

# **GERMAN GREEN CARDS**

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## INTRODUCTION

In February 2000, the industrial association BITKOM (*Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue Medien*) asked the German government to allow German employers to hire up to 30,000 foreign professionals from outside the EU to help fill what BITKOM said were 75,000 vacant jobs for computer programmers and engineers. Information Technology (IT) industries employ 1.7 million persons in Germany, and IT employment has been increasing by 60,000 a year.

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder responded that his government supported what he called a U.S.-style “green card” program that would allow high-tech specialists to work temporarily in Germany. There was much speculation about why Schroeder embraced the green card concept, especially after opposition parties forced the SPD-Green coalition government to scale back plans for dual nationality. Some observers thought that “computer-chancellor” Schroeder could use the green card proposal to: (1) fill vacant IT jobs; and (2) put the larger immigration debate into an economic framework in which the benefits of foreigners would be clearer to Germans.

There were three general reactions to the green card proposal—“yes,” “yes but,” and “no”—and all were immediately apparent within Schroeder's cabinet. The yes proponents included federal Minister of Education and Research Edelgard Bulmahn (SPD), who said that, “We cannot allow companies to move abroad because of the shortage of highly skilled personnel in information technology.” Her ministry agrees with BITKOM that there will be openings for 60,000 IT workers a year, but only 10,000 computer-science students are expected to graduate in Germany each year. Economy Minister Werner Müller highlighted the job-multiplying aspects of foreign professionals with the following example: “If you need a pianist, you can't just hire a piano tuner. But when you employ a new pianist, you'll also need additional piano tuners.”

The yes-but camp was illustrated by the leader of the SPD in Bavaria, who said that German companies should be allowed to import non-EU computer workers only if they also stepped up their efforts to train unemployed and young Germans for computer jobs. About 4,000 students studied computer science in 1994/95, compared to 11,000 in 1999/00.

The opponents of the proposal included Labor Minister Walter Riester (SPD), who said: “We cannot allow a general international opening of the job market. We have over four million unemployed people, among them very qualified people in the information technology field.” (There were 31,000 unemployed IT workers in December 1999.) Riester noted that German employers could already hire foreign professionals, and that 580 work permits were issued to foreign professionals in 1998, but only after German employers were able to convince the labor department that German or EU workers were not available. Some German unions echoed a common complaint heard in the U.S.—German IT companies prefer to hire only recent graduates who are familiar with the latest software and are willing to work long hours.

Public opinion polls reported that most Germans opposed admitting foreign professionals, many of whom were expected to come from India, the source of many temporary foreign computer specialists employed in Canada, the U.S., and the UK. A March 2000 poll reported that 56 percent of Germans opposed the green-card proposal; 37 percent supported it.

These poll data encouraged the opposition parties, the CDU and CSU, to strongly oppose the green card proposal, even though they usually support business, which favors easier access for foreign workers. Their opposition was crystallized by the CDU candidate premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, former federal technology minister Juergen Ruetters, who made opposition to the green card program the centerpiece of his campaign. Ruetters asserted that Germans preferred “*Kinder statt Inder*” (children instead of Indians), and sent postcards to voters asserting that Germany needed “*mehr Ausbildung statt mehr Einwanderung*” or “more training instead of more immigration.”

Ruetters hoped to repeat the success the CDU had in Hesse in February 1999, when it made opposition to the SPD-Green government's proposed dual nationality law the centerpiece of the state election campaign, and mobilized a massive signature campaign against the federal government's proposal to permit foreigners becoming naturalized Germans to routinely keep their old passports. In exit polls, opposition to the government's dual nationality proposal was second only to worries about unemployment, and the CDU victory caused the SPD-Green federal government to lose its majority in the sixty-nine vote *Bundesrat*, which needed to approve the dual nationality legislation.

The SPD-Green federal government modified its dual nationality proposal, replacing routine dual nationality with an option model. Under the option model, the 100,000 children born to foreign parents in Germany each year will be considered German as well as the nationality of their parents until age twenty-three if one of their parents lived legally in Germany for at least eight years. At age twenty-three, these children born in Germany lose German nationality unless they give up the nationality of their parents.

