The Merkel Miracle? The Promising Beginnings of a Readjusted German Foreign Policy
By Dr. Christian Hacke

-Page One-

The first months of the Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Berlin were dominated by issues of foreign policy. Given Chancellor Schröder's preoccupation with domestic issues in the final stages of his Red/Green government and the bitter campaign fights about domestic economic reform, this is quite surprising.

It is Chancellor Merkel herself who is the driving force behind this development. Her conduct in Paris, Brussels, London, Rome, Warsaw, Washington, Moscow, and Tel Aviv was universally applauded as a convincing mixture of "friendly sobriety and smooth determination."(1) What are her priorities in foreign policy? Is there an emerging readjustment of the definition of the German national interest - and a change in the ways to pursue it?

1. Renewal of the domestic foundations of foreign policy
Ms. Merkel understands that foreign policy begins at home. Thus, her first priority is the strengthening of the German economy because without a prospering economic power, Germany's influence on world affairs can only be minimal.(2) She wants to reverse Germany's economic atrophy.

So far, however, the rather timid attempts at domestic reform by the Grand Coalition give reason to doubt her sincerity or at least her effectiveness. The 2006 budget, for instance, accumulates even greater debt than the preceding budgets. Even under a Black/Red government, Germany's economy continues to ail. This remains Ms. Merkel's greatest political challenge in the months to come.
 
2. Transatlantic Relations
Despite the lack of a discernible long-term vision in economic matters, Ms. Merkel is quick to try and repair the rifts which Mr. Schröder's foreign policy has left behind. For the first time in a long while, President Bush described Germany as a valuable ally and demonstratively sought political proximity with the new chancellor. "She loves freedom," President Bush said, impressed with Ms. Merkel's biography and the career history of this former physicist in communist Eastern Germany.(3)  It is this personal background that leads Ms. Merkel to call for a renewal of the transatlantic community of shared values and common action.

To this chancellor, America seems to be of even higher importance than it was to Helmut Kohl. He failed to do his part to fulfill President Bush Sr.'s promise of a "partnership in leadership," while Ms. Merkel declared in Washington: "Partnership in leadership was a great offer, and I believe that Germany has to continue to contribute to its realization in the years to come."

Nevertheless Ms. Merkel did not exactly throw herself into President Bush's arms but voiced distinct criticism. For instance, she clearly and openly enunciated the German position on Guantanamo. But even in doing so, her aim is not to offend, but to seek common ground. Therefore, her leadership could mark the beginning of a new chapter in German-American relations if Washington will show more willingness to inform, consult, and debate. Ms. Merkel confidently demands from Washington to refrain from a go-it-alone strategy; in exchange, she offers sincere cooperation and at least diplomatic support.

The cornerstone of Ms. Merkel's vision of renewed cooperation is NATO, where she would like to discuss the political, strategic, and military challenges ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan: She calls for a new strategic concept for NATO that reflects the realities and challenges of the 21st century. Thus, her new style in transatlantic relations becomes nowhere as evident as in her policy of political primacy for NATO. This reform proposal is in the tradition of Chancellor Schröder, and yet: It is her diplomatic sincerity and her new tone that enable Washington to think about the substance of this plan for greater cooperation and equality in the transatlantic relationship.

3. Revitalizing an Atlantic Europe
Ms. Merkel's third priority after strengthening the German economy and the transatlantic relationship is to revitalize Europe. But rather than achieving a more united Europe by distancing it from the U.S., Ms. Merkel chooses to recalibrate the German-French relationship.

During her visit in Paris, Ms. Merkel stressed the importance of German-French relations, was utterly friendly towards President Chirac, and respectfully acknowledged his nuclear threat against terrorists. However, she carefully omitted Mr. Chirac's term of a "German-French axis" from her own speech. Ms. Merkel knows that Mr. Chirac's time in office is coming to a close. This is why her current attitude of pleasant leniency is the most prudent course in French-German relations. At the same time, she is wisely engaging the French Interior Minister and probable successor of Mr. Chirac's, Nicolas Sarkozy.

During her visit in London, the chancellor also prudently kept her distance. Angela Merkel does not want to become anyone's "poodle." This distance, however, does not mean isolationism or unilateral action. To the contrary, in all capitals Ms. Merkel praises the advantages of open debate, consultation, and cooperation.

The Schröder administration was taken in tow by the clever French diplomacy. This as well as Mr. Schröder's supreme relationship with Russia's Vladimir Putin damaged the strong German ties to Central and Eastern Europe and the traditional German role of a balancer in Europe. Thus, Ms. Merkel is abandoning the anachronistic axis Berlin-Paris. She independently revived the stalling debate about the EU budget and managed to improve the German-Polish relationship at the price of an additional 100 million Euros. Determination, consultation, and balance are the appropriate means to overcome the foreign policy crises of Germany and Europe. Ms. Merkel vigorous pursuit of this goal could make her the senior leader in Europe at a much quicker pace than many assume today.

