Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Experiences and Further Prospects
By Dr. Ulrich Speck

Page Two of Two

4. From Policy to Politics: Challenges on the Ground
While European support for a democratic transformation of the Broader Middle East has remained weak so far, the Bush administration's efforts to translate the democracy agenda into politics on the ground have met a broad range of problems. There are at least three major challenges the Bush administration has had to deal with: first, the weakness of genuine liberal, democratic forces; second, the strength of the Islamist movement; and third, the resistance of the autocratic rulers.

The weakness of liberal-minded democratic forces in countries that have been ruled by autocrats for a long period of time should not come as a surprise. For decades, there has been no or very little public space in Arab countries to discuss politics openly, to found organizations, and to build mass support. The omnipresent secret police, a main pillar of most regimes in the region, have efficiently prevented every attempt to build competing secular political forces that might be able to challenge the autocratic rulers. (10) With a skillful combination of hard and soft repression, dissidents have been silenced or forced to go into exile.

The only opposition force that has a solid base at its disposal in the region are the Islamists. As the autocratic regimes had to find a compromise with the existing religious forces, there remained some public space for civil activities of religious actors: in and around the mosque. Even though some of the regimes crushed on the most radical Islamist elements, they were not able to exert complete control of their activities. The existing religious networks can therefore be used to build political support. Furthermore, autocratic regimes have utilized radical Islam in order to strengthen their rule, to legitimize tough state control and human rights violations, and to assure European and American support by presenting themselves as the only guarantee against an overtake by radical Islam.

Whether Islamism will split into a moderate and a radical wing remains to be seen. What seems to be crucial is the context in which they operate. When there is a strong, established, respected and secured political framework, the chances of moderation seem to be much better than in countries without stable statehood. However, the broad support that radical Islam enjoys in the region is certainly not making democratic progress any easier. It leads to the conclusion that Marina Ottaway and Tom Carothers have drawn: without the participation of the Islamists, "democracy is impossible in the Middle East." (11)

What Washington did in the last year was to press autocratic regimes to liberalize, openly as well as behind closed doors. Some of them - Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia - have responded with a reform agenda. But most of these concessions have been merely cosmetic; in some countries, there is even a backlash going on now, most visible in Egypt. The Washington Post recently noted that "Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak tried twice last year to stage a democratic election that would impress the Bush administration as credible without risking his hold on power... Now Mr. Mubarak is moving away from even the pretense of democracy." (12) At the Arab League summit in March 2006, the reform program launched in Tunis in 2004 wasn't even mentioned.

In their long experience with Western demands to liberalize and democratize, Arab leaders have developed sophisticated tactics and strategies to counter these demands. According to Bahey Eldin Hassan, Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Arab governments "have demonstrated an impressive ability to maneuver and play on contradictions within the international community." The "so-called major powers of the world have yet to realize that they are mere children playing among regimes well schooled in despotism." (13)

The autocratic regimes red line of danger becomes visible when they perceive that reforms might challenge their power base. What they see as especially dangerous are activities of NGOs that are not controlled by them. The "colored revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, where NGOs played a role in the overthrow of autocratic governments, reinforced the perception of foreign-funded NGOs as a central threat to their rule. (14)

It was precisely along that line that the Forum for the Future - the diplomatic centerpiece of Washington's Broader Middle East Initiative - collapsed in Bahrain in November 2005. Egypt decided to confront the U.S. openly by refusing to sign a declaration that would have - in return for financial incentives - permitted the funding for NGOs that were not registered with governments. (15)

According to Marina Ottaway and Tom Carothers, many Arab rulers didn't take the new American democracy agenda seriously, but it seems that there was at least some irritation, in 2003 and 2004. (16) Meanwhile, there is a sense among rulers, as Hassan M. Fathah has noted, that they simply can wait out the end of the Bush administration - and than do business as usual again. (17)

5. Start Again: The Need for a Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa
The efforts of the Bush administration to help along a process of democratic transformation of the Middle East and North Africa have met many obstacles: skepticism in American foreign policy circles, reluctance of Europeans to participate, and difficulties in translating the agenda into politics on the ground.

Furthermore, Washington is facing huge challenges in the region now: the looming full scale civil war in Iraq, the election of a Hamas-run government in the Palestinian territories, Tehran's nuclear program, and the unstable situation in Syria and Lebanon. All of these issues have forced the Bush administration to adopt a more "realistic" foreign policy approach. As Washington needs regional partners to deal with these issues, autocrats in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and elsewhere have regained much of their bargaining power. Every attempt to press these allies towards internal reform bears the risk of antagonizing them, damaging other American foreign policy goals.

As a consequence, the prospects for a democratic transformation in the Arab world do not look very promising at the moment. At least in the short term, other pressing issues have displaced democracy promotion on the American foreign policy agenda.

