On April 29, 2004, AICGS held a workshop on "A Growing Divide?: Culture, Social Values, and Politics in the United States and Europe" in the Berlin offices of the German Institute for Security and International Affairs (SWP). This was the second workshop in Europe of the broader project on the current and future state of transatlantic relations, entitled "Transatlantic Relations in a Post-Iraq World: Managing Change and Sustaining Cooperation." The project, which is made possible through the generous support of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Bereich ERP-Sondervermögen, is intended to facilitate transatlantic dialogue on tools for managing change in the transatlantic relationship at a time of great uncertainty and unpredictability.

The workshop began with the question of a European identity, if such an identity exists, and, if it does, what form it takes. It was argued that the European identity existed separately from the national identity and had for quite some time. Positive public opinion, the creation of unifying European political symbols, and the growing importance of the European identity for European actors in national governments has helped to build that identity. It is not as strong as national identity and is not felt as strongly in some countries as in others, but for many Europeans, the two identities are seen as complementary. The question, then, is not of having simply a national or a European identity, but having only a national identity or possessing both. There have been many statements made recently referring to the new EU member states as new members of Europe, but many in these countries rightly feel that there is a common European heritage that has existed long before negotiations for accession began. Many of these central and eastern European countries have experienced a post-communist rebirth of regional and local identities, as well as increased nationalist sentiments. A sudden shift to a western European concept of identity by these countries should not be expected, especially because many of these countries define themselves by what they are not--namely, like their neighbors. In order to mute these differences, education and the mass media will have to play a pivotal role. Education must stress diversity while at the same time preparing the populations for a multi-ethnic reality. Mass media has been far too negative in their presentation of the EU and collective European news.

Despite these historical discussions, it was generally agreed that the question of European identity was much more unclear ten years ago and remains so today, particularly when considering certain issues. The question of a clear, common political identity throughout the EU countries was contested, as was the idea of common foreign and security interests. Many speakers questioned the true level of integration in the EU, as there remain divergent views on many issues of key importance including foreign and security policy. It was mentioned that on 80 percent of foreign policy issues, there is a common European position, but this does not include questions of war and peace. The passive acceptance of those policies that seem unimportant could be reaching its limits with the recent enlargement.

The second panel examined the situation on the other side of the Atlantic, discussing the current division within the American public and the red state/blue state phenomenon. Europeans tend to ignore the deep political divisions in the United States and assume that the entire nation is united behind the agenda of the current administration. Such beliefs lead to a misunderstanding of the U.S. public and to increased anti-Americanism, as was discussed by the third panel. The conclusion was that transatlantic differences are not a new phenomenon but, rather, the continuation of longstanding differences. The differences within the United States, in terms of red state/blue state, are more distinct when it comes to value issues such as homosexuality and religion.

The role of religion in U.S. politics was discussed at length. Europeans tend to overplay the importance of religion in American politics. There is a religious side to politics in the United States in a way that is not evident in other countries but, contrary to popular belief, religion does not drive foreign policy. Although the Christian Right is a channel for religion to influence U.S. politics, it does not, as many in Europe believe, run the show. Panel three dealt with the issue of anti-Americanism. The question as to whether or not anti-American sentiments exist in Europe hinges on what definition you assign to the term. There is no aggression against the United States, but there does exist a more complex and subdued form of anti-Americanism that presents itself sometimes even openly. Thus, the discussion focused on understanding this and working against it rather than dwelling on its existence. Many Europeans are quick to remark that the general sentiment in Europe is more anti-Bush than anti-American, yet the situation may change if Bush is reelected. The Europeans could see this as Americans confirming their support of Bush's foreign policy and actions in Iraq. The political elites in Europe view Bush's reelection as probable, but popular opinion, fed by the mass media's portrayal of Bush's position, feel that his reelection appears less likely. Europeans also appear to be divided--as evidenced by the more functional pro-Americanism visible in the central and eastern European countries and the anti-Americanism in western Europe. The new EU members are more conservative and less focused on environmental issues, which place them more in line with the United States. That is not to say that the new states will all side with the United States. They are not a block and should not be seen as such. Nor should they be viewed as being entirely pro-American. It was agreed that anti-Americanism would be a problem not easily resolved in the near future.

The final panel tried to bring everything together and show the policy implications of the issues discussed. The political elites in America tend to misread American public opinion. A majority of Americans want the United States to play a large role in world affairs, but they do not believe that the United States should be the only power. They want the United Nations to play a role and believe multilateralism to be the desired tool in international affairs. Only one in five Americans, however, believe they have any influence over foreign policy. This reality is reflected by how the Bush administration has responded to the American public in foreign policy issues. The administration tends to reflect the American public on more symbolic, rather than substantive, issues. A strong majority in America is willing to give up more control in Iraq in order to bring more international involvement, but there has been little evidence of this in the Bush Administration. Multilateral efforts are seen as important in other issues as well, including the fight against terrorism, resolution of the Israelis-Palestinian conflict, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The reactions or expected reactions to terrorist attacks in other countries have varied. The attacks in Madrid in March proved crucial in swaying Spanish voters to vote their government out of office. A study in Poland showed that attacks there would have the opposite effect, with the people rallying behind the government. The American public rallied behind the Bush administration post September 11, but it is difficult to tell if this will continue to be the case come November 2. .

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