Tu felix Francia! The German Debate over the EU Constitution
By Dr. Markus Kaim

In the past weeks, history once again resonated through the halls of the Bundestag, at least from the vantage point of the decision makers, as the German parliament debated the ratification of the European constitutional treaty. Across party lines, mention was made of a "historic document" and a "crowning achievement" of German postwar politics that had no true alternative. Finally, the foreign minister warned darkly that a relapse into nationalism and barbarism loomed, should the treaty fail to be ratified. A true debate, however, took place neither in the parliament nor among the German public: The consensus among the parties, which referred to the reason of state, swept away any critique, however carefully worded, and even the twenty-three members of the Bundestag who withheld their consent seemed uncomfortable in their own skins, so diffidently and weakly did they recite their misgivings.

Given the fact that the constitutional treaty is meant to be one more building block on the way to a "Europe of citizens," the main paradox of Germany's Europe-policy once again reveals itself: The diffuse consensus on European policy in the Federal Republic, which posits that everything that is European is good in one way or another, stigmatizes any critique, however delicate, of the European project as rooted in the most cataclysmic era of German foreign policy and directly ensures that the German public would rather debate about grasshoppers ["Heuschrecken-Debatte" i.e. the capitalism debate started by the SPD Chairman Müntefering] than be interested in the vital European questions. Only 11 percent of Germans claim they have heard of the constitutional treaty and know some of its contents.

And yet it is not necessary to be an extremist, in order to consider a few aspects of the constitutional treaty as at least worthy of discussion. So it is quite appropriate to point out that the expansion of the majority vote in the Council of the European Union can also mean that the German government must, if need be, subordinate itself to a will which is not that of the German sovereign. Therefore, it should absolutely be allowable to have doubts about the idea of a European constitution, since the terminology alone suggests a finality of the integration process that would have grave consequences for the constitutional order of the Federal Republic, namely, the evolution from a European confederation of states to a federal state. And finally, anyone who wishes to refuse further rounds of EU enlargement must inherently be against the constitution, since the treaty is meant to give the EU that institutional form which will prepare it for the admission of further members. In this sense, the connection drawn between the EU Constitution and Turkey's accession in the debate, is not, after all, without a basis.

How lucky, on the other hand, must the French population count itself! For months now there has scarcely been another topic that has dominated the political debate in France and polarized the French sovereign as this one has. The streets are brimming with the parties' posters, the media currently know no other topic, and the political elite is forced to give the citizens an accounting of the goals, contents, and perspectives of the contract. If the constitutional treaty truly is the vital European question posited by German politicians, then at least the French have grasped its momentousness and are honoring it with passionately controversial debates accordingly. These might not always stay within the factual and non-populist channels many wish for but such is the price that must be paid for a Europe of citizens that is more than just an object of Sunday sermons.

So the German federal elites are anxiously looking to the outcome of the French referendum on May 29, 2005, for which all polls predict a very narrow result and where rejection cannot be ruled out as the final outcome. And what does it mean for Europe, if the French make use of their sovereign right to refuse a cross-national contract, which is after all what the EU constitutional treaty is? And what if, after a similarly possible French approval, it is perhaps the British population that causes the ratification proceedings to shut down with its "no"? Will a grim era of nationalism and barbarism really befall Europe once again?

Not in the least. The day after, when the hangover will have slowly begun to dissipate, the commissions' functionaries and the delegates of the member states will return to their cubicles and conference tables and the EU will continue to function on the basis of the Nice Treaty - sluggishly perhaps, inchoate, and with deficits. But for more than fifty years, exactly this has been the distinguishing mark of the European integration process, the fruits of which German politics never tire of praising. Europe will then remain a patchwork of differing depths of integration but that is exactly what it already is today: Some states do not participate in the euro zone, some not in the Schengen regime, some avoid the European security and defense policy, and a few members see the EU as nothing more than a large free trade area anyway.

And then the decision makers in Berlin will hopefully notice that overblown historical rhetoric cannot, in fact, replace actual answers to the central questions of the German Europe-policy and the integration process: Which institutional and constitutional form should the EU take? What is the unifying element that holds its members together - values, law, free trade, or security? And finally: Where should the political and territorial boundaries of this political community lie?

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This essay appeared in the May 19, 2005 AICGS Advisor, translated by Sarah Fichter.

For the original German version, please click here.