Ruetters did not improve his party's showing in the May 14, 2000 election in North Rhine-Westphalia. The CDU won 37 percent of the vote; the SPD, 43 percent; the FDP received 10 percent; and the Greens seven percent. North Rhine-Westphalia has 18 million residents, more than the former East Germany, and the results may presage the outcome of the national election scheduled for 2002.

### **GERMAN GREEN CARDS**

The German proposal is not a U.S.-style green card system: green cards in the U.S. are immigrant visas that allow foreigners to live and work anywhere in the U.S. and to become naturalized U.S. citizens after five years. The German proposal is also quite different from the U.S. H-1B program, which admits foreign professionals and their families for up to six years. After arriving in the U.S. to work for the U.S. employer who requested them, many H-1B foreigners persuade that employer to sponsor them for immigrant or green card status.

The green card program approved by the German cabinet in May 2000 will have far more government involvement than similar programs in other industrial democracies. The *Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung* (ZAV) in Bonn is collecting job offers from employers and resumes from foreigners who want to work in Germany. In a process that is not yet clear, the ZAV will help to match employers and foreigners, and then the first 10,000 foreigners will enter Germany. The jobs must offer at least the DM100,000 (\$47,000) a year.

The foreigners selected by German employers can enter Germany with their families with three-year work visas beginning August 1, 2000; their visas can be extended for another two years. Family members may accompany them to Germany, but if they want

to work they will have to secure work permits of their own. At present, the average wait for work permits for family reunification immigrants is four years. In order to get foreign professionals into German jobs quickly, it was announced that work and residence permits would be issued within two to six weeks.

After the first 10,000 foreigners arrive with green cards, the government will evaluate the program to determine if there is still a labor shortage and if German IT employers are on track to keep their promise to double the number of apprenticeship slots from the current 30,000 to 60,000 by 2003. To train more German workers for high-tech jobs, the government allocated an additional DM 200 million, bringing spending to DM 1.2 billion annually.

Many other German industries, among them biotech, construction, and hospitals and nursing homes, asked for expedited access to non-EU foreign professionals. Thus, non-EU foreigners for IT may be the first in a new series of guest-worker programs. Many business leaders asked that the DM 100,000 minimum annual salary be reduced to the level above which German employees may elect to buy private health insurance rather than participate in the usual employee health system (*Krankenkasse*), DM75,000 in the west and DM65,000 in the east. The German Industrial Association said that Germany should also import blue-collar craftsmen: the GIA said that Germany would be short 300,000 skilled craftsmen by 2003.

German universities want to use the green card discussion to liberalize current requirements that require most foreign students to return to their country of origin after graduation following a maximum ninety days of work in Germany. The 165,994 foreign students enrolled in German institutions of higher education in 1998/99 were about nine percent of all students enrolled; two-thirds of the foreign students were from Europe, and thus most of them were eligible to remain and work in Germany as EU nationals if they wished.

### **U.S. GREEN CARDS**

What is often called a green card in the U.S. is an immigrant visa, I-551, that permits a foreigner to live and work in the U.S. indefinitely, and to become a naturalized U.S. citizen after five years. (These visas were once printed on green paper; they are now white credit-card style cards.) The U.S. issued 798,378 immigrant visas or green cards in FY98, the twelve months ending September 30, 1998. There would have been about 130,000 more green cards issued to foreigners in the U.S. who were adjusting from, for example, student to immigrant, but bureaucratic delays pushed green cards for these foreigners into 1999.

There are five major types of green-card immigrants (Martin and Midgley 1999). In FY97, there were:

- 321,000 immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, including 170,300 spouses, 74,100 parents and 76,600 children.
- 213,300 family-sponsored immigrants, including 113,700 spouses and children of legal immigrants; 55,200 siblings of U.S. citizens; 21,900 married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; and 22,500 unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.
- 102,100 refugees were adjusted to immigrant status, and 10,100 asylum applicants were recognized as refugees and permitted to remain in the U.S. (refugees must be in the U.S. one year before they can adjust to immigrant status).

- 90,600 employment-based immigrants (including family members); they included: 42,600 skilled and professional workers; 21,800 priority workers; 17,100 professionals with advanced degrees; 7,800 special (unskilled) immigrants; and 1,400 employment-creation investors.
- 49,400 diversity immigrants, or foreigners who won the right to immigrate to the U.S. in an annual lottery.

