Whither Turkey's EU Accession? Perspectives and Problems After December 2004
By Heinz Kramer

Reports about the issue of Turkey's eventual accession to the European Union (EU) proliferate. So do conferences about the issue, though there seems to be room for still more reports and conferences. This indicates at least two things: First, the issue is of widespread public interest and of eminent political importance. Second, the issue is a highly complex, multi-faceted, and not easy to handle. Indeed, the expected decision of the European Council at its upcoming December meeting will be one of the most controversial and most important ones in this institution's recent past.

Therefore, it seems appropriate to have a closer look at the potential consequences of this decision in Turkey and in Germany and on the period thereafter. Although many commentators seem to believe that the outcome of the European Council's meeting is clear - if there is a positive report and an accordingly positive recommendation by the European Commission in early October - it would be wise to take also into account a different or slightly modified result, given the considerably divergent views on the issue among the EU's members.

Another issue of equal political importance is the question of how to conduct the ongoing process of Turkish accession after a positive decision in December. The actual course of accession negotiations and the accompanying political and economic developments in Turkey and in the EU will have a decisive impact on the final result of negotiations and, what seems to be more important, on the final acceptance of Turkish membership by the EU public and the Turkish public. Therefore, in the second part of this paper, I will try to analyze some crucial elements with regard to the political management of the negotiation process as well as some persistent political stumbling blocs on the way to a successful termination of these negotiations.

What will be the European Council's decision in December?
The decision of the European Council will, to some degree, be a decision on Turkish membership in the EU. If the decision is a positive one, accession negotiations must be conducted with membership as the end goal, in accordance with EU law. There is no alternative goal of negotiations foreseen in the acquis communautaire. If the decision proves a negative one, it will be the end of the actual accession process that has been started in Helsinki in December 1999.

An unqualified "Yes" with a clear date
The prevailing expectation in political and expert circles in the EU and in Turkey is that the European Council will decide to begin accession negotiations sometime in 2005. The main reason for this expectation is the assumption that the European Commission will give its recommendation when it publishes on October 6 its evaluation of Turkey's progress since 1999 in meeting the conditions for the start of negotiations. This report will be accompanied by another study on the likely impact of an eventual Turkish membership on the EU. Additionally, it is equally presumed that no EU member government will contradict the Commission's evaluation, and thus the European Council will follow its recommendation.

However, no one expects the Commission to present a "pure white" evaluation of Turkey's progress towards meeting the political criteria of Copenhagen for the start of negotiations (i.e. democracy with stable institutions that guarantee the rule of law, the respect of human rights, and the protection of minorities). Nevertheless, the general assumption is that the Commission, although with some difficulty, will come to the conclusion that Turkey has met these criteria to a sufficient degree and that the prospect of further progress is promising enough to recommend the start of accession negotiations.

A qualified "Yes"
Yet such a development cannot be expected with absolute certainty. There are factors that can still give reason for doubt. There are political and civil society groups in some EU member states that over the past few weeks have declared that Turkey's progress in terms of human rights cannot be regarded as a sufficient fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria and that further efforts are needed. In particular, they point to Turkish reports about ongoing practices of mistreatment of individuals in police custody and to recent reports about a generally unfavorable situation for women in Turkey, which strongly deviates from the EU principles of gender equality and non-discrimination.

Therefore, such organizations recommend a decision by the European Council that would link the start of accession negotiations with proof of some concrete progress in these issues, i.e. delay the start of negotiations without, however, calling into question the start itself. This could either take the form of a qualified "Yes," binding the start of the negotiations to another positive report of the Commission concerning a few specific issues, or a qualified "Yes" binding the start of negotiations at a pre-determined future date to the fulfillment of certain specific demands put forward by the EU.

Some people think such considerations could have a certain impact on the position of some EU member governments that are well known for their reluctance in supporting a positive decision of the European Council. Such countries include Austria, and the Netherlands, where the government coalition seems to be internally divided on the issue. It is also well known that the French president, Mr. Chirac, is under strong domestic pressure from the public and from his own party not to support an opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Also within the European Commission, opinions on the advisability of the start of accession negotiations differ widely among various members. Even Mr. Verheugen, the commisioner in charge of the preparation of the report, seems to have developed a rather ambiguous impression of the situation on the ground in Turkey concerning the fulfillment of the political criteria.

