The Nobel Nudge

October 16, 2012 Print

The response to the Nobel committee awarding this year’s peace prize to the European Union has been a mixed bag − and predictably so. The cynics pointed to the struggles of the EU to maintain momentum, as well as relative calm at times, amidst the strife over the euro. Those more positively inclined saw the award as recognition of a half century of putting Europe on a path toward one of the most important political experiments in world history.

The proverbial glass is either half-full or half empty depending upon your prejudices. Yet either way it does not really matter. Europe’s future is being forged by decisions now being taken in Europe, but also elsewhere around the globe.  Europe faces challenges and choices it can in part shape and influence, but it will also be confronted with the consequences of decisions being made among those emerging forces in other continents. The question Europe has to face is: can there be a consensus on how to see and respond to those challenges.

The evolution of Europe out of the ashes of 1945 is a good story − better than the first half of the last century. It is one that involved a decisive transatlantic dimension along with an increasingly global impact. Yet, it is an unfinished story that will continue to spread beyond Europe’s borders as it develops.

Europe has become more than the sum of its parts – a fact that is not only to be measured in economic terms. Almost five hundred million Europeans trading with each other does make up one of the world’s largest trading blocs. However, it is also represents a political bloc of twenty-seven nations engaged in a complex project, one that sees many more countries knocking at the door for membership. The process of qualifying for membership is as important as membership itself. Both dimensions − process and project − are dynamic. The story of these past few decades has been one of decisions. These decisions have steered ever more Europeans in the direction of sharing their challenges and choices with the consequences of continually expanding a web of interdependence. Up until 1990, that web was defined by the divisions of the Cold war. After 1990, more Europeans became part of the web.

In less than seventy years, Europe has gone through multiple transformations in learning how to define and how to manage that web. While not all those opportunities were successful along the way, there was a widespread shared assumption that the process was moving forward toward a more integrated European future. That involved creating new, multi-level institutions and structures which have become a defining dimension of Europe’s project involving all facets of European life, be it regulations and subsidies, travel and food supplies, or taxes and governance.  Apart from decisions to expand membership, the introduction of the euro was one of the more critical major milestones along the way, and it has certainly been one of the most complicated.

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1 Comment

  1. avatar K Bledowski says:

    The author’s take on the forward-looking aspect of the award is spot-on.

    To me, the Committee seemed to say “here’s the award, you’ve done well so far, now look into the future and don’t mess up”. It reminds me of the Obama prize which had been also very much forward-looking when conferred a few years back.

    Peace is a fluid concept that cannot be captured at a point in time but whose temporal dimension spans both ex post and ex ante frames. The Nobel Committee is right to emphasize this.

    Where I take issue with the author is in the intrinsic vs extrinsic importance of euro, the currency. “The actual use of the euro, as envisioned by those who preached its value, was seen as a bonding tool for European unity. Yet it was never only about the currency itself. The euro is a means, not an end. It was about the wide mix of European political and cultural priorities and perceptions behind it and the assumption that it would lead to shared policies and processes.”

    Herein lies the crux of the euro malaise: the architects of the euro tried to solve a political goal with an economic toolbox. Monetary sovereignty serves to bond a banking system, acts as a fiscal agent to a government, and safeguards the flow of credit. A legal tender that bonds “European unity” is a false premise. The object of Hamilton’s First Bank of the United States or Montagu’s Bank of England was expressly to assure the flow of credit. Thomas Jefferson actually argued that the FBUS was unconstitutional (sic).

    If the euro embodied a “wide mix of European political and cultural priorities and perceptions” then these pan-European political and cultural priorities and perceptions ought to come to the fore to solve the crisis now. But it’s so hard to do precisely because the politicians had reached for the wrong toolbox in the first place. They still cling to it.

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