Not Quite Quiet on the Western Front
By Dr. Karl Kaiser

Can new circumstances enable a new beginning in transatlantic relations?

The G8 Summit in Heiligendamm revealed circumstances that had been brewing for some time and whose further development may have long-term consequences for transatlantic relations. Primarily, it is important to note the changes on the U.S. side. Particularly since the reelection of George W. Bush, the dramatic failure of the neo-conservative revolution has brought about a turnaround in foreign policy. The illusory idea of using U.S. power to remodel the world according to one's own agenda, topple regimes, and impose democracy has led to the catastrophe of a seemingly never-ending Iraq war, the strengthening of Iran, the imminent destabilization of the Middle East, and a long-term conflict with radical Islam, let alone the electoral defeat of the Republican majority and an intra-party rebellion.

Thus feeling the limits of U.S. power, President George Bush has rediscovered the value of allies and has once again acknowledged the importance of the previously neglected NATO alliance, particularly in dealing with Afghanistan. In addition, and in spite of neo-conservative criticism, he has revived support for European integration and also moved towards a formerly demonized multilateralism in cooperating with the "EU Three" on the issues of Iran and international jurisdiction, for example. Several architects of former policies have meanwhile left the administration. Moreover, domestic pressure against the refusal to adopt any effective climate policy whatsoever is very much on the rise.

Thus, the U.S. side has experienced changes which at least partially alleviate a return to the transatlantic unity that was destroyed by the Bush administration's former unilateral policies in general and the Iraq war in particular.

However, the run-up to the G8 Summit also saw the emergence of new alliances on the European side. The Iraq war's grave consequences for pan-Western interests took precedence over earlier differences in opinion about the initial handling of the war. In the face of an enhanced threat to common interests, the willingness to improve transatlantic relations was strengthened decisively. Transatlantic economic relations had at no point been affected by the political crisis anyway.

The replacement of the political leaders in both Germany and France, the principal opponents of the United States' Iraq policy has brought about a second development. Under the changed circumstances of the enduring debacle in Iraq, their position took on greater significance than Great Britain's support, which was appreciated, but taken for granted. The election of decidedly pro-U.S. Chancellor Angela Merkel created a new atmosphere for transatlantic cooperation, as she elaborated by means of skilful diplomacy on Gerhard Schröder's initial attempts to meet U.S. wishes for an improvement of relations. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy in France had a similar effect. He shares Angela Merkel's affection for America and has signaled the end of old Gaullist airs to lead Europe as a fundamental counterweight to the United States.

The resolution agreed upon at the G8 Summit expressed a decisive turnaround in U.S. climate politics, adopting a number of positions which had previously been dismissed by the Bush administration, namely the recognition of climate change as a political problem of global survival, the commitment to a substantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and the agreement to a continuation of measures within the multilateral forum of the United Nations. This turnaround was made possible only because of a confluence of several factors  on the European side: the remarkable unity between the three large powers, Germany, France and Great Britain, their predisposition to pro-U.S. attitudes, and their explicit recognition of the United States' leadership. Added to this was the support of Japan, Russia, Canada, and Italy, as well as the masterly tour de force of the German chancellor and her diplomats, who made this difficult compromise possible through an adequate mixture of discretion and public pressure. The G8 resolution enabled the U.S. president, who was under tremendous pressure from home, to save face and take another decisive step down a path he had already begun to take: the return to multilateralism and transatlantic consensus.

This is certainly not the beginning of an era of transatlantic harmony. Differences in opinion about Turkey, the further liberalization of trade and possibly, should President Putin's offer not lead to a détente, the problem of missile defense, will make sure of that. However, preconditions for further transatlantic cooperation have improved due to several factors: the United States' return to a multilateral approach regarding a problem of global significance, the renewal of a cooperative atmosphere between the United States and Europe, and the recovery of European unity on a decisive political question. The pressure exerted by international problems as well as domestic issues in the United States leading up to the next presidential elections should work the same way.

Professor Dr. Karl Kaiser is Ralph I. Straus Visiting Professor at Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs/ John F. Kennedy School of Government.

This article originally appeared in German in the July/August edition of Internationale Politik, which can be accessed by clicking here (PDF). This version, which was translated into English by Anke Irgang, appeared in the June 22, 2007, AICGS Advisor.

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After the Summit, By Dr. Jackson Janes, June 8, 2007.