

FORGING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND EUROPE: REFLECTIONS ON 20 YEARS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

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AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

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FOREWORD

The questions, choices, and decisions that Germany of 2010 faces today are vastly different than those the two Germanys confronted over two decades ago. This special publication, made possible by the Dräger Foundation, looks back not only at the changes in Germany as they unfolded in 1989 and 1990, but offers views on Germany's role in Europe and the world in the decades to come.

The pace of history in the lead up to German unification in 1989 and 1990 was and remains breathtaking. The combination of courage, cool-headed assessment, and *carpe diem* thinking on the part of those who made possible the celebration on the steps of the Reichstag on October 3, 1990 was a unique confluence of people who grasped an opportunity and worked together to make a vision come true. In his essay, Robert B. Zoellick outlines the diplomatic steps taken on the road to unification, suggesting lessons that can be applied to today's challenges.

Throughout the decade after unification, Germany tried to plot its course fully aware of what unification meant, not only to the millions of Germans on either side of the now fallen Berlin Wall, but also to those who had experienced a powerful and aggressive Germany in the first half of the twentieth century and were wary of the direction Germany would take now as the largest economy and most populous country in Europe. Josef Joffe discusses just this issue, analyzing how the Federal Republic of Germany's embeddedness in the West and in Western institutions kept it from repeating its past aggrandizement.

Indeed, European neighbors recalled the meaningful words of historian Fritz Stern who once said: when Germany thinks about its future, others think about its past. And that is why Germany and then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in particular, were so fully behind the efforts to widen and deepen the process of European integration. The message was that German unification and European integration were two sides of the same coin. However, even twenty years later, the business of unifying Europe is not complete, argues Wolfgang Ischinger. Germany's leadership in European integration must continue in the twenty-first century.

The path Germany was to take after 1990 involved not only working on the difficult challenges of unifying the country. There were also adjustments to its role on the world stage. The political environment has changed and questions about the balance of power, responsibility, and the overall purpose of the transatlantic alliance were being raised more seriously than ever before.

Many of the institutions that had been created to deal with the world during the Cold War have had to adjust to new kinds of threats and challenges, such as terrorist threats, energy security, climate change, pandemic diseases, or mass migration. Still, there was a surprising degree of continuity and consistency in security policy as it emerged in 1989 and 1990 that continues to reverberate today, argues Mary Elise Sarotte.

Even before the Wall fell in 1989, the Federal Republic of Germany had evolved as the world's leading export nation, a powerful economy, and a leading actor on many international stages, in Europe and across a range of international institutions and initiatives. Today, German-American economic relations are at the heart of transatlantic relations, says Robert M. Kimmitt, and the challenge going forward will be to ensure that we do not relegate our economic relations to less importance than political and military relations.

West Germany was an important member of NATO during the Cold War as a primary basing theatre and it remains a cornerstone of the alliance today. Both its role in NATO's mission in Afghanistan and its recent election to the United Nations Security Council—a role it has actively sought for many years—are indications that Germany wishes to demonstrate its ability to be what President Bush called for in 1989—a partner in leadership and that a “reconstituted” Germany, according to John Kornblum, is coming of age.

Even as Germany strives to prove its leadership and partnership both within the European Union and across the Atlantic, the work is not complete. As long as Europe is going to remain a cluster of nation-states with different political systems and styles of government, the question of European leadership will remain answered in the national capitals as well as in Brussels. Unification has ultimately given Germany a strong economic position. Due to the euro it has a limited exchange-rate risk and it carries a significant amount of weight in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in Brussels under the rules codified by the Lisbon Treaty. But as we saw during the euro crisis, Germany must grow more accustomed to its political heft and risk making unpopular decisions. It cannot, says Almut Möller, be afraid of its leadership role.

As we look back on the past two decades of a unified Germany, the record of accomplishments are many. Today Germany has become one of the world's most prosperous and respected nations. It has fulfilled its goals of becoming a partner in a global web of intergovernmental institutions and has used its abilities and skills in pursuing consensus on the world stage as well as within its own social economic order.

Throughout all these transformations, debates, and challenges, the role of Germany will remain of central importance. The challenges Germany faces are shared with many of its neighbors, indeed also with the United States. Adjusting our economic systems to avoid the perils we have been through during the past two years, dealing with the assimilation and integration of immigrants, or finding new ways to prevent our planet from suffering long-term environmental dangers, the U.S. and Europe have to confront an enormous agenda of shared burdens and responsibilities.

During the past twenty years, we in the United States have watched Germany and Europe struggle with these domestic and foreign policy questions just as we have struggled with them as well. Throughout the many challenges we've faced, Germany's track record has clearly been positive: Germany is a reliable partner in leadership of the Euro-Atlantic community. Its institutions are stable, its political culture is resilient, its quality of life is among the most attractive and admired in the world. Unified Germany has overcome many challenges.

The past twenty years have shown that the fall of the Berlin Wall is far from being just an end-point; rather, it was the beginning of a new era in German-American relations, in transatlantic cooperation, and in global affairs. With this publication, AICGS seeks to shine new light on German unification and its consequences for Germany, the European Union, and transatlantic relations. We are grateful to the Dräger Stiftung for its generous support of this publication, to the authors for sharing their experiences and insights, and to Jessica Riester for her editorial work.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Global Head of Government Relations with Allianz SE. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Federal Republic of Germany's Ambassador to London. Prior to this assignment, he was the German Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006, and from 1998 to 2001 Deputy Foreign Minister. In 2007, he represented the European Union in the troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo. Ambassador Ischinger has served on the staff of the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York, on the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office, and at the German Embassy in Washington, DC, focusing on security policy issues. From 1982 to 1990, Wolfgang Ischinger served on the staff of the Federal Foreign Minister, became the Minister's Private Secretary in 1985, and Chief of the Parliament and Cabinet Division of the Federal Foreign Office in 1987. In 1990, he was appointed Minister and Head of the Political Section of the German Embassy to Paris. In 1993, he was named Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office. In 1995, he became Political Director-General of the Federal Foreign Office. As Political Director, Ambassador Ischinger was Head of the German Delegation during the Bosnian Peace negotiations in Dayton/Ohio in 1995, the negotiations on the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1996/1997, and during the Kosovo crisis in 1998.



Dr. Josef Joffe is publisher-editor of the German weekly *Die Zeit*. Previously he was columnist/editorial page editor of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (1985-2000). Abroad, his essays and reviews have appeared in: *The New York Review of Books*, *The New York Times Book Review*, *Times Literary Supplement*, *Commentary*, *The New York Times Magazine*, *New Republic*, *Weekly Standard*, *Prospect* (London), and *Commentaire* (Paris). He is a regular contributor to the op-ed pages of *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*. In 2007, Dr. Joffe was appointed Senior Fellow of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (a professorial position), with which he has been affiliated since 1999. A visiting professor of political science at Stanford since 2004, he is also a fellow of the University's Hoover Institution. He has also taught at Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Munich and as a Visiting lecturer at Princeton and Dartmouth. In 2005, he co-founded the foreign policy journal "The American Interest" in Washington (with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Francis Fukuyama).



Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt is Chairman of the Deloitte Center for Cross-Border Investment. He is also Senior International Counsel at the law firm of WilmerHale. Mr. Kimmitt served from 2005-2009 as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. Earlier, he was American Ambassador to Germany, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, General Counsel to the Treasury, and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at the White House. Before rejoining the government in 2005, Mr. Kimmitt was Executive Vice President, Global Public Policy, of Time Warner, Inc. His earlier private sector positions include Vice Chairman and President of Commerce One; partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; managing director of Lehman Brothers; and partner at Sidley & Austin. From April 1970 to August 1971, Mr. Kimmitt served in combat with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam. He retired in November 2004 as a Major General in the Army Reserve. Mr. Kimmitt was graduated with distinction from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1969 and received a law degree from Georgetown University in 1977, where he was editor in chief of Law & Policy in International Business. From 1977 to 1978, he served as law clerk to Judge Edward A. Tamm of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In May 2009, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Humane Letters degree by Marymount University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Academy of Diplomacy.



Ambassador John Kornblum is a Senior Counsel at Nörr Stiefenhofer Lutz Rechtsanwälte in Berlin. Before taking on this role, he was Chairman of Lazard & Co. GmbH. From 1997 to 2001, he served as U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambassador Kornblum enjoyed a distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service, starting in 1964, shortly after his graduation from Michigan State University. As a junior officer he served in Hamburg and Washington before being assigned to Bonn as Political Officer in 1969, where he also served as Action Officer for Berlin and as a member of the United States Delegation to the Four Power negotiations. After returning to Washington in 1973, he held a number of policy-related positions at the State Department, and he served as U.S. Minister and Deputy Commandant upon his return to Berlin in 1985. He was also chosen to be the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO in Brussels and was U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the OSCE, and chief of the American delegation to the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference. Ambassador Kornblum was appointed Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in June 1994 and Assistant Secretary in 1996. During his service at the European Bureau, he was one of the architects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and played a key role in conceiving the Administration's strategy for a new security structure in Europe.



Ms. Almut Möller is an analyst on European integration and European foreign and security policy. She has been the head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin since 2010. Prior to that, she lived and worked as an independent political analyst in London. Between 2002 and 2008 she was a researcher at the Center for Applied Policy Research at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, where she initially worked in the European Union reform and enlargement program. Since 2007 she was the head of the Center's Euro-Mediterranean program. She was a guest researcher at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (2008), at Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo (2007) and at Renmin University of China in Beijing (2006). Ms Möller is an Associate Fellow at the Austria Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) in Maria Enzersdorf near Vienna and the founder and editor of the *berlinbrief*, a briefing on German foreign policy for an English speaking readership.



Dr. Mary Elise Sarotte is Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Her newest book, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*, appeared with Princeton University Press on November 9, 2009, the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The *Financial Times* selected it as one of their "Books of the Year" and it has won three prizes: (1) the 2010 Robert H. Ferrell Prize of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAHR), for distinguished scholarship on U.S. foreign policy; (2) the 2009 Prize from the German government's Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), for distinguished scholarship in German and European Studies; and (3) the 2010 Marshall Shulman Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS, recently renamed ASEES; co-winner). In addition, the book received reviews in *Foreign Affairs*, *The London Review of Books*, *The New York Review of Books*, *The New York Times Book Review*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, among other places. Dr. Sarotte's previous publications include the books *Dealing with the Devil*, and *German Military Reform and European Security*, plus a number of scholarly articles. She has also worked as a journalist for *Time*, *Die Zeit*, and *The Economist*, and appears as a political commentator on the BBC, CNN International, and Sky News. Dr. Sarotte earned her BA in History and Science at Harvard and her PhD in History at Yale. After graduate school, she served as a White House Fellow, and subsequently joined the faculty of the University of Cambridge. She received tenure there in 2004 and became a member of the Royal Historical Society before returning to the U.S. to teach at USC. Dr. Sarotte is a former Humboldt Scholar, a former member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She is spending academic year 2010-11 on leave as a Visiting Scholar at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University.



The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick has been the president of The World Bank Group since July 1, 2007. He served in President George W. Bush's cabinet as U.S. trade representative from 2001 to 2005 and as deputy secretary of state from 2005 to 2006. From 1985 to 1993, Zoellick worked at the Treasury and State departments in various capacities for Secretary James A. Baker, III, as well as briefly in the White House as Deputy Chief of Staff. In 2006 and 2007, he served as vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International. Zoellick holds a J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, a master's degree in public policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and a bachelor's degree from Swarthmore College.



ESSAYS

LESSONS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK

Twenty years ago, on October 3, 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany absorbed the German Democratic Republic, uniting Germany. In the eleven months after the East Germans breached the Berlin Wall, diplomacy raced toward what now seems a pre-ordained result. But was it? Perhaps there are some lessons that might be useful today.

First, anticipation is vital. It is nearly impossible to predict precise incidents, but one can perceive trends and lay groundwork for contingencies. This need may seem obvious, but the daily press of events usually pre-empts thinking far ahead.

In early 1989, President George H.W. Bush felt that the geopolitical center of gravity was shifting to Central and Eastern Europe and that Germany's posture would be critical. In his first six months, Bush shored up NATO's cohesion—and Germany's place within the Alliance—by deferring the contentious issue of short-range nuclear missiles and by advancing drastic cuts in conventional forces in Europe, over the objection of his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bush visited Germany, Poland, and Hungary to signal that the Cold War had to end with a Europe whole and free.

Second, the United States approached German unification with a strategic and historic perspective. To avoid a "Versailles Victory" that invited its own destruction, we sought to mesh German unification within the unification of Europe in peace and freedom. We resisted efforts to restrict a united Germany's sovereignty, so as to avoid future grievances and to encourage Germany to be a full partner. We welcomed a unification of Europe that could be a democratic partner for the United States. And we offered the Soviet Union an opportunity to participate

in a new security system based on a changed North Atlantic Alliance, seeking to address legitimate concerns with respect, so as to limit the likelihood of future irredentism.

Third, the United States combined strategy with practical judgments about events: We believed the East German public would be a driving force for national unity. Our diplomats in East Germany, in touch with courageous dissidents, thought the East would opt for a "Third Way." But the desire of East Germans to have what their Western cousins enjoyed meant that unification would be a takeover by the legitimate German state, not a merger. The human momentum also posed risks if the diplomatic process stalled.

