American Perspectives on Turkey and Turkish-EU Relations
By F. Stephen Larrabee

The European Union's decision whether to open accession negotiations with Turkey will have important consequences not only for the European Union and Turkey but also for transatlantic relations. While the United States is not a member of the European Union, it has close bilateral ties to Turkey and has been a strong advocate of Turkey's membership in the EU. Washington views the upcoming decision about accession as a strategic choice which will affect the future political orientation of Turkey and the EU as well as broader U.S. strategic interests in the Greater Middle East and Black Sea region.

For Turkey, the EU's decision will be critical. The Erdogan government has made EU membership a top strategic priority and has invested considerable political capital in trying to persuade the EU to open accession negotiations. If Turkey does not obtain a date to begin accession negotiations, there is likely to be a strong political backlash in Turkey and a sense that Europe has turned its back on Turkey. The political consequences of such a turn of events could be quite serious for Turkey's political future and for the Erdogan government, which has staked considerable political capital on obtaining a date for the opening of accession negotiations.

The debate over Turkish membership, moreover, comes at a time when U.S.-European relations remain badly frayed as a result of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. If mismanaged, the EU's decision could set off a new round of recriminations between the U.S. and Europe, exacerbating already existing tensions. Thus the EU's decision could have repercussions which extend well beyond the EU's relations with Turkey.

U.S. Interests and Perspectives
Turkish-EU relations are seen in Washington largely through the prism of America's broader strategic interests. During the Cold War, Turkey served as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Mediterranean. It tied down some twenty-four Soviet divisions that otherwise might have been oriented toward the Central Front. It also provided important facilities for monitoring Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

The end of the Cold War, however, did not reduce Turkey's strategic importance, as many Turks feared would happen. On the contrary, Turkey's strategic importance has increased in U.S. eyes. Today, Turkey is increasingly seen as an important part of the United States' broader strategy toward the Gulf and the Greater Middle East. Turkish facilities are seen in Washington as important potential staging areas for operations in the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States was able to use the air base at Incirlik to fly sorties against Iraq in the first Gulf war and to monitor the no fly zone over Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the war.

Moreover, since 9/11, and especially since the election of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AK), headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's role as a secular Muslim democracy has taken on increased importance in U.S. policy. For many in the Bush administration, especially the neo-conservatives, Turkey has become the poster child for the administration's effort to promote democracy in the Middle East through its Initiative for the Broader Middle East and North Africa. They see Turkey as a model for the rest of the Middle East and would like to see other countries in the region follow the Turkish path.

However, Turkey's path of political development is unique and not easily emulated. There are few Ataturks on the horizon in the Middle East who are ready to embrace democracy and secularism and make them strategic priorities. Moreover, many Turks, especially the westernized Turkish political establishment, reject the idea of Turkey being a model for the democratization of the Middle East. They fear it will pull Turkey more deeply into the Middle East and weaken Turkey's ties to the West. They are also concerned that it will strengthen the role of Islam and the Islamists in Turkish politics.

Finally, many countries in the Middle East do not see Turkey as a model or want to emulate it. They view Turkey as a heretic which has "sold out" to the West. There is also resentment of Turkey's role as a former imperial power during the Ottoman period and its close ties to Israel today. These factors inhibit Turkey's ability to act as a role model in the Middle East. However, Arab views of Turkey have begun to evolve recently as a result of the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow the United States to station U.S. troops on Turkish soil to open a second front against Iraq and Erdogan's recent criticism of Israeli policy. These moves have improved Turkey's image in the eyes of many Middle Eastern officials and earned Turkey greater respect in the Middle East.

Iraq and the Kurdish Issue
The United States has seen the Kurdish issue in Turkey largely as an issue of terrorism. This tendency has become stronger since 9/11 and President Bush's determination to wage a global war against terrorism. Thus Washington has generally supported the Turkish government's campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its successor organization, Kongra-Gel. On the other hand, until recently, Europe has tended to see the Kurdish issue primarily as a human rights issue. In the past, it has thus been much more critical of the Turkish government's effort to suppress the Kurdish separatists in Turkey.

However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has complicated U.S.-Turkish relations and given the Kurdish issue a new dimension. In the aftermath of the invasion, the United States has had to tread a fine line between supporting Kurdish demands for autonomy in Iraq and maintaining good relations with Turkey. The Turkish establishment remains highly suspicious of U.S. policy goals in Iraq. They fear that U.S. policy will strengthen Kurdish influence in Iraq and could lead to the creation of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey's border, exacerbating separatist pressures by the Kurds in Turkey. These concerns are not new. They have haunted Turkish policymakers since the end of the first Gulf War. But the invasion of Iraq and the resulting post-conflict instability have given them greater resonance.