Most of the foreigners who receive immigrant visas are already in the U.S. when their green cards become available: 418,000 or 52 percent were in the U.S. and adjusted from another status to immigrant, and 380,700 were new arrivals.

### **U.S. NONIMMIGRANT H-1BS**

The U.S. has twenty nonimmigrant programs that admit foreigners who can work in the U.S.; they are issued combined work and residence visas that range from A for ambassadors to TN for NAFTA professionals. About 14 of these nonimmigrant visa categories permit foreigners to be employed by U.S. employers for U.S. wages, that is, they are nonimmigrant visas that lead to the foreign workers being considered U.S. workers in the U.S. labor market—there were about 400,000 such worker admissions in FY96, the most recent data available. An additional 600,000 foreigners were admitted as students or exchange visitors; many of them are also permitted to work in the U.S. labor market.

The U.S. system for admitting foreigners for economic or employment reasons was changed by the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT). Before IMMACT, most foreign workers were admitted only after a **certification** process, which means that an employer wanting to hire a foreigner to fill a job had to prove to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) that: (1) the employer tried and failed to find U.S. workers despite offering a DOL-set wage; and (2) that the presence of foreign workers would not “adversely affect” similar U.S. workers.

The border gates remained closed to foreign workers until the certification process was completed, and the admission of foreign workers was sometimes held up by bureaucratic delays as well as protests by unions. Unions or the Employment Service sometimes sent unemployed workers to fill the jobs, the employer would say the U.S. workers were not qualified, and the result would be litigation over whether the worker was qualified or not, with judges often issuing injunctions ordering the foreign workers to be admitted so that, for example, the apples would not rot on the ground.

The 1990 IMMACT introduced a new concept for the admission of temporary foreign professionals called attestation. Attestation allows U.S. employers who have found a foreign professional they want to employ as a guest worker to assert or attest that they tried to find U.S. workers and failed. Filing the attestation or Labor Condition Application with DOL, in which the employer promises to pay the foreign professional the prevailing wage for the job and certifies that there is no strike in progress, is sufficient to open the border gates to the foreigner. No government agency inspects the employer or interviews U.S. workers before the foreign professional arrives; any enforcement is done in response to complaints after the foreigner is in the U.S.

In exchange for this easier entry process, unions won a 65,000 a year cap on the number of foreign professionals, those with a BA degree or more, admitted via attestation

to fill a U.S. job that requires a BA degree. These foreign professionals receive renewable three-year H-1B visas; their spouses and children receive H-4 visas. In FY96, there were about 163,000 H-work visa admissions, and 50,000 H-4 dependent visa admissions.

The attestation procedure used to admit H-1B foreign professionals proved to be very popular with U.S. employers, and they used up all 65,000 visas before the year ran out in 1997. The IT sector mounted an effort to raise the annual ceiling, and Congress, responding to pleas that more programmers were needed because of the Y2K problem, approved the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 which raised the cap to 115,000 in FY99 and FY00 and 107,500 in FY01. Even this higher cap has proved to be insufficient, with the 115,000 visas gone before the end of 2000, and Congress is currently debating proposals to raise the cap further, to 145,000 to 195,000.

Many high-tech firms are calling for a complete elimination of the cap on foreign professionals admitted under attestation procedures. They cite Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who in February 2000, said that, "The benefits of bringing in people to do the work here, rather than doing the work elsewhere, to me, should be pretty self-evident" (Migration News March 2000).

Congressional leaders and others listen carefully when Bill Gates of Microsoft and Andy Grove of Intel call for more H-1B workers. But the H-1B program is very controversial (Lowell 1999). U.S. critics of the program make three arguments:

1. Preference for Youth. Many U.S. employers want young and fresh graduates willing to work long hours for relatively low wages. Foreigners who study in the U.S. can be recruited easily at U.S. universities, or be employed as interns while they are students, and U.S. employers are eager to hire them because they are smart and willing to work very hard in the hope that the U.S. employer will sponsor them for a green card or immigrant status. It is often alleged that U.S. computer firms that hire less than 5 percent of the applications they receive, and leave jobs vacant rather than fill them with workers who do not have precisely the right skills, are guilty of age discrimination when they prefer a twenty-two year old Chinese or Indian programmer to a fifty year old engineer laid off from a defense company.
2. Displacement/Wages. Entry procedures for foreign professionals were simplified in the H-1B program because it was assumed that U.S. employers would hire foreign computer professionals only after they had searched the U.S. job market; in any event, it was assumed that U.S. workers with BA degrees would be able to complain if they saw employers hiring foreigners when Americans were available. However, many of the same displacement and wage depression issues that arise in the unskilled labor market have also arisen with professionals.