Fourth, the United States and West Germany urged the creation of the "Two-plus-Four" process to manage change while avoiding delaying tactics. The Soviets, after all, had treaty rights from World War II and 380,000 troops in East Germany. It appeared we could influence their thinking. During times of flux, counterparts may be uncertain; in the right circumstances, negotiators can help others determine how to achieve or even define objectives. Yet negotiators must be disciplined in linking process to goals, because diplomats can fall into a trap of treating talks as an end in themselves.

Fifth, the strategy and negotiations depended critically on the investment President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker made in building trust with their counterparts. These ties were fundamental to the partnership with Germany, of course, but also vital for reassuring the Poles and the West Europeans. Early on, when France's President François Mitterrand suggested to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that they work together with Britain to block unifica-

tion, Gorbachev worried that he was being set-up against Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and President Bush. Although Bush paid a price at home, his non-triumphal response to the opening of the Berlin Wall earned dividends in his relations with Gorbachev. By July 1990, trust had developed to the point that Baker alerted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to U.S. initiatives at NATO, enabling Shevardnadze to pre-empt opponents with a positive statement when NATO announced the changes.

Sixth, the United States was aware of the special need to communicate with the public so as to generate support for its diplomacy. We needed to assure Germans that we stood with them, while addressing the anxieties of publics throughout Europe and the Soviet Union; if their concerns were not addressed, political leaders would have less room to work out solutions. We were aided immensely that the American public instinctively associated with the desire of Germans to unify in freedom.

Finally, timing—seizing the moment—is at the heart of diplomacy. A few months after Germany's unification, Shevardnadze was gone. The next year, coup plotters struck and both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were finished. Even on the U.S. side, by the time of the final signings, attention had shifted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the need to create a new coalition.

Bismarck, who unified Germany a century before, said that the sign of a statesman is to recognize Fate as she rushes past, so as to grab on to her cloak. Though Fate changes her appearance, she is still with us.

This essay was originally published on HuffingtonPost.com and in German in Die Welt.

TWENTY YEARS AFTER REUNIFICATION: NO “FOURTH REICH,” JUST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WRIT LARGE

JOSEF JOFFE

On October 3 this year, Germany celebrated the twentieth anniversary of reunification. The event left nary a trace. So let's go back to 1990. Writing in the *International Herald Tribune*, a German-Jewish journalist poured out the anxieties of the time. A “unified Germany,” this son of Holocaust survivors warned, “may grow into everything the world abhorred in the Germany of the early part of the century: a powerful country never content to accept limits on its political or economic strength [...] whose rulers remain happily oblivious to foreigners' concerns.” Soon, we might be watching the replay. “The peaceful and moderately dull Federal Republic of Germany [...] is leaving the stage. Its replacement, a rich and mighty entity, may become a strange and eerie place—perhaps even the source of a new wave of darkness spreading over the earth.”

This was the archetypal horror scenario, circa 1990: the past as prelude, the Federal Republic as precursor of the “Fourth Reich.” Tempting as the historical analogies may be, they turned out to be completely wrong. Why?

To begin with, democracy worked in West Germany, whereas it was curtailed in the Second Reich (1871-1919) and doomed in the First Republic (1919-33). And it worked because the conditions were, for the first time, just right. The difference between 1919 and 1945 was the Cold War, which soon turned a pariah into an indispensable ally. Instead of reparations, there was the Marshall Plan. Instead of beggary-neighbor protectionism, there was free trade. Export outlets lost in the East were doubled and tripled by the Common Market in the West, fueling export-led growth. Paradoxically, even dismemberment and partition proved a boon, feeding, until the Wall was built in 1961, twelve million refugees into a

booming economy in desperate need of fresh labor.

Unlike the Weimar Republic, the Bonn Republic could enjoy the economic consequences of peace; and, as a result, democracy flourished. But the politics were also right. The great loser of World War I, Weimar Germany, could never clear the accounts. It remained the object of suspicion and encirclement. Not so the Federal Republic, which was handed membership in the Western community that delivered a shelter and a role. Instead of French intervention, there was Franco-German friendship. Instead of endemic insecurity, there was NATO and a junior partnership with the United States.

For once, Germany was not alone but embedded in the West. And because West German—and European—security was guaranteed by a mighty superpower, the Federal Republic was blessed twice: it could not threaten others and it could not be threatened by them. To exaggerate a bit, West German democracy was the sturdy child of the Cold War and an American-sponsored Western community.

Safety and prosperity prepared the grounds where the seeds of civility, democracy, and, yes, “Westernization” could take root after 1945—as they could not after 1919. Western democracy—rejected 1919 and torn to shreds after 1933—came to rest on a stronger foundation than the loaded guns of the victors. In the 1950s, the extremist parties of the Right and the Left, new Nazis and old Communists, fell into oblivion one by one. The 1970s witnessed the rise of terrorism, complete with spectacular murders of business leaders. Predictably, there was a cry for harsher laws and greater police powers. In the end, though, civil rights were not curtailed, apart from the ugly *Extremistenbeschluss* that barred radicals from the

civil service—be they lowly railroad workers or high defense officials. The Constitutional Court, at first the weakest of the three branches, became a strong, independent force—as in the United States.

The most critical test came in the mid-1960s—in the guise of West Germany's first postwar recession. Half a million people were out of work, and that correlated ominously with the rise of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD). Today, the NPD gets less than 1 percent at the polls—while three million are jobless (and five had been in mid-decade). The reason is simple. The modern welfare state, in Germany as elsewhere, has thrown up plenty of defenses against the revolt of the losers, be they victims of recession or globalization. In the 1920s, an impoverished young German might have joined the Storm Troopers for the sake of a fresh brown shirt, three meals a day, and the social status conferred by a shiny pair of jackboots. Today, his out-of-work great-grandchild gets two-thirds of his last after-tax income from the government. Joblessness does not imply misery.

The long and the short of it is that Germany today is part of the Western mainstream—and resolutely in the middle. Resentment of Muslim immigration has thrown up far-right, xenophobe parties from France to Sweden, but not in Germany. Here, the past is indeed prologue, but in entirely benign ways. Given the country's murderous past, anti-Nazism is part of Germany's DNA, which explains why neo-Nazi parties are always on the verge of extinction and while the prospects of a "Sweden Democrats" type party remain dim.

Hence reunited Germany did not turn into a "strange and eerie place." But what about a milder version of the angst that was rampant in France, Britain, and Italy twenty years ago? Wouldn't this colossus in the heart of Europe, no matter how democratic, start throwing its weight around once it was liberated from the chains of the Cold War?