The crucial question, then, is whether in the period between the publication of the Commission's report and recommendation and the December meeting of the European Council a political dynamic will evolve among some EU member governments that could lead to a qualified decision. This cannot be totally excluded, but it seems rather unlikely because there are still some important EU members that unconditionally favor the start of accession negotiations if the Commission's report and recommendation point to that direction, such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain or Germany.

Under these circumstances, it is rather unlikely that the EU states, which face other crucial political future tasks besides the issue of accession negotiations with Turkey (e.g., ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and decision on the financial program 2007-2013), would start a serious political quarrel among themselves about this issue. It is more likely that they will settle for a line that follows the Commission's recommendation and postpone the real debate about Turkish membership to some later date when the course of negotiations with Ankara and experiences with the just finished accession of ten new member countries would allow a much better evaluation of the likely repercussions of Turkey's eventual accession.

Another issue that could prevent an unqualified decision of the European Council is the problem of Turkey's official recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. As of Cyprus' entry into the EU on May 1, 2004, the government of the (Greek-Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus in the south of the island is the only officially recognized Cypriot representative in the EU. This situation creates the necessity for Turkey to recognize the Greek-Cypriot government as its legitimate counterpart in all EU affairs.

Two issues stand out in this respect. One is the adaptation of the EU-Turkey customs union of 1995 to the new situation after the recent EU enlargement. Cyprus, as part of the enlarged EU, has become part of this customs union, and the Greek-Cypriot government has become the only legitimate counterpart for Turkey concerning all customs union issues that may occur with respect to Cyprus. However, Turkey, for well-known political reasons, does not recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus as a legitimate representative of the island. This situation cannot prevail indefinitely under the conditions of the EU-Turkey customs union.

Of equal or even greater importance is the recognition of the Greek-Cypriot government with respect to the conduct of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, because the true partners in these negotiations are Turkey as the applicant or candidate country on the one hand and the member states of the EU on the other hand. From an international legal perspective, accession to the EU actually means the extension of the treaty between the existing member states on the foundation of the EU to one or more other acceeding states. Although it is the European Commission that negotiates for the EU with the applicant country, it is the member states that decide about the negotiation mandate of the Commission and that finally endorse the result of negotiations by means of national ratification of the treaty of accession.

Under such conditions it is highly unlikely that the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which for the EU is the only actual legitimate representative of the island, would agree to the opening of accession negotiations with a country that does not recognize it. Such a position could hardly be criticized by other EU member states as too formal and legalistic, because it is only natural for a government to secure its international legitimacy by avoiding even the slightest impression of doubts in that respect.

Consequently, the Turkish government would be well advised if it sought to bring about the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member state well before the internal EU process concerning the decision of the European Council reaches its final stage. Such recognition does not necessarily imply the mutual establishment of embassies and an exchange of ambassadors, as can be seen in the cases of Taiwan and or the Palestinian Authority. What should, however, definitely not happen is a one-sided Turkish recognition of nine new EU member states as partners in the customs union and deliberately leaving aside Cyprus, as is the actual state of affairs at the time of writing this paper.

If nothing happens, this could lead to a situation whereby at the request of their Cypriot co-member, other EU member states in the European Council decide to start accession negotiations only after the recognition has taken place. The more - and the longer - the Turkish government brings the Greek Cypriot government in a position to capitalize on Turkish hesitancy concerning the recognition issue - even if for the purpose of regaining lost international ground - the greater the negative impact this issue could have on the European Council's decision and the actual start of accession negotiations. These implications clearly show the limited value of the recognition issue as a Turkish bargaining chip with respect to the still outstanding EU decision concerning the establishment of direct trade between the EU and the Turkish part of Cyprus and/or the equally undecided issue of EU financial aid to the Turkish part of the island. A growing impression in some EU capitals that Ankara is trying to establish a link between these issues and the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus could undermine the generally favorable attitude with respect to the December decision.

