It Truly is a Long and Winding Road: The Saga of EU-Turkey Relations
By Soli Özel

It is important to understand Turkey's relations with the EU in the context of Turkey's quest for modernization along Western lines. Without appreciating the strength and the depth of that quest, it would be almost impossible to assess the developments of the past three years and the surge of the reformist zeal in the country. Without the passionate attachment to that goal, those powerful enough to block the process would have succeeded in their task. Without the ideological commitment of the established state elite to become part of Europe, the Eurasian fantasies of some would have overcome their European aspirations. Ultimately, it is this deep-seated legacy of Kemalism as well as the late Empire and the conviction that Turkey is European that stopped the anti-European, authoritarian westernizers cold in their tracks.

The process of modernization began over two centuries ago and acquired new momentum with the founding of the Turkish Republic. The republican reforms undertaken by Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's founding President, and his colleagues aimed at creating a modern, secular state. The fundamental ambition of the new republic was the attainment of a level of "contemporary civilization," a formulation for European civilization. Therefore, the revolutionary regime in Ankara pursued the country's integration into the European political order since its inception. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey joined the institutional framework of the Western alliance, becoming a member of the Council of Europe. It also joined all the organizations that helped shape the European order in the postwar period. In time, as the Cold War international system finally took shape, Turkey became part of the security architecture of the transatlantic alliance as a member of NATO. A corollary of the new developments in Turkey's strategic choices, position, and status immediately presented itself. Ankara undertook and succeeded in transforming the country's single-party authoritarian regime into a multiparty system with a restrictive democracy. The post-WWII developments actually repeated a pattern that had been a constant in the course of the last three hundred years. Challenged by the international environment and its demands, Turkey's domestic dynamics responded to the transformative changes in the world system by adapting to these. The critical dimension here is the presence of either a vibrant or latent reformist domestic energy that needed the protection and the prompting of the international environment. Yet, the main axis upon which Turkey's relations with the transatlantic community, particularly with the United States, were built was security. Therefore, collecting on the rent of its geopolitically critical location, Turkey did not have to work hard to deepen its democracy. Even under military rule it was forgiven its democratic deficiencies even by its European allies, who were far more sensitive to the issue of human rights than the United States ever was. As the Cold War waned and then ended, this forgiving attitude also changed--to the great consternation of the Turkish elite.

The application to the European Economic Community in the late 1950s was, therefore, part of the historically established process of seeking "Europeanness." In 1963 Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). The agreement held the promise of eventual membership for Turkey after conditions for such a development were fulfilled. In 1987, after providing its citizens with the right to appeal to the European Court for Human Rights, Turkey did submit a surprise application for full membership. Calling this process "a long and winding road" then Prime Minister Turgut Özal thus repositioned Turkey on its European track, after the cooling of relations caused by the last military coup between 1980-1983. He thereby responded to the yet timid and fragile calls for civilian control of the military and democratization as well. The rejection by the European Commission of Turkey's application cited the Community's busy schedule but reiterated Turkey's eligibility.

In the Wake of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War led the EU to turn its back on Turkey since the security dimension of the transatlantic alliance was no longer of primary importance. The Soviet threat was gone. The EU faced the challenge of German unification and had to contemplate enlargement in order to stabilize the eastern part of the continent. Even the constructive role played by Turkey in the Balkans did not alter that stance or the ordering of priorities. For a long time the Turkish elite failed to recognize the changing circumstances in the European environment that made tolerating an imperfect democracy with a failing human rights record impossible. In the middle of a civil war fought against a brutal separatist ethnic insurrection led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), the democratization program was scrapped from the country's agenda. The conviction on the part of the state elite that Europe, and Germany in particular, was at best tolerant and at worst supportive of the PKK poisoned relations. The open support given by some Greek politicians and perhaps by Greek secret services to the PKK, and the absence of any reprimand for such behavior on the part of Turkey's allies in NATO, awakened long-held fears and suspicions about European intentions. The legacy of the 1990s, then, for EU-Turkey relations and, in particular, for Turkish-German relations was a negative one.