Yet the Berlin Republic did not turn into a remake of the Wilhelmine Reich, clamoring for a "place in the sun." Put it down to a wondrous learning experience. When Germany went it alone, it reaped deadly war and political disaster. When it opted for community

and alliance with the West, it flourished beyond belief. Even giving up the Deutsche Mark was a boon, protecting the economy against relentless revaluation while forcing the rest into monetary discipline à la the Bundesbank. Indeed, the European Central Bank is the Bundesbank writ large. Why act the bully when you can exert your power through international institutions? Angela Merkel got her way on the Greek rescue package, and again in 2010, by insisting on stricter EU sanctions against spendthrift members of the euro-zone. Why fight if you can sing "I did it my way" while honoring multilateral rules and procedures?

The new, more civilized and civilianized game of nations offers the largest payoffs to nations such as Germany; that is, those who are strong, but not overbearing. The game has devalued vast military power, delivering influence to those who can back up their bets with economic chips and the authority that comes from an attractive socio-political model. Why, then, should they forgo their advantage by changing the rules? In the attempt, the Germans would certainly revive the hostile coalitions that proved their undoing in 1919 and 1945.

What about yesterday's "rulers" who remained "happily oblivious to foreigners' concerns?" The difference is sixty-five years of happy and stable liberal democracy. Democratic rulers are simply more sensible and sensitive about such risks than were the Hohenzollerns and the Hitlerites.

What is the moral of this tale? Yes, the past is prologue. But it is not the past of Wilhelm, Weimar, or Hitler, but the political miracle after the war that trumped even the fabled economic one. Failure poisons the future, but success breeds success, in business as well as in politics.

GERMANY AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF UNIFYING EUROPE

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER

Twenty years ago, a miracle happened. After the fall of the Wall in November 1989, Germany was united within 329 days, without a single shot fired. All of our neighbors and partners agreed, and Germany remained a member of the European Union (EU), and of NATO. The Warsaw Pact was subsequently dissolved, the Soviet Army withdrew from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries in central Europe, intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) were eliminated, and a START and a CFE agreement concluded. In short, the Cold War was over, Germany united, Europe transformed, and the world changed. Truly: a diplomatic and historic miracle.

Have we fulfilled the promise of 1990—in the words of Helmut Kohl—“to serve peace in the world and advance the unification of Europe”? Have we heeded the warning spelled out by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, also on October 3, 1990, that “the Western border of the Soviet Union must not become the Eastern border of Europe”?

For the better part of the last decade, we have defended a European order which has become largely dysfunctional. Our existing institutions and structures were unable to prevent the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, offer a solution to the instability in Kyrgyzstan, or resolve simmering disputes in the Caucasus and the Balkans, including the Kosovo problem. In short, the status quo in Europe is not satisfactory. It is at risk of developing into a source of instability instead of providing sustained stability.

The unification of Germany became the model for the unification of Europe: no new institutions. While this worked very well indeed in the case of Germany, this approach has turned out to be somewhat less

successful in the case of the European order. Sure: superficially examined, enlargement of Western institutions has been a great success story: the EU of twenty-seven, NATO of twenty-eight, with Germany smack in the middle: a dream come true?

Since 1989, a total of fifteen new states have emerged out of the former Soviet Union, seven from former Yugoslavia, while Czechoslovakia split in two. Many of these states continue to be subject to crises and instability, ethnic strife, frozen territorial conflicts, economic hardship, and fear of foreign intervention. A number of these and other “in between” states—from Belarus to Ukraine to Turkey—have not yet really found a firm anchoring spot in the European order.

But the central issue is, of course, Russia. If Russia would feel comfortable with the European order, the rest of the puzzle would most likely fall into place.

The problem is that Russia never accepted a European order centered on NATO and the EU. Yes, Russia tolerated the expansion of the West. But this came to an end a decade ago when the West ignored Russian opposition and intervened in Kosovo in 1999. And the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) never became popular in Moscow and could therefore not fill the vacuum.

This is the key reason why the business of unifying Europe is not finished—yet.

The European Security Order: Building a New Relationship with Russia

From a German point of view, there is today a window of opportunity for a new arrangement with Russia.

Why? Let me give you four reasons:

■ First, the conditions and perceptions of security in Europe have significantly changed since the 1990s, and quite dramatically over the last few years. Today, none of the EU's twenty-seven members fears military attack. This is even true for those European countries closest to Russia, such as Poland, and the Baltic states. A Baltic prime minister recently remarked that his country has never been as safe, and as free of the fear of foreign intervention, as today. The one exception to this is probably Georgia. The vacuum left by the absence of the fear of war has been filled with post-modern concerns: defending a certain way of life, climate, energy, immigration, environment. European elites have changed the way they think about security.

Actually, this change amounts to a major paradigm shift: whereas in the past, Europeans feared powerful neighbors who might invade them, they are more afraid today of weak or failing countries and neighbors, and of possible resulting threats to their prosperity, or to their way of life. More precisely: we worry today a lot less about the military balance than about the collapse of our banks, or of those of our neighbors.

■ Second, for the first time in hundreds of years, Europe and its security issues is neither the central problem nor the central solution in the global order. European security has become a regional rather than a global problem.

■ Third, there is a growing awareness, both in Europe and in Russia, that, in demographic and economic terms, our relative weight in the world will tend to decline in coming decades, as new emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil begin to occupy the front row. Accepting and managing interdependence thus becomes a key to the establishment of a functioning European order. This is particularly challenging in the case of asymmetrical interdependence—as between the EU and Russia in the field of energy, where the EU's need for energy allows Russia to exert significant pressure, even though the EU is by far the major economic power on the continent.

■ Fourth, the Medvedev proposal for a new European Security Treaty—despite a number of legitimate concerns about it raised by Western commentators—importantly defines Russia as part of Europe. Russia wants to be part of us—is that not what we wanted all along? This is why, in my view, we should not squander the opportunity provided by President Dmitry Medvedev's proposal, which reflects a genuine change in the way Russia defines its foreign policy interests and its acknowledged need to work with the EU.

The fundamental point is that we need to demilitarize our relationship with Russia, replace fear and frustration with mutual trust, and begin to flesh out a vision of a future European order focused on managing interdependence, and a little less obsessed with classic military threat perceptions.

Against this background, what practical steps might be considered to move us in the right direction?

■ At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November, the relationship with Russia will be the central issue, more important even than nuclear weapons, arms control, the Article V debate, or the mission in Afghanistan. Can NATO members agree on how to deal with Russia, and finally stop defense planning exercises against Russia, after having agreed that Russia is no longer an adversary? Yes or no? In short, can NATO and Russia agree on a new relationship of trust? That is going to be the litmus test.