A (qualified) "No"
Although it seems highly unlikely, it cannot be totally excluded that the Greek Cypriot government and/or some other EU member government would come to the firm conclusion that Turkey is not yet ripe for accession negotiations. In this case, a veto could be raised already in the run-up to the European Council's meeting, which could lead to a non-specified postponement of the envisaged decision. This would, however, create a rather unnatural internal situation for the EU if such a decision of the European Council would constitute a negative deviation from a stated position of the European Commission. In this case, the task of deciding when Turkey would be ready for the start of accession negotiations would fall upon all member states, because no one would expect the Commission to come to something other than a positive result in future evaluations - unless there were serious, negative setbacks in Turkey. The situation would only be different if the European Commission had already agreed to a "mixed" recommendation in its October report. Then a turn-around in the member states' attitudes could not be excluded, given the great hesitancy with which some governments would view a positive decision of the European Council. However, at present, there are no indications of a strongly "mixed" or even negative recommendation of the Commission.

Reactions in Turkey and in Germany/the EU
Different outcomes of the December meeting of the European Council will lead to different reactions - in Turkey and in Germany/the EU. An unqualified "Yes" indicating the start of negotiations sometime in 2005, would create an EU-euphoria in the Turkish media and in the Turkish public. They would finally see themselves as being accepted as equals by the Europeans. Still existing suspicions about EU double standards concerning Turkey would decrease. There is, however, the danger of overly charged emotions, which could lead to unrealistic expectations with respect to the negotiation process itself. Although we can hear many public voices that indicate a realistic and sober Turkish approach to the negotiation process, the vast majority of the Turkish public does not seem to be prepared for the cumbersome and very intrusive process that runs under the label of "accession negotiations." For many Turks it is difficult to imagine that it will most likely take another decade before membership of the EU would become reality, and that there are still many stumbling blocs on the way to that goal.

Therefore, the Turkish government will be in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the start of accession negotiations would bolster its image as a true and effective custodian of Turkey's most cherished national interest. Its rate of approval among the electorate could get a further boost. Whether this would induce Mr. Erdoðan and his companions to go for early elections sometime in 2005 remains to be seen. In addition, accession negotiations will be a welcome means to uphold the momentum of the economic and political reform drive, thus further consolidating the still fragile stability of Turkey.

On the other hand, the government will constantly have to ask for more reforms without being able to tell the people when membership will occur. The task set before the AKP - to feed their followers and the Turkish population in general with hopes of a better future while asking for actual and sometimes hard to digest changes - will become much more difficult to accomplish than it has been during the past two years. Since December 2002, there was a clear date indicating a specific goal for which it would be worthwhile to make some sacrifices. After December 2004, there will be no date at all for several years to come, which could make the task of convincing people of the necessity of drastic change much more difficult.

German public reactions to a decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey would be mixed. In governmental circles, there would be a silent relief that this difficult and controversial issue would have been brought to a (temporarily) successful end. The government would then put the issue on the backburner by leaving the concrete task of preparing and conducting the negotiations mainly to the European Commission. Given its high degree of domestic controversy, the government will have no great interest in keeping the issue on the public agenda. A similar official reaction would also occur in other EU countries, where the general attitude towards Turkish membership is more favorable.

Those German and European circles opposed to membership would utter severe public criticism in the immediate aftermath of the European Council's meeting, which would be widely reported in the media. This criticism would, however, calm down soon, because opponents would bend to the inevitable fact that the decision is irreversible. Furthermore, even if there has been a lively public debate about the issue in the run-up to the December meeting, Turkish accession to the EU is not the major public concern in any of the member states - with, perhaps, the exception of Greece. This fact will also contribute to a rather quick calming-down of the public debate in which other, more important issues that are mainly connected to severe domestic economic and social problems will supersede the Turkey issue.

There is, however, a likelihood that this issue will re-surface in some EU countries, especially France, during the campaign for the referendum over the Constitutional Treaty. It would be a great surprise if nationalist and other rightist political circles would forego the opportunity to couple the public decision about the EU's political future with the question of Turkey's accession.

If the European Council would come out with a qualified "Yes" postponing the date of the final decision or of the start of negotiations coupled with demands for further reform measures or a broader implementation of the measures already taken, the public reaction in Turkey would be a mixture of deep disappointment and strong condemnation of the EU for cheating Turkey. Under such circumstances, the Turkish government of prime minister Erdoðan would be confronted with attacks from its political rivals. They would try to convince the Turkish public that all the recent reforms have been one-sided "concessions" to the EU that only undermine the national cohesion and strength of the Turkish republic.

