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Unity and Solidarity are Key to NATO’s Success in Afghanistan
By Eckart von Klaeden


At NATO's upcoming Riga Summit, the most important and pressing debate will be about Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of NATO's top priorities. The objective is clear: we have to enhance the nation-building process and thus prevent Afghanistan from once again being turned into a breeding ground for transnational terrorism.

We are increasingly being tested there by the enemies of freedom and democracy; it is clear that the war cannot be won by military means alone. There is no alternative to a comprehensive political approach, as laid down in the "Afghanistan Compact" earlier this year. We need smart policies combining security with reconstruction, and above all we have to maintain unity and solidarity among ourselves.

Three issues have the potential to undermine solidarity within the Alliance, with negative effects not only on the joint mission in Afghanistan but also on the future of NATO itself.

First of all, like other nations, Germany has suffered losses of soldiers in the joint missions in Afghanistan. In this context, we should all refrain from comparing casualties. In addition to being disrespectful, this could also lead to a situation where the public debate focuses on taking casualties for others instead of our national and common interest in defending our own security and values with these missions.

The second issue is the question of "national caveats," which negatively affect multinational missions' effectiveness on the ground. They should be minimized.

The third is the question of standards. We need clear and common rules of engagement among NATO and contributing partners, including about the treatment of "prisoners of war" and so-called "unlawful combatants." There is also concern about becoming involved in activities which are considered unlawful by our legal system and by our public and would therefore undermine domestic political support for the joint effort in Afghanistan and the overall fight against transnational terrorism. This has led to NATO partners putting in place national caveats, which we all want to avoid.

The German Bundestag decided in 2005 to expand the ISAF mandate, making Germany the first country to leave Kabul to assume responsibility for the stabilizing and community-building effort in northern Afghanistan. Other partners followed by accepting responsibility for other parts of the country. In northern Afghanistan, we developed the innovative civil-military PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) concept, which has since been adopted by other partners. Germany is one of the biggest donors for Afghanistan, contributing $885 million in total, and with nearly 3,000 soldiers currently on the ground, Germany, once the biggest contributor to ISAF, is still the third-largest. Last October the Bundestag extended the mandate for Germany's participation in ISAF by an overwhelming majority. This mandate, like the previous one, also allows for German troops to be temporarily sent to other parts of Afghanistan, if there is an urgent need that these troops would be able to support. Only two weeks ago we also extended the mandate of Operation Enduring Freedom, which allows German Special Forces, among others, to be deployed in Afghanistan to fight terrorism. These forces were last called into action in May 2005.

We must not confuse "national caveats" with national responsibilities. There were and still are good reasons for sharing responsibilities in Afghanistan among partners, because if everybody was in charge of everything, nobody would be responsible for anything. Before going to the Bundestag to ask for an extension of the ISAF mandate, my government produced a thorough analysis of the achievements and shortcomings of five years of "nation building" and a strategy for our future work in Afghanistan. Besides being in charge of the north, Germany is the key partner nation for the Afghan National Police. Germany has now trained more than 17,000 police officers, including 4,200 senior officers at the German-built Afghan police academy in Kabul. This has been a success, but in our evaluation we came to the conclusion that we have to do more. And I am sure that we will. We also asked Brussels to consider an EU engagement in this important field.

I urge our partners to examine their responsibilities too and to evaluate what they have achieved and where they could and should do more. In my view, much more has to be done to build a modern legal system. More needs to be done in the fight against drugs. It is difficult to argue in favor of the joint effort domestically when the production of drugs - which has a direct impact on our societies - is reaching record highs instead of going down. More has to be done to build an effective Afghan National Army. ISAF is not an occupation force but rather an International Security Assistance Force that fights side by side with Afghan soldiers, who are increasingly assuming responsibility for defending their own country.

Germany is ready to help partners in their fields of responsibility, because we can only be successful together. The goal has not changed since we set out five years ago to help build a new Afghanistan that would not pose a threat to our security again. I hope that the Riga Summit will send the right message to friends and foes alike: that NATO remains united and dedicated to the joint mission in Afghanistan.

..............................................................................................
Eckart von Klaeden is a Member of the German Bundestag and Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag.

This essay originally appeared in the December 7, 2006, AICGS Advisor.

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Want to know more? Check out this link for more information:

"Out of Area, Into Trouble?" By Theo Sommer, The Atlantic Times, December 2006.

 



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