Talking to Islamists?
By Dr. Andreas Jacobs

The transatlantic debate over Islamist parties in the Middle East

The Israeli campaign against Hezbollah militias in Lebanon has again raised the question of how to deal with Islamist groups in the Middle East. Islamist parties have started their march into the political arena, not only in Lebanon, but also in other countries of the Middle East. The Palestinian Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt, and the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development are the most prominent examples of Islamist parties that are just about to change the political landscape of the region. This phenomenon bears the potential of becoming another cause of transatlantic contention over the Middle East. Political analysts, think-tankers and Middle East experts in Europe and the United States differ in their assessment of the political meaning of Islamism, of the role of Islamist parties in the democratization process and, consequently, in strategies for dealing with them. The following essay tries to identify and explain these differences and to show political options for a common strategy vis-à-vis the phenomenon of Islamism as a political player in the region.

The perception of Islamists: for God or for the people?
The crucial question of every assessment of Islamist parties is the question of ideology. Most observers agree that the political interpretation of Islam (i.e. Islamism) is the greatest ideological challenge the West faces today. Many would even agree that the political ideology of Islamism and the Western model of democracy are, by their very definition, antithetical. Transatlantic disagreement begins, however, when it comes to the question of whether Islamist parties are ultimately committed to a political ideology which wants to turn the world into an Islamic empire ruled by religious leaders and the Sharia, or if they rather aim at the establishment of a just political order based on the ethics of religion. Are Islamist parties really committed to the will of God (as the term "Islamist" suggests) or are they rather to be understood as socio-political movements wrapped in the language of political Islam? Many American scholars tend to the former understanding while most Europeans prefer to assume the latter.

Many in Europe argue that the public support for Islamist parties -- as was expressed by the landslide victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections -- cannot be understood as an ideological statement. In fact, Hamas neither campaigned on its commitment to an "Islamic state" nor on the issue of violent "resistance" against Israel. Opinion polls show that most Palestinians disagree with Hamas' ideology and support a two-state solution. It seems that for the Palestinian electorate this was not a vote for "Islam" but for a political movement that stood for change and justice, and was not associated with corruption and ineffectiveness. However, the same polls also show that most Palestinians accept the notion of "armed struggle" against Israel. Most American observers therefore argue that violence and the pledge for Islam (Hamas is the acronym for "Islamic Resistance Movement") are indispensable parts of Hamas' mission. The main U.S. perspective is that Hamas and Hezbollah field a private army, embrace violence as a political tool, regularly orchestrate terrorist attacks, and are dedicated to the destruction of Israel. It is thus not sufficient to say that Hamas's victory is simply a Palestinian popular response to Fatah's corrupt regime; instead it must be viewed as a victory for radical Islamism, as perceived by radical Islamists globally.

Obviously there is no simple answer to the question of whether Islamist parties are primarily committed to the case of God or to the case of the people. It seems that at least a certain percentage of Islamist activists and many of their supporters are quite uncertain about this issue. While most Islamist parties harbor hardcore ideologists, pragmatic idealists, and power-politics-oriented realists all at the same time, it is quite useless to take ideology as the main argument to make general statements about Islamist parties. Instead, the only reasonable criteria to differentiate between Islamist groupings Western governments should talk to and those they should not talk to seems to be the use of violence. Here -- and this has been made clear by the common Western response to the Hamas victory -- the transatlantic gap is much smaller. There is a broad consensus that Western governments can neither recognize nor support governments or political parties unless they meet the minimum standards set by the international community.

The political role of Islamists: Midwives or undertakers of democracy?
The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 also points to a structural problem of democracy promotion in the Middle East. With elected Islamists assuming political posts in parliaments, municipal councils and governments, Western democracies are confronted with the dilemma of dealing with democratically legitimized political actors which are considered to be anti-democratic by many observers. It is no wonder that uneasiness has been the primary response in both in the United States and Europe to Islamists' role as political players. Although it is clear that democracy promotion has to be both, morally sound and in-line with other policy objectives, the general question is this: are Islamist parties part of the solution to the Middle East's democracy deficit or part of the problem? Here again, the debate in Europe and the United States is going in different directions.