But the agenda of American foreign policy is one thing, the need for reform in the Arab world another. The 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call for the West, making it clear that the status quo is untenable and that the West has to revise its approach towards the Middle East and North Africa. It is important not to fall asleep again; the stakes are high.

The new American approach has been centered on the terrorist threat. But terrorism is not the only problem of the Arab world - far from it. The region's stability is massively at risk because of its social and economic situation - and because of the incompetence and unwillingness of autocratic rulers to respond to the challenges, to deliver the public goods that are needed. A fast growing population, a poor economic performance, and a dependency on oil and gas (which will run out during the next few decades, at least in some countries) are likely to lead to a further deterioration.

A report from the World Bank makes clear what is at stake. (18) The recent growth in GDP in the region is due chiefly to the boosted oil revenues. The lack of economic development contrasts with the urgent need to provide a young and growing population with jobs, which is the "single most important development challenge over the coming decade. Close to 100 million new jobs will be needed over the next 20 years to keep pace with new labor force entrants and absorb the current unemployment. This means that the number of jobs in the region needs to double during that period." (19)

The report identifies three main realignments: one, from closed to more open economies; two, from public sector-dominated to private sector-led economies; and three, from oil-dominated to more diversified economies. (20) The achievement of these goals "requires fundamental changes in the role of government in some key areas of policymaking and considerable enhancement of its effectiveness in others." (21) Compared with other regions, the quality of governance is poor; the quality of public accountability in the Middle East/North Africa is worse than in every other region in the world. (22)

Without dramatic economic and political changes in the coming years, the region's stability will be replaced by disorder and violence. The UN Arab Development Report 2004, written by Arab reformers, paints a bleak picture:

"If the repressive situation in Arab countries today continues, intensified societal conflict is likely to follow. In the absence of peaceful and effective mechanisms to address injustice and achieve political alternation, some might be tempted to embrace violent protest, with the risk of internal disorder. This could lead to chaotic upheavals that might force a transfer of power in Arab countries, but such a transfer could well involve armed violence and human losses that, however small, would be unacceptable. Nor would a transfer of power through violence guarantee that successor governance regimes would be any more desirable." (23)

The World Bank report as well as several UN Arab Development Reports leave no doubt that the current Arab crisis is, to a large extent, caused by bad governance. In other words, the autocratic structure of these nations has become an obstacle to the economic and political modernization of the Arab world.

Given the likely prospect of an economic and political breakdown, or at least of a massive crisis of the region, it is in the European and the American interest to use the leverage they have to support democratic reform. Both sides of the Atlantic dispose of considerable influence in the region - aid, trade, diplomacy, but only by coordinating their efforts and developing a common strategy (24) will they have a chance to influence the behavior of the autocratic rulers. If Europe and the U.S. don't try to change the political framework in the region today, they will pay a huge price tomorrow. It is time to start again - seriously.

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To return to page one of this essay, please click here.

This essay appeared in the May 12, 2006 AICGS Advisor.

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Footnotes:
10. Cf. Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, "Think Again: Middle East Democracy," Foreign Policy, November/December 2004.
11. Ibid pg. 3
12. Editorial, The Washington Post, February 21, 2006.
13. Bahey Eldin Hassan, "Broader Middle East Initiative: Arab Governments Strike Back," Arab Reform Bulletin, March 2006, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
14. Thomas Carothers, "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006.
15. "The deal breaker was a statement in the draft declaration committing participants to fostering "the roles of civil society, including N.G.O.s," to which Cairo wanted to add the provision that the N.G.O.s be "legally registered in accordance with the laws of the country." When Washington resisted Cairo's request, the Forum collapsed and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit left the meetings before their conclusion." Michael A. Weinstein, "Forum for the Future Ends in Discord," Power and Interest News Report, 28 November 2005.
16. "Think again: Middle East democracy," Foreign Policy, November/December 2004.
17. Hassan M. Fattah, "Democracy in the Arab World, a U.S. Goal, Falters," The New York Times, April 10, 2006.
18. "Middle East and North Africa: Economic Developments and Prospects 2005." The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2005. Cf. also "Job, Growth, and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlocking the Potential for Prosperity," The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2003.
19. Middle East and North Africa, p. 43.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid p. 66
22. Ibid p. 67.
23. Arab Human Development Report 2005, Executive summary.
24. Cf. Ronald D. Asmus, Larry Diamond, Mark Leonard, Michael McFaul, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democracy in the Broader Middle East," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 7-21.

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Dr. Ulrich Speck is a political analyst and journalist, based in Frankfurt am Main. He also writes a foreign policy blog for the German weekly Die Zeit (click here).  This essay is the product of a two-month DAAD/AICGS fellowship at AICGS in Spring 2006. The author wants to thank the DAAD for the grant and AICGS for all kinds of support.  To leave feedback for the author, please e-mail him at ulwisp@yahoo.com