Such criticism could reach a considerable intensity and could result in a serious public fall-out if the actual stalemate with respect to improving the international situation of the Turkish Cypriots would continue for some time. Any Turkish move towards recognition of the Republic of Cyprus is already tainted with the impression of a one-sided Turkish concession that could undermine the international political gains Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have been able to reap from the rejection of the Annan Plan for a solution of the Cyprus problem by the Greek Cypriots in the referendum of April 24, 2004.

Under such circumstances, the AKP may be tempted to take a more reluctant position towards EU requests for future reform measures. This, in turn, would create reasons or pretexts for the EU to further hold back its final decision on the start of negotiations. A downward spiral of mutual allegations and reproaches could be set in motion that would lead to a breakdown of the actual process of Turkey's accession to the EU. Such a development would be even more likely as in the aftermath of another postponing decision of the European Council the debate about Turkish membership in EU countries would not calm down. It could even intensify and turn more negative when official EU-Turkey relations would lose its actual relative smoothness.

In the very unlikely case of a negative decision of the European Council, we would experience a public anti-EU uproar in Turkey combined with harsh political reactions. Under strong public pressure from the media and almost all political circles, the government would be forced to take some highly symbolic measures against the EU. This could go as far as canceling the customs union. Voices will be raised that would urge a re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy towards either a stronger relationship with the United States or a stronger regional Turkish role in Eurasia, or a combination of both.

However, in the medium-term political practitioners and the public alike would have to acknowledge the fact that it would be rather difficult and costly to completely sever the existing multitude of strong links between Turkey and the EU area. Attempts at mending the fences by developing pragmatic formulas for a non-membership relationship would gain ground. Nevertheless, there would be serious negative impacts on such crucial issues as Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus question - unless Athens could convincingly prove that it had fought to the utmost to prevent a negative outcome of the European Council's deliberations.

Domestic political repercussions in Turkey would be more serious. The economy would at least experience a temporary downturn caused by negative reactions in the national and international financial markets. The actual course of economic recovery could be derailed for some time. Together with the deep political disappointment about the European rejection, even a short-lived economic crisis would most likely lead to a government crisis. Popular support for the AKP government would dwindle, public accusations of misleading Turkey would mount, and the government would face a serious crisis of confidence. Intra-party cleavages in the AKP would gain in political importance and could lead to a break-up of the party or the resignation of Prime Minister Erdoðan and his group.

Early elections could not be excluded, which would most likely mean the end of the dominant position of AKP in Turkish politics. Another era of unstable coalition governments could set in. Under such circumstances, nationalist-Kemalist forces would have a good chance to regain much of the political ground they have lost during the past reform period by retracting many of the recent legal reforms with the argument of securing the endangered stability of the country. Another chance for a lasting establishment of liberal democracy and a modern society in Turkey would have been lost.

In the EU countries, a negative decision would mean a considerable loss of political prestige for some governments such as the German, the British and the French, further complicating their already shaky domestic position. Others would be very much relieved and would publicly express their satisfaction of rescuing Europe from the "new Turkish siege." Generally, a clear majority of the European public would welcome such a result, thus adding to growing international suspicions that the enlarged EU is becoming more inward-looking and exclusive, isolating itself from the unwelcome and fearful consequences of international globalization. The management of Atlantic relations would become even more difficult, whatever administration takes office in Washington in January 2005.

In order to minimize the negative consequences of a "No" to Turkey, EU governments and the new Commission would start hectic attempts at mending the fences. However, there would seem to be little prospect for inventing new models of EU-Turkey relations, such as a "privileged partnership," under such conditions. The best one could hope for would be a continuation of the status quo ante of Helsinki 1999, with a definitely closed accession perspective. Some time and skillful diplomacy would be needed by Turkey and by the EU to establish a new basis for necessary mutual relations that take into account the reality of non-membership. A sober analysis would show that much of what has been established over the past forty years could provide productive elements for a new relationship, with some corrections in the economic and in the security policy field.

