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The Merkel Miracle? The Promising Beginnings of a Readjusted German Foreign Policy
By Dr. Christian Hacke-Page Two- 4. Germany's role in world politics
As a fourth priority, Chancellor Merkel strives for a greater German role in Europe and the world - not just as a civil power, as Red/Green was fond of putting it, but also according to the fundamental principles of economic and power politics. She abandoned Mr. Schröder's ambitious and futile campaign for a permanent German seat at the UN Security Council. There is no more loose talk about building a multipolar world with the UN at its center in order to constrain the U.S. (9) There is some continuity to Red/Green, however, in terms of security policy and commitment to the war on terror. Ms. Merkel fully supports the German contribution in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and on the Balkans. She recognizes the importance of military means in the fight against terrorism, but just like Red/Green, she proposes a greater emphasis on political and economic means in order to fight the roots of terrorism. Her stance on Israel is distinctly friendlier than Mr. Schröder's was. He did not visit Israel until years after taking office, while Ms. Merkel already went there, showing great understanding for Israel's interests and its difficult and insecure situation. She follows in Konrad Adenauer's great tradition of friendship and reconciliation with the state of Israel and the Jewish people. (10) Her demands on Hamas to acknowledge Israel's right to exist, to cease the violence, and to seriously engage in the peace process, have generated wide agreement and great sympathy in Israel. Still, she kept in line with the balanced policy of the EU, expecting from Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. UN resolution 242 and the Venice EU declaration of June 12/13, 1980, which was heavily influenced by German foreign minister Genscher, remain valid today. Regarding Iraq, Ms. Merkel keeps the promises made: Germany supports the creation of democratic and economic structures, including a free press, trains Iraqi military and police forces as well as (university) teachers and engineers, and releases Iraq from 4.5 billion Euros in debt. German military, however, will not be deployed in Iraq. In Asia, Ms. Merkel realizes the growing importance of this region, especially the enormous potential of China and India, but also the Japanese renaissance. Ms. Merkel is aware of Japan's economic resurgence and agile diplomacy that create a new scope of action in the region and towards the U.S. It is no accident, Ms. Merkel knows, that the U.S. supported the Japanese desire for a permanent seat at the Security Council from the beginning, while turning its back on the German plan. Thus, the early steps of Ms. Merkel's foreign policy can be interpreted as a transatlantic renewal in light of the Pacific challenge. Ms. Merkel understands that in a unipolar world, economic strength and a clear and united vision can only reap benefits if pursued side by side with the U.S. This cost-benefit analysis of German foreign policy is realistic. Also, Ms. Merkel's clear-eyed rhetoric of economic reform in Germany and Europe is a pleasant deviation from the usual European wishful thinking about a "socially acceptable globalization." Globalization created a new era of competition in which Germany lost its powerful and reliable role of Cold War times. Ms. Merkel embraces the spirit, the challenge, and the opportunity of this competitive era of globalization, and this is the first step in building a Germany and a Europe more secure, more prosperous, and more influential. 5. Germany and the Iran crisis
So far, diplomacy has not failed in the Iran crisis. But what happens if negotiations ultimately break down? To her credit, Angela Merkel does not rule out a military option and warns against a failure of nerve. The leadership of the Social Democrats, however, has publicly ruled out any military action against Iran. So what might happen if Israel or the U.S. tried to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities? Would one of the first casualties be the coalition government in Berlin? Foreign minister Steinmeier (SPD) declared he was dead-set against any military option, but many voices in the CDU think this attitude a tactical mistake: "There is no reason to relieve Iran of this uncertainty." (11) The disagreements surrounding the Iranian nuclear program could not only dismantle the Berlin coalition but could bring escalation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq, and the clash of civilizations that became evident in the cartoon controversy. The steady supply of oil would be endangered, spelling economic catastrophe for the West. Paradoxically, this is exactly why Ms. Merkel has to insist on the military option - there is no other way to force Iran to comply. The chancellor's customary trips around the world have shed much flattering light on Angela Merkel, while the SPD has been living in the shadows. Accordingly, chairman Platzeck and minister Steinmeier seize the opportunity of Iran to sharpen their profile - possibly with disastrous consequences. Thus, the front line of Ms. Merkel's Iran policy runs straight through her own cabinet. It is of prime importance to her to keep the SPD from pulling another "Iraq"on Iran and the transatlantic relationship. 6. Conclusion
With reference to Niccolo Machiavelli's three aspects of a successful politician - fortuna, occasione, and virtu - one could argue that so far it was mostly Fortuna who smiled on Chancellor Merkel. (12) The first major occasion for determined and virtuous action will arise soon. It is not only Ms. Merkel who has gained considerable authority in matters of foreign policy, but also her foreign minister Steinmeier. Despite his involvement in the Iraq/CIA affair of the German secret service, he conducts himself carefully and is ready to strike useful compromises. In some key questions, however, he deviates from Ms. Merkel's line - most notably on Russia and Iran, but also regarding the U.S. Accordingly, Ms. Merkel's foreign policy is shaped by a dual need for balance. First, she needs to balance the Black/Red coalition. She needs the support of the Social Democrats on domestic issues as well as in foreign affairs. Consensus needs to be maintained, clear leadership must be exercised, and a readjustment of German foreign policy is imperative. So far, Ms. Merkel managed this complicated task without putting too much of a burden on her coalition partner. Still, there is a danger of a resurgence of the long-standing anti-American and pacifist impulses within the SPD and the German Left as a whole. Given the economic and political constraints, coalition politics is a balancing act between splitting up and stagnation. The second need for balance pertains to the increasingly complex international challenges. Germany needs to find its traditional role as a balancer, and nowadays, there is a lot to balance: 25 members of the European Union, the U.S. and Europe, Western and Eastern Europe, and the everlasting triangle of Paris, London, and Washington. The true challenge, however, is to pull off this balancing act while still pushing for change. Ms. Merkel must keep her eye on the goal of a united, Atlantic Europe that can entice Washington to pursue a less narrow policy. Chancellor Merkel has made some promising gestures, but the major tests for the Grand Coalition still lie ahead. Angela Merkel has steered Germany back on the right course - friendship with America, partnership with Russia, a competitive Europe in a globalizing world - but foreign policy always holds unsettling surprises that will neither spare Ms. Merkel's administration. .........................................................................................................
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Footnotes:
9. Christian Hacke, Neudeutscher Wilhelminismus. Die UNO-Politik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung: Von der Euphorie zur Ratlosigkeit, Internationale Politik No. 8, Vol. 60, August 2005, p. 56.
10. Vgl. Sven Berggötz, Nahostpolitik in der Ära Adenauer. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (1949-1963), Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1998; Niels Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben Gurion, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 2002.
11. Der Spiegel, February 13, 2006, p. 25.
12. Josef Joffe, Gestatten Merkel, Die Zeit, December 21, 2005, p. 1. .........................................................................................................
Dr. Christian Hacke is a professor at the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft und Soziologie at the University of Bonn and is a frequent participant in AICGS events. This essay appeared in the March 17, 2006 AICGS Advisor.
 
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