■ Should Russia be offered membership in NATO? If Russia meets all the criteria for membership, it should be up to Russia, in due course, to file an application. The NATO door should be open not just to Georgia and Ukraine, and NATO should say so explicitly. Good Russian strategic planning would actually conclude that Russia may need NATO sooner, and more, than NATO will need Russia. But let us be realistic: Russia is not going to be a NATO member any time soon. We are discussing principles, not concrete time-tables. But this discussion leads in the right direction.

■ At the very least, the NATO-Russia Council should be upgraded, from Economy to First Class, so to speak. In the words of the Heads of State and Government of 28 May 2002, on the occasion of the

second round of NATO enlargement: “The NRC will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.” If this promise of 2002 will finally be translated into practical reality in Brussels, a step that is long overdue will be taken.

■ One game-changing example of joint decision and joint action between NATO and Russia would be joint ballistic missile defense. NATO decided recently to embark on a ballistic missile defense program, and Germany insists that this program be developed jointly with Russia. The obstacles will be enormous, in the U.S. as well as in Russia, but this is really worth trying.

and central role in completing the unfinished business of unifying Europe by building an even more integrated, more enlarged, and more capable EU; by keeping NATO alive and well; and by opening our door to Russia.

The German Mission Statement

German political elites have not forgotten the mission statement pronounced twenty years ago by Helmut Kohl: “Our Country dedicates itself to serve peace in the world and to promote European integration.” This is the mission of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), which remains valid for the united Germany. On 3 October 2010, exactly twenty years after the Kohl statement, Federal President Christian Wulff made the same point in his own words: “But I will never stop championing Europe, for Europe is our future and we Germans should remain its engine.”

The effect of the 1990 miracle was that, with the stroke of a pen, all of Germany now belonged firmly to the West—we were now and will be “*Teil des Abendlands*.” Thus, 1990 also ended all speculation about a German “*Sonderweg*” (special way). This is why being part of the West has been, along with the gift of German unity, the greatest gift Germany received in the second half of the twentieth century. On this we must now build.

Germany would have more to lose than any other country from an ailing or fragmenting EU or from a disintegrating euro-zone. We know this very well in Berlin. And Germany will benefit substantially from a European security order which offers an appropriate place and role to Russia, and to the “in-between” states. This is why Berlin will continue to play a vital



GERMAN UNIFICATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

MARY ELISE SAROTTE

On October 3, 2010, Germany celebrated the 20th anniversary of its reunification. In a surprisingly brief period—less than a year after the unexpected opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989—divided Germany became a united and sovereign country. As part of the dramatic changes of 1989-90, the division of Europe ended as well. The lives of not only East Germans but also Central and East Europeans became vastly freer as a result and they gained a wide array of new life choices.

Yet for all of the dramatic changes that took place in Berlin, Germany, and Eastern Europe, there were also notable elements of continuity between the Cold War and post-Cold War world. If one changes the level of analysis—from individual to international—one sees a gradual shift from an image of dramatic change to one with more inherent consistency. In the brief space available here, this essay will focus on the history of consistency in European security in 1989-90 and, in conclusion, speculate on its legacy twenty years later.

The most notable symbol of security consistency between the Cold War and the post-Cold War world is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO. Originally the quintessential Cold War institution, created to shield the West from the Soviet Union, NATO survived both the demise of its enemy and indeed the Cold War conflict intact. Although the transatlantic alliance's primary mission had been to counter the Soviet threat, both it, and a "front line" moved eastward but still west of Russia, outlived that threat. The means by which this happened are of more than historical interest, given that NATO's endurance enabled its subsequent enlargement. If world leaders had made alternative bargains at the end of the Cold War—namely, ones subordinating or

replacing NATO, or foreclosing NATO's future movement eastward—then such enlargement would have become much more difficult, if not impossible. How did NATO not only endure but also continue to enlarge, despite the dramatic changes of 1989?

It did so in the face of challenges from potential new institutions. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, although surprised by events in late 1989, sought to make use of them to create further dramatic change. Once he got over his shock at the unexpected opening of the Berlin Wall, in early 1990 he suggested creating a collective European security organization from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

His ideas about how to do so varied over time. At first, he spoke of a new institution that would represent a security version of his "common European home." While the details of this new architecture stayed vague, the central concept was a pan-European one: Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, or even the Pacific Ocean. Gradually, however, Gorbachev switched to suggesting more pragmatic solutions. He proposed putting a united Germany into both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, thereby creating the new security structure on the basis of the existing institutions. In May 1990, he even suggested the idea (in a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker) of putting the Soviet Union in NATO.

Gorbachev was not alone in his calls for a security solution that stretched across the continent. In the immediate wake of 1989, the French president, François Mitterrand, following in the spirit of Charles de Gaulle, spoke of a "European Europe," consisting of various overlapping security and economic confederations. For their part, the East European dissidents

who had headed the revolutionary upheaval in their respective countries and subsequently become rulers had their own visions of the future of security in Europe. In many cases they were pacifists who had refused to perform the military service mandatory in their home countries. They suggested turning the combined territory of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia into a neutral, weapons-free zone. The idea was for this zone to function as a bridge between East and West, providing a buffer between the West and Russia. It would be part of a larger pan-European security organization, based on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or perhaps an expanded European Community (EC). The freely elected foreign minister of East Germany, Markus Meckel, additionally called for all nuclear weapons to leave Germany as part of unification.

All of these proposals had three characteristics in common. First, they were all general ideas, not specific plans. Second, they all included a role for the Soviet Union. Third, they threatened to diminish the pre-eminence of the United States in European security. Not surprisingly, Washington regarded them with skepticism. Minimizing uncertainty about the future and maintaining NATO's dominance in post-Cold War European security became the highest priority of the George H.W. Bush administration in 1990.

Writing personally to Mitterrand in April 1990, President Bush stated, "I hope that you agree that the North Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of Europe's future." Moreover, "I do not foresee that the CSCE can replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and stability. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize how a European collective security arrangement including Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, would have the capability to deter threats to Western Europe." Bush asserted, "NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe." In the words of Mitterrand's top foreign policy aide, Hubert Védrine, the transatlantic alliance's future was "the only issue" that truly concerned Bush at the end of the Cold War.

Fortunately for President Bush, the West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, agreed strongly with this goal. The chancellor wanted to avoid the construc-

tion of what he termed "Fortress Europe." In other words, Kohl wanted to ensure that Americans stayed closely involved in European security beyond the end of the Cold War. He viewed that outcome as much more desirable than a Europe on its own. Moreover, both Bush and Kohl understood that NATO guaranteed that involvement.

Put another way, the reactions of both Washington and Bonn to the events of 1989 revealed the accuracy of a popular saying about NATO—namely, that its real objective was not only to keep the Russians out, but also to keep the Americans in, and the Germans down. By 1990, the alliance had clearly succeeded. The Russians were "out," but the Americans wanted to stay "in" and the Germans wanted to stay "down" nonetheless.