How to conduct accession negotiations with Turkey
After a positive decision of the European Council in December, a new process will start: accession negotiations. Though the debate in EU member states until December will largely be dominated by the question of whether Turkey really has met the political criteria of Copenhagen for the opening of accession negotiations, it would be wise not to forget that the real concerns about Turkish membership are related to the issues of European Union identity, integration and governance. The eventual acceptance of Turkey's entry to the EU will in the end depend on satisfactory answers to these issues. This has to be reflected in the way negotiations are conducted. To be more precise, negotiations with Turkey will, to a much greater degree, have to take into account the political concomitants of the issue than has been the case in past rounds of enlargement.

Accession negotiations with Turkey cannot mean "enlargement business-as-usual" with an almost singular emphasis on the acquis communautaire and Turkey's ability to effectively apply it at the moment of entry into the EU. What is equally or even more important is a conduct of negotiations that would enable the EU governments at the end of the process to convince the EU public that Turkey does not enter the Union as an "alien" but as a fully-fledged "European" society and state.

Consequently, from the very beginning, i.e. from the formulation of the negotiating mandate for the European Commission, the EU member governments must commit a greater degree of political attention to these negotiations than they have done in past negotiations. And this political attention must be constantly present throughout the negotiation process and cannot be restricted to so-called crucial dossiers or crucial moments, such as free movement of people, common agricultural policy, financial and institutional regulations or the "long last night of negotiations." What is necessary is a continuous political exertion accompanying the negotiations in order to inform the public about the ongoing process of Turkey's "Europeanization."

This "no-business-as-usual-approach" should be clearly stated by the EU member governments during the December meeting of the European Council. It should be clear from the beginning that Turkey would be treated differently from past candidates and that this discrimination, as the Turks will certainly see it, is one of the many prices Turkey will have to pay for a smooth and successful later accession to the EU.

For this purpose, the EU should make it clear from the beginning that the implementation of the acquis will be the yardstick on which progress in accession negotiations will be measured. This would imply a much more extensive monitoring of the application of EU regulations in Turkey than has already been the case during the last round of enlargement with the Central European states. Dossiers or chapters of negotiation should only be declared provisionally closed when the EU is convinced that Turkey is able to apply the rules in a satisfactory manner. This does not imply that there should be no negotiated transition periods concerning certain parts of the acquis where it would be politically unfair or unpractical to expect from Turkey or from the EU an immediate full application at the moment of entry. However, "adoption of the acquis" should become more of a political category in the negotiations instead of a legal-technical one.

The European Council should also clearly express its expectation that Turkey will have to continue with its daring and so far successful political and economic reform process. The acknowledgement that Ankara has satisfactorily fulfilled the political criteria of Copenhagen should not lead to the misperception that this issue is no longer relevant for Turkey's accession process and that future efforts should be directed mainly at economic, legal and technical adaptations to the acquis. Quite to the contrary, the EU should clearly state that an eventual accession would crucially depend on further lasting democratization and liberalization of the Turkish polity in order to bring it even closer to EU standards.

Such statements should not be misperceived by Turkish politicians and public as new (and unjust) additional conditions put forward by the EU in order to make the accomplishment of accession more difficult for Turkey. The EU institutions and the governments of the Union's member states should undertake an increased effort at explaining to the Turkish public that the process of Turkey's accession to the Union implies a continuous domestic reform process in which the yardstick for success is not the fulfillment of certain singular measures but the attainment of a European standard with respect to democratization and liberalization. What really has to be changed is not certain practices but public and official mindsets.

And the Turkish public should also be aware of the fact that in this respect, the public in many European countries is more critical towards Turkey than it has been towards other candidate countries. One may reject and condemn this as a double standard, but it would be politically more mature to accept it as a deeply ingrained factor of EU-Turkey relations. The best way of changing such European prejudices is the quick and smooth proof of Turkey's ability to "Europeanize" and not a condemnation of European attitudes as wrong and insulting. A positive reaction to certain European preconceptions would also help EU member governments convince their respective publics of Turkey's ability to become a "normal" member of the Union.

