Germany as Leader in the Middle East Peace Process: From Reluctant Mediation to Active Engagement
By Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman

Personal Diplomacy

By the time he left office in November 2005, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had visited Israel fourteen times. He was considered one of Israel's best friends, and was also held in high esteem by Palestinian leaders. As a result, in times of crisis, such as the period after the June 2001 suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub, Fischer was able to mediate between the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite his deep personal commitment, Fischer was a reluctant mediator, believing that Germany's past and special relationship with Israel precluded it from an active leadership role.

With Angela Merkel's assumption of the chancellorship, there was some concern in the Middle East and in Germany that the personal dimension would be lacking and that reluctant mediation would be replaced by relative disinterest. The first eighteen months of Merkel's chancellorship have demonstrated just the opposite: the Middle East conflict is one of her highest priorities; her commitment is both personal and political; she is using Germany's presidencies of the EU and G8 to pursue a comprehensive approach to reinvigorating the stalled peace process; and these initiatives are occurring with the blessing of the U.S. and the Middle East players. Moreover, the one-track preference of the Red-Green Coalition, in which Gerhard Schröder never developed Fischer's sense of engagement, has been replaced by the double-pronged initiatives of the current government, in which Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier are equally deployed.

Germany's EU and G8 Presidencies: the Middle East Conflict as a Key Agenda Item

At the December 2006 G8/Middle East Foreign Ministers' conference, Foreign Minister Steinmeier advocated a revival of the Quartet (the EU, the U.S., Russia and the UN) discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He signaled that under the German presidency beginning January 1, 2007 the G8 would be a major forum for deliberations and statements about the road to peace, much as it had been at the July 2006 G8 meeting in St. Petersburg. In addition to the diplomatic path, under Germany's presidency ("Growth and Responsibility"), the G8 agenda accords priority to intensification of the economic and social track of peace-making through the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA resulting from the July 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit) and through examination of the foreign policy dimensions of energy security and supply.

The EU agenda under the German presidency ("Europe's Success Equals A Common Agenda") also has dual top priorities: revival of the diplomatic Quartet and its three-stage roadmap for peace leading to a two-state solution; and revitalization of the EU's economic partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The latter is also related to a third item on the German EU agenda: energy sufficiency and diversification. The proposal was immediately converted into reality, as evidenced by Merkel's championing the Quartet's revival in her January 5, 2007, meeting with President Bush; by the Middle East statement in the Conclusions of the first EU Foreign Ministers summit presided over by Germany in Brussels on January 22, 2007; and by the actual meeting of the Quartet on February 2, 2007, in Washington after a six-month hiatus, with a promise of reconvening soon in Berlin.

In elaborating on the EU's role in Middle East peace-making, both Merkel and Steinmeier see the double motivation of vision and pragmatism. In Merkel's February 5, 2007, speech to the Abu Dhabi Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research and in Steinmeier's February 8 essay in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, they both proffered the EU as a model for regional conflict resolution. The idea of a peace community drove European integration as much as the practical considerations of economic prosperity. Merkel went one step further and personalized the path from vision to reality by referring to her upbringing in the GDR. Only because visions were never surrendered, Merkel suggested, could the Berlin War ultimately fall and set in train the reality of dismantling the Cold War. Merkel's personal experience seems to render the prospect of peace in the Middle East less dim.  Her relative inexperience in foreign policy and the absence of baggage concerning the Middle East conflict permit both persistence and fresh ideas in a region that is a black hole for plans, principles and deadlines.

Germany's Comprehensive Approach to the Middle East Conflict: Political, Economic, Military and Intelligence Initiatives

With the G8 and the EU as the framework, German officials have referred to a Gesamtplan (Comprehensive Plan) driving Germany's bilateral behavior concerning the Middle East conflict. Germany's activities are comprehensive in terms of the actors involved, the functional areas of cooperation, and the relationship between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other conflicts in the greater Middle East. 

Merkel and Steinmeier believe that Israelis, Palestinians and Arabs must all be drawn into the peace process through one-on-one meetings. On the eve of Germany's presidencies of the EU and G8, Merkel met separately with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Egyptian President Mubarak in December 2006. Then in January 2007 she held discussions with Jordanian King Abdullah II and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. This direct engagement intensified an initiative undertaken a year earlier when Merkel highlighted the importance of resolving the conflict by traveling to Israel at the beginning of her chancellorship. It was during the Israel trip that Merkel insisted on the three conditions for Germany and the EU to deal with Hamas: end of violence; recognition of Israel; acceptance of previous international agreements concerning the conflict. Steinmeier then visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority in February 2006, and kept up the momentum by visiting the region at least five more times in 2006, including several trips to Lebanon to show solidarity with Prime Minister Siniora, and a trip to Syria to meet with President Assad. Chancellor Merkel's trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Kuwait at the beginning of February 2007 is the latest example of Germany's efforts at personal diplomacy in the Middle East.

Beyond diplomatic discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and promotion of the Quartet's Roadmap, Merkel used her Middle East trip for two economic purposes: to drum up financial support for Palestinian society and economy from moderate Arab countries as an alternative to sizable assistance for Hamas from Iran; and to increase the region's structural connections with Germany and the EU through trade and investment. In addition to its support for a Palestinian state (that recognizes and accepts Israel), Germany and the EU have continued humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even as they cut off aid to the Hamas-dominated government of the Palestinian Authority. Economics Minister Glos accompanied Merkel to the Middle East in February 2007, and he visited Israel in June 2006 for the inaugural meeting of the Israel-German Business Council. Merkel and Steinmeier believe that embedding Middle Eastern actors in economic networks will add to their pragmatic calculus for peace.