In the interest of maintaining the pre-eminence of the United States in post-Cold War European security, American and West German leaders took quick, decisive, and successful action to protect NATO—both from potential competitors, in the form of new European structures, and from restrictions on its future activities. The idea of the Soviet Union becoming a NATO member was dismissed. Gorbachev's alternate ideas of collective European security never moved beyond vague sketches; he had too many problems at home distracting him from geopolitics. He had critics on both the left and the right, and the economy of the Soviet Union remained in an abysmal state despite his reforms. The Americans and West Germans skillfully outmaneuvered him in every negotiation on the subject. The French and East and Central Europeans ultimately decided to abandon their initial visions for the future of European security and follow Washington and Bonn instead. NATO emerged from the end of the Cold War with its core structures and, most importantly, its ability to continue to expand intact.

As Baker has noted, "almost every achievement contains within its success the seeds of a future problem." Bringing the Cold War in Europe to a peaceful end was an enormous achievement. The press of events mandated swift action, and that is what Bonn and Washington provided. But, following Baker's words of wisdom, it is also necessary to be clear-eyed about the longer-term consequences of

major decisions, namely, the perpetuation of the dominant Cold War institution, NATO, into the post-Cold War world. As a result of this achievement, no meaningful place was carved out in European security for the Soviet Union, later Russia, in the post-Cold War security order that emerged in 1990. Later attempts at limited inclusion remained partial and halting; the Georgian War of 2008 revealed the extent of remaining Russian hostility. Finding a way to define Russia's post-Cold War relationship with its Western neighbors remains as pressing a need as ever.



AN ENHANCED RELATIONSHIP IN A NEW ERA

ROBERT M. KIMMITT

As we look to the future of our bilateral relationship twenty years after the historic events of 1989 and 1990, many Germans worry that America is losing interest in Europe and Germany. They point to the passing of the generation of Americans who shaped U.S. postwar policy toward Europe, and also to the fact that America is becoming more Hispanic-Latino and Asian in its makeup and orientation. But these German friends sometimes overlook the fact that three generations of Americans have close ties to Germany developed long before or since 1945. I am one of those Americans.

My father was an Army officer and my mother an American Red Cross girl who met and married in Berlin in March 1947. I was born exactly nine months later in the United States. So I, too, can say: "Ich bin (ein) Berliner," but in my case, also "Made in Germany."

My mother's family came to America in the nineteenth century from Lippe-Detmold near Hannover, so like almost one-quarter of Americans (the highest of any ethnic group), I have German roots. I was also one of almost 15 million Americans who lived in Germany as a military dependent (1960-62 in Heidelberg and 1962-64 in Baumholder) and one of almost 5 million Americans who served there in the U.S. military (Aschaffenburg in 1968 and Stuttgart in 1995-97).

No two countries, then, have a firmer personal foundation for future ties than the United States and Germany. But a foundation is only that, a base upon which to build the structure we choose. The question before us, twenty years after unification and sixty-five years after the end of World War II, is what type of structure will meet our common interests both today and in the decades to come.

We have been through three eras since 1945: (1) the Cold War; (2) post 9.11.89; and (3) post 9/11/01. In each period, the political and military components of our relationship were either dominant (Cold War), crucial (post fall of the Wall), or important (post 9/11). And those ties will remain crucial, both in Europe and beyond, including on areas of common strategic concern like interacting with Russia and countering Iran. But for our enhanced relationship in this new era—the G20 or post financial crisis era—commercial and financial ties, which have played a key but subsidiary role for decades, will grow in importance.

Germans and other Europeans often express concern that growing U.S. commercial ties with China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets, especially in the G20, will come at the expense of commercial, and political, ties with Europe and Germany. We must reject this zero-sum analysis and focus instead on a "both-and" result: our common goal going forward is both closer ties with the emerging world and closer and stronger ties with Germany and Europe. And, as with the statistics noted above about Americans with personal ties to Germany, commercial and financial statistics demonstrate a solid basis for an even stronger bilateral relationship in a more globalized world.

The United States and the European Union are the world's two major economic powers today and will be for years to come. Certainly our economic and financial ties will grow with the emerging markets, but trade and investment between the United States and Europe will continue to be the dominant reality for both economies for decades to come.

Take investment as an example. In 1989, the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Germany was

around \$23 billion. By 2009, it had grown to more than \$150 billion. Even more impressive is the growth in the stock of German foreign direct investment in the United States, which increased from around \$28 billion in 1989 to over \$200 billion in 2009. And, as the United States reduced its military forces in Germany over the past twenty years, it increased its economic presence. Today around 850,000 Germans work for American companies in Germany, while more than 650,000 Americans work for German companies in the United States. These workers are the new “forces” in our bilateral ties.

Even as we continue to work bilaterally and in NATO to keep our political and military relationship strong, we must devote new energy to strengthening our commercial and financial ties. The work of important organizations like AICGS will increasingly include economic and financial analysis, while links between organizations like the German Federation of Industry (BDI) and its American counterparts will be of growing importance. Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger’s initiative to add a business dimension to the Munich Security Conference is also especially welcome, as a recognition that the concept of security is broader today than it was twenty years ago. And companies themselves can help make this point by interacting with legislators in whose states and electoral districts they have created jobs, which is always the highest economic priority for a politician.

However, Americans also must recognize that the German-American economic relationship is increasingly embedded in the EU-U.S. relationship. That is why the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), established in 2007 by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President George W. Bush during the German EU presidency, is so important to strengthening not only European-American but also German-American economic ties. While I hope we will see in this decade an EU-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, working now toward the TEC’s goal of reducing non-tariff barriers is the best way to make our economic and financial ties even closer. A recent study by the European Commission found that for the European Union, removing all non-tariff measures would translate into an increase in GDP of €122 billion a year and a 2.1 percent increase in exports to the United States. For the United States, benefits from removing these

measures would lead to increases of €41 billion per year for GDP and 6.1 percent for exports to the European Union. And achieving these results will mean that as each of us reaches out to the emerging markets, we will do so with the strength and confidence that comes from closer transatlantic ties.

The twenty years since unification have made clear that the German-American relationship is at the core of the transatlantic relationship; that our relationship has important political, security, and economic dimensions; and that our economic and financial ties have kept occasional differences on political matters (as in 2003) from damaging the overall relationship. Going forward, these economic and financial ties have the potential to become more than a defensive buffer; instead, they can be active contributors to forging an enhanced bilateral relationship and advancing transatlantic and global interests vital to both our countries. But we have to ensure, in both public and private sector settings, that economic and financial issues are accorded the same priority as political and military ties. That is our challenge, but also our great opportunity, in the new era before us.