Another peculiarity that makes Turkish accession different from past rounds of enlargement is its almost exclusive justification by strategic considerations alone. Turkey is touted to the European public as a state whose membership would considerably increase the EU's potential as a strategic actor in global politics. This could be in its function as a "bridge" to or a "model" for the Islamic world that would greatly enhance the chances for avoiding a clash of civilization. Its role could also be that of a pivotal state in the future development of the Greater Middle East, including a possible role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another asset connected to Turkey's EU membership is its strategic location with respect to Europe's future energy supplies from the Middle East and, more importantly, from the Caspian region. And last but not least, Turkish membership is expected to make a fundamental contribution in turning the Eastern Mediterranean area into a zone of enhanced security. Even with regard to domestic security issues, Turkey is advocated by some as a perfect model for the development of a "Euro-Islam" that could contribute to the alleviation of domestic tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in certain EU member states. In contrast to such arguments, there are hardly any references to potential economic or identity-related advantages that may be tied to Turkey's accession. Turkey is expected neither to greatly enhance the EU's wealth or welfare nor to make an important contribution to the "reunification of Europe."

This peculiarity has to be adequately represented in the accession negotiations. Issues of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including aspects of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), have to be one special focus of negotiations in terms of substance and institutions. This dossier cannot be treated as a residual category. As most of the issues mentioned above are characterized by a high degree of political urgency, they should be addressed early on in the negotiations with the aim of finding some interim framework that would allow the EU to make much better use of the assumed advantages of Turkish membership than could be made by the actual practice of political dialogue or via NATO.

In this respect one should encourage a closer and more continuous Turkish participation in CFSP and ESDP along the lines of its former status in the Western European Union, i.e. a kind of special associated membership. Such a framework would be more feasible and justified today than it might have been some years ago when EU relations with Turkey were unclear on the question of membership. In any case, it would be a great disadvantage if the EU would wait another decade, i.e. until the actual Turkish entry, in order to fully reap the expected positive results of membership.

Another deviation from the usual course of accession negotiations that is proposed by some German politicians is the suggestion of more "open" negotiations with Turkey. In particular, Wolfgang Schäuble from the CDU and Egon Bahr, former foreign policy adviser to Chancellor Willy Brandt, support the idea that negotiations with Turkey should also include alternatives to accession that may be more suitable for both sides. Such a suggestion raises some political and legal problems for the EU. Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union as well as article I-57(2) of the Constitutional Treaty that deal with the issue of enlargement discuss accession only. On this legal basis, accession negotiations can only be conducted on the modalities of accession and not on the basis of alternative schemes. What may be possible would be modalities of accession that fall short of full membership, i.e. a special kind of EU membership with certain "opting-out" clauses, as has been the case during the past development of the EU with respect to certain issue areas with certain member states.

It is, however, hardly conceivable that Turkey would accept open negotiations in the sense mentioned above, nor would it seem that the EU would be prepared to offer a detailed and comprehensive scheme of "special membership." In this scenario, only the Council of the European Union can mandate the Commission to start accession negotiations with Turkey, which may have its peculiarities from the beginning but which, nevertheless, are directed at full membership. It cannot be totally excluded, however, that sometime during the course of negotiations both sides may reach the conclusion that it really would be in their common interest to go for something other than full membership.

Another issue that will play an important role with respect to Turkey's accession negotiations is the EU's concern that Turkish membership may seriously impede further development of the Union. This concern has become even more accentuated after the most recent entry of ten new members on May 1, 2004. There are many in the Union who fear that it would be too difficult to digest this enlargement and then to engage in another enlargement of almost the same dimension at the same time. Consequently, considerations about the EU's ability to function effectively will be a regular accompaniment to the negotiations with Ankara. This will most likely have repercussions on the speed of negotiations, which would have to be slowed down if the EU members fear that too early a Turkish accession would overload the Union. It is this concern that already now can be seen behind the almost unanimous declarations by leading EU politicians that Turkish accession would at least require a period of ten years before it could be accomplished.

Under such circumstances, it would be wise if the European Council in December would not only enable the start of accession negotiations but would also clearly state that the EU countries expect this accession not to happen before at least another decade. The statement should not be constructed in the form of a fixed road map that could be revoked by both sides, but more as a clear statement of intention that may be reformulated during the course of negotiations, depending on the development of Turkey and that of the EU. Such a statement would set a landmark that could hardly be ignored by the Turks and which could help to reduce exaggerated public expectations in Turkey concerning the time frame of accession negotiations.

