of Islam Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Studie S-10, April 2005: 37.

19 Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001): 226-227.

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21 Quoted in Mirjam Dittrich, "What Place for Islam in Europe?" European Policy Centre, Issue 10, "Charting new paths for Europe at home and abroad: new strategies for Europe's future challenges," 2003.

22 Olivier Roy, "Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Culture," Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 127-129.

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25 Jytte Klausen, "Counterterrorism and the Integration of Islam in Europe," July 6, 2007, AmericanDiplomacy.org, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0709/klau/klausen_counter.html. Republished by permission of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684 (www.fpri.org). Originally published in WATCH ON THE WEST, Vol. 7, No. 1.

26 José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective," Hedgehog Review, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2006: 17.

27 Davis Masci, "An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe," The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, December 2004: 16.

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Transatlantic Dialogue on Religion, Values, and Politics

This Issue Brief follows an AICGS workshop entitled "Religion and Politics in European Integration and Transatlantic Relations" that took place in Brussels in October 2006. This day-long workshop looked at religion in foreign policy; religion as a factor in European integration; Islam in the United States and Europe; religion and terrorism; and discussed religion's implications and next steps. AICGS is grateful to the Bosch Foundation for its generous support of this project.

Previous AICGS publications on religion and politics include:

■ Understanding the "God Gap": Religion, Politics and Policy in the United States and Germany, by Lily Gardner Feldman, Cathleen S. Fisher, Douglas M. Johnston, Jytte Klausen, Jeffrey M. Peck, Rolf Schieder, Clyde Wilcox. German American Issues 4 (2005).
■ Reconciling Religion and Public life: Essays on Pluralism and Fundamentalism in the United States and Germany, by Patrick J. Deneen, Türkan Karakurt, Charles T. Mathewes, Erik Owens, Rolf Schieder. German-American Issues 7 (2007).

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Religion and Politics: The European Debate

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