The Turks see the issue of Kurdish separatism as a serious threat to their national security. They have made clear that they will not tolerate the Kurdish separatists using Northern Iraq as a sanctuary to conduct attacks against Turkey and have pressed the U.S. and the Iraqi government to crack down on the Kurdish insurgents in Northern Iraq. The Kurdish issue is becoming a growing irritant in relations with both Baghdad and Washington. If it is not satisfactorily managed, it could lead to serious tensions in relations with both capitals and prompt Turkey to take unilateral action, including incursions into Northern Iraq. Such actions, in turn, could have a negative impact on the EU's readiness to open accession negotiations with Ankara.

At the same time, behind the scenes there are signs that Turkey may be beginning to rethink its policy toward the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Lately, it has moderated its opposition to a federal solution in Iraq. Some Turks are also beginning to recognize that Turkey shares a common interest with the Kurds in Northern Iraq in preventing the emergence of an Iraq dominated by the Shi'ites and closely linked to Iraq. If Turkish thinking continues to evolve in this direction, it could bring U.S.-Turkish approaches toward Iraq into closer alignment.

Central Asia and the Caucasus
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey's role in Central Asia and the Caucasus has also taken on greater importance in U.S. eyes. American officials see Turkey as an important strategic ally in these regions and as a useful counterweight to Russian influence. This has been a strong driving force behind Washington's support for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has been a major strategic goal of successive Turkish governments. The pipeline is seen as strengthening the energy independence of the countries in the Black Sea region as well as enhancing Turkey's strategic role in the region.

However, Turkey's ability to expand its influence in Central Asia has proven more difficult than many American and Turkish officials expected. Having only recently emancipated themselves from Soviet rule, many Central Asian countries have been reluctant to trade one Big Brother for another. Turkey also overestimated the economic potential of many of the Central Asian countries. Third, the post-Communist authoritarian leaders in Central Asia have shown little interest in importing the Turkish model of Muslim democracy since this would undermine their own power. Finally, Russian influence proved stronger than many Turkish officials had expected.

As a result, the initial euphoria of the late Ozal period has been replaced by a more realistic approach on Ankara's part and a greater realization of the difficulties involved in expanding Turkish influence in Central Asia. Moreover, since 9/11, the United States has established its own military presence in Central Asia. It is thus much less in need of surrogates. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish interests in Central Asia are broadly congruent and Washington has welcomed Turkey's readiness to play an active role in the region.

Ankara and Washington also share a common interest in stabilizing the Southern Caucasus and reducing Russian influence there. Both countries have been at the forefront of pushing NATO to develop stronger ties to Azerbaijan and Georgia and have strongly supported Georgia's quest for NATO membership. Moreover, the emergence of a pro-Western, reform-minded leadership in Tbilisi since the "Rose Revolution" in November 2003 has given this support new impetus.

Turkey's major weakness is its poor relations with Armenia. The United States has pressed Ankara to improve its relations with Yerevan by taking small steps such as opening the Turkish-Armenian border, closed since the outbreak of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s, and improving trade relations. The continued existence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, remains an important obstacle to a serious improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkey has not wanted to risk a deterioration of relations with Azerbaijan, which regards moves toward Turkish-Armenian rapprochement with great suspicion, by moving too quickly to improve ties to Yerevan without a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

A resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would have three important benefits. First, it would lay the basis for an improvement in relations between Turkey and Armenia. Second, it would allow Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia (one reason why Moscow has shown little serious interest in seeing the conflict resolved). Third, it would lay the groundwork for Armenia's integration into a broader regional energy and security framework.

Hence, both Washington and Ankara have a common interest in seeing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolved. Prospects for the resolution of the conflict in the near future, however, are slim. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan seem prepared to make the compromises necessary to resolve the conflict. And as long as this remains the case, a far-reaching rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia is unlikely.

Domestic Influences and U.S. Policy
There is a broad consensus among the American elite on Turkey's geo-strategic importance and a desire to see Turkey become a member of the EU. This consensus transcends party lines and is shared by Republicans and Democrats alike. However, there are important nuances and differences of emphasis among particular groups and branches of the U.S. government.

Many neo-conservatives, for instance, are much more concerned about Turkey's strategic role in the Middle East than its ties to Europe. They believe that Turkey should pay less attention to Europe and instead strengthen its ties to the U.S. and Israel. Many would actually not be unhappy if the EU refused to open accession negotiations with Ankara because they believe this would force Turkey to rely more heavily on the U.S. and Israel.