Turkish accession negotiations that are conducted by the EU as "non-business-as-usual" would most likely raise Turkish accusations of an unjustified special treatment in comparison with other former and even future candidate countries. Although many Turks tend to see their country as something special, they are less inclined to accept special treatment by the EU. In this respect, the Union and its member states are faced with the difficult task of bringing home to Turkey's politicians, media, and public the very unpleasant reality that accession negotiations are not a level playing field. Accession to the EU does not mean the negotiated merger of the Union with the respective candidate, but a process of mostly one-sided adaptation to the EU by a state accepting the EU's demands for accession. This inherent imbalance in any accession process may become very accentuated in the case of Turkey, given the fact that the basis of the process is not an invitation by the EU but a decade-long demand and pressure by Turkey and given the further fact that of all enlargements so far, Turkish accession is the one that is least supported by EU member state populations. At the moment, fears of the possible consequences of Turkish membership outweigh by far any expected gains. This situation will have to change fundamentally if, after a long process of negotiations, the parliaments of the EU member states were ready to ratify the treaty of accession.

Persistent Stumbling Blocks
The success of accession negotiations will depend not only on the two sides' ability to manage the complicated process but also on some other factors that can only be partially influenced and controlled by the EU or Turkey.

First and foremost, there is the necessity of a smooth continuation of Turkey's economic and political reform process in the direction of "Europeanization." Only if Turkey is able to stabilize its recent economic recovery and turn it into sustainable growth over the next decade will there be a chance to reduce or eliminate concerns on the side of the EU about accession being too costly and too destabilizing in social terms. Any return of Turkey's economy to the roller coaster growth of the 1990s would negatively impact the EU's perception of the feasibility of Turkish accession. This would, in more concrete terms, imply a continuation of the present restrictive budgetary policy, further reforms of Turkey's social security system, and little room for a policy of broad income redistribution. Turkey's masses could be faced with the real situation of considerable economic growth without new jobs for some years to come.

Even taking into account the enormous amount of patience the Turkish people are able to gather in times of economic hardship, such a policy of continued economic and social self-restraint on the part of the government bears the danger of eroding the electoral support of the party in power. To maintain a solid level of political stability, much will depend on the ability of the AKP to sell the consequences of accession policy to its followers and on the ability and readiness of the opposition parties not to exploit the situation for populist propaganda.

These difficulties on the economic and social policy front could be aggravated by unwelcome political developments with respect to the Kurdish problem. This question, in addition to ongoing concerns about the general situation of human rights, is still the most intensively followed Turkish domestic policy issue in many EU countries. A certain re-evaluation after 9/11 notwithstanding, there is still much unqualified sympathy for the Kurdish case in large sectors of the EU public. The PKK or its successor organizations are still regarded by many as legitimate representatives of the Kurdish people. Their acts of violence are less perceived as terrorist activities than as actions of resistance against a suppressive Turkish state policy. This perception may change if important representatives of Turkey's Kurdish citizens, such as Leyla Zana or the mayor of Diyabarkýr, disassociate themselves from the PKK policy of renewed wide-spread violence and/or if the internal rifts within the PKK on the issue of violence becomes more widely known in the European public. Nevertheless, any intensification of the state's reaction to renewed PKK violence, which would take on the form of low-intensity warfare, so well known from the 1990s, would lead to a considerable deterioration of Turkey's image in the EU public. Even if EU governments would back such a Turkish policy as justified by the fight against international terrorism, a swing to the negative in European public opinion on Turkey would most likely negatively impact on accession negotiations.

So would certainly any Turkish military incursion into Iraq as a consequence of a severe deterioration of the situation there. Turkey's deep security concerns with respect to the development of a strong and largely autonomous political Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq are not shared by most of the EU member states. Even less understanding exists in EU political circles for Turkish concerns about the fate of Iraqi Turkomans. After the start of accession negotiations, the Iraqi Kurdish dilemma of Turkey will become even more difficult. In devising its policy and actions, Ankara would not only have to take into account the sensitivities of regional states and the United States but the impact on its EU ambitions as well. If their worst-case scenario unfolds in Iraq, Turkish political leaders may be faced with the choice between standing-by and hoping for the best with respect to Iraq, on the one hand and a (temporary) halt of accession negotiations if they opt for a military intervention into northern Iraq, on the other. Such an eventuality could best be prevented by an immediate intensification of an EU-Turkey political dialogue on the situation and future developments in the Middle East.

