After the EU Summit: Pause or Plateau?
By Michael Hanpeter

Where does Europe go from here? Today's Europe, whatever its many successes, possesses no viscerally-compelling, integrative vision comparable to that of the "founding fathers," who had lived through the disasters of World Wars I and II and who were determined to make future European civil wars impossible.

The recently-concluded European Union Brussels Summit presented a sober picture of the current state of Europe, in spite of the best efforts of Chancellor Merkel and other European leaders, notably newly-elected President Sarkozy, to overcome resistance to deeper integration, especially in foreign affairs. A fundamental question arises: has European integration effectively reached a set of qualitative limits, with further progress to be limited to working the margins of technical and procedural regulations?

This is not to underestimate Europe's greatest achievement of all - maintaining peaceful, productive relations among its members for over half a century. The question is whether this noble achievement will continue to provide sufficient motivating force for today's generation the way it did for their parents and grandparents. What, if any, are the unifying symbols to which today's generation of politicians and public are attached? Clearly, the economic stability and increased prosperity which the EU has provided the citizenry of the member countries have been enormously important. Still, they are hardly symbols in themselves.

Reactions to real or perceived cultural homogenization in the age of globalization reflect reawakened awareness of national identity in Europe (and elsewhere). Some of this sentiment has been directed to the EU itself. Economically and financially, things look fine. Harmonization of technical standards, a common currency for much of the region, increased economic integration, easy movement of capital, and ease of movement across national borders under the Schengen Protocols are all tangible benefits to EU citizens. In contrast, labor remains less mobile than capital, particularly for new members. New members also chafe at restrictions on full market access for their products.

The more the EU expands beyond its original Carolingian core, the lower the common denominator of a shared sense of purpose will be. Changes in the larger cultural and political fabric are inevitable byproducts of growth. Proliferation of multiple national outlooks, disparate interests, histories, motivations, and expectations increase the proclivity for national annoyances to become more apparent in a larger EU. Older members are noticeably impatient, for example, with newer members' skepticism and hesitation about how business is done.

So, how do these factors add up? There's no need to fall into the trap of binary thinking. It's not a question of whether the EU stops expanding and deepening or not. A more appropriate inquiry may be how the EU will grow in the future and the pace at which it will grow. The current situation may be described as a momentary plateau, but it is certainly not an end-state. Nonetheless, widening and deepening may not always keep pace with each other. Phases of consolidation to enable deepening may be preferable to geographic expansion. That approach inevitably evokes the charge of the larger and older members pursuing a "multi-speed" Europe. Deepening contains other internal - and controversial - dynamics because it necessarily raises questions about how federal Europe should become, and specifically, how much residual national sovereignty should remain with the individual members. On a theoretical level, this is a nearly insoluble problem since sovereignty has long been considered indivisible.

Can Europe continue to grow and deepen in the absence of a unifying myth and an accompanying set of supranational symbols? How does the United States fit into the equation - or does it fit? How relevant is the U.S. in Europeans' perceptions and awareness? Have the strained relations between the U.S. and Europe, particularly during the first Bush term, improved, or is the apparent restoration of calmer relations more an indication of indifference than rapprochement?

It is safe to say that at the extremes Europe will neither disintegrate, nor will it become a United States of Europe. It will far more likely move to further integration within a general set of limits however conditioned by ever-changing public expectations. After the Dutch and French rejection of the draft EU Constitution, political leaders in both the member states and the EU bureaucracy will need to keep in better touch with their several bases. If they get too far in front of their constituents, they will run the risk of popular blowback with charges of EU institutions being anti-democratic.

It would be a mistake for Americans to underestimate the many accomplishments of the EU and to worry excessively about where the EU will go from here. Americans have traditionally supported a stronger Europe, and there's no indication they're changing that view. For their part, European politicians need to engage their publics more actively in discussing both what Europe is to remain, and what it is to become, in a changing world. However that discussion proceeds, it is reasonable to think that leaving Europe's fortunes hostage to continued economic prosperity and momentum alone, especially in aging societies, isn't a dependable long-term strategy. Is it also reasonable to assume that the array of new political leadership in Europe, particularly in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, will be able to meet the multifaceted challenge of "Quo vadis, Europa?"

This essay appeared in the September 27, 2007, AICGS Advisor.