Merkel in Washington, Part Deux
By Stephen F. Szabo and Alexander Skiba

While at the White House, the German Chancellor must use her sway to promote an innovative approach toward the Iranian nuclear challenge

In less than four months in office, Angela Merkel will have travelled twice to meet with President Bush at the White House. When the two leaders get together in Washington on the evening of May 3, they will pick up on the informal phone conversations that have evolved after their first official meeting. Back in January, Ms. Merkel managed to win the President's trust with her frank but constructive personal style and quickly left behind the frosty awkwardness of the Schröder era.

With her new pragmatic approach, Ms. Merkel has skilfully circumnavigated the obstacles to reinvigorated transatlantic relations: a wary if not anti-American German public and a U.S. administration that has shown little patience with wavering allies. So far Ms. Merkel has pleased both sides. Prior to her first official U.S. visit she criticized the American detention policy at Guantanamo - which has become a powerful symbol for arbitrariness in the war on terror - while proving her credentials as a reliable partner on global issues in Washington.

However, this second visit will begin to reveal the substance rather than just the style of her foreign policy. During the upcoming visit, photo-ops with the media and the avoidance of tough talk will not suffice to tackle an international agenda that has become more pressing since the last White House meeting. It is essential that Ms. Merkel and Mr. Bush continue the promotion of a new partnership between Berlin and Washington based on the pragmatism and enlightened realpolitik that has marked the first months of the post-Schröder era. Both leaders should concentrate on the topic that is vital for the future of the transatlantic partnership: the Iranian nuclear program.

Germany and the United States are united in their preference for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear conflict and policies toward Iran have been closely coordinated between both capitals following the January visit. While Berlin has worked to enlist Moscow to support a tougher stance against Tehran in the UN Security Council, Washington has tried the same in the case of Beijing. Unfortunately, the strategy is likely to fail on both counts. While all UN veto powers remain committed to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, their stakes are vastly different. Despite Iran's defiance of the international community, Russia recently announced that it will continue civilian nuclear cooperation on the Bushehr reactor. For economic reasons, China will similarly not be easily convinced to back a firmer line. At the recent summit in Washington Mr. Bush failed to obtain President Hu Jintao's support for sanctions against Iran. Ms. Merkel and Mr. Bush must therefore be realistic about the probability that the UN route ends up in a stalemate that fails to tighten the screws on Tehran's leadership and should look for a renewed transatlantic approach to the nuclear crisis.

Plan A should be for the U.S. and Germany to make one last concerted effort to get a UN Security Council decision.  They should therefore make a strong last push towards President Putin of Russia to support UN sanctions.  In this joint effort they should make it clear that if the issue is not resolved prior to the Petersburg G-8 meeting in June, they will put Iran at the top of the summit agenda.  If they succeed in getting Russian agreement, this will greatly increase the pressure on China to go along in the UN Security Council.

If these efforts do not succeed, Ms. Merkel and Mr. Bush should develop a viable plan B that is survivable outside the UN. A transatlantic "coalition of the willing" that is determined to confront Tehran in a united fashion would comprise the EU-3 (Britain, France, Germany), the United States, and all other countries that are ready to take up the challenge. The coalition must be prepared to exhaust all diplomatic options and stop public speculation about military solutions. The serious use of military force is politically and militarily unsustainable both in Europe and America, and Ms. Merkel should make it clear to the Bush administration that sabre rattling, especially nuclear sabre rattling, will undermine German and European support for a unified approach.

Should Iran be willing to return to the negotiating table, at some point the coalition would have to come forward with an attractive mix of incentives - diplomatic, political, economic, and security-related - but only after the country has regained the necessary international confidence over its nuclear weapons ambitions. Otherwise, if Iran continues to play hardball with the international community, the coalition would have to stick together and climb up the ladder of sanctions. 

Iran presents a death trap not only for the non-proliferation regime but also for transatlantic relations. Another American military operation in the region would be the end of the German-American rapprochement and could mark the effective end of the Atlantic alliance. The stakes could not be higher. This meeting is further proof that the German-American relationship is now less about Europe and more about common approaches to larger global issues. Ms. Merkel and Mr. Bush should be aware of this dimension of the Iranian nuclear problem and work to keep Germany and the United States united on this vital issue. Given the political situation in France, the United Kingdom and Italy, Ms. Merkel is going to be the major leader of European, and not just German, foreign policy for at least the next two to three years. She, therefore, carries not only the responsibility of representing Germany but Europe as well. If the United States is serious about creating a new transatlantic relationship, then it must take advantage of this visit for more than just photo opportunities.

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Stephen F. Szabo is Professor of European Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. He currently is based at The Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, and is also Chairman of the AICGS Advisory Council.

Alexander Skiba is currently a research assistant at The Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

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This essay appeared in the April 28, 2006 AICGS Advisor.