German and American Perceptions of ‘Rogue States’
By Holger Stritzel

The perceptions of rogue states in Germany and the U.S. are in many respects paradigmatic for general differences in the security policies between the two countries. The image of rogue states is perhaps the single most important continuity in U.S. strategic discourse since the end of the Cold War. Initially invented to signal and justify the replacement of the global Cold War threat scenario with one of regional encounters, the rogue states image became increasingly used in the U.S. to describe post-Cold War problems of horizontal proliferation. After 9/11 it has turned into a central element of the 'Bush doctrine' and a means to give the diffuse 'war on terror' a more state-centric frame.

The reception of the term 'rogue states' in Germany could not be more different within the transatlantic security community. After having been largely ignored, its late reception has been marked by skepticism, irony and open hostility towards the U.S., criticizing America of stigmatizing other states and separating the world into dichotomous spheres of good and evil. Many German scholars and professionals argue that the language of rogue states is inappropriate and highly counter-productive, destroying prospects for re-including 'rogues' into the community of nations through means of diplomacy and dialogue.

In the past, differences such as these often have been dealt with in cultural terms. Most prominently in recent years, Robert Kagan has described cleavages between Europe and the U.S. with the opposing cultures of Mars and Venus, which are derived from different positions of power in the current international system. A popular German framing of such an explanation highlights differences between the identities of the German 'civilian power' versus the U.S. 'security state.' While German foreign policy strives to tame power politics by strengthening international law and building trust and confidence among states as part of an ideology of exporting the positive experiences of Europeanization to the world-stage, the U.S. is more willing to follow security rationales, to apply military means and to define problems in terms of a state of exception if it comes to think that a vital security concern is at stake.

While there is certainly a grain of truth in cultural explanations such as these, they nevertheless suffer from treating Germany and the U.S. too simplistically as monolithic blocs. A closer look at the real debates in both countries reveals instead the existence of controversial national receptions with several competing voices and coalitions struggling for dominance. There have always been several actors in the U.S. criticizing the label 'rogue states' and/or the policies linked with it and, conversely, there have also been actors in Germany arguing in favor of central elements of the 'rogue states package' such as counter-proliferation, ballistic missile defense and/or military preemption.

Rather than resorting too quickly to monolithic cultural explanations, scholars and policymakers alike should pay more attention to the social and political dynamics behind threat perceptions and how language can influence these dynamics as part of a transnational communicative exchange. As I will explain in the following, the structure of the controversies in Germany and the U.S. shows that the language of rogue states is closely related to the ability of domestic coalitions to set or deny the agenda of a particular threat.

For the rogue states problematic, this concerns three central issues. First, the language of the rogue states image emerged out of a distinctly U.S. culture of American exceptionalism where it was a viable linguistic resource for any actor in favor of aspects of the rogue states policy. This specific context explains the framings of God-given missions to lead the world and bring civilization to it (often expressed with the metaphor of the shining city upon the hill), a fight of good against evil, morality against immorality, and democracy and liberty against totalitarianism. This way of 'selling the threat,' of creating threat awareness, has always been part of U.S. history and thus resonates with several traditions and ideologies across the political spectrum. In contrast, the German cultural context makes it easier for critics to mobilize resistance and more difficult for supporters to mobilize additional support.

Second, actors in the U.S. often have a structural incentive to use a strong language in a context of 'checks and balances' and a 'divided government.' Furthermore, in order to create threat awareness, actors usually argue against isolationist tendencies, a public more concerned with economic and domestic issues than with foreign policy, and strong preferences for a balanced budget in both political parties. These issues played a significant role when the threat of rogue states was introduced to the U.S. debate in the early 1990s. At that time, the economy was weak, opinion polls confirmed a disinterested public, and strong voices in the Congress claimed to reduce the military budget to at least two-thirds of the level during the Cold War in the context of a debate on the decline of U.S. economic power and the existence of a 'peace dividend.' In such a context, it was insufficient for actors in favor of a strong U.S. power position in the world to talk about 'instability' as the new post-Cold War security problem and the need of 'regulating risks' rather than 'fighting threats.' But this more cautious, less dramatic and much more diffuse framing has been and still is dominant in the German strategic discourse after the end of the Cold War.

Third, the whole 'rogue states package' helped to establish a broad and strong coalition of supporters only in the U.S. For example, for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and evangelical groups it was attractive because of its implications for the Middle East and Israel; the Cuban American National Foundation supported the issue because Cuba was on the list of rogue states; for several conservatives, supported by think tanks such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, or the Center of Security Policy, the linkage of rogue states and ballistic missile defense was a viable foreign policy alternative in their mainly domestic and moral political campaign in the elections; an increase in military spending is in the interest of the Pentagon and the defense industry; and the rogue states image has also been used by security experts who promote a new rationale for non-proliferation away from a focus on regimes and treaties. Similarly, the rogue states package helped to create a strong, and similarly heterogeneous, coalition in the German context. Yet, this was a coalition of resistance while the group of supporters in Germany remained weak and fragmented.

Beyond the controversy of how to deal with rogues as 'revolutionaries' or 'revisionists' in international society, the analysis of their different perceptions in Germany and the U.S. points out an interesting general tension in the transatlantic relationship. As the leader of at least the Western alliance, the U.S. has to communicate to, and find a common language for, several audiences. And the language they decide to use not only affects the mobilization dynamics in their own domestic context but similarly in other countries such as Germany. This fundamental structural problem of having to communicate in this sense at two levels simultaneously can turn into a dilemma. The more difficult it is to gain support domestically, the stronger is the incentive to use a strong and distinctly American language, and the more difficult it is then for coalitions in other countries to mobilize support in their domestic contexts. The analysis of the rogue states image describes a likely scenario for such a dilemma: a weak U.S. economy, isolationist tendencies in the general public, and difficulties in getting support from the Congress.

Holger Stritzel was a DAAD/AICGS Fellow in the fall of 2006 and is a doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

For a summary of an event regarding the same topic, please click here.

This essay appeared in the October 13, 2006 AICGS Advisor.