After Crawford: German-American Relations and Missile Defense
By Dr. Colette Mazzucelli

Implementing the Crawford Consensus on Iran
As Jackson Janes observed recently, 'time is the currency of world leaders.' During their meeting in Crawford this month, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President George Bush demonstrated their resolve to stay focused on the diplomatic course to address Iran's nuclear objectives. Relations with Iran are one of the key issues in the bilateral relationship. This is because of the threat posed by proliferation in the Middle East. Since 2003 the EU-3, Britain, France and Germany, have invested considerable resources and time in multilateral diplomacy with Iran. In the last two years, the EU's High Representative, Secretary General Javier Solana, has played a more central role at the negotiating table with successive Iranian nuclear negotiators. Despite the nuclear stalemate, European initiatives are, in Brzezinski's words, a 'strategic asset' as the U.S. weighs options in Iraq, Pakistan, and the broader Israeli-Palestinian context.

The Crawford meeting is a signal that the German chancellor is determined to work with the United States to mitigate a crisis with Iran. This is in the German and European interests as much as the American one. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's recent visit to Washington, DC, underlines this reality. The transatlantic objective after Crawford is to convince Iran that reality-based thinking and goals are also in its national interest. It is clear that sanctions are taking a heavy toll on the ordinary Iranian citizen who already despairs given the lack of economic development under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime. By urging German business to reduce ties with Iran, the Chancellor is displaying German statecraft vis-à-vis a state that in no way addresses the security concerns of its own people during a critical period of regional developments. Improvements in security for citizens in Baghdad, emergency rule in Pakistan under President Musharraf, and the latest efforts at an Israeli-Palestinian peace in Annapolis are issues that American statecraft must address through the creative use of a broad set of instruments. The fragility of the present context provides the handwriting on the wall: missile defense is a distraction the nation can ill afford. It is a policy that detracts from American interests in national, transatlantic, and global security.

Potential Spoilers - Putin's Russia
The Bush administration's plans to build missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic gives Putin cards to play in transatlantic and Middle East relations. At stake is whether the gains that the Bush administration perceives are to be made in pushing ahead with missile defense against 'rogue states,' interpreted in this context as Iran, outweigh the costs of pursuing such a policy course at this time. In a game of chess with the Russian president, a sense of balance in protecting as wide a range of U.S. strategic assets as possible is critical on the board. Missile defense upsets the balance and throws the weight of the pieces in Putin's favor. In such a game, anticipating the next move is essential to countering a forward strategy. Preemption on this board is much more than a missile defense operation.

As successive American administrations squander resources in the folly to militarize space, U.S. attention is diverted from the real threat shared across the Atlantic: Russia stays on course to increase its leverage by turning off the gas. While China makes headway investing in resource-laden states in the Middle East and Africa, India, a democratic ally, reaps the benefits of a double standard in nuclear energy and continues to assess a future pipeline deal with Iran in terms of its own national interest. Present reasoning that the American interest is served by untold spending to develop a Star Wars system that may function as expected is flawed. Even if the U.S. expects to have a working system in place to counter nuclear weapons, experts do not believe Iran is likely to acquire the bomb anytime soon. In the spirit of Crawford, the U.S. should think better than to sacrifice the present hard fought gains in transatlantic relations since the 2003 Iraq invasion for the future bargaining chip missile defense represents. Ahmadinejad's rhetoric notwithstanding, reports conflict as to how far Iran has actually progressed in acquiring a bomb.

Staying the Course with Germany and Europe
The greatest liability of missile defense, which far outweighs its potential at the negotiating table, is the instability current U.S. plans for this policy interject into German-American and transatlantic relations. Chancellor Merkel is at the head of a difficult grand coalition, which makes her successes abroad critical to achievements at home. The last thing Germany and Europe need at this juncture is persistent domestic strife about missile defense. Beyond the Federal Republic, European neighbors are not likely to achieve a consensus in support of the Bush administration's plans. The recent elections in Poland confirm that new Prime Minister Donald Tusk intends to revisit this issue as he consults with other EU member states. Tensions among and within a number of European states over missile defense that weaken solidarity are not in the U.S. interest. This is a fundamental reality as the West faces a single-minded Russian strategy to tip the balance in Central Asia and the Middle East. Iran is the pivot in this balance. In the waning months of the Bush administration, it is not enough for leading academics and former Secretaries of State to assert that the U.S. does not intend to promote regime change through military action. The U.S. must engage Iran diplomatically with the determined objective to capitalize on the strategic asset the EU-3 have cultivated for several years.

Direct American engagement via an envoy should be timed to promote negotiations with the Islamic Republic in a way that gives statecraft a chance to speak to the Iranian national interest at home and abroad. The turmoil in Pakistan, the potential to turn a corner for greater security in Baghdad, and efforts to return to the table in Annapolis each speak to the importance of issue linkage, personal intervention, and the tactics of timing. It is more essential than ever that the United States stay the course with Germany as a partner that can negotiate with America, its European partners, and Russia. U.S. diplomatic efforts that aim to persuade must be patient and persistent, returning always to the essential point: civilian uses of nuclear energy are in the Iranian interest, the acquisition of a nuclear bomb is not. No contribution to the national prestige of an ancient civilization or pride in its acceptance among the club of nuclear powers can trump the dangers of the Arab race to nuclear arms. Iran's actions will surely provide the impetus for this race among the Arab neighbors should it emerge from a lengthening shadow with a bomb in its arsenal. This is the reality in the region. Missile defense provides no strategy for preemption on that chessboard. In reality, it internalizes the threat for Europe as surely as it jeopardizes our transatlantic solidarity. Engaging with Germany, France and our traditional allies to set limits on Putin's ability to interfere and Iran's proclivity to bluster is the most prudent way to capitalize on the will displayed in Crawford.

Sources:
Jackson Janes, 'Connecting the Dots in Crawford,' November 14, 2007.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance. Basic, 2007.

Dennis Ross, Statecraft. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Dr. Colette Mazzucelli is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Political Science at Molloy College.

This essay appeared in the November 30, 2007, AICGS Advisor.