Transatlantic Hot Air - Kyoto Becomes Binding
By Frank E. Loy
The Kyoto Protocol, the global climate change agreement, came into force ten days ago. I've been asked what is the likely impact of this event on the relations between Germany and the United States, given that Germany is an enthusiastic member of the treaty while the United States is a resolute and rather disdainful non-participant.
It is the wrong question.
That the United States backed out of the Kyoto negotiations at the beginning of the Bush administration shocked the Germans and soured them on the new administration. It raised -- long before the controversy over Iraq -- profound doubts about the willingness of the United States to be a cooperative ally, as opposed to a go-it-alone bully, in dealing with global problems. That is serious stuff. In fact, one could say that America's handling of Kyoto did much to give Chancellor Schröder permission from the German electorate to take on the United States -- to lead Germany down a foreign policy path strongly opposed by the United States. That is something no German chancellor had been free to do since the end of World War II.
But relations among nations change; they get better and they get worse. Breaches are reversible. What is not reversible is the damage to the world's climate that is in process of occurring -- unless ways are found to limit globally the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that cause the climate change. So Germany should worry not about how to improve the relationship with the United States, but rather how to use the present moment to persuade the United States to become serious about combating the threat of climate change, a threat the Germans rightly believe to be a matter of high priority for them and the rest of the world.
The moment is ripe, because as the president's visit to Europe demonstrates, the United States seems now to recognize -- in a way it did not three years ago -- that it needs a cooperative Europe to achieve most of its important goals. And as Prime Minister Blair said, if the United States wants the cooperation of Europe for its agenda, it must be ready to cooperate in the agenda of the Europeans.
Germany's role in this is not as strong as the UK -- which, having been a staunch supporter of the United States in some of the most harrowing recent decisions, has serious chits to cash -- but Germany is not without cards. It has been of tangible and important help in Afghanistan. It is a powerful voice in the organs of the EU as well as NATO.
What should Germany seek from the United States in the climate change arenaïve First, it should press the United States to establish a meaningful domestic regime to cap America's absolute GHG emissions. That is hard for this administration, but an easier first step than an international commitment. Second, it should insist that the United States participate in the negotiations that will be launched later this year for a post 2012 international regime. (The Kyoto regime goes no further than that date.)
In return, Germany should revisit its historic hostility to the idea that farmers and forestland holders, by boosting carbon storage on their lands and protecting forests, have a credible and substantial role to play in addressing the GHG problem. In fact, by welcoming such initiatives, Germany might hit an environmental trifecta -- help the transatlantic alliance; boost efforts to conserve the world's dwindling tropical forests; encourage participation by developing countries in GHG mitigation; and offer a sustainable income source to U.S. and European farmers, as the end of agricultural subsidies looms.
What Germany should not do -- if it wants success -- is to insist that the future regime must be Kyoto continued. That could well end up being the case, but it would be best to let that happen rather than to wave this red flag before the administration.
Most important, what Germany should do is not lose this moment to further one of its top agenda issues. The issue happens to be one that will determine what kind of world we and our children will live in.
This commentary appeared in the March 10, 2005 AICGS Advisor.
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The views expressed in this essay are those of the author(s) alone and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.
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