U.S. employers do not have to prove that they first tried to recruit Americans; indeed, most U.S. employers are allowed to lay off U.S. workers and replace them with cheaper foreigners (U.S. Department of Labor 1996). When he was the labor secretary, Robert B. Reich, testified that, "We have seen numerous instances in which American businesses have brought in foreign skilled workers after having laid off skilled American workers, simply because they can get the foreign workers more cheaply. [The H-1B program] has become a major means of circumventing the costs of paying skilled American workers or the costs of training them."

U.S. employers are required to offer H-1B foreigners “prevailing wages.” The range of prevailing wages is wide, e.g. \$40,000 to \$80,000 a year, so that a company can report it is paying the “prevailing wage” when it is at the low or high end of the wage range.

1. Merchants of Labor. Many guest worker programs quickly become the domain of a handful of firms and nationalities. In the U.S., many Indian-Americans have set up so-called body shops, firms that recruit and bring into the U.S. Indian programmers and then send them out to U.S. jobs that last for one to 12 months. The attestations filed by a U.S. employer such as Tata Consultancy Services promise to pay H-1B workers the prevailing wage, which is \$50,000 to \$60,000 a year, but each of the body shops has separate contracts with individual programmers that, after deductions for transportation, living costs, and other fees, can reduce earnings far below this level. Most body shops have 50 to 80 percent H-1B workers among their 500 to 2,000 employees.

About half of the H-1B visas are issued to Indians, and most of them come from three schools in India that use U.S.-style teaching methods. The popularity of the H-1B visa as a stepping stone to U.S. immigrant status has become so well known that marriage ads in India highlight the fact that a prospective bridegroom has an H-1B visa, which is considered a major plus in the Indian marriage market.

In 1998, the H-1B program was revised: the annual limit on the number of H-1B visas available was raised from 65,000 to 115,000, and there were two important changes aimed at curbing employer abuses. First, beginning in 1999, U.S. employers requesting H-1B workers must pay a \$110 administration fee and a \$500 visa fee for each H-1B application or renewal—the \$500 fees generated \$41 million in 1998-99 which are used for \$2500-a-year scholarships for American students to encourage them to learn programming and thus eliminate the need for H-1B workers in the future. The play-or-pay fee is an effort to persuade U.S. firms to train U.S. workers or to pay so that colleges and universities provide the training, but many critics consider the visa fee far too low—they prefer a fee of \$5,000 to \$10,000. Most U.S. employers hire lawyers to prepare H-1B applications; immigration lawyers charge \$1000 to \$2000 per application.

Second, body shops—firms that have 15 percent or more H-1B workers among their employees—must include in their attestations a statement that they did not lay off U.S. workers to open jobs for the H-1B workers, and that they attempted to recruit U.S. workers. Only about 60 percent of the H-1B visas go to workers employed in high-tech; the other visas go to foreigners in many other professions, including teaching, fashion models, and photographers.

H-1B visas are often seen in India, China, and other countries as a side door to U.S. immigrant status. H-1B visas are one of the few U.S. visas available to intending immigrants, meaning that an Indian or Chinese applicant can tell the U.S. consular officer in India or China that he wants to come to the U.S. to work and eventually to settle; once in the U.S., he can find a U.S. employer to sponsor him for immigrant status. Most H-1B workers leave the jobs they were brought into the U.S. to fill as soon as they become legal immigrants.

## FROM GREEN CARDS TO IMMIGRATION?

The green-card debate has reopened discussion of immigration, asylum and education in Germany. The major issue separating the major political parties is whether the green-card program should be linked to reforms of Germany's economic system and labor market or to a further tightening of the asylum and deportation system. The SPD-Green government would like to continue with tax and labor reforms; the opposition CDU-CSU-FDP parties would like to use the green card program to enact a comprehensive immigration law that would tighten asylum and speed up deportations.