In the dominant European understanding, Islamist parties are about much more than mere opposition and expression of ideological extremism. They also draw on deep roots in society and represent a certain tendency of political thinking that has to be acknowledged when the idea of democracy is taken seriously. Europeans tend to explain the public support for Islamist parties with the wish for good governance instead of with the wish for an Islamist political system. Islamist thinking, they argue, is not representative of mainstream Arab politics. But Islamists had the comparative advantage of a political infrastructure (mosques) and could therefore establish themselves as the only alternative to the corrupt and autocratic regimes of the region. The anti-Western tone of Islamists is often explained (or excused) with the argument that the West promoted the autocratic regimes Islamists seek to counter.

Most U.S. analysts agree that the West failed in democracy promotion in the Middle East, but they draw different conclusions. In the U.S., the broad view is that the election of Hamas will not go down in history as an example of the global march toward democracy but as another instance of the "one person, one vote, one time" syndrome. In the U.S. there is little understanding of the European assumption that the way to democracy might be paved with Islamists. For most observers in Washington, quite the opposite seems to be the case: once Islamists secure their position or come into power, they will show their true anti-democratic face. An Islamist government of any Arab state would only threaten regional stability since it considers itself part of a broader transnational movement that aims at undermining the governments of other Arab states. Even as a legal or illegal opposition, Islamist parties are seen as a burden to the democracy process in the region; if the only well-organized opposition is from Islamists, the regimes have good arguments domestically and internationally to maintain the status quo. From this perspective the consequence is clear: only a strong liberal opposition, a "Third Way" between autocracy and Islamism, could ultimately guarantee a rise of democracy in the region. The bad historical conscience about supporting authoritarian regimes should not lead to the support of another form of authoritarianism. Instead, the West should rather promote real democrats.

Due to the fact that it is difficult to say what Islamist parties really want, one can only speculate about their commitment to democracy. For the policy making process vis-à-vis Islamist parties, a third aspect seems to be important. As Michael Herzog pointed out in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, the co-optation of Islamist parties through democratic participation is not a given, but rather depends on the existence of certain conditions in the specific political context. It seems that at least two conditions have to be met for democratic moderation to occur: a stable and relatively free political system and a strong counterbalance to the Islamists in this system. Thus, Islamist parties are not the necessary condition of a democratization process, but if certain conditions are met they do not form a structural problem to democratization either.

The strategy vis-à-vis Islamists: Let them try or let them fail?
The Israeli campaign against Hezbollah came as a surprise to many European observers. For them there was still enough room for negotiations and a fair chance that Hezbollah could change its position towards Israel and become a "normal" player on the political chessboard of Lebanon. Most American commentators in contrast have little understanding for such pious hopes. Although the degree of understanding for the scope of Israel's response to provocations of Hezbollah varies significantly in the U.S., there is the general assessment that the disappearance of Hezbollah would be a good thing for Lebanon and the whole region. This difference gives an example of the general debate over the right strategy of how to deal with Islamists. While most European analysts would opt for a strategy that gives Islamist parties a chance to assume a political role, to moderate and to transform, most of their American colleagues would rather see them fail as soon as possible.

The European preference for a strategy of "let them try" generally points to the example of Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco. Here, Islamists finally adapted to the existing political systems and became legal opposition or ruling parties. However, the record shows that the few examples of moderation of Islamist parties only occurred after decades of evolution in countries that enjoyed strong institutions, powerful security apparatuses, and a supreme guarantor of the political system. Advocates of "let them try," argue, however, that political activity will ultimately moderate Islamist movements and transform them into authentic democratic forces. They point to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and even Hamas and Hezbollah have demonstrated political pragmatism and showed their willingness to participate within the bounds of the political establishment. After all, many Europeans think that there is nothing more educational and transformational than running a government in a developing country. From this perspective, a policy of confronting Islamist parties appears likely to make these movements more popular, while the West receives the blame for being soft on its own call for democracy. Consequently, some prominent politicians in Europe have already called for closer contacts with Islamists. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder already commented that Europe should engage in direct negotiations with Hamas.