Despite this poisoned atmosphere, Turkey entered into a Customs Union agreement with the European Union in 1996. This was done during the darkest days of the civil war. This was also a dismal period for Turkish democracy, human rights, and individual freedoms. In retrospect, the signing of the Customs Union agreement was one manifestation of the changing socio-economic profile of Turkey. No longer a closed economy, rapidly integrating with European markets, and witnessing the rise of a provincial business class that sought economic openness, Turkey could not insulate itself economically from the EU.

The 1997 Luxembourg summit of the European Union declined to declare Turkey a candidate for membership. In Ankara Germany was widely believed to be the author of that outcome. Greece, by actively opposing any such move, covered for many other members' aversion to the idea of having Turkey as a candidate. As a result Turkey broke off the political dialogue with the EU. The promise of membership did, however, resurface at the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in 1999. The efforts of the new Red-Green coalition to break the impasse, chronicled in detail by Heinz Kramer in his essay, were instrumental in reaching that result. Undoubtedly, the thaw in Greek-Turkish relations that began in the wake of the apprehension of PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan while he was a guest at the Greek ambassador's residence in Kenya helped. That thaw later turned into a veritable rapprochement engineered by George Papandreou of Greece and Ismail Cem of Turkey. This Aegean Spring got a boost of popular support as well after the earthquakes that hit both countries in the summer of 1999.

At the Helsinki summit Turkey was accepted as a candidate for membership that would be treated on an equal footing with all other candidates provided that the political principles of the Copenhagen criteria were fulfilled. For good measure, Ankara was also asked to avoid a potential Greek veto and show good will for the resolution of the long festering Cyprus problem.

The Aftermath of September 11
The twenty-first century world order is being shaped rather painfully and painstakingly. Turkey's pivotal role as a mediator of civilizations, as the legatee of not just the Ottoman Empire but the myriad civilizations that rose and fell in Anatolia, is now receiving increased attention. Turkey's historical choices for modernization along Western lines as well as its democratic and secular system present it to a world beset by a religiously based nihilistic terrorism as an extraordinarily significant experiment. Therefore, Turkey's accession to the European Union has acquired a complicated strategic dimension as well. The decision by the EU will be a strategic one both in security terms and in terms of fulfilling the promise of a multicultural Europe shaped by the values of the Enlightenment. That dimension of the strategic calculation suggests that the decision about Turkey now has an audience that is larger than just Turkey itself. The relevant audience now includes the Arab and Muslim worlds, independent of the perception that prevails in these worlds about Turkey, as well as Europe's own Muslim citizens.

Underscoring the evolving strategic nature of Turkey's accession should not in any way imply that Turkey ought to be treated with kid gloves. The full and unequivocal adoption of the Copenhagen criteria that demand the establishment of a market economy, rule of law, liberal democracy, and respect for minority rights are the sine qua non of Turkey's accession. The Turkish public and the Turkish government are cognizant of this fact. At the level of development Turkey has attained in social and political terms, the citizenry is unlikely to accept standards that may be deemed bon pour l'Orient but do not cut muster as universal ones. Following deep economic, social, and political transformations, the Turkish public, led by westernized intellectuals, the Turkish business community, an increasingly active NGO community, and committed politicians has fought for the attainment of EU credentials. In a sense, Turkey's civil society took over the westernization project from its initiator, the Turkish state, as a modern urban public opinion has come of age. The fact that the 1990s turned out to be a wasted decade of civil war, recurrent economic crises, rampant corruption, bankrupt political parties, and the breakdown of societal consensus contributed to this. The Turkish public came to demand the expansion of the EU's zone of peace to encompass Turkey as well. For the first time in history, the EU project acquired a solid popular base. Undoubtedly this was a sign of the maturation of Turkey's westernization project as well. Curiously, or ironically, this final stage of modernization that required profound changes along liberal democratic lines was vehemently opposed by elements within the state establishment, traditionally the vanguard of westernization. Even more unexpectedly, the political driving force of this new surge in reforms to qualify for the start of accession negotiations turned out to be a political party with an Islamist pedigree.

Arguably one of the most interesting aspects of the Turkish experiment in the post-September 11 context is the fact that a party rooted in Turkey's Islamist movement, the AKP, is in power. In an age when Islamic politics, if not the faith itself, is all but identified with reactionary attitudes and violence, the forward looking, democratic reformist AKP indeed appears to be an anomaly.

