Why Lisbon Matters: Germany's Transatlantic Policy
and the Assets-Expectations Differential
By Dr. Colette Mazzucelli

Crisis Mode is Not an Option
The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on June 12, 2008, by a margin of 53.4 percent to 46.6 percent of citizens voting prolongs the internal policy debate about external relations in the European Union (EU). Previous treaty revisions, particularly the Single European Act, signed in 1986, and the Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992, introduced reforms that led to substantial policy innovations. Notable among those are the internal market and the Euro.

The Lisbon Treaty introduces modifications to the Union's international profile, including a permanent President of the European Council, a High Representative of the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and an EU diplomatic service. Ireland's negative vote must not provide the excuse for another period of introspection. In the aftermath of failed referenda in France and the Netherlands during 2005, the demise of the European Constitutional Treaty led the Union to turn inward. In the present global environment, a crisis mode only serves to fuel the external perception that the EU is a 'diminishing asset' just as more is expected of Europe from its allies, particularly the United States. Sadly, Ireland's vote reveals that the Union has acted on credit vis-à-vis its allies and other third party actors who fully expected the Lisbon reforms to be implemented by January 1, 2009. To this extent, Lisbon matters in what may be identified as the assets-expectations differential.

The Union's leaders have decided not to take any decisions to address the Irish referendum until later this year. Steps are likely to be taken during France's program for the Trio Presidency, which begins on July 1. France will be followed by the Czech Republic in January and Sweden in July 2009. There are several options on the table to move ahead that the Trio leadership must consider. These include the prospect of a second Irish referendum, negotiating a new treaty, or accepting a Union in which some member states integrate more fully, and quickly, than others. Realistically, there is neither the desire nor the intention to reopen treaty negotiations. Presently, the Union continues to operate under the rules of the Nice system articulated in the text negotiated under the French Presidency in 2000. The Nice Treaty was initially rejected by the Irish population in a 2001 referendum only to be approved in a second vote by which time the original text had been modified.

The Crux of the Differential
Despite the failure of the Irish referendum, the EU continues to function well in a whole host of areas related to the internal market and the single European currency. Even in external relations and foreign affairs, the European Commission and the High Representative in the Council, Mr. Javier Solana, continue their work with the member states and third party actors throughout the world. The Lisbon Treaty's rejection puts on hold a number of fundamental changes to the EU's system of decision making. These changes add more complexity to the system without necessarily enhancing its legitimacy.

The EU has genuine assets to offer which its allies, particularly the United States, expect will be put on the table in coming months. The EU's tendency to turn inward corresponds to its own disappointed expectations about the treaty reform process. The fact is that the European member states do not require Lisbon to maximize their assets as they move ahead with ad hoc initiatives. The E3 diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran is now complemented by EU sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Defense cooperation among 'the big six,' which Mr. Sarkozy has already proposed, is outside the Lisbon Treaty. French defense initiatives raise concerns for the Irish who remain attached to a policy of neutrality. The French Presidency's focus on the big member states risks alienating other small members as well as those European institutions, Commission and Parliament, which have no competence in defense.

Such tensions are likely to spill over into the Lisbon reflections. The political dynamics of failed expectations matter inside the EU. Expectations from Washington, likely to come from the next Democratic or Republican administration, are intrinsically different. The U.S. expects that European countries will demonstrate leadership identifying compromises in which their individual and collective assets contribute solutions to challenges we must face together. The assets-expectations differential speaks directly to the painful reality the United States acknowledges as a legacy of successive Bush 43 administrations. As other powers rise in relation to America and Europe, neither continent can be successful acting on its own.

Merkel's Leadership: A Lengthy Electoral Campaign
In an influential essay, Kori Schake focuses attention on Chancellor Angela Merkel as the leader in transatlantic relations who knows how to "identify problems, take initiatives, craft agreements other countries can support, and then turn to the U.S. for the contribution needed to close or enforce the deal." In the run up to the November election, the German Chancellor has demonstrated the ability and interest to work with the candidate elected as the next American president.

