Heroes of the Retreat
By Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte

The election in Dresden decided about the future government personnel in Berlin. It was another reminder: in view of a nonexistent strategic majority (black-yellow or red-green), a traditional, stable formation of a government on the federal level is not possible. This accelerates the theatrics of a grand coalition in Berlin, and thus also the personnel questions are clarified. The chancellor's retreat is rapidly approaching.

The crisis alliance of the formerly-large "parties of the people" is not entered into enthusiastically. This is because the shrunken parties are obviously suffering from having gained only 69.5 percent of the votes. That is a significant decline in comparison to the numbers of decades before (over 90 percent in the 1970s). At present, a tactical, provocative poker game is underway between the SPD and the Union; whoever gives up their options too early weakens their negotiating position. The SPD and CDU/CSU are as small as rarely before, and both lost and clearly failed with their respective candidates. After the initial party caucuses, they stepped in front of the cameras in a show of false bravado. But today, the largest parties are as weak as never before. The loosely-joined anarchy inside the parties is being disciplined at present only by the fight around the chancellorship. The longer the parties' probing and then the coalition negotiations last, the more the current leadership of the parties will witness their authorities decline.

Although the voters, who strengthened the smaller parties, did not vote for a grand coalition, it has become ever-more probable. What then are the conditions for success for the development of a grand coalition? First, the relationship of power between the parties must be built. The largest parliamentary group (CDU/CSU) cannot give up the chancellorship under given percentages. Our democracy has seen many small coalitions in which the chancellor never had the strongest parliamentary group. Schmidt always governed against the majority parliamentary group of the Union. But that cannot apply strategically to grand coalitions with regard to power. Negotiations will fail if this link is not understood.

For the second condition, it is important that the junior partner does not only receive the vice-chancellor position and positions in important departments. The smaller partner must be able to distinguish itself under the larger partner. The grand coalition as crisis alliance, as opposed to other coalition variants, from the beginning is focused on the end. Single projects are to be agreed upon and processed, and then afterwards everyone looks for a new coalition partner. Thus reads the internal logic of cooperation. To that extent job-sharing and chancellor-rotation after two years can be an important option for the formation of a grand coalition. It offers an incentive for both partners to distinguish themselves.

The "retreat of the heroes" remains central as the third condition. After the television spectacle of the "elephant round" (high-level discussions between the parties), Schröder blocked the road to a grand coalition for himself. At the same time, he took Merkel down with him into the whirlpool of downward momentum. Only an exchange of leaders makes the grand coalition feasible. Merkel remains chairwoman of the overall party and parliamentary party. Schröder has a strong departure: he retires with large gestures - for Germany. Joschka Fischer has already done this.

For the fourth condition, moderators must be found who can integrate and steer the grand coalition and at the same time act as transient leaders and pilots. These are politicians whose political heights are already behind them; for the SPD, one could put forward Clement, for the CDU/CSU, Schäuble. Both of them would not erode future political power prospects for others within their parties. They both fit the type of the "ambitionless" problem solver. Neither the Gabriels in the SPD nor the minister-presidents in the Union could tolerate competitors at the top of the grand coalition who could build themselves up by the chancellorship for the time after. Only when the smoke from the election has cleared, could such a stable, pragmatic government with an admittedly small majority in the Bundesrat be built.

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Prof. Dr. Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte is Professor of political science at the University of Duisburg-Essen and a former DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow.
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This essay appeared in the October 7, 2005 AICGS Advisor and was translated by Matthew Wiggins.
For the original German version, please click here.