The Conservatives and the 2010 UK General Election: Implications for Germany and Europe
By Dr. Simon Green and Dr. William Paterson

The UK General Election on 6 May 2010 will go down in history as one of the most significant in the country's history. The election produced the first 'hung' parliament, in which no single party has an overall majority, since 1974. The resulting coalition between the Conservative party and the centrist Liberal Democrats not only represents the first formal participation of the latter in government since 1945, but the first 'minimal-winning' coalition (i.e. not a 'grand' coalition between the two largest parties) since universal suffrage was introduced in 1918. That said, what distinguishes this new British government from its predecessors is not so much the number of political milestones it represents but the scale of the challenges it faces, in particular in fiscal policy where the public sector deficit stands at almost 12 percent of GDP. Within that broader context, our focus here will be on the new government's European, foreign, and security policies, with special reference to Germany.

At first sight, the omens are not good. In a stark change from the 1960s and 1970s, when it was the leading proponent of Britain's entry to the EEC, the Conservative Party is now resolutely opposed to further European integration. This transformation has its roots firstly in Margaret Thatcher's premiership during the 1980s, and secondly in the party's evolution in opposition since 1997 (1). In turn, the latter has taken two main forms: On the one hand, its membership aged and shrunk significantly in size to under a quarter of a million (a trend of course common to most other established parties in Europe). On the other hand, several of its traditionally important constituent groups have virtually disappeared, notably business interests associated with manufacturing and the 'One Nation' group of moderate center-right MPs. Instead, the party, both at grassroots and in parliament, is now dominated by two core groups: the free-market libertarians and the socially-conservative wing. Crucially, both are firmly 'euro-skeptic,' with only individual exceptions. In practice, there is moreover a considerable overlap between the two groups, as typified by David Cameron, the new Prime Minister.

This process of intra-party concentration around a relatively narrow core not only amplifies the existing euro-skeptic predisposition, but also is one reason why the Conservatives' performance at the election was in fact relatively disappointing. Thus, the UK's new electoral map (see BBC News) shows very clearly that the Conservatives are increasingly concentrated in English rural areas and especially the wealthy hinterland of London in the southeast of England. The party holds only two seats within major cities outside London, and none in Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, Leeds, or Glasgow; it has just a single MP in Scotland. Second, the composition of the parliamentary party has become more homogenous: More than half of its current membership has been educated at the country's private schools, with Eton dominant in Mr. Cameron's opposition shadow cabinet. The single most common professional background is financial services. In short, the Conservative Party is not as broad a church as it used to be.

In policy terms, the Conservative Party's euro-skepticism means both that it rules out UK membership in the euro in perpetuity and actively supports the repatriation of powers from Brussels to the member-states. Unsurprisingly, this has created considerable tensions between the party and its European counterparts, notably Germany's CDU/CSU. These came to a head over the Conservatives' intentions to disassociate themselves from the European Peoples' Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, a move which was pledged by Mr. Cameron back in 2005 as part of his bid to become party leader. Following the 2009 European Parliament elections, this intention became reality, and the Conservatives now form a separate group in that legislature with what might benevolently be labeled as an eccentric collection of eastern European nationalists.

A further source of friction between the CDU/CSU and the Conservative Party was the Lisbon Treaty, which Mr. Cameron campaigned against right up until its entry into force on 1 December 2009. However, having initially promised a referendum on the treaty, even after the UK completed its ratification process in July 2008, Mr. Cameron was forced into an embarrassing retreat once the treaty's entry into law made such a referendum meaningless. This left many grassroots members feeling betrayed by their own party and represented an early warning to Mr. Cameron over the difficulty of reconciling his Party's ideological euro-skepticism with the realities of EU politics. As an instinctive euro-skeptic himself, Mr. Cameron is acutely aware of this and his appointment of William Hague, the former party leader from 1997 to 2001 and a leading right-winger, as the Foreign Secretary in the new government is a clear nod to the euro-skeptics within the party.

In principle, all of the above suggests that we are at the cusp of a potentially difficult era in British-German relations. However, there are a number of factors which indicate that this might not be the case.