It is necessary to emphasize that the AKP can only be understood in the context of Turkeys' political evolution and is a product of its history. To put it briefly, Turkey's Islamist movement had the advantage of participating in the pluralistic political process for over three decades. Although the movement was anti-Western, anti-secular, and non-democratic from its inception and, at its fringes, counted many extremists, it always played by the electoral rules. In its political expression starting with the National Order Party in 1970, it always preferred electoral legitimacy to extra-democratic means. When the Islamist movement came to power under its third incarnation as the Welfare Party (WP), it failed to rise to the challenge of running a complex and diversified country. The ousting of the WP by the military through a post-modern coup that relied on the mobilization of secular public opinion and civic organizations marked a turning point in the history and fortunes of the Islamist movement as well. The blow to the party led to a generational and ideological rift in the ranks of the movement. As the patrimonial structure broke up, the Islamists in Turkey split into two parties, the AKP and the Felicity Party (FP) after an uneasy coexistence in the transitory Virtue Party. The FP now represents the traditional wing of the movement.

The AKP itself took advantage of the erosion of centrist parties and their inability to move away from corruption-engendering patronage politics. Its leadership, defying the beliefs and inclinations of many in its rank and file and with a keen eye for self-preservation, redefined Islamic politics along liberal democratic lines. As they themselves like to call their new ideological calling, they became "conservative democrats." As a representative of the newly ascendant provincial business classes and appealing to the electoral base that populate the periphery of metropolitan cities, the party won the 2002 elections. The continuation of the party's fortunes and its ability to consolidate its power required a determined pursuit of the IMF stabilization program and the political reforms demanded by the EU. The AKP could only survive in power and consolidate its political position if it continued widening the democratic space in the country. Even during the Iraq war or in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, to accept the false tradeoff between less democracy and more security would have taken the AKP into the playing field of those who cannot tolerate its political ascent. Similarly, the AKP had to resist its own temptations to go the populist route in the management of the economy as well since in the shadow of the catastrophic crisis of 2001, the economy could not sustain further mismanagement.

So far the AKP has done wonders in propelling Turkey towards fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. The AKP government brought the country nearer than ever to start accession negotiations in 2005 despite rigorous opposition by civilian and military actors. In this quest the AKP also accumulated plenty of debts to groups and institutions that are not its natural allies. The more liberally inclined economic and societal elites, pro-EU bureaucratic circles, the chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, and the pro-European elements in the military aided the AKP in surmounting the very vocal opposition within the establishment. Some have done so with great misgivings, but the commitment to the project held this coalition together despite the AKP's lapses that surfaced occasionally, particularly on matters pertaining to the role of women. A positive decision in December would naturally consolidate the AKP's hold on power, but it might also break this tactical coalition and usher in an era of political reconstruction in both the left and the right of center. An unholy alliance of hard core nationalists, ex-Maoists, military officers, and bureaucratic elites oppose the process. They do so either because they have vested interests in the existing order of things or because they distrust the Europeans or fear that the pace and content of the reforms might jeopardize Turkey's territorial integrity or undermine the secular nature of the regime. The battle has been fierce and in all likelihood will continue to be so in the next three months as well as after the start of negotiations. A negative decision would inevitably strengthen the latter group as the popular reaction to such an outcome would be fiercely anti-EU, emotional, and overwhelming. To the extent that EU membership as a goal and as a process is a national cause and, therefore, a unifying factor, the removal of the goal post may result in the activation of Turkey's socio-political faultlines: Kurdish/Turkish, Alevi-Sunni, Islamist/Secular, and Rich/Poor.

