Afghanistan and NATO - Do the Germans Do Their Share?
By Dr. Detlef Puhl

This week, the German government decided to send 6 "Tornado" reconnaissance aircraft to Afghanistan, where they will join NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. But before these additional forces can deploy, the German parliament, the Bundestag, will have to vote on a new mandate. Rarely has such a vote been so controversial, although there is no serious opposition to German military engagement in Afghanistan. What has happened?

1. Germany has been put under pressure. And this, in itself, creates controversy. Last fall, complaints of NATO commanders about the lack of support from German troops for units in difficulty in the south of Afghanistan became public. Why couldn't they leave their positions in the northern part of the country, where the situation is relatively quiet, to help British and American troops in the south, which had been forced into fighting by a resurging Taliban force? Critics already saw the "weenie" Germans shy away from solidarity with their allies. At the same time, German officials kept insisting that they saw no reason to back off from the distribution of tasks decided within NATO: Germans are in charge in the north, the British in the south. And although no formal request for additional German troops was issued before a few weeks ago, in British and American circles the feeling grew that when a situation becomes dangerous, the Germans wouldn't be reliable partners. After Iraq, is Afghanistan now becoming a case of dissenting positions among members of the NATO Alliance?

2.  In fact, there is agreement within the Alliance that Afghanistan is going to be the test case.  NATO must not fail; if it does, NATO is dead. However, at the same time, there is disagreement as to the strategy Alliance members want to pursue.  This is another reason for controversy.  NATO, in Afghanistan, is in charge of ISAF, and the German Tornado aircraft will become part of the ISAF force. At the same time, U.S., British and other Allied forces are also engaged in "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) in Afghanistan, which is a U.S.-led coalition force. This force is still engaged in fighting Taliban forces mostly in the Southern and Eastern parts of Afghanistan, while it is ISAF's mission to "establish and guarantee security in order for the Afghan authorities, UN personnel and international organizations to work in a secure environment." In formulating the new mandate for its Tornado aircraft, the German government took great care in insisting upon a clear distinction between the two missions. The reconnaissance aircraft serve the ISAF mission; results of their reconnaissance missions may be shared with OEF forces only if this is critical for the ISAF mission and ISAF forces.  "Close Air Support" missions, in OEF operations for example, are explicitly excluded from the mandate. This clear-cut distinction reflects a very important political decision, over which NATO members are in disagreement. U.S. Commanders have repeatedly called for a merger of the two missions, a call which has been constantly refused by others. Before leaving, the outgoing ISAF Commander, British General Roberts, had even announced an offensive operation against insurgents for next spring, which would clearly not be part of the present ISAF mandate.  But, of course, he probably meant OEF forces.

So, we're back to the delicate situation at the very beginning of operations in Afghanistan, when U.S.-led forces started "Operation Enduring Freedom" to rid Afghanistan of its Taliban rulers, who had hosted Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorists. Their mission, with full support of the UN Security Council and all members of the Alliance, continues. But the Alliance as such has been excluded from the very beginning, although NATO had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the time, many allies, including Germany, expressed disappointment over this course of action. It was only a year later that NATO was given a role, that of command of the ISAF forces, which have a mission based in peacekeeping and stabilization: to provide security, at first, in Kabul, later in the north and the west, and now, since October 5, in all of Afghanistan. So, the distinction between the two missions is the distinction between a peacekeeping and reconstruction force on the one hand, and a fighting force on the other. Germany has made clear that its aircraft will not be part of the fighting force.

There are reasons for this distinction.  While OEF forces are to chase the remaining Taliban forces out of Afghanistan and catch the top Al Qaeda terrorists, ISAF has to try to secure a country which has long been torn between powerful local war lords with their private forces and a weak central government. The central government is very slowly making ground in a delicate attempt to establish new structures of a state and to integrate its opponents, but the political situation is still far from being stable. If ISAF is to help the central government and the political process of stabilization, it has to rely on building confidence with the people, which is what NATO has tried to achieve through its "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs). So, the disagreement is this: should NATO concentrate on using PRTs, training and equipping Afghan security forces, and helping create the conditions for peaceful and democratic state authorities to develop, thus stabilizing the country and rid the Taliban of its potential of support?  Or should the allies prioritize support for U.S. and British fighting units, who are engaging in difficult battles against Taliban forces? And is one mission an obstacle to accomplishing the other? Should the allies continue to act in two separate operations with two separate missions? Or should they all engage in one mission, blurring the differences? These are two very different approaches. Germany obviously opts for keeping the missions separate. But this is exactly the opposite of what the U.S. and the UK wish to do.

3.  These two approaches tend to be incompatible. NATO's long-term credibility in Afghanistan is at stake. And this is yet another reason for controversy. Is the Alliance in for the long haul, because it will most likely take a long time for the country to rebuild and because it needs help? Or is it there to stop Taliban insurgence quickly and leave reconstruction to other actors? And how is the Alliance perceived in a country that has a proud record of defeating whoever wanted to dominate it?  If NATO wants to succeed in its mission, the allies must not be perceived as an occupying force. They must be perceived and accepted as a helping force; air raids with unavoidable "collateral damage" are probably not the best way to achieve this. In Afghanistan, NATO and the allies not only have to fight against insurgents, they also have to fight for the Afghan soul. So, Afghanistan really is the test case for a completely new role of NATO.  What will it take for a military alliance to try to re-establish order in a far away country in the name of the international community?  Is military strategy appropriate, executed by an ad-hoc coalition of forces that tries to fight insurgents primarily with special forces and airpower, thus minimizing its own casualties, while local and civilian casualties count as "collateral damage"? And one that needs some sort of "exit strategy" in order to determine when the mission is accomplished? Or does it need a different peacekeeping strategy that combines military and other instruments to achieve stabilization and security over a longer period of time? And for how long is the Alliance willing and permitted to engage in Afghanistan?  Which road do the allies want to take? Is NATO or any military alliance the right tool for this kind of policy? Germany's decision on the Tornado mandate reflects this dilemma. It doesn't solve it.  It doesn't even address it.

The Afghan test case shows how difficult it is for a transatlantic military Alliance of democracies to define and assume a role in global security. There are no precedents that might help along the way.  So, behind each decision NATO makes in this regard, there is not only the question of how this impacts the mission, but there is also the question about the mission itself: is NATO on the right track? It is obvious that there are serious doubts among and between the member states. These doubts trickle down to the question of what to do with the German Tornados in Afghanistan. They make decision-making difficult, but they need to be taken seriously. The future of the Alliance depends on this.

Dr. Detlef Puhl is the German Associate Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. These views are his own.

This essay appeared in the February 16, 2007, AICGS Advisor.