GERMANY AT 65: A NEW CHAPTER BEGINS

JOHN KORNBLUM

"The success of the occupation can only be judged fifty years from now. If the Germans at that time have a stable, prosperous democracy, then we shall have succeeded."

General Dwight Eisenhower
June, 1945

"The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies, but today we share an added role: partners in leadership."

President George H.W. Bush
May, 1989

Twentieth Anniversary? How about 65th?

The modern German clock did not begin ticking twenty years ago, but rather sixty-five. This year postwar Germany reached the age when most people think of retiring. But Germany was already forty-five before it was once again made whole. Today it is just beginning a new and more mature chapter of its life.

At sixty-five, it is one of the world's most prosperous and respected nations. Increasingly, it is emerging as the fulcrum of Europe, more the center of a growing Eurasian network than a middle power between two large blocs.

In other words, Germany has fulfilled its basic task of becoming a democratic, prosperous, and loyal partner. We have exactly the Germany we wished for sixty-five years ago.

Not exactly. President Bush's call for German leadership was made before the Wall came down. Even before reunification it was becoming clear that the future of Europe and thus of the Atlantic world

depended increasingly on the role of Germany. In 2010, that is even more the case. Germany today is at the center of an unruly Europe in a rapidly changing globalized world. Both are calling for leadership. For all the progress the Federal Republic has made, German society is not yet prepared for the spotlight which is being aimed in its direction.

And, therefore, neither is Europe. Rather than being able to guide a global revolution, Germany and Europe are still seeking equilibrium between a difficult past and a dynamic future. Without a friendly, steadying hand, Germany and Europe will find it difficult to navigate the uncertainties of a multipolar world, and at the same time continue their process of internal transformation. For America, the European project is far from completed.

In a groundbreaking article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1994, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke warned against any sense that the end of the Cold War marked the end of America's task in Europe. He stated clearly that mastery of the post-Cold War world required that the United States continue to be a European Power. This vision is even more accurate today.

In many ways, the tasks ahead are as important as the role played by the United States in German reunification twenty years ago; or during postwar reconstruction sixty-five years ago. We are experiencing the coming of age of a reconstituted Germany; one which will be neither fully new nor recognizably old. Germany has transcended its past to become something quite different.

But however different it has become, this new Germany cannot be separated from its past. The

transition of Germany to a more confident identity is stirring up deep emotional currents among Germans and Europeans alike. The tragedies of the twentieth century seem to come alive with each step away from the defeat of 1945. The Atlantic framework is the only arena large enough to provide back-up for Germany as it steers through the transition to a new era.

Unfortunately, during the past decade the United States seems to have lost interest in maintaining its Atlantic pillar. In good American fashion, we seem to believe that having won the war, our job is finished. It has been difficult for us to understand the fundamental role played by the Atlantic community in supporting American global interests, even in the absence of the Cold War.

Here we encounter the paradox of what might be called post-modern American diplomacy. The Obama administration rejects the idea of a world divided into groups of friends and foes. It believes that with good will, problems can be solved on their merits rather than on the basis of power or ideology. It seems to fear that too much Atlanticism would appear to exclude other new powers from our attention.

But Barack Obama's entry on the world stage occurred midway through a very long and often tragic drama, which began with the collapse of the European order nearly a hundred years ago. Agreeing to treat all partners as equals does not mean that one can ignore the need to remain engaged in tending the interests and responsibilities that emerged from this sad past. The Arab-Israeli conflict is an obvious example. But so is the importance of a continuing American engagement in the evolution of Germany, the integration of Russia, and the final knitting together of the Eurasian continent.

The problem with the transactional approach is that it is being grafted on to the stationary structures of the Cold War era. Trying to put together new sorts of coalitions within the matrix of today's mentality can lead only to disappointment and frustration. "Old Europe" only looks that way if we ourselves view it through the optic of the past. Each of the past three administrations has encountered the same problem.

None has figured out that the rules of the game have changed dramatically.

We have hardly begun to define the new levers of communication and influence that are spreading across Eurasia, for example. A strategic vision that continues to define the West as a balance between separate European and American centers, rather than as an integrated community, has reached a dead end.

Most important today is the newness of a rapidly changing Europe united in democracy for the first time in history. Europe in its own way is going through the same process of modernization that we find in China and India. There is excitement in the new democracies to the east. Social experiments are changing even the most conservative of western European nations. Cold War structures are progressively being replaced with networks that spread out in all directions. We desperately need a new map of the globe that defines the new dynamic building across Eurasia and even over the Arctic.

We are instead trapped in the Cold War definition of a Europe slogging slowly through a complicated process of unification and are frustrated by the long wait for it to become more like us. Dialogue with Germany and Europe is still more about the past than the future.

If the United States stands apart from the important new processes spreading through Europe, we will soon be an outsider looking in. This will make it more difficult to deal with pressing issues where European cooperation is essential. It will also progressively rob the United States of the important geopolitical position it now assumes as a European power.

Germany's talents and geographic position are particularly well-suited to a multipolar world where network structures will be more important than static organizations. Eurasian trade routes coalesce today, as before, in Germany. Germany today is an even more essential fulcrum in the rapidly moving multipolar world than it was as the strategic center of an immovable Cold War balance.

How Germany evolves in coming decades will be the defining factor in Europe's ability to help build a new

sort of trans-Atlantic community that can function as an operating system for a democratic/ free market system around the globe. America's own future self-confidence will depend to a surprising degree on a continuing sense of common purpose with Europe's most important country.

Germany's skills in pursuing social consensus and system integration could be a key factor in building relationships with the many new centers of power. Its concepts of economic and industrial management have served it well in dealing with the economic crisis. There is much to be learned from them.

Germany is the Atlantic partner who can tie together the regions of Europe and help build this new, more open-sourced Atlantic relationship. Chancellor Angela Merkel was, for example, the first to put forth an innovative concept for a trans-Atlantic market place.

But many Germans would still argue in fact that we are projecting the wrong kind of future for their country. They would say that Germany has moved beyond the need for traditional definitions of national pride and individual achievement. They would argue that Germany has built a new sense of identity based on consensus, rule of law, and social equality. Its contribution to the world is to be found in the success of its society.

Many believe that Germany has become a unique "civil power," which defines a new sort of global role that can be a model for others. But this is where the differences begin. To many outsiders, Germany's focus on domestic balance instead reflects an increasingly self centered, inward looking society that cares for little more than its own well-being.

And even with a new consciousness, Germany still shies from responsibility, takes few risks, and finds strength in what it believes it has learned from its often tragic history—consensus and stability. It has eschewed power politics, plays a confusing role in both NATO and the EU, and only reluctantly engages militarily, even when common Allied interests are involved.

The debate over the future of the euro is an excellent

example of the mental gaps between Germany and many of its allies. Germans argue that the euro can only succeed if other countries match German economic discipline. The others contend that Germany should pay more attention to the health of a community in which many members simply cannot match German discipline, than to its own rules.