It is important to understand that the 2009 German campaign for the chancellorship has unofficially begun. This is the political reality, which has significant implications for transatlantic and intra-European relations. It is not yet clear which candidate Chancellor Merkel will run against in the September 2009 federal elections. The Social Democrat Kurt Beck is a potential challenger who raises concern given the possibility that he will make a deal with the Left Party, whose leaders include Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi. The Left's rise to the position of the fourth-largest party in the Federal Republic speaks to the radicalization of politics amidst popular apprehension concerning a range of issues, including globalization and immigration. The candidate emerging as a more likely choice to run against the chancellor is the present foreign minister in Merkel's grand coalition, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. By the end of 2008, it should be clear whether Foreign Minister Steinmeier will oppose Chancellor Merkel in federal elections. It is difficult to imagine how in the next year Germany might contribute to a host of transatlantic policy initiatives, ranging from domestic security to out-of-area engagement, for which the United States relies on its support.

NATO's Sixtieth Anniversary Summit: Prospects for U.S. Reengagement
Next year marks the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In retrospect, November 9, 1989, transformed the postwar environment. The years after September 11, 2001, fundamentally altered America's perception of its own vulnerability, thereby contributing to the construction of a unique narrative. The structural change two decades ago takes precedence in terms of the impact on U.S. relations with Germany and its European neighbors. The two sides of the Atlantic still grapple with the demise of the Cold War in their search for new ways to engage during the twenty-first century.

One prominent issue at the top of the French Presidency's Council agenda this fall is defense. This is a dossier where President Sarkozy aims to make genuine progress. After years of policymaking outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) integrated military command structure, France is serious about reintegration. Nonetheless, the closing of bases in country may hold the NATO issue hostage. Negotiations must take place to set preconditions and respect specific French caveats to a full reintegration into the military command structure. Only time will tell if President Sarkozy can identify the internal compromises to allow reintegration and mitigate the domestic opposition within the French army and conservative elements in his own political coalition. The price of reintegration may be tensions within the French-German relationship concerning NATO out-of-area engagement.

The most pressing issue for the United States with its European allies is to gain their commitments to increase contributions in Afghanistan. The NATO Anniversary Summit in April 2009 poses difficulties of timing, engagement, and, most importantly, agenda. The timing will be early in the new American administration. For Senator McCain, his initial months in office would likely be devoted to filling the ranks of policymakers after eight years of Republicans in office. For Senator Obama, the first 100 days would hardly provide the opportunity to prepare intensively for such an important diplomatic meeting. In the face of challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan / Pakistan, and Iran, the U.S. will likely rely on the EU to address a difficult situation in newly independent Kosovo. In terms of NATO, the Balkans is the only area within Europe where NATO is still potentially relevant. The challenge to NATO's legitimacy is addressed to the extent that its members are willing to engage out-of-area to address unconventional threats - the earthquake in Pakistan, the violence in Darfur - in other words, those crises in areas where France is more likely to send an expeditionary force and where Germany, owing to its particular domestic situation, is not.

The challenge for the NATO Anniversary Summit is to define an agenda for U.S. reengagement in the midst of tremendously difficult internal political situations, particularly in the Federal Republic. The early timing requires that the agenda be focused tightly, which necessitates out-of-the-box thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. The key to success is to reengage the United States in a way that brings France and Germany on board despite their diverse internal situations. If France and Germany, as Summit hosts, can agree, the likelihood of the other members identifying their interests in an eventual compromise is greater. The stakes at the NATO Anniversary Summit are high. This is why the significant obstacles to success must be addressed in a bipartisan way, sooner rather than later, by Republicans and Democrats alike.

More Information:

"EU Approves New Sanctions on Iran," International Herald Tribune, June 23, 2008.

Anand Menon, "Europe After Lisbon," The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2008.

Jackson Janes, "Beyond Bush," AICGS Advisor, June 13, 2008.

Kori Schake, "The U.S. Elections and Europe: The Coming Crisis of High Expectations," Center for European Reform, November 2007.

Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, "America Between the Wars," Public Affairs, 2008.

Dr. Colette Mazzucelli is Assistant Professor and Fulbright Scholar at Molloy College and is a regular contributor to the Advisor.

This essay appeared in the June 13, 2008, AICGS Advisor.