An even greater stumbling bloc in the path of smooth accession negotiations than the North Iraq/Kurdish issue will most likely be the unresolved Cyprus question. The result of the referendum on April 24, 2004 has not yet changed much of the situation. As mentioned above, the Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized representative of the island; the Turkish-Cypriot community in the north is still isolated. The possibility of the EU bringing about a change, which is clearly desired by the European Commission, is severely impeded by the presence of the Greek-Cypriot and the Greek governments as EU members in the Council of the EU. It will be very difficult to establish a relationship of the North with the EU that includes elements of a de facto recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot community against Greek-Cypriot resistance. A "solution," however, that would make the end of the Turkish-Cypriot isolation dependent on cooperation with institutions of the Republic of Cyprus seems to be unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.

If this situation were to continue for some time to come it would become a serious impediment to the progress of accession negotiations, because it is inconceivable that the Greek-Cypriot government would endorse Turkey's accession without a prior settlement of the Cyprus question. Another dilemma could arise for Turkey: having to give in to Greek-Cypriot demands for a Cyprus settlement in order get Nicosia's consent to accession. It is not clear today how Turkey would react in such a situation. It is, however, clear that there is the possibility for such a linkage between the accession process and Cyprus, and it would be a great surprise if the Greek-Cypriots would forego this opportunity. Therefore, prime minister Talat's pressure for some decisive international action to end the isolation of the North before the end of this year is quite understandable, as is the Greek-Cypriot effort at preventing such a decision by the Council of the EU. And as the hands of the U.S. administration seem to be bound because of the impending election, there is only a small chance for a decisive change of the situation on and about Cyprus in the near future. Therefore, the Turkish government would be well advised not only to get around to recognizing the Republic of Cyprus soon, but also to contemplate some one-sided Turkish measures that could help undermine the Greek-Cypriot resistance in the EU institutions.

There are, however, not only Turkey-related problems that may create serious impediments to a smooth conduct of accession negotiations. The future development of the EU itself is equally important in view of actual European concerns about an "overstretch" of the Union through Turkey's accession. The better the EU would be in realizing its ambitious "Lisbon Goal," i.e. to become the most internationally competitive knowledge-based economy, the less economic and social problems could be invoked against Turkish accession. Furthermore, such a development would boost the EU's self-reliance and create a psychological climate in which Europeans would be more willing to take on another great challenge.

More generally, one could expect accession negotiations to proceed without many complications if the EU would be able to digest the recent enlargement of ten new members without greater difficulties. For this to happen, the swift and uncomplicated ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would be a very positive signal. If, however, the treaty failed in the planned referenda in some important member states, the EU could experience a serious crisis that would most likely lead to a re-evaluation of Turkish accession. Although forecasts are always difficult to make, one cannot totally exclude a situation in which, some years from now, the EU or Turkey or both would come to the conclusion that their future relations would be better served by basing them on something other than EU membership of Turkey.

Conclusion
The start of accession negotiations with Turkey will not be the beginning of a more or less pre-determined process, as has been the case with earlier EU enlargements. Instead, it will be the beginning of a new game with an undetermined outcome. Never before have there been accession negotiations that were so controversial among EU member states and so laden with uncertainties and serious political and economic impediments than the Turkish accession. Both sides need a great deal of political determination and political skill to produce a successful conclusion of this process. From the very beginning, the negotiations have to be part of a broader process of intensified political contacts, debates and, wherever possible, cooperation between the EU and Turkey. If it were left to the normal accession negotiations procedures, the process leading to its conclusion would encounter a serious risk of failure along the way.

Bringing accession negotiations under a broader political umbrella should not, however, imply a dilution of the process. Accession negotiations are (and have to be) goal-directed, even if they do not have a pre-determined result. Discussions about alternatives to Turkish membership in the EU should not be included in the accompanying political process. Should such alternatives be raised, then only as a consequence of the realization by both sides that the goal of accession would not be attainable in the foreseeable future.

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This paper was prepared for the AICGS Conference on "Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turkish Relations: Future Scenarios," held on September 20, 2004 in Berlin.

This paper appeared in the AICGS Advisor of September 30 , 2004.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.