Though former U.S. president Jimmy Carter has also been quoted with the statement "give Hamas a chance," this is a minority position in the U.S. Most of the observers argue that instead of moderating the radicals, the West should rather empower the moderates. As the thinking goes, the right way for dealing with not only Hamas but also with other Islamist parties is to create basic conditions for their political activities as intolerable as possible and let them fail by exposing their weaknesses. Consequently, Western politics should concentrate on doing everything possible to encourage the collapse of Hamas, thereby speedily and spectacularly undermining the appeal of the Islamist model. This includes a strict line of non-negotiation, as this would only help their cause and lead to a rift in the international alliance against terrorism. Within this general line there are different positions about concrete measures. Some hope that Hamas will split between those who favor good governance and those who are largely motivated by a terrorist agenda. Furthermore, there is a widespread consensus that the cut of budgetary aid is legitimate and appropriate while humanitarian aid should be continued. Humanitarian aid is almost entirely channeled through NGOs, private voluntary organizations, and UN bodies. Therefore it is less likely to be interpreted as an implicit legitimization of Hamas' rule. The issue of humanity is also an issue of realpolitik. The West cannot afford the risk of being seen in the broader Middle East as trying to starve Palestinian children. For some in the U.S., even this gives the wrong signal, as it gives legitimacy to Hamas and weakens the international consensus.

The general problem with the "let them fail" approach is that nobody knows if Hamas would disappear, even if they fail. On the other hand, the "let them try" approach might be misleading too. Hezbollah serves as an example that accession to government might not lead to a change of ideology or necessarily results in moderation. A possible chance to bridge the transatlantic gap is a mixed strategy which lends some time for change and imposes clear sanctions when such a change of behavior does not occur.

The transatlantic approach: Talk over talking!
The sober truth is that there are no good options in dealing with Islamist parties. The choice is between bad and worse. But in order to achieve the bad rather than the worse, the transatlantic policy community should engage in a debate over the issue of talking to Islamist parties. Many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have already called for a closer transatlantic dialogue regarding the criteria of talking to Islamists, while others have proposed precise benchmarks and a checklist. In order to discuss concrete strategies and criteria it might be useful to overcome general misperceptions first. Many differences are in fact perceived and not necessarily real. U.S. commentators frequently speak about a "possible" European readiness to deal with Hamas. Even after the EU Council decided to stop budgetary aid to the Palestinian authorities, it seemed to be a given fact to many U.S. commentators that the Europeans were dealing with Hamas and giving money to them. In fact, most European observers have realized that having Hamas in power is different from having Hamas in politics. The Middle East peace process has been a key part of the EU's collective foreign policy strategy. Hamas' rejection of that vision - in their view - jeopardizes years of careful and persistent diplomacy.

But misperceptions are not an American privilege. Europeans generally suspect their U.S. colleagues of categorically running a course of confrontation on Islamist parties. This view generally ignores the lively U.S. debate over this issue. In fact there is a lot of transatlantic convergence on the Hamas issue. Contrary to common impression, the EU and the U.S. positions remain committed to a common position with regard to Hamas. Chancellor Merkel made clear that Hamas has to recognize Israel's right to existence without any "ifs and buts" before financial cooperation between the EU and Palestinian authorities can be continued.

The next challenge is to find a strategy that is sound and coherent. It is logical that conditions for dialogue and cooperation with Islamist parties can only be established when one is ready to offer a reward if these conditions are met. In this regard, the Europeans are technically more coherent in their Hamas policy. The EU gave a clear signal that there will be dialogue and eventually cooperation if Hamas meets certain criteria. The U.S. meanwhile is pushing an ambiguous agenda in demanding change on the one hand and sending general signs of mistrust of such a change on the other hand. The transatlantic community should be clear if it prefers a categorical "no" or a conditional "yes." It cannot have it both ways. Likewise, Islamist parties have to be confronted with the fact that they must make clear decisions. Hezbollah had its chance for change, but it passed up this chance. It might be true that other Islamist groups will not change either, but they should at least be given the chance to do so. In that case, the transatlantic community should talk to them - and it should talk with one voice.

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Dr. Andreas Jacobs is the Middle East Coordinator of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin. His areas of responsibility include political consulting, research, and preparatory work for the Foundation's activities regarding Islam and Muslim countries.  He was also recently a Die Zeit/AICGS Fellow in June of 2006.

This essay appeared in the August 3, 2006 AICGS Advisor.