The Nobel Nudge : (Page 2)
October 16, 2012Those complications were as much about the structure of the currency as they were about the continuing diversity of millions of Europeans and their differences, despite the process of Europe continuing to unfold. The actual use of the euro, as envisioned by those who preached its value, was seen as a bonding tool for European unity. Yet it was never only about the currency itself. The euro is a means, not an end. It was about the wide mix of European political and cultural priorities and perceptions behind it and the assumption that it would lead to shared policies and processes. That was and is a “work in progress,” as is Europe in many dimensions.
Indeed, the very fact of increasing interdependence has underscored − some might say exacerbated − those differences in ways that challenge the project. The experiences of individual countries in Europe on their unique paths to integrating themselves − Germany in particular − reflect those same challenges.
Europe today, in the form of the European Union, faces serious choices that will shape the process and the product of its next chapter. In its proactive manner, the Nobel Committee was trying to nudge that process along with its recognition of what has been accomplished, as well as what still needs to be done. One can question if that is the job of the Committee, but that does not really matter either. The challenges that Europe faces are not affected by the prize. The question is whether the leaders of Europe and their respective publics are.
The main message of the award may not only be one of congratulating the continent on having built a European project. The award also signals the committee’s desire to encourage the next steps taken in Europe by saying ‘you’ve done well, but now go on and continue the process.’
The next chapters of this story will be written not only about what Europe can do for itself, but also about what Europe might be able to do for the world in which it has been able to evolve during the past decades. Just like German unification in 1990, European unification emerged from an environment that was shaped by factors many of which, like the Soviet Union, are no longer relevant. Other, more contemporary forces have become shapers of today’s choices well beyond the European continent in Asia, South America, and most certainly in the troubled regions of the Middle East. It also includes changes in transatlantic equations of power and influence, along with new webs of interdependence − for better and for worse.
Europe has come a long way in a short period of history. It can take justifiable pride in that accomplishment with or without a Nobel Peace Prize. But that very accomplishment is also a signal that Europe needs to continue to pursue opportunities it has achieved, but also those it has been given in order to continue both the process and the project it started two generations ago.
In the meantime, Europe is more than the sum of its parts and processes. It is part of a much larger global project in which it has much to contribute and much to gain. Europe needs to widen its lens to see that opportunity. The Nobel nudge might help.

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The author’s take on the forward-looking aspect of the award is spot-on.
To me, the Committee seemed to say “here’s the award, you’ve done well so far, now look into the future and don’t mess up”. It reminds me of the Obama prize which had been also very much forward-looking when conferred a few years back.
Peace is a fluid concept that cannot be captured at a point in time but whose temporal dimension spans both ex post and ex ante frames. The Nobel Committee is right to emphasize this.
Where I take issue with the author is in the intrinsic vs extrinsic importance of euro, the currency. “The actual use of the euro, as envisioned by those who preached its value, was seen as a bonding tool for European unity. Yet it was never only about the currency itself. The euro is a means, not an end. It was about the wide mix of European political and cultural priorities and perceptions behind it and the assumption that it would lead to shared policies and processes.”
Herein lies the crux of the euro malaise: the architects of the euro tried to solve a political goal with an economic toolbox. Monetary sovereignty serves to bond a banking system, acts as a fiscal agent to a government, and safeguards the flow of credit. A legal tender that bonds “European unity” is a false premise. The object of Hamilton’s First Bank of the United States or Montagu’s Bank of England was expressly to assure the flow of credit. Thomas Jefferson actually argued that the FBUS was unconstitutional (sic).
If the euro embodied a “wide mix of European political and cultural priorities and perceptions” then these pan-European political and cultural priorities and perceptions ought to come to the fore to solve the crisis now. But it’s so hard to do precisely because the politicians had reached for the wrong toolbox in the first place. They still cling to it.