Ethnic factors also play a role in shaping U.S. policy toward Turkey. The Armenian lobby has periodically introduced legislation condemning Turkey for genocide. These resolutions have exacerbated tension with Ankara. In 2000, for instance, the Armenian lobby introduced a non-binding resolution that created a furor within Turkey. Some Turkish politicians even threatened to curtail American access to the air base at Incirlik for non-NATO purposes if the resolution was adopted. The dispute was defused only when the Clinton administration succeeded in getting the resolution withdrawn at the last second.

The Greek lobby has also used the Cyprus issue as a means to mobilize Congressional pressure against Turkey. In the past decade, Congress has held up or halted a number of arms sales due to Turkey's policy toward Cyprus. This has created considerable resentment in Turkey and prompted Ankara to reduce its dependence on U.S. arms. However, the more accommodating position on Cyprus adopted by the Erdogan government recently, together with the general improvement in Greek-Turkish relations of late, has reduced the salience of the Cyprus issue as a factor in U.S.-Turkish relations.

The Turkish-American community in the United States is relatively small (about 300,000-350,000) in comparison to the Greek-American and Armenian-American communities in the U.S., and it has little political influence. On the other hand, there is a large Turkish "lobby" within the United States government, especially the Pentagon, which has a strong strategic interest in maintaining close ties to Turkey.

The perspectives of the Executive and Legislative branches, however, often differ. The Executive branch tends to give priority to strategic considerations in relations with Turkey. Congressional attitudes, by contrast, are much more influenced by ethnic factors and human rights considerations. As noted earlier, these lobbies have succeeded at various times in getting Congress to halt or block arms sales to Turkey. This has caused increasing frustration and resentment in Ankara, which has tended to regard such actions as unwarranted intervention in bilateral relations.

Bilateral Differences
While the United States regards Turkey as an increasingly important ally in its broader strategy toward the Greater Middle East and Black Sea region, relations between Washington and Ankara have rarely been trouble-free. This was true even during the latter part of the Cold War.

Cyprus has been a particular source of discord in bilateral relations. The 1963-64 Cyprus crisis--especially the "Johnson letter," which suggested that the U.S. might not come to Turkey's aid if its support of the Turkish Cypriot community provoked a Soviet attack -- sent shock waves throughout the Turkish elite and prompted Turkey to reduce its heavy reliance on the United States. The 1975 arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress in response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus also provoked a sharp downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations, which continued even after the embargo was lifted in 1978.

While the recent thaw between Greece and Turkey, as well as the more accommodating position on Cyprus adopted by the Erdogan government, has reduced the importance of the Cyprus issue as a source of friction in bilateral relations, the shift in the Erdogan government's position on Cyprus was largely undertaken to assuage the EU and influence the EU's decision regarding the opening of accession negotiations. If the EU fails to give Turkey a firm date for the opening of accession negotiations, or if (Greek) Cyprus -- now a member of the EU -- obstructs an easing of EU policy toward northern Cyprus, Turkish policy toward Cyprus could begin to harden again, creating strains in relations with both Brussels and Washington.

U.S. access to and use of Turkish military facilities, especially the air base at Incirlik, has been another contentious issue affecting bilateral relations. President Turgat Ozal's strong support of the United States in the 1990-1991 Gulf war represented a high point of U.S.-Turkish solidarity. However, Ozal's willingness to allow the U.S. to use Turkish facilities to conduct sorties against Iraq in the first Gulf war has been the exception, not the rule. Generally, the Turks have been very wary of allowing the U.S. to use their facilities for non-NATO contingencies. Operation Northern Watch, which monitored the no fly zone over Northern Iraq, had to be extended every six months by the Turkish parliament, and extensions were often subject to vigorous internal debate and delays.

In recent years, the Turks have also imposed increasing restrictions on U.S. operations out of Incirlik. The Turks are particularly sensitive about the use of Incirlik for combat operations in the Middle East and Gulf. Thus the United States cannot automatically assume that it can use Incirlik air base for purposes beyond those spelled out in the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). The Bush administration has been exploring options for basing 48 F-16s at Incirlik as part of its overall restructuring of the U.S. defense posture. However, the Turks have been uneasy about the use of these planes in future combat operations in Iraq and have insisted that their use be coordinated closely with the Turkish military and be used only in NATO-related contingencies. They are also opposed to any permanent stationing of U.S. troops on Turkish soil.

Finally, U.S.-Turkish approaches to the Middle East do not entirely coincide. Turkey has a strong interest in maintaining cordial relations with Iran and Syria. All three countries share a common concern to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Given its growing energy needs, Turkey also has a strong interest in maintaining good energy ties to Iran. These interests put it at odds with U.S. policy. Turkey's recent rapprochement with Iran and Syria, for instance, has caused consternation in certain circles in Washington, as has Erdogan's recent criticism of Israel. Indeed, on many issues related to the Middle East Turkey's position is much closer to that of European countries than it is to Washington's.

