Europe and the Radars
By John Kornblum

Haven't we been here before? The United States believes Western security requires that radar systems for anti-missile defense be stationed in Central Europe.  The Russian President makes a dramatic statement against the idea. Fearing conflict, public opinion all over Western Europe chastises the Americans for upsetting the Russians.

Rather than supporting Chancellor Merkel's idea to focus discussion in NATO, where it belongs, many Europeans demanded that the matter be raised at the EU summit. They wanted the EU to separate itself from the U.S. on this issue. They wanted the new EU members who accepted the American proposal to be disciplined. They expected that the EU reject this latest American outrage as a threat to peace.

These emotions remind us of the crisis in the 1980s over NATO's dual-track decision on medium range missiles. The psychological similarities between the two issues are uncanny, but the differences are equally as great. Today's weapon is not aimed at Russia, but against far-away Iran. Europe is no longer divided and Russia is no longer a totalitarian power with hundreds of thousands of troops stationed in Germany. The radars are important for the protection of Israel, whose security should be one of Europe's highest priorities.

The emotions will soon subside. Left behind will be two unfortunate consequences:  solidarity among NATO and EU partners has little chance if Europeans erupt publicly each time the Russians warn of dire consequences from this or that Western action.   Europeans will continue to be divided among themselves over how to deal with Russia and increasingly with the U.S. Even worse, the EU could continue to separate into pro-U.S. and pro-Russian factions.

Of longer term concern is the steady loss of confidence in Europe's leadership abilities. There are many people, myself included, who are convinced the world would be a safer place if the European members of NATO would play a larger role in defining Atlantic security policy. But there are just as many who doubt that Europe is up to the job.

At the moment, America is not providing the necessary leadership. The Bush administration even admitted to The New York Times that it has neglected relations with Russia and is now trying to make them better. European engagement inside NATO, where it can have a direct effect, is desperately needed. It will become even more important as America's Iraq engagement begins to wind down. What is Europe's strategy for this dangerous next phase in the Middle East? We all know the answer. There isn't one.

The uproar about the radars demonstrates why European allies do not have more influence in NATO. Simply demanding an equal voice does not work. The Europeans bring too little to the table. Publicly disagreeing with the Americans may feel good, but it is not leadership and does not demonstrate either independence or self-confidence as some like to argue. Trying to organize a competing event within the EU only reduces Europe's influence where it really matters - affecting American behavior.

Leadership is the result of strategic vision and the ability to forge common action among partners. Building this foundation for leadership is of more long term importance to Europe than is convincing Russia to maintain a smooth supply of oil and gas. There are many sources of oil, and Russia will think twice before risking the important European market. A Europe that is confident of its Atlantic links will influence both American and Russian behavior more easily than will a fearful one.

A senior German official told me recently that his main concern about Europe's future global role was just this. Europeans seem to have forgotten the art of strategic thinking. They have yet to relearn the skill of building a strategic road map which would help ensure that they do not lose their way in the thicket of uncertainties that has come to characterize our modern world.

The current European state of mind has been described well by Professor Werner Weidenfels, who calls it "situational thinking." Longer term interests are defined by the needs of the moment. Europe needs Russian gas. Thus, opposing the Iraq War or avoiding conflict with Russia becomes more important than preserving Western solidarity. Whatever the value of missile defense, it must be opposed if it upsets Putin.

Perhaps the real similarity between 2007 and 1982 is not the weapons or even the Russians. Ronald Reagan upset the Europeans in the 1980s just as George Bush did in 2002 and 2003. Both talked loudly and rather aggressively about military action against the "evil empire/axis of evil." Both spread the impression that they would consider unilateral military action. George Bush actually did it.

But more than twenty years have passed since the INF debate. Europe has been reunified and communism defeated. One would have thought that Western Europeans could react more calmly to the recurring Russian-American verbal duels. The real disappointment of 2007 is that this is not the case.

Ambassador John Kornblum is a former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, an AICGS Trustee, and Chairman of Lazard and Co. GmbH.

This essay appeared in the March 30, 2007, AICGS Advisor.  The original version appeared in German in the March 12, 2007, Handelsblatt, and is available by clicking here.