The Franco-German treaty was viewed subsequently by the German government as a template for the development of its relations with Poland, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but the treaty may also have relevance for relations between Japan and South Korea, particularly at a time of heightened tension over territorial issues, Japanese history textbook content, and the inadequate Japanese response (political, social, economic) to the plight of South Korean women used as sex slaves (“comfort women”) during World War II.

In times of crisis in bilateral ties, the idea of a comprehensive cooperation treaty could be the necessary “game changer” that unlocks paralyzed Japanese-South Korean relations by injecting a totally new idea into the debate. Observers of Japan have floated the issue of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “doing a Nixon” by undertaking the totally unexpected for a conservative government. President Nixon’s 1971-72 opening to China, the staunchest foe of the U.S. at the time, was a major breakthrough that led to the normalization of ties.

The Long-Term Importance of Franco-German Institutions

Personal relations and individual commitment on the part of government leaders made a significant difference in Franco-German relations in the post-war world, as the contrast in General de Gaulle’s relations with Chancellor Adenauer and Chancellor Erhard demonstrate most starkly.  Yet, de Gaulle recognized that partnership had to be anchored in something less subject to change and chance than personal chemistry and leadership. In addition to his reasoning that a treaty would place distance between Germany and the U.S. immediately, and preempt any German unilateralism in the East, one of de Gaulle’s main motivations for the 1963 Elysée Treaty was to embed Germany for the long-term bilaterally and to make relations more predictable through the creation of permanent institutions. De Gaulle went on to be disappointed in the treaty itself after the Bundestag insisted on the preamble that emphasized Germany’s transatlantic ties; and he compared treaties to young girls and roses, who can fade quickly.

Despite such disillusion, the institutions that developed from the 1963 treaty proved to be highly durable, bearing out Adenauer’s response to de Gaulle’s notion of ephemeral roses: “I know roses. And the plants with the most thorns are the most resistant. The roses [in my garden] survived the winter brilliantly. This friendship between France and Germany is like a rose that will always have buds and flowers.” De Gaulle was moved already in July 1963 to revise his initial metaphor with the following words: “The treaty is neither a rose nor a rose bush, but a rose garden. A rose barely lasts a morning … But with good will a rose garden lasts a long time.”[i]

Fifty years later, the Franco German engine is showing signs of rust. The current French President Francois Hollande and the political establishment in Paris fear that France might have permanently become the junior partner in a Europe now openly dominated by Germany. And even for many Germans, too much power causes unease.

With the benefit of hindsight, it could be argued that the writing was on the wall—even fifty years ago. The seeds for the current imbalance between France and Germany that so many commentators describe as the result of German reunification were already present at birth. When De Gaulle and Adenauer gathered in Paris to sign the famous treaty, it merely marked the end of the first phase of Franco-German post war rapprochement. But it certainly failed to meet the most ambitious goals of de Gaulle, and was far from a turning point in the relationship of the two nations.

It helps to remind us that General De Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 initially sent off alarm bells in Bonn. Adenauer feared that the French president might try to pursue an anti-German nationalistic course, thus weakening NATO and the European Community. When the two leaders finally met in the general’s house in Colombey les Deux Eglises in September 1958, a suspicious Adenauer was struck by the openness of De Gaulle. De Gaulle repeatedly stressed the need for Germany and France to move even closer. Adenauer concluded that the new French leader was not a man of the past after all. However, only days after this promising start, the chancellor learned about a French memorandum addressed to London and Washington outlining De Gaulle’s offer to form an exclusive directorate with the UK and the U.S. Adenauer was furious. The following five years from 1958 to the signing of the Elysee treaty in 1963 were filled with ups and downs. Both leaders showed the willingness to work together, but their underlying interests often diverged.

Having failed to forge a triumvirate with the Anglo-Saxons, De Gaulle’s increasingly turned to Germany. From the general’s perspective, the negotiations with Adenauer needed to accomplish two main objectives: cement the relationship with a Western Germany relegated to a permanent subordinate role and loosen the Western alliance in order to weaken American predominance in Western Europe.  Seen under this light, the talks leading to the Elysee treaty utterly failed to fulfill De Gaulle’s most ambitious expectations. Yet, the agreement has since become the symbol for a long lasting marriage between old enemies, and is even cited as a possible blueprint for reconciliation in other parts of the world.

Cameron’s speech rests on one key assumption. He believes that the nature of the EU is about to change and that his European colleagues have embarked on a journey that will force them to share more sovereignty and strengthen centralized, European institutions. Cameron also believes that a Europe of multiple groups is not a far and distant possibility but rather today’s reality. According to Cameron, “the club we belong to is changing. We can’t ignore this. Change is under way.” Cameron recognizes that those inside the euro area “are likely to need to make some big institutional changes. By the same token, the members of the euro zone should accept that we (i.e. the UK) need to safeguard our interests.”