The third area of German involvement in Middle East conflict resolution efforts has been military, both continuing a tradition and offering a new twist. Although this engagement was registered a half-year before Germany's dual presidencies, it has granted Germany increased credibility in Europe, in Israel and parts of the Arab world, and in the U.S. to assume a leadership role during its presidency terms.

In July 2006, with the approval of the German government, which will also bear a significant portion of the cost, Israel signed a contract with a German shipyard to build two Dolphin submarines. The previous Schröder government also had approved the sale at the end of its term in 2005, but would not allow the sale to Israel of the Dingo armored personnel carrier out of concern that these could be used against the Palestinians. The Merkel government began to override that decision by agreeing in July 2006 that a Dingo would be sent to Israel for test purposes. The new German government's actions in providing arms to Israel are part of a pattern dating back to the mid-1950s, even though since the 1960s German guidelines prevent the export of arms to "areas of tension."

In its second major military decision of 2006 - to send German troops to Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - the Merkel government's initiative was a major departure, but also a logical element of a comprehensive plan for a Germany and a Europe that Steinmeier has termed "a civilian power with teeth." In this "expanded" concept of security, economics and diplomacy are combined with military means. While German soldiers have been active in various regional conflicts (including Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Balkans), Germany's historical responsibility to Israel and the potential danger of Germans clashing with Israelis have precluded the dispatch of German troops to the region in the past. Germany's sensitivity to history has limited the new mission to commanding the maritime operation along the coast of Lebanon to protect the sea lanes and prevent the smuggling of weapons. Lebanon requested German participation in UNIFIL and Israel welcomed it. In announcing the September 2006 cabinet decision, Merkel indicated its special nature while heralding Germany's expanded commitment: "This is not an intervention like any other. Germany is no longer a spectator in the region."

A final dimension of Germany's involvement in the region is the question of its mediation between Israel and Hezbollah for the return of Israeli soldiers, whose kidnapping was the proximate cause of Israel's summer 2006 military actions in Lebanon. Three events suggest German active engagement in yet another aspect of a highly complex peace process: Germany's important mediating role in prisoner exchange agreements in the past (as recently as January 2004); the drafting by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan of a German official in the Federal Intelligence Service to secure the soldiers' release; and Steinmeier's non-denial of current German involvement.

For Germany, the comprehensiveness of its peace approach means talking to all the actors and operating on multiple levels. It also entails recognition of the context in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is set, and action to ameliorate other conflicts. In her recent trip to the Middle East, Merkel emphasized that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could help the other two main conflicts in the region: the power struggle in Iraq, and the nuclearization of Iran. Even though Germany has opposed the war in Iraq, its training of Iraqi military and police personnel and its forgiving of debt through the Paris Club demonstrate that it remains engaged. The chancellor has described the U.S. Iraq Study Group's report as "realistic" and a "good starting point." On the Iranian question, together with France and the UK in the EU Three, Germany has pursued a policy of negotiation and constructive engagement with Iran. Iran's failure to abide by international norms and to accept international proposals for settlement of the conflict have mandated UN sanction activity, starting in a limited and reversible way with the UN Security Council's December 2006 Resolution, sponsored by Germany, the UK and France. Steinmeier now sees the task as converting the sanctions into reality to show international resolve while remaining open to negotiations.

Obstacles: A German Sense of Realism

German initiative and enthusiasm are refreshing without suggesting naiveté. Both Merkel and Steinmeier have warned about unrealistic expectations; the obstacles to movement in the peace process are multiple. In both the EU and the G8, there are competing agenda items in terms of time and money, for example the priority Germany has assigned to internal issues such as the constitution in the former and to Africa in the latter. 

Developments in the Middle East region can easily and frequently thwart the best plans. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Abbas finally met in December 2006 after the peace process had been frozen for many months, and they will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on February 19, but action by extremists on both sides can still push the centrists apart. Olmert's government continues to suffer the disaffection of Israeli public opinion following the war in Lebanon. The recent Saudi-brokered Fatah-Hamas agreement to end intra-Palestinian violence may mean a national unity government for the Palestinian Authority, but it is fragile, boosts Hamas' credibility among the Palestinian people, and does not contain an acceptance by Hamas of the three EU/Quartet principles. Germany, like the U.S., is cautious about the Fatah-Hamas agreement, whereas France and Russia welcome it, revealing fissures within the EU and within the Quartet.

Outside the region, Germany sees the U.S. as vital to the peace process, but bold moves will not likely come from a lame-duck president whose Middle East focus is trained on Iraq. The repaired relationship between Germany and the U.S. could soon fray once again due to basic differences over tactics regarding Iran and Syria.

The Middle East as Neighbor

Germany's sense of realism militates against a fundamentally new approach. Rather, it will use the window of opportunity provided in the G8 and EU presidencies to exercise leadership by being focused, comprehensive, consistent, and inclusive. Its chief aim is to give life to the Quartet's Road Map that will result in a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its "special relationship" with Israel, determined by history, will remain a priority. Its commitment to Palestinian self-determination, colored by its own decades-long experience with national separation, will also be paramount. Germany will highlight its "traditionally close relations" in the Arab world.

In the face of inevitable hurdles, Germany will keep the Middle East conflict high on the agenda for the three related reasons that Merkel and Steinmeier have outlined: (1) As the largest economy in the EU, Germany has a particular responsibility for the continuation of Europe's success story into the twenty-first century; (2) the security of Europe and the prosperity of its citizens cannot be separated from economic and political developments in the Middle East region; and (3) the Middle East is Europe's direct neighbor, such that Germany and the EU cannot remain indifferent to protracted conflict.

 This essay appeared in the February 16, 2007 AICGS Advisor.

Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman is a Senior Fellow in Residence at AICGS.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.