"Yes We Can"? The Germans Between Social
Angst and a Shift to the Left
By Dr. Paul Nolte

Germany during the Soccer World Cup 2006: A country in the happy frenzy of being host to the entire globe, optimistic and full of confidence, yet free of national arrogance. That was "Germany, a Summer Fairytale." Has the country radically changed since then? Or was it just collective self-delusion, a fairy tale, from which the Germans have reverted back to their bitter reality?

In any case, the year 2007 can go down in history as the year of Teutonic fear and uncertainty. Positive economic progress has done little to change this. On the contrary, it seems that economic growth, the noticeable decrease in unemployment, prosperity in core industrial branches such as steel, engineering and automobiles, and budget consolidation (the list truly is long!) have increased citizens' expectations to the point where they cannot be realized. "The boom hasn't reached me yet" - this observation could qualify as the German sentence of 2007.

Germany has become an insecure, despondent society, yet offers at the same time the peculiar paradox of a giant who does not want to become aware of his own strength. Its large European neighbors such as Italy and France or even the United States have objectively larger problems. However, we're not talking about a landslide over the last few months. Rather, for some time a counter movement has been perceptible: a movement against the liberal optimism experienced at the beginning of the century, when Germany began to rise to its challenges - in demographics, in the social system, in education - and reforms were launched which sought to combine increased responsibility with a new spirit of community. Compared to similarly motivated new beginnings in other countries, these reforms remained moderate - and apparently for many Germans, perhaps a majority, went too far.

The reforms from Schröder's "Agenda 2010" and their careful continuation during the early stages of the Grand Coalition laid bare the problems presented to an aging industrial society in the face of globalization. Now these problems are being blamed on the messenger. Germans feel like a nation of losers, and for the future, both for individuals as well as the whole country, the worst is always expected. A few weeks ago the debate over the "Riester-Rente," a government-supported private retirement provision, was symptomatic: why should I save for later if I'm going to be poor in my old age - and the government will have to support me anyway? Those who are not poor now will be later: it is almost as if we have become a universal lower class in waiting.

Against the background of this collective frame of mind, the successes of "Die Linke" party in the regional elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony aren't surprising. Die Linke is reacting to social uncertainty and fear of a downswing; they promise justice for the weary and heavy-laden, almost reminiscent of the New Testament. In wake of this seemingly simple recipe for success, the SPD has followed along a bit. Now the talk everywhere is of a shift to the left ("Linksruck") and the possibility of a left majority in Germany. But does this adequately describe the new political tectonics?

The notion of a shift to the left is too simple. The Germans have not become a nation of Marxists and revolutionaries. A classical left-wing pathos is likely to be found in many of the functionaries of "Die Linke," who have stumbled upon this party from union or communist environments. In the electorate, a sometimes downright apolitical instinct of the uncertainty of their status, the social angst for the future, is often associated with nearly conspiracy theory images about the puppet masters of capitalism and their pawns in the established political parties. This is the classical sentiment, the classical clientele for populist temptation.

On the other hand, it is no coincidence that this populism has made its bed with the left and that at this time right-wing populist parties - fortunately - cannot have success. This yearning for social stability is driven by two elements, which can be described as thoroughly left-wing: a radical understanding of egalitarianism and a pronounced fixation on the state. It does not have to be the GDR exactly, yet the GDR is cast in an increasingly softer light. A "socialism light" promises solutions to the plight of capitalism and globalization.

What could the political answers to this situation be: answers to the left-wing party as well as the sensitivities of fear? That is now the big, open question for the future of Germany and for the federal election campaign in 2009. The recent election in Hesse strikes a skeptical note in this regard. The SPD seemed content to wait upon social fears - in a region that is prospering, that has every opportunity! The CDU with Roland Koch played on fears of another kind; that was apparently not well received by the voters. Where have the rousing politics of trust, new beginnings, and chances gone? And which party stands for them with credible people and programs? Germans are in great need of the "Yes we can" of Barack Obama to be able to break out of their prison of despondence.

Dr. Paul Nolte is a Professor at the Free University in Berlin and a regular participant in AICGS events.

A German version of this article originally appeared in the February 3, 2008, Neue Zürcher Zeitung as well as the March 7, 2008, AICGS Advisor. It was translated into English by Jennifer Windell.