Where will Ms. Merkel lead Europe? Her call for another try at the constitutional process is not too serious. She knows that such enormous issues cannot be tackled before a change of government in other European countries, France and Great Britain in particular. This involuntary interim period must not lead to inaction. Most of all, Ms. Merkel is to develop a potent new policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. Not only Germany but the West as a whole has been too lenient with President Putin.

Ms. Merkel affirms the strategic partnership between Berlin and Moscow but her dispassionate and critical attitude contrasts sharply with that of Mr. Schröder. With Ms. Merkel, style and substance merge - she is fundamentally changing Germany's relationship towards the U.S. and Russia. While Chancellor Schröder lavished criticism on President Bush and praised President Putin as an "unblemished democrat," Chancellor Merkel sensibly reverses this: She is reconnecting with the U.S. and speaks of political continuity with Russia while simultaneously voicing her concern about the illiberal developments there. When in Moscow, she met with human rights groups and critics of the Russian President.(4)  She also talked to opposition politicians from Belarus in Berlin and invited the western-oriented President of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili. All this would have been unthinkable under Mr. Schröder.(5)  Red/Green did not fight for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe or the Caucasian region.

At the center of the Russian-European relationship is the question of energy policy. When at the end of last year, Russia unexpectedly reduced its gas exports to the West in order to discipline the Ukraine, the West felt reminded of Soviet times. This sparks fear and doubt in Germany, where energy dependency on Russia is increasing.(6)  Mr. Schröder is about to follow an invitation and become one of Gazprom's leading officials, but Ms. Merkel is concerned about Russia's energy policy - as is the majority of Western heads of state and government. Brussels, Kiev, and Berlin feel they share the same insecurity. In this context, the repeated calls at the World Economic Forum in Davos for a new common European energy policy and the increasing uneasiness about Russia's pipeline in the Baltic Sea are hardly surprising.

In Berlin, worries about a secure supply of energy are rising. However, the main alternative to Russian gas, nuclear power, is firmly opposed by Social Democrats and Greens who value the prospective abolishment of nuclear power plants in Germany as one of the few lasting achievements of their time in government. Germans, particularly of the SPD/Green Party brand, like to claim that American policy in the Middle East is solely determined by oil interests. Similarly, one must conclude that Germany's Russia policy was solely determined by gas interests.

Mr. Schröder with his personal friendship with President Putin and his self-serving ignorance towards restorative tendencies of the Kremlin pursued an uncritical Russia policy. Against this history, Angela Merkel is developing a new profile, demonstrating a true cosmo-European outlook despite the difficult political landscape: "NATO and the EU are the most successful alliances for common values and common security in recent history. This is one of the reasons why they will become an anchor of stability for the whole world."(7)  Statements like these, which embody a trans-european as well as a transatlantic perspective, signify the stark contrast between her and her predecessor. Consequently, Ms. Merkel wants to put the common European foreign and defense policy in closer relation with the framework of NATO.

The chancellor is devising a new Eastern European policy - in cooperation with and not against the U.S. Chancellor Brandt, Chancellor Schmidt, and foreign minister Genscher have increased German standing and influence in the East, and they did so while bringing the U.S. in. For quite some time, not the U.S. but Germany was the driving force behind détente and rapprochement with the heart of Europe.(8)  Ms. Merkel picks up on this tradition.

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Footnotes:
1. Günther Nonnenmacher, Erfolg mit kleinen Schritten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), February 3, 2006, p. 1.
2. Chancellor Merkel on February 3, 2006 at the Munich Security Conference: "The goal of my admini-stration is to make within the next ten years Germany one of the leading countries in the EU in terms of growth, employment, and innovation. Such domestic strength is the precondition for our strong in-ternational engagement and the sustainability of our responsibilities."
3. "It is no accident when one ascends from an assistant scientist in a regional institute to general sec-retary of a major party just to triumph over three well-established contenders within that party and gain the highest job in government." Henry Kissinger about Angela Merkel in: Die Welt, December 27, 2005.
4. Cf. FAZ, February 17, 2006, p. 2.
5. Cf., Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), February 3, 2006, p. 6.
6. Cf. NZZ, June 30, 2005, p. 5.
7. Chancellor Merkel at the Munich Security Conference, February 3, 2006.
8. Christian Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, München 20034, p. 148ff.