Cameron is not telling the euro zone members that they should not integrate further, quite the contrary. But he is stating that further integration at the core should not come at the expense of non-euro zone members of the EU. This is a legitimate concern. That is why Cameron resists the term of a Europe of multiple speeds. The prime minister simply refuses to accept that some members (such as the UK) will always be forced to play catch up with the core just because they might choose not to join the euro zone.

According to Cameron, the common European denominator of the EU, a union that will continue to expand and be open to new members, is not the common currency but rather the single market. Britain is merely asking for a firm commitment from its partners that deepening the single market will remain the highest priority of Europe’s efforts in the coming years, even if the euro zone moves towards greater political integration. What the prime minister is essentially asking for is a recalibration of a changing union in order to accommodate older (the UK) and possible future members (Turkey potentially being one of them).

Not surprisingly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s reaction to Cameron’s words was far from belligerent—quite the opposite in fact. She carefully refused to jump on the bandwagon of those who flatly criticized Cameron’s remarks and instead signaled that she might even agree with much of what he said. In her speech at the World Economic Forum, Merkel, much like the prime minister before her, focused on the need for Europeans to become more competitive in global markets. She stressed that painful structural reforms and growth are two sides of the same coin and need to be pursued with determination.

On his first visit to Berlin as French Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault is slightly more diplomatic, but the essence of his message to Germans is similar: stop lecturing us. The stuttering Franco-German engine is back in the spotlight as mutual frustrations are growing on both sides of the river Rhine. Germans believe that the new French President Francois Hollande is showing unwillingness to reform his country; the French are frustrated by what is perceived as a persistent German attempt to turn the whole continent, including France, into Germany. The debate between austerity and growth is back where it was a few months ago. But the simmering tensions between Germany and France go deeper. Germany and France have to find a new balance. The crisis management of the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel clearly did not work to France’s advantage. Merkel has to understand and accept that France is looking for alternatives to reestablish some sort of equilibrium. The recent debate in Germany does not help to strengthen the ties to the new government in Paris. Here it is in a nutshell:

The German political elite seems to think that in order to avoid the wrath of financial markets, France’s economy needs to reduce the size of the public sector, reform the labor market, and create the conditions for small and mid-sized companies to grow. Higher taxes and deep spending cuts are unavoidable. France could quickly become the sick man of Europe if it does not act decisively. In other words, Germany and many economists are suggesting to France to swallow the same bitter medicine that other big European countries such as Italy and Spain are taking to cure themselves from past sins.

President Hollande recognizes that he and his country have a problem. However, he is still struggling to find the right balance, and any outside intrusion makes his job more difficult. So far, France has been rewarded by financial markets not because of its stellar economic performance, but because of its closeness to Germany. Even at the height of the euro crisis, financial markets thought that Germany would stick with France and vice versa, even in the event of a partial breakup. Hence, Paris’ political elite fears that rising tensions between Hollande and Merkel could spook investors and turn them against France. Things could unravel very quickly. Any lectures from Berlin increase the risk for Germany as well as for France.

“Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity” examines the Federal Republic’s external relations with four former enemies—France, Israel (the Jewish people), Poland, and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic—as it achieved international rehabilitation after the Holocaust. The book develops the concept of international reconciliation while illustrating its manifestation in practice, blending and balancing moral imperatives with pragmatic interests. Germany emerges as a model for how the bitterest of former international enemies can reconcile.

Lily Gardner Feldman is Harry & Helen Gray Senior Fellow in Residence and director of the Society, Culture & Politics Program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

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Kimberly Frank

Indeed, Franco-German relations have become a lesson for many other regions of the world to learn how one can lay aside the roots of conflict and clashes of armies. Speeches on the 50th anniversary of de Gaulle’s address to the youth of Germany in Ludwigsburg were also testimony to why that accomplishment was able to be achieved. The purposes of building Europe transcended the purposes of Franco-German conflicts in the past.

Of course, there were references to the fact that Germany and France continue to struggle and argue about the path forward for Europe.  The battle over the guts of the fiscal policies which will further guide the EU remains undecided. Yet those issues were set aside during the celebration of a half-century of efforts to strengthen the Franco-German partnership. When Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer met on that same spot in 1962 for de Gaulle to make a major address to the youth of Germany, they represented a very different Germany and a very different France facing each other less than twenty years after the worst war Europe had ever experienced.

Today the two neighbors look across the Rhine at each other in a Europe which has been enormously transformed and represents an environment in which so much of those relations are taken for granted. Along with that transformation comes a much more complicated network of connections that do not eliminate conflicts or arguments, even while the interdependence of France and Germany within an interdependent European Union has become both wider and deeper than ever before.

The continuing arguments and debates over the future course of the euro are today’s demonstration of the same type of arguments that were started six decades ago over the building of the very institutions that were to become the basis of the European Union. Back then the challenges that nations were facing in creating a basis for integration policies were just as difficult, but not many people would have perhaps believed then that Europe would be having the kind of arguments it is having today. Indeed many would have not expected Europe to be as far along as it is in the larger framework – beyond Cold War divisions, with a common currency and a far greater set of achievements in actually implementing what was seen as more dream than reality. This is all the more underscored when we look beyond Europe into the turmoil of other places. Apart from the clashes throughout the entire Middle East, particularly the bloody civil war in Syria, we see the continuation of wars and threats of war in Africa and now in East Asia, as China and Japan confront each other over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.

