The Future of NATO: Military Toolbox or Strategic Actor?
By Christian Tuschhoff

What transatlantic leaders should have decided

It would be comforting to think that President Bush's visit to Europe last week succeeded in establishing a fresh point of departure from which transatlantic relations can grow. But the president and his newfound European friends failed to settle the key issue that will determine the future of NATO as the main institution for decision making on foreign and defense policy. The real test still to come is whether NATO will remain just a military toolbox or resume anything like its previous stature as a strategic actor in international relations.

In the wars against terrorism and Iraq NATO lost its role as a strategic actor that it had gained during the cold war and the wars in the Balkans. In these conflicts, the North Atlantic Council was the main political institution in which allies coordinated their policies and decided on collective action for common security and defense. On the military side the Supreme Allied Headquarters planned and commanded all major operations. They also guided the national defense planning processes to ensure national contributions to the collective defense purpose and interoperability of allied forces. All member states possessed a voice and veto because they were represented and deeply engaged in all political and military decisions.

Unfortunately, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's recent analysis is on the mark: NATO has lost its role as a strategic actor and no longer serves as the main arena in which leaders discuss, compromise, and agree on foreign and defense issues. NATO now functions as a military toolbox from which member states draw assets for military missions. Today, the alliance only supports Donald Rumsfeld's "coalitions of the willing."

As a military toolbox, NATO still guides national force planning processes and ensures interoperability. With the Prague Capability Commitments and the establishment of a NATO Response Force it has also increased its capability to act globally. The alliance, however, has lost its role as the main decision maker. In the wars against terrorism and Iraq, U.S. and allied forces have not been commanded by NATO headquarters in Europe but by the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, FL. Coalition forces are not represented in this American headquarter but maintain only a small liaison delegation there that is informed but not consulted on the main decisions affecting their forces' operations. The North Atlantic Council no longer forges a consensus among allies on when and how to use military force but instead offers a pool of resources for shifting military alliances, mostly dominated by the United States.

As a result, the European allies have lost some portion of their voice and certainly their veto, while the United States has gained political flexibility for military operations. However, Europe wants to be consulted not just informed when its military forces participate in allied operations.

While both the United States and Europe complained about NATO's degeneration into a military toolbox, they have both unilaterally contributed to it. The experience with Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 is a case in point. The Pentagon became frustrated with this "war by committee" in which all allies kept a finger on the safety catch of the armed forces. The Europeans did their part of complicating military operations, raising doubts about their commitment and reliability. So far on the European side, little has changed. Germany passed a law on February 18, 2005, granting powers to the German parliament to approve or withdraw German forces that have been requested for NATO missions, including the forces assigned to the NATO Response Force. This law severely undermines the ability of this force to act swiftly and decisively in a crisis -- and further hampers NATO's military capability of assuming the role of a strategic actor.

Both the United States and Europe will have to reverse their unilateral tendencies if they are truly serious about keeping NATO as the centerpiece of transatlantic relations and the key institution for forging a consensus on foreign and defense policies. The United States must accept the European voice and veto, which will ultimately lead to a stronger and sustainable coalition. The Europeans will have to prove their reliability as partners and their credibility as allies by further improving their military capabilities in exchange for voice and veto in allied decision-making processes. Both sides should use the new spirit of transatlantic relations after President Bush's visit to do their homework and reinstall NATO as a strategic actor. To this end the United States needs to move away from using coalitions of the willing and put the NATO Supreme Commander back in charge of allied operations. The Europeans have to more vigorously build-up their capabilities. National parliaments should contribute to NATO's military effectiveness by authorizing their governments to release national forces to NATO under specified condition. The United States must be reassured that NATO will fight, while the Europeans must be reassured that NATO will decide. The ultimate test of the new spirit in transatlantic relations after the president's visit is whether both sides can agree on this basic formula. 

If no such compromise can be struck, Europeans are likely to use the European Union as a suitable alternative to NATO, and the United States will resort to more unilateralism. This would not only eliminate the American voice and veto in European affairs but also undermine the interoperability of allied forces. In the end, the West would be weakened by its division into two strategic actors that offer competing models to the rest of the world.

This essay appeared in the March 10, 2005, AICGS Advisor.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.