At the Threshold of Historic Change
By John C. Kornblum

When I first arrived in Hamburg as a young vice consul exactly forty years ago, every aspect of public life appeared to be frozen in a sort of postwar Eistorte. Lots of whipped cream covered a solid, tasty, but frozen center.

The father of the Wirtschaftswunder, Ludwig Erhard, was re-elected easily the next fall. The Berlin Wall seemed to have sealed Europe's division more deeply than ever. German democracy was rock solid and America reigned supreme as Germany's saviour and civilizational model.

Less than two years later, Erhard had been toppled, Ostpolitik was at the top of the political agenda, Germany was experiencing its first postwar recession, America's image was tarnished by Viet Nam, and the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) had come out of nowhere to question the stability of German democracy.

An old and experienced observer later told me, "Germany always takes a long time to change, but when things get bad enough, change comes rapidly and dramatically. You can never tell which way it will go. "

The next few years more than proved this prediction to be true. By the mid-1970s Germany's mood and government had changed almost beyond recognition. Peace, detente and the welfare state replaced the firm conservatism of the postwar period.

I cannot help think of these days as I puzzle over the state of affairs in Germany in 2004. So much has changed, but so much remains the same. The advice I received as a young man still sticks in my mind: "You can never tell which way it will go."

The coming years are likely to mark a defining moment in modern world history. Europe's future will depend considerably on the behaviour of its strongest and most central nation.

One might say that realization of the Western democratic vision for the world depends on Germany's ability to remain a strong and confident partner in both Europe and across the Atlantic.

This is why there is once again so much interest in Germany's ability to reform. What will define the behavior of a nation still struggling to recover national self-confidence and pride? Where will Germany find the resilience to deal successfully with the challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War and the drastic erosion of its postwar social/economic model?

And how does a nation dependent to an astonishing degree on the behaviour of the United States, overcome a drastic decline in trust with Washington and remain the European anchor of the Atlantic world?

As 2004 comes to a close the answers to these questions are not clear.

Many Germans would argue that I am asking the wrong questions. They would say that Germany has moved beyond the need for traditional definitions of national pride and individual achievement. They would argue that Europe has built a new sense of identity based on consensus, rule of law and social equality. This, rather than the Atlantic community will increasingly serve as a model for the rest of the world.

Perhaps so. But the major questions remain. The postwar consensus is no longer producing satisfactory results. Lacking a sense of national urgency, many Germans seem not yet convinced that renewal is more important than personal comfort. Germany's leaders still seem to be more interested in winning their own internal party battles than winning the battle for a true reform of the system.

How is Germany going to restore economic strength? How can it provide a vision for Europe and beyond? .

Management experts teach us that the first step towards fundamental change is to undergo a reality check. It is essential to understand the real reasons for problems before one can solve them. Leaders must establish a commitment to renewal that convinces voters and employees that change will make things better.

Germany does not yet seem to have faced its realities. As the postwar economic miracle fades away, Germany seems to have lost energy and direction. Self-doubt is widespread. Without a sense of direction, public debate is stuck at the level of an unending TV talk show, with no beginning and no end.

But the story doesn't end here. Change comes slowly in Germany, but it does happen. Germans have developed mechanisms to compensate for this national fear of the unknown. To judge the chances for success, it is important to understand the special German road to change.

In a nation traumatized by violent upheavals, voters seem to demand an emotional insurance policy before accepting change. This insurance must promise that new methods will not undermine the social and economic stability, which is so important to their special postwar sense of self.

New ideas must be sold as not really changing anything. Change must be seen as a method of strengthening stability, not as a new way of doing things. German politicians have become adept at making new ideas sound like old ones. In the words of Konrad Adenauer: "No experiments."

A current example of this phenomenon is the tone of political and economic writing in Germany. With a few notable exceptions, authors focus on the inevitability of collapse. Germany's economy is destined to decline, the Chinese will rule the world, and America is finished as a great power.

There are few grand visions for a new future. Instead, readers are warned that if they do not move quickly, their comfortable world will collapse around them. Motivation is negative rather than positive.

However strange this discussion may sound to outsiders, it seems to be serving an important purpose within Germany. Belief in the old stability is wearing away. As 2004 comes to an end, the most important question is not whether there is going to be change, but how it will come and which direction it will take.

Fifteen years after the end of the cold war, we are starting to understand that history will never end. A reunified Germany cannot be a large Switzerland. An enlarged EU will probably change fundamentally. A post 9/11 America will never be the predictable partner of the Cold War era.

Thus, it is too simple to claim that Germany has been ruined by social welfarism. Or that loosening work rules and lowering taxes will solve most of the problems. Or that Europe would be a world power if it could just learn to speak with one voice. Or that if only President Bush hadn't been re-elected, German-American relations would again be harmonious.

More important is to understand the psychological difficulty Germany is experiencing in moving from a traumatized past to a modern, self-confident future.

Such a process is slow and painful. The public's capability for critical analysis is clouded by its continued acceptance of the deadening slogans of consensus politics. Much time is being lost and Germany's future directions are still unclear.

Yet there do seem to be at least two hearts beating in the German breast. Traditional values of hard work, innovation and ambition are also still strong. As the 1960s and 1970s recede, younger generations seem increasingly to seek individual rather than collective identities. They are looking outward. They find more vision in Asia and the United States than in an increasingly inward-looking Europe.

A good example is the fact that the German public was much quicker to identify with the popular movement in Ukraine than was the government. .

As a young SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) leader told me recently: "My generation cannot work with persons over forty-five. We just look for ways of keeping them from doing too much damage."

The unrelenting drumbeat of critical analysis from German sources is having an effect.

If the bad news of 2004 is that Germany has not yet turned the corner, the good news is that the public is now coming to see the value of change to an extent not thought possible even two years ago.

Changes are evident to anyone who wishes to see them. It now even seems possible for political leaders to describe themselves as German patriots or to express pride and even love for their country.

A French journalist friend recently told me that he felt refreshed every time he came to Germany. There may be problems, he said, but at least change and reform are now at the top of the agenda. In France, these issues are still being repressed.

Those seeking to understand the current state of Germany would probably do well to ignore most of the current political debate. In every country, political jousting is the final line of defence, before change breaks through. Much of the talk show discussion is designed to obfuscate rather than enlighten. It is more important to look below the surface and observe how individual Germans are reacting to the pressure for change.

Real change cannot be legislated. Governments tend to follow public opinion rather than create it. Ronald Reagan did not begin change in America in the 1980s. He sensed a mood and brilliantly convinced the American people that change would make their lives better.

The same sort of mood is building in Germany. We are reaching the point where the dangers of inaction are becoming impossible to ignore. This suggests that when change comes, it will be rapid. An important new chapter will be added to Germany's national consciousness, as it was by Willy Brandt in 1972 and Helmut Kohl in 1990. But as I learned many years ago, "You can never tell which way it will go."

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This article appeared previously in German in the German magazine Handelsblatt on December 23, 2004 (p. 3). It was published in English in the January 12, 2005 AICGS Advisor.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.