The Iranian Predicament in Germany's Relations
with America and Europe
By Dr. Colette Mazzucelli

Turning a Corner in Tehran?
The recent election of a rival to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as speaker of the Iranian parliament sends a message that the West and the world must know how to read. The country's growing youth population is dissatisfied with the state of the economy ahead of the summer 2009 elections. Will parliamentary changes at the top bring about a different government in Tehran next year? Mr. Ali Larijani, a pragmatist, is the former lead Iranian negotiator in nuclear talks with the West who resigned his post last October. He advocates a robust technology program for the country as an integral part of a conservative agenda. His elevation to speaker is significant because of its timing ahead of German federal elections as well as Iranian and U.S. presidential elections over the next twelve months. This is a striking development in the ever-shifting balance among numerous competing power centers in Iran. Mr. Larijani clearly has the support of the country's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose voice is decisive in policymaking. His new role is likely to motivate the Iranian parliament to present a more effective challenge to Mr. Ahmadinejad's unpopular decisions. Iran's present economic course has left a country flush with oil revenues reeling from inflation with blackouts last winter, during which its people had neither heat nor electricity.

The official view from Washington is that Mr. Larijani's rise is a continuation of the present regime with which the Bush administration refuses to negotiate unless preconditions are met. In the run up to the November elections, there have been calls from experienced policymakers, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom, for the United States to adopt a 'dramatically different diplomatic approach' with the objective, in their analysis, to 'help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region.' This offers Berlin opportunities, as its relations with Medvedev's Russia evolve, to be instrumental in the Iranian predicament - with a new administration in Washington, between its E3 partners, France and Britain, and in negotiations among the EU-27.

Redefining the Triangle - Balancing Moscow and
Engaging Washington
The very public transatlantic rift over the Iraq war led Germany, France, and Russia to oppose the military actions of the United States and Great Britain. The present context in the Middle East gives the Merkel government a chance to redefine the German-American-Russian triangle in a different configuration. The logistics of a phased withdrawal from Iraq are likely to vary. This does not change the reality that the United States must work diligently to retain a presence for reconstruction, not occupation, there over a prolonged time period. In the face of extremism, this is in the national interest as well as the interests of Arab and Muslim countries that oppose al Qaeda's universal totalitarian ambitions. For this reason, the Bush administration has repeatedly called for Germany and other large European states to increase their involvement in Afghanistan. In accordance with Germany's constitutional requirements, the Bundestag must approve all troop deployments. To date, the Merkel government has not agreed to increase Germany's military contribution. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, France and Romania demonstrated solidarity with an agreement to provide increased commitments of soldiers.

As the Merkel government faces the challenges of Russia's opposition to the transatlantic agreement on missile defense, the Federal Republic continues to negotiate constructively in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to keep Russia, and China, on board in negotiations with the Islamic Republic. A third round of sanctions against Iran was agreed to, without dissent, earlier this year. The recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, which Mr. Larijani has criticized, raises concerns about a new generation of centrifuges the Iranians are developing at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz. The IAEA report heightens a debate about whether a high-level initiative in bilateral diplomacy between Washington and Tehran has the potential to complement or undercut multilateral efforts in which the Germans are so engaged. The window of opportunity over the next year is for Germany to strengthen its relations with the new Russian president in a way that retains his constructive support for multilateral diplomacy on Iran. Russian leaders are likely to accompany the European Union's High Representative Javier Solana as well as their German, French, British, and Chinese counterparts in an upcoming meeting to induce the Iranians to accept a package of enhanced incentives to suspend its uranium enrichment program.

American leaders do not intend to participate in the meeting. As the German government develops relationships with the next administration, the strategic opportunity exists to encourage direct U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iran at the level of a special envoy who has the confidence of the new president. The bilateral diplomacy Iran seeks with America as an alternative to longstanding calls for regime change in Tehran could strengthen parallel E3 + 3 initiatives. To date, multilateral diplomacy has not changed the fundamental context that motivates Iran's actions to acquire nuclear technology, which some observers suspect is as likely to be used in a weapons program.

Dual Tracks on Iran - German Interests in the E3 and EU
Germany has the chance to pursue a dual track within European circles to address the Iranian predicament. Timing is critical because the electoral contexts in Berlin and Tehran are likely to be fluid during the coming year. The E3 track is now firmly embedded within the E3 + 3 discussions at the United Nations; Germany is the only non-nuclear member of the E3. In this capacity, its diplomacy can demonstrate a renewed commitment to the principles of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Double standards must be countered with agreements to reduce nuclear weapons on the part of all signatories in possession of large stockpiles. Given the threat to the planet that proliferation represents, this is a moral necessity for our time, which a realist policy supports as a matter of prudence. One of the most engaged American public servants during the twentieth century, the diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, understood this context from years of international experience.

For several years, the Iranian predicament has profiled the E3's participation in global diplomacy. The challenge of proliferation also reveals the potential limits of the European Union as a global actor. Among the EU-27, Germany and Austria have significant commercial interests in Iran. American policymakers expected the Union to implement its own sanctions independent of those agreed in UNSC Resolution 1803 this past March. Since that time, the internal dispute among the member states is led by those countries with strong economic motivations. Their argument is that the Union should not take collective action against the Islamic Republic beyond the text of Resolution 1803. Divergent interests among the Union's states give the Federal Republic a leadership responsibility. Berlin must work with Vienna, Paris, the smaller members, and Brussels institutions in a European concert grounded in precedents for imposing sanctions based on human rights. At stake is more than a demonstration of the Union's normative influence as an alternative leadership model for the twenty-first century. Their objective is to construct a solid multilateral coalition around the imposition of EU sanctions against Iran on the basis of universal human rights violations. The Merkel government has the chance to make a difference in relations between the Iranian regime and its population by matching actions and convictions in the 'nation-European' interest. This is an ethical imperative to prevent the weapons proliferation that will surely lead to increased regional impoverishment as well as greater incentives for world powers to perpetuate the global arms trade, thereby sustaining a race to acquire nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

More Information:

Nazila Fathi, Graham Bowley, and Helene Cooper, 'Rival to Iran's President is Elected Speaker,' The New York Times, May 29, 2008.

Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom, 'A Sensible Path on Iran,' The Washington Post, May 27, 2008.

Jackson Janes, 'The Russian Challenge,' The AICGS Advisor, May 16, 2008.

Judy Woodruff, 'IAEA Voices 'Serious Concern' on Iran's Nuclear Ability,' The Online Newshour, May 27, 2008.

Emanuele Ottolenghi, 'Human Rights and the Basis for EU Sanctions against Iran,' Policy Watch # 1368, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 30, 2008.

Dr. Colette Mazzucelli is Assistant Professor and Fulbright Scholar at Molloy College and is a regular contributor to the Advisor.

This essay appeared in the June 13, 2008, AICGS Advisor.