The Stakes
The start of accession negotiations is, of course, contingent on a favorable report and recommendation by the European Commission. It necessitates a political decision by the member states at their summit in December to finally cross the Rubicon. This decision about Turkey is the EU's challenge. Or, at least it is increasingly seen as such in Turkey almost by all groups. Some would argue that without Turkey the EU will not be able to match its economic prowess with the political clout and the strategic depth that it needs in order to have both a more balanced relationship with the United States and to be taken seriously as a global actor. Furthermore, if Turkey is deemed to have been treated unfairly by the EU, such a perception might reverberate among the Muslim populations residing in European countries. As the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder articulated on a number of occasions, a rejection by the EU of a Turkey that has fulfilled the relevant criteria will also be received by the wider Muslim world as an affront and a clear indication of double standards--a prospect that the EU can ill afford. Undoubtedly, there are many Muslims in the Arab world and beyond who believe that Turkey has sold its soul by wanting to become European. Yet those who assess that the membership of a Muslim country in the European family is a good thing are probably much more numerous.

From the perspective of those who believe in Turkey's European vocation and who consider a liberal democratic order the best guarantee of the country's unity as well as its prosperity, this long journey has been a beneficial one. The relations with the European Union, based on the mutual contractual obligations first codified in the Ankara agreement, helped Turkey institutionalize its market economy. The existence of diverse, complex and penetrating economic ties with the EU was also primarily responsible for Turkey's ability to integrate with the global economy and compete in world markets by the quality of its people's work and production. Nowadays these relations are helping democratic forces in Turkey to push the country to change along liberal democratic lines and to institutionalize the rule of law. It is also clear for those who strive for EU membership that when Turkey meets the European democratic standards it will be able to fulfill its promise and will all the more readily serve as an example for its large neighborhood. Arguably, Turkey's success and true integration into the EU could be a force to help the stabilization of the Middle East and avoid the dreaded clash of civilizations.

The role of the Cyprus conflict in all of this is secondary but critical. It was clear that it would be an obstacle to start negotiations next year. After a long period of unnecessary foot dragging, the Turkish government finally took the initiative for a resolution of the conflict, and great strides were made to find a fair and workable solution to the problem. In the end, much to the surprise of all concerned parties that had not paid sufficient attention to the new dynamics in Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan prepared by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Greek Cypriots effectively voted for the partition of the island, but no reprisal against them for defying the will of the international community and of the EU was possible. Today, in the absence of substantive steps to ameliorate the lot of the Turkish Cypriots or break their isolation effectively either by the EU or the United States, the island is poised to become a cauldron of trouble once more if the December decision is negative.

The commitment of a majority of Turks to the values of the liberal Europe that emerged in the aftermath of the second Thirty Years War is real and profound. Turkey's citizens support EU membership by a ratio of 3 to 1. Turkey's citizens share the aspirations and the interests of their future European partners. In general, Turkey's citizenry hopes and expects that in December the wisdom of statesmanship and the acknowledgement that this would serve long term interests of the EU will indeed prevail over the historically insignificant domestic costs of moving this process along. If the EU cannot rise to the occasion, it would be safe to assume that severe turbulence will define both the relations between Turkey and the EU and Turkey's domestic politics at a time when both are extraordinarily hazardous luxuries for all sides.

In the flood of papers and conference presentations treating the issue of Turkey-EU relations, a consensus has almost been reached in identifying the specific trouble spots. Turkey's economy, the size and poverty of its population, and the impact of these on EU budget and institutions, whether geographically Turkey belongs to Europe and the differences in culture/religion have been raised and debated ad infitum. Most recently, the report of the independent commission on Turkey basically dismissed the worries about costs and incompatibilities and highlighted the advantages. Yet seven important issues remain and need to be addressed and ameliorated as much as possible all the way to the Summit. These are: judicial reform; return to villages; ongoing cases of torture; religious freedom; women's rights; the Kurdish question; furthering civilian control of the government.

For those who do not oppose Turkish membership on exclusionary and xenophobic grounds, and who take the security generating imposition of norms by an expanding EU seriously, the case for a positive decision in December is ironclad. Yet there is also a growing recognition that the case of Turkey might be the first example of negotiations not ending with membership. In fact among those who favor the opening of negotiations, many wish this realistic perspective to be made absolutely clear for both parties. Whether Turkey would accept anything short of full membership if it complied with all the conditions and met the membership criteria remains to be seen.

