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	<title>Comments on: Poland and Further Enlargement of the Euro Zone: Chance for Poland, Chance for Germany</title>
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		<title>By: K Bledowski</title>
		<link>http://www.aicgs.org/issue/poland-and-further-enlargement-of-the-eurozone-chance-for-poland-chance-for-germany/#comment-5450</link>
		<dc:creator>K Bledowski</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Sep 2012 17:56:40 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Germany is emerging as THE strategic partner for Poland in Europe. This has transpired without Poland being “tied” to Germany through the common currency. Warsaw’s political class, its policy establishment, and public opinion all broadly coalesce around the need to have in Berlin a friend, an ally, and a close diplomatic and business partner. It’s also a given that Germany needs Poland. It’s easier for Germany to foster a better relationship with Russia and promote a peaceful eastern neighborhood - not least through support for a prosperous and independent Ukraine - when Poland not only shares these goals but actively promotes them. But how does euro membership come into this equation? 

Let’s face the facts straight: the premature adoption of the euro was a mistake. It can be sourced to supremacy of politics over economics. “By ignorance we mistake, and by mistakes we learn” – close alliances are held together by political prerogatives; currency unions are held together by economic necessities. The right question to ask is then: how does Poland fare in economic readiness to adopt the euro?

There are two types of requirements for accession: formal criteria, and political support. Both of them have to click, fully, before you embark on the journey. Let’s check.

Poland fulfills the price stability criterion (inflation differential down to about 0.7 percentage point by 2011), and the long-term borrowing cost criterion (risk premium down to two percentage points) as well as the public debt benchmark. It does not toe the line on fiscal deficit but probably can bring it down in two years or so. Few realize, however, that on real convergence the record is mixed. Relentless trade and investment bias in favor of the Eurozone speaks clearly in favor of adopting the euro; yet GDP per capita, when converted through the PPP exchange rates, paints a surprising picture. Poland was fourth from the “synthetic EU-27” bottom in 1991; in 2010 it moved up by one spot and now ranks fifth. The country was poor in relation to the EU two decades ago and remains poor today.

In the past ten years, Polish 10-year bond yields moved in synch with those of Germany about 63 percent of the time, with Austria 73 percent, and 91 percent with non-euro Czech Republic (note: we’re not talking levels; it’s co-movement that is important and that’s what is measured here). The standard deviation of the euro exchange rate over the same decade was 0.34 groszy around the mean of PLN 3.99. There was pressure for substantive adjustment of the exchange rate and the zloty’s managed float accommodated it – something that will not happen under the euro.

A decade ago most Poles overwhelmingly favored accession to the EU and adoption of the euro. Today, most are happy with being in the EU; at the same time, most are unhappy about the prospect of acceding to the EMU.

The TNS Polska opinion pool of August 2012 produced the following results: (i) adoption of the euro will be wrong for Poland – 58%; (ii) won’t be good and won’t be bad – 22%; (iii) will be good – 12%; (iv) will negatively impact respondents’ households – 69%; (v) will negatively shape the national identity – 44%; (vi) Poland should not adopt the euro – 43%; (vii) if the country were to adopt the euro, it should be after 2015 – 33%; (viii) Poland should adopt the euro right away (this year if possible – sic!) – 1%

On economic grounds, Poland faces shaky fundamentals that matter when relinquishing monetary policy. On political grounds, Poland enjoys no popular mandate to proceed. Separately, on strategic grounds, the country has every reason to remain a loyal ally of Germany. But this has nothing to do with the euro.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Germany is emerging as THE strategic partner for Poland in Europe. This has transpired without Poland being “tied” to Germany through the common currency. Warsaw’s political class, its policy establishment, and public opinion all broadly coalesce around the need to have in Berlin a friend, an ally, and a close diplomatic and business partner. It’s also a given that Germany needs Poland. It’s easier for Germany to foster a better relationship with Russia and promote a peaceful eastern neighborhood &#8211; not least through support for a prosperous and independent Ukraine &#8211; when Poland not only shares these goals but actively promotes them. But how does euro membership come into this equation? </p>
<p>Let’s face the facts straight: the premature adoption of the euro was a mistake. It can be sourced to supremacy of politics over economics. “By ignorance we mistake, and by mistakes we learn” – close alliances are held together by political prerogatives; currency unions are held together by economic necessities. The right question to ask is then: how does Poland fare in economic readiness to adopt the euro?</p>
<p>There are two types of requirements for accession: formal criteria, and political support. Both of them have to click, fully, before you embark on the journey. Let’s check.</p>
<p>Poland fulfills the price stability criterion (inflation differential down to about 0.7 percentage point by 2011), and the long-term borrowing cost criterion (risk premium down to two percentage points) as well as the public debt benchmark. It does not toe the line on fiscal deficit but probably can bring it down in two years or so. Few realize, however, that on real convergence the record is mixed. Relentless trade and investment bias in favor of the Eurozone speaks clearly in favor of adopting the euro; yet GDP per capita, when converted through the PPP exchange rates, paints a surprising picture. Poland was fourth from the “synthetic EU-27” bottom in 1991; in 2010 it moved up by one spot and now ranks fifth. The country was poor in relation to the EU two decades ago and remains poor today.</p>
<p>In the past ten years, Polish 10-year bond yields moved in synch with those of Germany about 63 percent of the time, with Austria 73 percent, and 91 percent with non-euro Czech Republic (note: we’re not talking levels; it’s co-movement that is important and that’s what is measured here). The standard deviation of the euro exchange rate over the same decade was 0.34 groszy around the mean of PLN 3.99. There was pressure for substantive adjustment of the exchange rate and the zloty’s managed float accommodated it – something that will not happen under the euro.</p>
<p>A decade ago most Poles overwhelmingly favored accession to the EU and adoption of the euro. Today, most are happy with being in the EU; at the same time, most are unhappy about the prospect of acceding to the EMU.</p>
<p>The TNS Polska opinion pool of August 2012 produced the following results: (i) adoption of the euro will be wrong for Poland – 58%; (ii) won’t be good and won’t be bad – 22%; (iii) will be good – 12%; (iv) will negatively impact respondents’ households – 69%; (v) will negatively shape the national identity – 44%; (vi) Poland should not adopt the euro – 43%; (vii) if the country were to adopt the euro, it should be after 2015 – 33%; (viii) Poland should adopt the euro right away (this year if possible – sic!) – 1%</p>
<p>On economic grounds, Poland faces shaky fundamentals that matter when relinquishing monetary policy. On political grounds, Poland enjoys no popular mandate to proceed. Separately, on strategic grounds, the country has every reason to remain a loyal ally of Germany. But this has nothing to do with the euro.</p>
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