Transforming Taboos? Changing Perceptions of National Pride in Germany
By Cynthia Miller-Idriss

It's been over three years since Germany's Minister of the Environment, Jürgen Trittin, sparked a political controversy in Germany when he referred to Laurenz Meyer, General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), as a skinhead after Meyer remarked in a media interview that he was proud to be German. Politicians that spring scrambled to make statements about how exactly they felt about the German nation, and whether one could be proud of being German. In the midst of this so-called "pride debate" (Stolzdebatte), then President Rau issued a statement that reflected the dominant public narrative about national pride in Germany: namely, that it is not possible to be proud of being German, since one cannot be proud of something that one had not achieved oneself.

The Stolzdebatte was only one of a series of debates about German identity and culture that erupt periodically in German public life, including, for example, the historian's debate (Historikerstreit) in the 1980s or the discussion about German "guiding culture" (Leitkultur) in the late 1990s. Such controversies and discussions about contemporary German national identity are, of course, a reflection of the fact that German identity is perpetually challenged by and deeply intertwined with the country's history of horrific racial and ethnic relations. In the German case, the legacy of the atrocities perpetrated during the Holocaust in the name of an exclusionary, race-based national identity has forever tainted Germanness and the German nation.

When it comes to expressions of national identity, then, German history leaves many Germans with a deep sense of discomfort with and suspicion of national pride. In cross-national survey research on national pride, for example, Germans tend to report very low levels of national pride compared with other nations. But surveys only tell part of the story. What surveys can't capture is the complexity of the concept of national pride in Germany, and the extent to which, at least in part, it is the word "pride" itself that is problematic, rather than the sentiment that pride conveys.

For a generation of Germans raised after World War II, the word for "national pride" (Nationalstolz) signifies the kind of racism and rampant nationalism that ultimately culminated in the Holocaust. This connection has rendered the expression of national pride taboo in Germany. Saying one is proud of being German marks one as a right-wing sympathizer, as Trittin's reaction to Meyer in the spring of 2001 illustrates. In fact, the phrase "I am proud to be German" is still used as a standard measure of right-wing extremist attitudes in German survey research.

However, in my interviews with sixty young Germans (aged seventeen to twenty-five at the time of their interviews) and twenty-five of their teachers in Berlin over the past three years, I have found that a younger generation expresses significant resistance to this taboo on national pride. Moreover, they do so in part because national pride simply signifies something different for their generation than it does for their parents. Pride, for these young people, is not equated automatically with fascism, but is rather a normal reflection of one's identification with the nation's collective accomplishments. They argue that they should be allowed to be proud and explain that the things they want to be proud of are related to Germany's economic accomplishments and to its social system and safety net. They are proud of the fact that they lead relatively good lives compared to the lives of people in many other parts of the world, that they have access to education and health care, and that they don't have to worry about being taken care of if something goes wrong in their lives. They argue against the unfairness of living with a taboo that resulted from the actions of their grandparents' generation, even while acknowledging the importance of teaching about the Holocaust so that nothing like it ever happens again. In short, they argue for a transformed view of and relationship with their nation, and thus reflect a changing national conception of what it means to be German.

In fact, the shifting signification of national pride is not necessarily limited to the younger generation in Germany. Those who have spent time in Germany over the past few years may notice subtle and not-so-subtle changes in the ways in which national identity and national pride are discussed and expressed. Posters in Berlin a few years ago displayed images of people of diverse ethnic descent wearing white t-shirts with the phrase, "I am proud to be German," simultaneously challenging notions of what it means to "be German" and reclaiming the notion of national pride from the radical right-wing. Flags waved in German streets during the World Cup in 2002 in a strikingly widespread public display of national identity. And three years after the Stolzdebatte, in a speech following the vote nominating him as Germany's new president in May 2004, Horst Köhler remarked that he loves his country.

Köhler's remark set off another round of public discussions about the permissibility of expressing an emotional attachment--such as pride or love--to the nation. Just as they had in the Stolzdebatte three years earlier, journalists and talk show hosts, chat room users and public figures took up the question of whether it is acceptable to be proud of being German, but this time, there was a noticeable difference. Instead of automatically condemning the notion of national pride, many Germans increasingly began to suggest that it might be possible, and even desirable, to develop a closer relationship with the nation. The television station Phoenix advertised a talk show about the issue of national patriotism by explaining that recent political debates have carried more patriotic tones. And the actress Nadja Auermann, for example, stated in an interview with a national magazine that it is unhealthy not to have a national feeling.

In post-unification Germany, several national narratives that had dominated the post-World War II era have been challenged, dismantled, or otherwise transformed. Contested notions of east and west German identity, Germany's changing role in Europe, the continuing legacy and shame of the Holocaust, changing patterns of immigration, and the reform of citizenship and naturalization laws, among others, have coalesced in public debates, calling into question the very notion of what it means to "be German." The taboo on national pride is just one national narrative among many, in other words, and its transformation is inextricably linked to a variety of other issues that impact German national identity. Shifting conceptions of German national identity and notions of national pride are complex, and their transformation is continual.

Changes in identity are neither simple nor linear processes. Not all of the young Germans with whom I spoke expressed resistance to the taboo on national pride. A few said there was no cause to be proud of being German, usually referring specifically to German actions during World War II. Once I heard a student explain that being proud of being German would be like saying you are proud of being born. But when viewed in light of the differences in the public discussion about national pride between the Stolzdebatte in 2001 and the controversy over Köhler's "love" of Germany in 2004, my interviews with young Germans suggest that the dominant national narrative about pride in Germany is at the very least splintering, if not being fully transformed.

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Cynthia Miller-Idriss is Assistant Professor of International Education and Educational Sociology at New York University and a recent DAAD/AICGS Summer Fellow.

This essay appeared in the September 9, 2004 AICGS Advisor.
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.