The coalition government that governed Germany between 1982 and 1998 was dominated by the CDU-CSU, parties that wanted to maintain the immigration status quo, which says that, "*Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland.*" (Germany is not a country of immigration.) Critics argued that this policy did not prevent Germany's foreign population from increasing, but has prevented planning for immigration and encouraging the integration of settled foreigners (Bade 1994). The CDU-CSU coalition partner, the FDP, argued for a quota-based immigration system linked to more integration assistance.

The SPD and Greens offered proposals and principles for the reform of immigration policy that would have formalized immigration criteria and expedited naturalization. Only the Green proposal was introduced as legislation, and it went no where until after the 1998 elections (Martin 1998).

There is little sign that the public has become more receptive to immigrants, which signals more debate and contention rather than a quick consensus. The CDU-CSU-FDP opposition said that the green-card program should be part of comprehensive immigration legislation that lays out "clear rules" on family unification, more restrictions on asylum and faster deportation, with the CSU calling for an end to the constitutional right of an individual to seek asylum. The Greens immediately countered that they would be happy to discuss a new immigration law, but that German asylum law could not be changed.

The argument of the opposition parties demanding major changes in German immigration and asylum policy runs as follows. Germany now receives about 300,000 newcomers a year: 100,000 asylum seekers, 100,000 ethnic Germans, and 100,000 family unification immigrants. Instead of taking newcomers who need Germany, they argue, Germany should be attracting newcomers that it needs, such as professionals and craftsmen. The way to do this without increasing overall immigration, they argue, is to further restrict asylum and to limit family unification.

When the FDP reintroduced a comprehensive immigration law proposal in May 2000 that included an annual immigration quota tied to unemployment levels and integration capacity, the governing SPD-Greens led an effort to reject it, with Interior Minister Otto Schily saying, "There is no need for an immigration law, because, if we had one, the quotas would be zero." The Greens called for an integration law to set the stage for an immigration law.

However, the tide may have turned. President Johannes Rau, formerly an SPD leader, in May 2000 used the annual "Berlin Speech" to urge Germans to accept the fact that Germany is becoming a multinational society that has and will continue to receive immigrants. In June 2000, Interior Minister Schily said that he would like an expert commission to make recommendations on the shape of a comprehensive immigration law for Germany.

Opinion polls suggest that there is still considerable public opposition to an immigration law with quotas. Public support for an immigration law with annual quotas peaked at 54 percent in 1996; in 2000, 37 percent said they favored such a law, and 40 percent were opposed.

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## APPENDIX 1. NONIMMIGRANT U.S. DATA, 1990-96

There are three major sources of data on especially nonimmigrant visas that permit employment in the U.S.: DOL data on the number of employers requesting workers and the number of workers they request; INS data on admissions, with double counting for foreigners who enter 3 or 4 times within a year on e.g. an H-1B visa, and DOS data on the number of each type of visa issued--the DOS data are an undercount because (1) some foreigners adjust their status with the INS while in the U.S. and (2) some foreigners extend their stay in the U.S. with the INS. The most recent INS data are for 1996.

