Poland and Further Enlargement of the Euro Zone: Chance for Poland, Chance for Germany
September 11, 2012 PrintAmid the euro crisis it seems elusive to think about further enlargement of the euro zone. After all, the political elites, the media, and the common European people are busy debating whether the euro will even survive. The legitimate questions being asked are whether it’s fair to help states to stay in if, in the short term, it means the transfer of billions of euros to aid the peripheries’ dead economies and further guarantees of unimaginable proportions to appease the financial markets; and if, in the long run, the stabilization of the euro zone means further integration and more hollowing out of the nation state? While some euro zone insiders might wonder why they joined the single currency in the first place, it may also lead those on the outside to be relieved that they have not. In that kind of climate why would any member state voluntarily want to “join this mess”? The Treaty on European Union requires all EU member states (unless a member state has secured a permanent derogation as is the case with Denmark and the UK) to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but not in a specific time frame. Therefore, member states can theoretically defer the entry into ERM III indefinitely. Sweden has set a precedence case for this. I argue that Poland’s early and full commitment to the euro would not only benefit its interests but also give Germany more options in setting the pace for Europe.
Poland is a new member state (NMS) that joined the EU in May 2004 without an opt-out pertaining the euro question. At the beginning of the millennium, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) government forged an ambitious plan to adopt the euro by 2007, but by mid 2003 the plan had failed. The more Eurosceptic Law and Justice (PiS) government under the leadership of the Kaczyński twins sought to delay the adoption of the common currency for as long as possible. A week before their electoral defeat in the 2007 parliamentary elections, Finance Minister Zyta Gilowska announced that Poland would be ready to talk about joining the ERM II mechanism in 2009, with the intention to join in 2012. In 2008, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s first Civic Platform government published a roadmap on fulfilling the nominal convergence criteria by 2011, with the euro replacing the zloty in 2012[1]. The banking, sovereign debt, and euro crises obliterated these plans.
Since then, the Tusk government has sent mixed messages. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski remarked in an interview in December 2011 that Poland could join by 2016 if “the euro zone is reformed by then and if joining is beneficial to us”.[2] In January 2012 Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski corrected Martin Schulz, the President of the European Parliament, who said that Poland would join EMU in 2015. Rostowski clarified that “we do not intend to join in 2015, but want to fulfill the fiscal requirements.” He added that is was difficult to predict whether Poland will have fulfilled all the necessary requirements, and that it is “likely, but it is not our goal. Whether we will fulfill the exchange rate criteria? That is unlikely since we do not assume that we will have joined ERM II.”[3] In July 2012, Jacek Dominik, Government Plenipotentiary for the Euro Adoption in Poland, when asked what happened to the National Plan to Introduce the Euro prepared by the Finance Ministry, he replied that “given the scale of changes in the euro zone it has been purposefully considered to hold the work on the document.”[4] However, on his visit to Canada in May 2012, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that Poland is ready to join the euro: “On that question nothing has changed. The only thing that has changed is the euro zone’s reputation which has decisively worsened over the last years”. He added that the European Union must continue political as well as economic integration, of which one element should certainly be a common currency, but that “it has only sense when common rules exist and when all euro zone member states observe these rules.”5]

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Germany is emerging as THE strategic partner for Poland in Europe. This has transpired without Poland being “tied” to Germany through the common currency. Warsaw’s political class, its policy establishment, and public opinion all broadly coalesce around the need to have in Berlin a friend, an ally, and a close diplomatic and business partner. It’s also a given that Germany needs Poland. It’s easier for Germany to foster a better relationship with Russia and promote a peaceful eastern neighborhood – not least through support for a prosperous and independent Ukraine – when Poland not only shares these goals but actively promotes them. But how does euro membership come into this equation?
Let’s face the facts straight: the premature adoption of the euro was a mistake. It can be sourced to supremacy of politics over economics. “By ignorance we mistake, and by mistakes we learn” – close alliances are held together by political prerogatives; currency unions are held together by economic necessities. The right question to ask is then: how does Poland fare in economic readiness to adopt the euro?
There are two types of requirements for accession: formal criteria, and political support. Both of them have to click, fully, before you embark on the journey. Let’s check.
Poland fulfills the price stability criterion (inflation differential down to about 0.7 percentage point by 2011), and the long-term borrowing cost criterion (risk premium down to two percentage points) as well as the public debt benchmark. It does not toe the line on fiscal deficit but probably can bring it down in two years or so. Few realize, however, that on real convergence the record is mixed. Relentless trade and investment bias in favor of the Eurozone speaks clearly in favor of adopting the euro; yet GDP per capita, when converted through the PPP exchange rates, paints a surprising picture. Poland was fourth from the “synthetic EU-27” bottom in 1991; in 2010 it moved up by one spot and now ranks fifth. The country was poor in relation to the EU two decades ago and remains poor today.
In the past ten years, Polish 10-year bond yields moved in synch with those of Germany about 63 percent of the time, with Austria 73 percent, and 91 percent with non-euro Czech Republic (note: we’re not talking levels; it’s co-movement that is important and that’s what is measured here). The standard deviation of the euro exchange rate over the same decade was 0.34 groszy around the mean of PLN 3.99. There was pressure for substantive adjustment of the exchange rate and the zloty’s managed float accommodated it – something that will not happen under the euro.
A decade ago most Poles overwhelmingly favored accession to the EU and adoption of the euro. Today, most are happy with being in the EU; at the same time, most are unhappy about the prospect of acceding to the EMU.
The TNS Polska opinion pool of August 2012 produced the following results: (i) adoption of the euro will be wrong for Poland – 58%; (ii) won’t be good and won’t be bad – 22%; (iii) will be good – 12%; (iv) will negatively impact respondents’ households – 69%; (v) will negatively shape the national identity – 44%; (vi) Poland should not adopt the euro – 43%; (vii) if the country were to adopt the euro, it should be after 2015 – 33%; (viii) Poland should adopt the euro right away (this year if possible – sic!) – 1%
On economic grounds, Poland faces shaky fundamentals that matter when relinquishing monetary policy. On political grounds, Poland enjoys no popular mandate to proceed. Separately, on strategic grounds, the country has every reason to remain a loyal ally of Germany. But this has nothing to do with the euro.