This sudden change of signals has caught Germany on the wrong foot. Can we blame them for being confused and slightly stubborn? They are told continuously to be peaceful and cooperative, while at the same time being expected to lead the West to a new future. The German press is filled with disbelief at the heavy criticism Germany is receiving for being just what they thought we all wanted them to be.

Angela Merkel understands this fact better than most. What seems to outsiders to be immobility is her way of preparing her voters for very difficult choices ahead. She knows that the social welfare state can no longer be financed at current levels. She understands also that Germany cannot withdraw from the world. But in a nation still suffering the traumas of the Third Reich, whose culture is based on many interlocking levels of consensus, the road to change must first be prepared by pretending that things will stay the same.

Here is where the United States too often drops the ball. We appear more as an outside friend who is seeking good relations with Europeans rather than as a constituent part of the European process. The President's speeches—Berlin, Strasbourg, Oslo, and Prague—dominated European debate. But they did little to define how the United States intends to behave as a European power.

This is the sort of engagement that will be important to ensuring that Europe will act with more responsibility and confidence in the future. Europeans, especially Germans, are not moved by rhetoric alone. They, especially the Germans, still need a sense that despite differences from time to time, the United States is still actively working on the European project.

Ronald Reagan's famous speech at the Brandenburg Gate was at first ridiculed as being naïve and unreal-

istic. It became historic only when the results were evident. Obama's skillful rhetoric will also soon be forgotten if engagement and action do not follow.

A TIP-TOEING ELEPHANT: GERMANY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION TWENTY YEARS ON

ALMUT MÖLLER

As a young German growing up in the far West of the country, the borders I knew back then were rather porous. We lived in a small town about five miles from the Netherlands, and in my world the Cold War was far away. I still remember the excitement of passport controls during our frequent trips to our Dutch neighbors. But most of the time, we continued our journeys over the border without even stopping the car. It also felt to me like we lived in—or at least close to—the heart of Europe. In 1989, my notion of borders was completely overthrown. Aged 12, I followed the events that started to unfold in Leipzig and Berlin on our TV screen, and my idea of what Europe was about started moving East. Then, in the summer of 2009, I moved to Berlin, while the city was preparing for the twentieth anniversary of the collapse of the Wall, and I revisited the places, emotions, and discussions of 1989.

In 1990, a breathtaking year after the event that shook up the world's order, Germany stood on the international stage as a unified country embarking on a new journey to rediscover and redefine its role in international relations. How far has Germany come, twenty years on? And more interestingly, where will it move in the next decades?

The last twenty years have seen Germany starting to slowly become aware of its new international role, but struggling with finding a clear focus and objective. While Germany's transatlantic orientation has been challenged since 1989, in particular during the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, it came as a surprise to many observers that Germany's European orientation seems to have changed over the last months, at least in the perception of its partners within the Union.

Where is Germany heading? This discussion was very prevalent in the aftermath of reunification, when Germany over night became by far the largest member country in terms of its population, and the old balance of the then Union of twelve was shaken up. Successive governments managed to steer the “new” Germany through its infancy in the 1990s: Germany demonstrated its European orientation in successive treaty reforms, starting with the revolution of Maastricht to the constitutional project, in the adoption of the euro currency, and in support of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union. Bonn and later on Berlin stood firmly by its commitment to building an “ever closer Union,” as laid down in the EU treaties.

But recently EU capitals started to ask anew the question about the future of Germany's *Europapolitik*. When the crisis of the euro currency started to unfold in the spring of 2010, unified Germany's European orientation was put into question for the first time. At the peak of the euro crisis, Chancellor Angela Merkel, representing the Union's largest economy, struggled to organize support for securing the common currency within her own party, her coalition government, and in Parliament. Berlin's handling of the crisis also raised many questions in other EU capitals. The Merkel government was initially reluctant to assist fellow euro-zone countries and insisted on the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (especially the non-bailout clause), arguing that it was the only way to defend European interests and the stability of the currency. This stance was seen as “anti European” by those EU members that wanted Germany to take the lead, as they believed non action was playing into the hands of speculators and would even worsen the situation. Within a few months, Chancellor Merkel lost a great deal of sympathy and support across

Europe. Partly the government failed to communicate clearly as the events were unfolding at unprecedented speed. But it is fair to ask the question whether Berlin has given up its ambition of taking the European project further in the future. Indeed there were clear signs that in the months before the euro crisis the coalition government's *Europapolitik* lacked both vision and clout.

Interestingly, when Germany eventually did take the lead—or was forced to by political and economic realities—many European partners again were not too comfortable with it. German leadership is still somewhat sensitive for both Germany and its European partners. But the euro crisis has revealed like never before the crucial role that the Union's largest economy is doomed to play. In the end, Berlin's reaction to the crisis suggested that it is aware of its importance, but there is still no intuitive reflex to punch its weight. Indeed it seems that today's Germany knows that it is an elephant—but it does not want to hurt the grass. It likes the idea of being something like a tip-toeing elephant. This is a lesson that Germany will have to learn in the future: Being an elephant means there are limits to befriending the grass, and sometimes that means Germany will not be liked by everyone. And it might also bring back the specter of the past. The future Germany might be confronted with its own history again. Indeed even twenty years after the Wall fell, much of the European Union's hard work for the future lies still in acknowledging and overcoming its own past.

So eventually, where is Germany heading? Clearly, its *Europapolitik* has changed from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic. While the general feeling of belonging to the Union has not (yet) been put into question by the political elite nor by the majority of German citizens, Germany's European orientation has become more pragmatic and somehow normal.

Following reunification, Germany has been in a constant process of adapting itself to a new environment following the treaty reforms of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon; the consequences of the failed constitutional project; the major enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007; and the more recent euro crisis. From a negative perspective one could argue that German EU politics seem inconsistent and

lacking a clear strategic orientation. From a more positive standpoint one could describe this process as a logical policy adaptation and learning curve.

With successive treaty reforms and rounds of enlargements, the old days of European integration have vanished. The future direction of the Union has become a lot more difficult to map out and domestic constraints have made it more difficult for German governments to set and pursue their European agenda. Germany has left the era of *Konsenspolitik* ("consensus politics") on the European Union behind. While in the old days decisions on the European Union were almost sacrosanct, even among the elites it is not taboo anymore to take a critical stance toward European integration in general or the euro regime in particular. The old guard of "Rheinland Europeans by heart" is a dying species.

Will this eventually lead to a more euroskeptical Germany? I doubt it. It is more likely that future generations will have to take further steps of European integration, facing an increasing pressure in economic, political, and security terms on their little patchwork continent. The most revolutionary steps can be driven by pure realism.

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