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The main agenda item was the future of Afghanistan after a decade of efforts to secure that future. The fact that the new French President Francois Hollander is pulling his French troops out this year  as opposed to the 2014 goal set by President Obama and the alliance − was downplayed at the summit.  However, it did serve as a reminder about the impact of domestic politics when it comes to maintaining an alliance consensus. We will be seeing more of that as Europeans and Americans struggle with an unpredictable economic future while trying to pursue a common alliance strategy.

Following Chicago, the questions remaining involve how much support for Kabul will be forthcoming as the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan army for security in the war-torn state begins in 2013. The war weariness is widespread throughout the NATO members and it is matched by the uncertainty of Afghan President Karzai’s ability to sustain a viable and credible government, as well as the stability of his country.

Germany restated its commitment to stay the course to 2014, adding further promises to provide support beyond the military departure. Chancellor Merkel affirmed the “in together, out together” mantra which has been the slogan in getting to the goal of concluding the alliance’s military presence. Yet a problem the Chancellor faces is that the mantra is just as relevant in Berlin as it is in NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Even as Chancellor Merkel faces significant headwinds in dealing with the economic crisis in Europe, she is demonstrating continuity of commitments to NATO. Most of Merkel’s headaches are generated by the euro crisis these days and they are bound to get worse in the coming months. Keeping a clear profile with the NATO dimension of her portfolio is perhaps an advantage, since she is also encountering the same cluster of people under that roof as in the euro mess.

That said, following the backlash against Germany’s decision not to engage in the action in Libya, questions about Germany’s ability to offer “deliverables” in the future still remain. That decision was a call that Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle made − but Merkel backed him up. Since then, the Libya experience has been illustrative of the challenge of getting an operative consensus in the alliance.

The fact that decisions involving the deployment of German military resources remain in the control of the federal Parliament places constraints on the Chancellor’s running space. Any suggestions that defense policy decisions be made without Parliamentary approval generate quick rebuttals from the Bundestag.

Yet, in a time of financial austerity in all NATO member countries, pooling resources is not only a military necessity. It also will involve pooling decision-making in order to apply those resources whenever the need for them might emerge. That raises a core issue of sovereignty and NATO has yet to figure out how to thread those needles.

At a recent AICGS conference in Washington DC, the consensus amongst participants was that not much will change in the Franco-German relationship. There could be a shift in tone, but no real departure from current policies. Austerity and the fiscal compact are here to stay. The growth compact, which is currently being cooked up, will likely emerge at the end of June and will be largely symbolic. President Francois Hollande could make some minor mistakes early on, participants agreed, but he will learn quickly, especially if markets become nervous. Nobody should expect him to put the French vessel on a collision course with its powerful neighbor to the East, namely Germany. According to Nicolas Veron, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based Brueghel Institute, Hollande has no clear governing program, despite some bold announcements made during the campaign. That will give him enough maneuvering room to act pragmatically. Markets seem to share this analysis with Mr. Veron. On Monday, after it was announced that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Hollande are to meet in Berlin next week, European stock markets quickly recovered from early losses. Merkozy is dead, “vive Merkollande.”

Against this backdrop even the Greek disaster looses some of its disruptive potential. Voters in Greece punished austerity and Germany, but the majority decided that they did not want the country to abandon the euro. Unfortunately, there was no consensus on how to achieve this goal. If the parties fail to form a government of unity within the next few days, Greek voters will be called on to return to the polls in about a month. The international media focused on the far right party, “Golden Dawn”, which for the first time made it into the Greek parliament. While the relative success of the fascists is an interesting story, its relevance may well have been blown out of proportion by reporters and analysts.

As for the vote in the German state of Schleswig Holstein, I refer to the essay by AICGS Executive Director Jackson Janes. The real test for Merkel is next weekend, when voters in the much more populous state of North Rhine-Westphalia go to the polls.

Last but not least, local elections in Italy confirmed that things are getting more complicated for Prime Minister Mario Monti. Its largest supporter in Parliament, the center right PDL (People of Liberty Party) of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, took a beating at the polls. With its controversial but charismatic leader out of sight, the political group is rapidly losing its grip on the conservative electorate. Many in Berlusconi’s party could soon reach the conclusion that there is very little for them to gain by continuing to support Monti’s experiment. The PDL’s alliance with the left and a smaller center right group in support of Monti’s government could fall apart sooner rather than later. At the very least, the PDL will do its best to slow down the pace of Monti’s reforms, which are perceived as too punishing for its traditional voters. Expect everything that comes out of the Italian Parliament as a watered down version of Monti’s original plans.