Nevertheless, the U.S. maintains a strong strategic interest in the emergence of a stable, democratic, secular Turkey closely anchored to the West. This overarching strategic concern is likely to remain a prime driving force behind U.S. policy despite differences with Ankara over specific issues.

The EU Accession Issue
The U.S. strongly supports Turkish aspirations for EU membership and its request to open accession negotiations. As noted earlier, this support is largely driven by strategic concerns--particularly a desire to see Turkey firmly anchored to the West at a time when the Greater Middle East and Black Sea region have become key U.S. strategic priorities. The financial costs of Turkish membership and its impact on EU institutions are viewed (rightly or wrongly) in Washington as secondary issues.

U.S. lobbying for Turkish membership, however, is a two-edged sword. While it is welcomed in Ankara, it is often resented in Brussels and other European capitals, where it is regarded as unwarranted interference in internal EU affairs. (Witness President Chirac's strong criticism of President Bush's advocacy of Turkish-EU membership at the NATO summit in Istanbul). Thus, U.S. officials need to recognize that strong lobbying and arm-twisting on Turkey's behalf may in some cases be counterproductive and could even hurt Turkey's chances of getting a date for the opening of accession negotiations.

This does not mean the United States should stop supporting Turkey's membership. But, rather, that it needs to show sensitivity to how it does it. At the same time, how the EU responds to the Turkish request to open accession negotiations will have an impact not only on Turkish-EU relations but also U.S.-European relations. Three scenarios with very different implications are possible:

• Unqualified Yes. In this scenario, the EU would agree to open accession negotiations with Turkey without qualifications. Such a decision would be warmly applauded by the U.S. and would be seen by Washington as confirmation that the EU understands the broader strategic stakes involved in anchoring Turkey more firmly to the West. U.S. and European policy would thus be in broad harmony and the chances that Turkey would become a major source of tension in U.S.-European relations would be significantly diminished.

• Yes But. In this scenario, the EU would agree, in principle, to open accession negotiations with Ankara but would delay the process, arguing that certain conditions still needed to be met. Such a decision would provoke a mixed response in Washington. The United States would welcome the decision to open negotiations, but probably express its disappointment that the EU had failed to "do the right thing" in a timely manner. Criticism would be particularly strong among neo-conservatives, who would argue that Europe had once again failed to show strategic vision. Beneath the surface, sniping over Turkey would continue. The U.S. would press the EU to open negotiations as soon as possible while the EU would become increasingly resentful of U.S. pressure and "heavy-handedness."

• Outright Rejection. In this scenario, the EU would openly reject the Turkish request to open accession negotiations, offering Ankara instead a broad-based "special relationship" which fell short of actual membership. Such a move would be regarded by many in Washington as a slap in the face for Turkey and proof that the EU lacked strategic vision. It would prompt strong criticism, especially from many neo-conservatives and would exacerbate already existing tensions between the United States and Europe.

In Turkey, the move would cause widespread resentment and could provoke a rethinking of some aspects of Turkish policy. While Turkey would not entirely turn its back on Europe, Ankara would probably seek closer ties to Washington and Israel. There would be calls by some Islamists to strengthen ties to the Muslim world. Erdogan's position would be weakened. The nationalists and Islamists would argue that the EU's decision was proof that reliance on Europe was a strategic mistake and an illusion. The impetus toward internal reform would be slowed but probably not halted entirely. Turkey would probably go through a period of internal turmoil as it sought to sort out its domestic and foreign policy priorities in the wake of the rejection.

At this point, it is difficult to predict which of these three approaches the EU will adopt. Europe appears divided over the issue of Turkish EU membership. While some key European governments, particularly Britain, France, Germany and Greece, have expressed support for opening accession negotiations with Ankara, public opinion in much of Europe is opposed to Turkish membership. Thus there may be strong pressure to postpone a decision.

Such a move would buy time. But it would also mean that the Turkish issue would remain a source of contention in U.S.-European relations. But even if Turkey is offered a date for opening accession negotiations, it will be many years -- perhaps a decade or more -- before Turkey will be ready to enter the EU. This long transition period would give the EU time to make many of the institutional adjustments needed to accommodate Turkish membership. During the transition period, the process of "Europeanization" of Turkish institutions and culture would continue and even intensify, reducing some of the current economic, social and political differences between Turkey and the rest of the EU.

