AICGS: ANALYSES : The Continuing Importance of the Value Gaps in German-American Relations, by Klaus Larres

Despite the recent atmospheric improvements in German-American relations, a considerable degree of tension remains. The United States continues to appreciate Germany's efforts in Afghanistan and in the Balkans. It is also genuinely grateful for the country's support of the recent UN resolution on Iraq. Beyond the surface, however, the governments of both countries do not trust each other entirely. The mutual mistrust and suspicion that came to the fore during the German election campaign of 2002 and the subsequent war against Iraq in early 2003 still lingers.

The German government remains very critical of the Bush administration's efforts to stabilize Iraq. Despite the hand-over of sovereignty to an Iraqi government, many in Berlin believe that Washington relies too much on hard military force and too little on negotiations, diplomacy, and engagement with the Iraqi population. Germany has also very little understanding for the Bush administration's rather half-hearted efforts to investigate the developments that led to the use of torture of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib. More generally the 'war on terror' is still suspect among a broad section of the German people. Many Germans are convinced that the Bush administration is actively contributing to a 'clash of civilizations' with its undiluted support for Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's policies towards Palestine. Many Germans also believe Bush is exploiting the war on terrorism to keep the American population in an artificial state of fear in order to persuade voters to cast their vote for the incumbent rather than for his opponent in the upcoming U.S. presidential election.

In the United States, on the other hand, there is a feeling that Germany has not supported the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq. Although Germany is training Iraqi police forces outside Iraq in the United Arab Emirates, it has shown no readiness to help persuade NATO to take over a military role in Iraq by, for example, assuming the tasks now fulfilled by Polish troops. The German government, along with France and other countries, also has refused to forgive Iraq all its pre-war debts—something that has not gone down well in Washington. In private, many supporters of the Bush administration express the conviction that Germany (as well as France) views America's difficulties in Iraq with a good deal of Schadenfreude and would love to throw the words “I told you so” at the administration, if this were not so politically inopportune.

At first sight, the political differences between Germany and the United States largely concern the tactics to stabilize Iraq and how to win over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Yet the tension underlying German-American relations goes much deeper than mere tactical and political considerations. There are still fundamental value gaps at play, and these gaps are responsible for the deep fissures in German-American relations that have been only thinly plastered over up to now. Germany's experience with its Nazi past and post-Second World War Germany’s successful integration into the European Community have fundamentally shaped the country’s political values. These experiences led to a multilateral and cooperative foreign policy style that has become second nature to German politicians, a strong dislike of the use of military force, and the tendency of the German population to adopt a very questioning attitude toward their political leaders.

Different Assessments of Political Leadership
To a large extent, both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were able to build their case against the weapons of mass destruction allegedly in Saddam Hussein's possession on the words "trust me." Until former weapons inspector David Kay's statements before Congress in early 2004 and subsequent revelations, the majority of the populations in both countries were convinced that Iraq had WMD. Many people in the United States were convinced that if the President, the Prime Minister and their advisers had made such a strong case about Iraq's WMD they deserved to be trusted and believed, despite the flimsy evidence produced. The situation was different in Germany. Based on the Germans’ collective memory regarding the deceptions and crimes committed by the Nazi regime, the German population was much less prepared than their American and British counterparts to take the government's word on trust alone. In the absence of clear evidence of the existence of Iraqi WMD, they chose to remain skeptical about the claims put forward by the leaders of the western world. The substantial weakening of the authority of political leadership in Germany led the vast majority of the German population to side with Chancellor Schröder's adamant refusal to be drawn into an optional and superfluous war.

Use of Military Force and Civil Engagement
Over the course of the post-1945 era, Germany has become an increasingly pacifist nation, and it tends to view international affairs in highly moral terms. Germany’s responsibility for Hitler’s rise to power, World War II, and particularly for the over six million deaths in the Holocaust still shape German society’s worldview. No event in recent U.S. history, not even the significant impact of the Vietnam War on the American psyche, is comparably profound. In U.S. politics and society, it is still acceptable to use the term war to refer to political strategies—for example, the war on drugs, the war against crime, or the war against terror— German politics and society, however, forbid this terminology. Germans associate war only with aggressive and offensive connotations. To some extent, the military remains discredited in German society. The participation of German soldiers in the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan created much domestic controversy and was only achieved with very slim parliamentary majorities—and not without a moral appeal by Foreign Minister Fischer to his parliamentary colleagues to learn the lessons of Auschwitz and be on the right side of history this time, i.e., on the side of the persecuted. The German population continues to be convinced that military force ought to be a very last resort, should only be used after all other alternatives have been exhausted, and then only if everyone involved agrees. In contrast, in U.S. and British governmental circles as well as in wide sections of their respective populations, the deployment of military forces at an early stage in a crisis—and even as a first resort to threaten or take preemptive unilateral action—is entirely acceptable under certain circumstances.