The Triangulation
There is a consensus in Turkey that in the post-Iraq war world, the country is at the dead center of new geopolitical and strategic configurations. There is also the appreciation that in addition to its battle trained and effective military, the strategic importance of the country would also derive from the nature of its regime and the strength of its alliances. To that effect, investing in good relations with regional powers, while continuing with the efforts to join the European Union, enjoys great currency. Those who favor a Turkey that turns its back to Europe and forms partnerships with Russia and Iran are out of power and out of favor. Yet a Eurasianist constituency is still potently waiting in the wings for the EU to make a mistake.

The United States has always been supportive of Turkey's desire to become a member of the EU. In the dark days after the Luxembourg summit, the Americans worked hard to reestablish a dialogue and put Turkey back on track. In Helsinki, the lobbying of President Clinton made a favorable difference. At the Copenhagen summit in 2002 though, the intervention of the Bush administration was greatly resented and may have hardened EU member positions against giving Turkey a date at that time. The Turkish public is also divided about the U.S. support for Turkey's membership in the EU. A strong constituency argues that the United States pretends that it wants Turkey in the EU but that it is not sincere. The other argument suggests that the United States has a vested interest in anchoring Turkey in the Western system and the best way to secure this permanently would be by the admission of the country into the EU.

The Turkish establishment had opposed and warned the United States about the ill-conceived war against Iraq. When the Turkish Parliament voted against the deployment of U.S. troops on Turkish soil to open a northern front, one of the first casualties of the Parliament's will was the state's domestically focused strategic vision. The concern with the domestic Kurdish problem long kept Turkey from having a more comprehensive Iraq policy that could contemplate the end of Baathist rule and Sunni-Arab dominance. The war and Turkey's non-participation in it meant that the Kurds were the main partners of the American military. With that fact came the rejection by the Americans of Turkey's prerogative to do as it saw fit in the north of the country. The result of the vote also showed to the rest of the world, the "old" Europeans and to the Arab countries in particular that Turkey was not a lackey of the United States. The fact that there was $24 billion on the table to be collected upon the passing of the bill made the Turkish decision even more impressive. Arguably, the favorable turn on the part of Germany towards Turkey that began with the Red-Green coalition received a boost from this stance. Since Germany is perceived to be the country that was most responsible for Turkey's exclusion in Luxembourg, the active promotion of the opening of negotiations by the German Chancellor is much appreciated. The main question that is raised is whether this is just the government's policy or a state policy that would not be substantially altered even if the Christian Democrats came to power.

Since then Turkey has been complaining that Washington did not keep promises made to Ankara on two issues. The American military made no effort to disarm the PKK despite repeated promises to do so. In fact, in a recent interview, Condoleeza Rice said that the United States was trying to deal with the PKK through non-military means. Such a position is unacceptable to the Turkish government. Ankara also believed that the Americans did not much care about the rights of the Turcoman minority in Iraq, whose well being was a priority for the Turkish public. Particularly touchy for the Turkish government and public was the status of the province of Kirkuk and the developments that took place there. Claimed by the Kurds as their Jerusalem, the multiethnic city that used to enjoy a Turcoman majority may yet become the reason for a Turkish intervention in Iraq.

While relations with the United States unfolded along a continuum of cooperation, tension, mistrust, and mutual dependence, Turkey made moves that brought it closer to the positions of the European Union. It also intensified its relations with its two neighbors, Syria and Iran, countries on Washington's black-list. Turkey, like the EU member states, favored a more diplomatic approach towards both countries and felt uneasy by the belligerent positions articulated in Washington. In the meantime, relations with Israel, having lost some of their importance in relative terms, recorded tense and testy moments as a result of Turkish government's reactions to Israeli policies in the occupied territories.

The stability and prosperity of Turkey will depend greatly on the continuation of its process of integration with the EU. If the December summit gives the green light for negotiations to start, the course of the country will be set. Such a Turkey would be in a position to play both a stabilizing role in its immediate vicinity and be the hub of economic activity for its neighboring regions. To the extent that the political and economic integration of the Greater Middle East into the world system is the most important priority of the Atlantic Alliance, Turkey's pivotal position becomes obvious. The expectation in Turkey is for this fact to carry the day against the naysayers come December.

This paper appeared in the AICGS Advisor of September 30, 2004.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.