Germany and the UN Security Council: Berlin Takes a Risky Approach
By Marten van Heuven

The determined drive by Germany to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) is likely to add to the problems plaguing the important U.S.-German bilateral relationship.

On the face of it, the German effort is based on merit - Germany pays a large share of the UN budget, it has made important military contributions in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and it plays a significant role in combating the proliferation of nuclear arms. But a permanent German seat as part of the package now under consideration - six additional permanent seats that would go to Japan, India, Brazil, Germany, and two others, along with four non-permanent seats - would further skew the Council's makeup in favor of Europe. Moreover, a 25-member Council, though more representative of the world community, is unlikely to be more effective than the current 15-member makeup.

The German initiative puts the U.S. in an awkward position. If the campaign to garner the 128 votes in the General Assembly needed for Charter reform succeeds, the U.S., as a permanent SC member, will be faced with the choice of going along with an approach it considers faulty or opposing the German quest. It may not come to that if the attempt to garner 128 votes fails, but either way Germany is pushing for a course that is likely to produce German disappointment if not worse. In its single-minded drive to obtain a permanent seat on the Council, the Schröder government seems to have been oblivious of the political reality that UN Security Council reform is unlikely to occur without U.S. support. Forcing the U.S. into this dilemma predictably will not sit well with an administration that remembers active German opposition to its course in Iraq and saw in the recent North Rhine-Westphalia elections a replay of a barely disguised anti-American electoral line for domestic political purposes.

There is a further irony; the German government has been a strong supporter of the EU objective of a common EU foreign policy expressed by a single EU "foreign minister." But to reach its objective of a permanent UN seat, it chose the old path of trying to get its transatlantic American ally to deliver. Berlin failed to recognize that, in today's Europe, it must take on the issues that affect the German ambition of UNSC membership with its European partners. Most important among these issues are the French and British unwillingness to give up their UNSC seats and their veto and staunch Italian opposition to any solution that favors Germany over Italy. Instead, Berlin went for a course that would have the U.S. pull these European chestnuts out of the fire.

Though late in the game, there is another course. Berlin could seek agreement of its European partners to have the European regional group in the General Assembly elect Germany to a non-permanent seat each time there is a vacancy. This would in effect place Germany on the Council permanently, an outcome similar to an arrangement that would have Germany occupy a permanent seat. To accomplish this end, Berlin would have to turn to its European partners and secure European regional agreement, which would be a better approach than putting the burden on Washington. It would also avoid a major point of friction in the bilateral U.S.-German relationship that remains important to the interests of both countries.

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Marten van Heuven is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer who served in Bonn, Berlin, and at the United Nations, and is a frequent contributor to AICGS.
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This commentary appeared in the July 28, 2005 AICGS Advisor.