Multilateralism and Belief in the UN System
Postwar Germany’s leadership role within both NATO and the EU enabled it to become a respected member of the international community and have an important voice in world affairs. The Bush administration’s tendency to downplay and often ignore the importance of international organizations has, therefore, deeply annoyed Berlin. Conflicts over the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the sidelining of the UN during much of the Iraq crisis have led to a deep and prolonged German disenchantment with the Bush administration’s unilateral inclinations. Despite Washington’s belated appeal to the UN Security Council in late 2002 and early 2003 to seek a resolution on how to deal with Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, German and the majority of European public opinion continued to believe that Bush and his closest advisers had already made up their minds and were merely looking for an excuse to invade Iraq, regardless of what their European allies might say. In view of the recent revelations by Richard Clarke, Paul O'Neill, and Bob Woodward about the thinking within the Bush administration, they now find this view fully justified. Washington’s recent re-engagement with the UN in Iraq has so far failed to convince the German people that Bush has had a genuine, rather than a tactical, change of heart.

Exploitation of Nationalist Forces
The two societies also hold vastly differing views of nationalism, flag-waving patriotism, and how to deal with domestic and international terrorism. Because the exaggerated nationalism of the Nazi years led to such disastrous results, post-1945 Germany has been characterized by strong anti-nationalist and anti-patriotic sentiments. Both Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik of the 1970s and the many skeptical voices in West Germany regarding unification in 1989/90 were based on the conviction that it would be best for Germany not to pursue a nationalist policy. It was argued that Germany had to atone for World War II and the Holocaust. The feeling that, in view of its past, Germany should not play a too assertive role in world politics is still widespread among the German people and significantly influences German politics and society. Yet policymakers in the United States hardly recognize this anxiety. In contrast, many Americans believe that they are involved in a war and that, as a wartime president, George W. Bush rightly enjoys special prerogatives that allow him to respond to the dangerous situation threatening the West. Unlike most Europeans with their experience of terrorist attacks in places such as Northern Ireland, the Basque country, Corsica, the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, and more recently the Madrid bombing, historically the United States has not been accustomed to feeling vulnerable to domestic terrorism. Most Europeans, however, believe that the western world is confronted with a severe crisis but not necessarily with a real war.

Although it will be very difficult to overcome the deep value gaps that separate Germany and the United States, both governments can compensate for them and overcome the German-American rift by intensifying their cooperation in several areas that are important to both countries. A strengthening of the Bush administration’s multilateral approach to international politics, in particular by continuing to give greater responsibility to the UN in Iraq, and by making greater efforts to arrive at a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would go a long way to convince the German government that Bush is serious about tackling pressing issues in a constructive way. If the German government, on the other hand, was prepared to forgive Iraq its debt and showed a greater willingness to agree to NATO taking over a constructive stabilization role in the newly sovereign Iraq, this may persuade the Bush administration that Germany has accepted the fact that it cannot afford to avoid dealing with the Iraq crisis. However, it is unlikely the deep values gaps in German-American relations will be resolved before the presidential election in November 2004. But both with the advent of a Kerry administration or the reelection of a Bush administration that decides to rid itself of the neo-conservative influence within its ranks during a second term, a new and more constructive phase in German-American relations might well be feasible. However, both sides need to make a serious effort to bridge the value gaps outlined in this essay. It will not happen by default.

Klaus Larres is Professor in International Relations & Foreign Policy at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a frequent participant in AICGS workshops.

This essay appeared in the July 15, 2004 AICGS Advisor.

AICGS is grateful to The German Marshall Fund of the United States for its generous support of this essay series.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.