A rejection of an accession date, on the other hand, could lead to the emergence of a more nationalistic and insecure Turkey, one less sure of its political orientation and a less reliable partner--not only for Europe but also the United States--and one more prone to take unilateral action, especially in areas close to its borders, such as Iraq. European governments have to ask themselves whether such a development is really in their interest.

By the same token, the United States needs to recognize that Turkish membership in the EU will change the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations. A Turkey integrated into the EU will be a more "European" Turkey--one which will have to coordinate its policy more closely with Brussels and other European capitals than Turkey has done in the past. This will inevitably affect the tenor of U.S.-Turkish relations.

Defense ties in particular could be affected. The U.S. is the largest supplier of goods and services to Turkey. Most Turkish officers have been trained in the United States. Once in the EU, however, Turkey will come under increased pressure to "buy European"--just as many of the new eastern European members of the EU have. Thus over time, Turkey is likely to broaden its defense relationships with other European suppliers.

Future Challenges
The November presidential elections are not likely to have a major impact on U.S. policy toward Turkey or Turkish-EU relations. President Bush strongly favors Turkish membership in the EU -- a position he reiterated during his visit to Turkey in June 2004. If he is re-elected, the U.S. is likely to continue to press the EU to open accession negotiations with Ankara, even at the risk of provoking European displeasure.

While the Armenian lobby has expressed support for Kerry, this is not likely to significantly influence Kerry's policy. A number of Kerry's key advisors, such as Richard Holbrooke--a top candidate for Secretary of State if Kerry is elected--favor strong ties to Turkey and Turkey's membership in the European Union. If elected, Kerry may be more sensitive to European concerns and seek to consult more with European leaders. However, these are differences in style rather than substance. On the basic issue of support for Turkey's EU membership and the opening of accession negotiations with Ankara, the positions of the two candidates are likely to be quite similar. Thus European officials should not expect a major shift in U.S. policy on Turkish-EU relations if Kerry is elected.

Regardless of who wins the election, however, U.S.-Turkish relations are likely to face increasing challenges that will require adjustments in U.S. policy. In the future, Turkey is likely to pursue a more independent path in many areas, especially the Middle East. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has reshuffled the political deck in the Middle East in ways that directly affect Turkish security interests. The Kurdish issue, in particular, could cause new divergences between Washington and Ankara. U.S. and Turkish approaches to Iran and Syria also do not entirely coincide and could also provoke new strains.

Thus the United States will need to get used to dealing with a more independent-minded and assertive Turkey, one increasingly inclined to pursue its own interests. This will particularly affect the ability of the United States to use Turkish military facilities. Turkey is likely to be extremely wary of allowing the U.S. to use its military facilities for operations in the Middle East and Gulf except when these operations are seen to clearly serve Turkish national interests.

The modernization of Turkish society will also pose important challenges. The democratization process in Turkey over the last several decades has opened up opportunities for new groups, including Islamic groups, to enter the political arena and has eroded the ability of the traditional Kemalist elite to direct and manage Turkish foreign policy. Today there is a much more open and diverse political debate in Turkey than was the case 20-30 years ago.

At the same time, Turkey faces an important generational change of political leadership. The older generations of political leaders who guided Turkish policy for much of the Cold War, such as Sulyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit, are fading from the political scene. Thus U.S. policymakers will need to reach out to a new generation of Turkish politicians whose world view--and view of the United States -- is quite different from the views of their predecessors. This is bound to complicate U.S.-Turkish relations and make them harder to manage.

Finally, the role of the Turkish military is changing. For the past seventy years, the military has acted as the "custodian of Turkish democracy," exerting a strong political role behind the scenes and intervening when it thought democracy and secularism were threatened. But the democratic reforms introduced in the past decade or so, especially those introduced by the Erdogan government, have reduced the power of the military to intrude in politics. This power is likely to be further eclipsed as the process of democratization proceeds. Thus the United States will no longer be able to rely as heavily on its ties to the Turkish military and will need to strengthen channels of communication with other parts of the Turkish political spectrum.

These changes will pose new challenges for Washington and make adjustments in U.S. policy necessary regardless of whether Turkey becomes an EU member or not. However, the prospects of EU membership will accelerate the process of internal change and make adjustments more urgent and more necessary.

Secretary of State Colin Powell's reference to Turkey as an "Islamic Republic" in April 2004, highlights these sensitivities. The statement provoked widespread criticism in the Turkish press and prompted a rebuttal from Turkey's ambassador in Washington, Faruk Logoglu, who reminded American officials that Turkey was a secular democracy in which religion was a private affair. In reaction to the outcry, Powell later retracted his statement.

This paper appeared in the AICGS Advisor of September 30 , 2004.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.