First, the Lisbon Treaty clearly draws a line for the foreseeable future under the drawn-out institutional discussions within the EU. In that sense, the Conservative leadership will even feel some relief that it can plausibly consign that particular debate to the history books. What is more, the notion of a finalité in European integration, which was so enthusiastically discussed by European leaders in the first half of the last decade, has also been laid to rest since the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the German Federal Constitutional Court's ruling in 2009. Instead, other more practical matters, especially the financial stability of the euro zone and the future development of the internal market will dominate the agenda for the coming years, making it much less toxic for a Conservative-led government to work together with other member-states. The fact that Kenneth Clarke, the last heavyweight pro-European among active Conservative politicians, has been included in the new cabinet as Justice Secretary suggests that Mr. Cameron is prepared to move forward constructively on the EU issue. Lastly, with the next UK presidency not due until 2017, there is no immediate need for the new government to act as 'honest broker' in the interests of European integration, something many Conservatives would find frankly unpalatable.

Second, the debate over the Greek bailout, in which Germany found itself in the unaccustomed position of the most reluctant player, has exposed the degree to which Germany too has shifted in its engagement with the EU, with 'reflexive multilateralism' no longer the overriding priority (2). It is notable that Chancellor Merkel was only the second foreign leader, after President Obama, to congratulate Mr. Cameron on the very evening of his appointment. This gesture constitutes a clear olive branch to Mr. Cameron and indicates that Chancellor Merkel is herself keen itself to move on from the EPP disagreement in an attempt to counter pressure by France and others towards a system of economic governance which potentially entails even larger bailouts.

Third, there will be the desire to cooperate in areas of security policy. The new UK government is committed to maintaining defense spending and will also maintain its independent nuclear deterrent. Most of all, both countries remain heavily committed in Afghanistan, and the recent escalation of fighting in the German sector will help to bring the two governments closer together in adversity.

Finally, the moderating impact of the Liberal Democrats, which is now the UK's most ardent pro-European mainstream party, should not be underestimated. On Europe, the two parties have adopted a pragmatic line by ruling out the euro for the life of the current parliament and promising a referendum on further transfer of powers to Brussels, neither of which issue, for the reasons outlined above, is likely to appear on the agenda for the next few years. As a formal coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats and their leader Nick Clegg, himself a former Commission official and MEP, will be able to blunt some of the more excitable proposals that are sure to emerge at some stage from the Conservative parliamentary party, something which Mr. Cameron may in fact welcome privately. The presence of the Liberal Democrats in government will also reassure other EU member-states that the 'exit option,' which has some support within the Conservative Party, is not viable, thereby allowing UK proposals to be viewed in a somewhat kinder light.

In conclusion, the stage is set for a unique British political experiment. The fact that the Conservative party is more euro-skeptic than ever before makes it inevitable that some tensions on individual issues will emerge over the coming years. For instance, the background of many Conservative MPs in financial services will make them keen to resist any regulation at EU level of the City of London. Likewise, the Working Time Directive will remain a constant source of irritation. In particular, though, the upcoming discussions of the new EU financial perspective in 2012-13 can be expected to reopen old wounds over the Common Agricultural Policy and the UK rebate. But there are plenty of reasons to believe that outright conflict, of the kind that dogged the latter years of John Major's government between 1992 and 1997, can be avoided.

Ironically, the incoming government arguably even has a huge opportunity. The Labour government, much to the chagrin of countries such as Germany, steadfastly refused to go beyond building ad hoc and issue-related coalitions to construct longer-term partnerships in the European arena. Were the Conservative-led government to do so in order to advance the many policy issues in which the two countries have been and remain close, it could become one of the most constructive administrations in the history of the UK's membership of the EU. The formation of the coalition itself is a pertinent reminder that in very difficult times, policy positions hitherto regarded as unwelcome can suddenly become possible.

Footnotes:

1. For the most authoritative recent account of the party’s fortunes over the past twenty years, see Tim Bale, The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).

2. See William Paterson, ‘Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?’ German Politics 19(1): 41-52 (2010).

Dr. Simon Green is Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe, and Dr. William Paterson is Honorary Professor of German and European Politics at Aston University, UK. Both are regular contributors to the Advisor.

This essay appeared in the May 13, 2010, AICGS Advisor.