### INS Nonimmigrant Admissions to the U.S.: FY1990-96

Category/Fiscal Year ending September 30	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	Dist: 96	Change: 92-96
All	17,574,055	18,920,045	20,910,880	21,566,404	22,118,706	22,871,209	24,852,503	100%	19%
<b>Temporary Visitors</b>	16,079,666	17,234,400	19,229,066	19,879,443	20,318,933	20,887,329	22,880,270	92%	19%
B1 business Visa Waiver	2,661,338	2,616,335	2,788,069	2,961,092	3,164,099	3,275,796	3,770,326	15%	35%
B2 pleasure Visa Waiver	13,418,328	14,618,065	16,440,997	16,918,351	17,154,834	17,611,533	19,109,944	77%	16%
<b>Transit Aliens (C1 to C4)</b>	306,156	364,456	345,930	331,208	330,936	320,333	325,538		-6%
<b>Treaty Traders(includes families)</b>	147,536	155,049	152,385	144,644	141,030	131,777	138,568		-9%
E1 Traders	78,658	76,952	71,796	65,362	60,196	53,557	54,289		-24%
E2 Investors	68,878	78,097	80,589	79,282	80,834	78,220	84,279		5%
<b>Students and Dependents</b>	355,207	374,420	401,287	403,272	427,721	395,120	426,903	100%	6%
F1 Academic Students	319,467	335,623	360,964	362,700	386,157	356,585	418,117	98%	16%
M1 Vocational Students	6,797	7,615	7,722	7,920	7,844	7,635	8,786	2%	14%
F2 Spouses/families	28,490	30,499	31,988	32,103	33,071	30,489	32,485		2%
M2 Spouses/families	453	683	613	549	649	411	507		-17%
<b>Reps of International Orgs G1 to G5)</b>	61,449	64,451	69,947	72,755	74,722	71,982	79,528		14%
G4 International Org employees	43,104	46,913	50,674	52,856	53,768	51,410	53,656		6%
G5 Attendants/servants	1,603	1,638	1,524	1,543	1,596	1,466	1,447	0%	-5%
<b>Temporary Workers and Trainees</b>	139,587	159,714	163,262	162,976	185,988	220,664	227,440	100%	39%

H1A Registered Nurses		2,130	7,176	6,506	6,106	6,512	2,046	1%	-71%
H1B Specialty Occupations	100,446	114,467	110,223	92,795	105,899	117,574	144,458	64%	31%
H2 Unskilled	35,973	39,882	34,442	29,475	28,872	25,587	23,980	11%	-30%
H2A Agricultural	18,219	18,440	16,390	14,268	13,185	11,394	9,635	4%	-41%
H2B Nonfarm Workers	17,754	21,442	18,052	14,847	15,687	14,193	14,345	6%	-21%
H3 Industrial Trainees	3,168	3,235	3,352	3,126	3,075	2,787	2,986	1%	-11%
O1 Extraordinary Ability Workers			456	3,105	5,029	5,974	7,177	3%	1474%
O2 Assistants of O1			258	964	1,455	1,813	2,112	1%	719%
P1 Int'l Recog Athletes and Entertainers			3,548	17,109	22,500	22,397	25,968	11%	632%
P2 Other Artists/Entertainers-Reciprocal			90	422	613	660	1,727	1%	1819%
P3 Artists/Entertainers-Unique Culture			1,131	4,036	4,942	5,315	5,938	3%	425%
Q1 Int'l Culture Exchange Programs			9	994	1,546	1,399	2,056	1%	
R1 Religious Workers Spouses and Children of Temp Workers/Trainees	28,687	34,803	40,009	39,704	43,207	53,582	53,572	4%	249%
H4: families of H1, H2, H3 workers	28,687	34,803	39,155	37,833	40,490	43,247	50,106		28%
O3: families of O1, O2			1	322	549	751	877		
P4: families of P1, P2, P3			152	498	562	592	667		339%
R2: families of R1			701	1,051	1,606	1,790	1,922		174%
I1 Foreign Media Reps(includes families)	20,252	21,073	21,695	21,032	27,691	24,220	33,596		55%
J1 Exchange Visitors	174,247	182,693	189,485	196,782	216,610	201,095	215,475		14%
J2: Exchange Visitor Families	40,397	40,737	41,807	42,623	42,561	39,269	41,250		-1%
L1 Intracompany transfers	63,810	70,505	73,315	82,606	98,189	112,124	140,457		92%

L2: families of Intracompany Transfers	39,375	42,529	45,464	49,537	56,048	61,621	41,250	-9%
TC NAFTA Professionals	5,293	8,123	12,531	16,610	5,031	121		
TN NAFTA Professionals					19,806	23,783	26,987	
TD: families of TN					5,535	7,202	7,694	
Others (Unknown)	189	51,576	1,354	446	878	779	310	
<b>Subtotal: Foreign Workers: H, L, TC/TN</b>	208,690	238,342	249,108	262,192	309,014	356,692	394,884	59%
<b>Subtotal: Foreign Students, Exchange Visitors</b>	500,511	525,931	558,171	567,402	610,611	565,315	642,378	15%

Source: INS Statistical Yearbook, 1996. Persons admitted several times are double counted