Expect the Unexpected: The 2010 Federal Assembly
By Dr. Simon Green
 

Among Germany's political institutions, the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung), which normally meets once every five years for the sole purpose of electing the Federal President, usually receives little attention, especially when compared to more visible actors like the Bundesrat. And yet, two factors combine to make the assembly a special part of the German polity. First, it represents the one occasion in German political life (other than state funerals, which are relatively seldom) when the entire political elite, including cabinet ministers, MdBs, Minister-Presidents, and other key actors at Länder level, plus a sprinkling of public figures, comes together under one roof. Second, the election of the president is by a secret ballot of the assembly's members, a process which is usually limited elsewhere in the political system to the election of a Land Minister-President or the Federal Chancellor.

As history shows, once a secret ballot is involved, things don't always go according to plan, even (or perhaps especially) when there is a notional majority backing the candidate in question. In 2005, Heide Simonis famously stood four times for election as Minister-President by the Landtag of Schleswig-Holstein, only to be denied on each occasion by a single and quite anonymous vote. And Angela Merkel herself was re-elected as chancellor in 2009 with nine votes fewer than her coalition government nominally commanded. Here too, the identity of the rebels from within her own camp remains unknown.

The fact that, on 30 June 2010, Christian Wulff needed a nine-hour marathon session of the Bundesversammlung involving all three rounds of voting in order to become Germany's tenth Federal President is therefore less surprising than it first seemed. Even so, the sense of shock, especially on Chancellor Merkel's face, was palpable when it transpired that Wulff had not won in the first round as had been widely predicted. What is remarkable, however, is the extent and persistence of the rebellion. In principle, the CDU/CSU and FDP blocs in the Federal Assembly had 644 votes - a comfortable majority on paper of 21 votes. Yet in none of the three rounds could the coalition mobilize its full voting complement, even allowing for the fact that four FDP delegates had declared in advance their intention to vote for Wulff's opponent, the widely-respected Joachim Gauck. Indeed, in the first round, no fewer than 44 delegates from the government bloc either failed to vote, spoiled their ballots, abstained, or voted for Gauck. In the second round too, and despite earnest meetings of the CDU/CSU and FDP groupings in the meantime, 29 delegates refused to toe the government line. Even in the final round, where only a simple majority of votes was necessary, Wulff scored 625 votes - still short of the government's total by 19.

Who was to blame? Inevitably, the recriminations started to abound as soon as the first round of voting was completed. The FDP categorically (and publicly) blamed the CDU/CSU. On the assembly's fringes, rumors quickly spread that defectors came from the CSU or the FDP (depending on who was spreading the rumors), while others claimed knowledge of a secret agreement among the market liberals in the CDU to give the chancellor a bloody nose. In truth, it could have been all, some, or none of these alternatives - we will of course never know unless the defectors from the party line choose to go public.

What of the implications of the events of 30 June? Undoubtedly, they have rocked the governing coalition: After a fairly torrid nine months of office, in which the coalition has been dogged by disagreements, procrastination and externalities, the election of the new president by a clear absolute majority in the first round (as was possible) was supposed to signal a new sense of unity and purpose to the electorate. That has now clearly not been achieved and Chancellor Merkel will now need a new way of invigorating her government. But by the same token, the notion that the coalition is fatally wounded as a result of this is wide of the mark.

As has widely been commented on, the principal loser in this case has rather been Chancellor Merkel herself. She had explicitly rejected the SPD's suggestion of Gauck as a cross-party candidate and personally picked Christian Wulff as the joint candidate of the CDU/CSU and FDP in an attempt to assert her authority. This proved to be a high-risk strategy, not just because Gauck quickly established himself as a popular (and non-partisan) candidate, but also because it dared those from within her own camp who were unhappy with her leadership to deny her candidate their support. And evidently, more than a few disaffected individuals grasped this opportunity with relish. What was particularly telling in this context was the fact that Wulff did ultimately manage to secure an absolute majority of the votes in the third round, with the implication that some of the rebels deliberately drew out the process in order to make their point vis-à-vis the chancellor. Perhaps more than anything, it is this which dents her authority within her party and the coalition. While of little consequence in the short-run, the six Land elections scheduled for 2011, including in the key CDU stronghold state of Baden-Württemberg, will now take on an extra significance in determining her chances of survival until the next federal election in 2013.

There is one other interesting aspect of the Bundesversammlung. Although Gauck was the joint candidate of the SPD and Greens, the Left Party put up their own candidate, Lukrezia Jochimsen, in the first two rounds. When she withdrew in the third round, most of the Left Party delegates abstained rather than vote for Gauck. Both the respective party nominees and the process on the day generated a considerable amount of acrimony, which is likely to sour relations between the two camps at federal level, at least in the short term.

Dr. Simon Green is Professor of Politics at Aston University, UK, and a regular contributor to the Advisor.

This essay appeared in the July 8, 2010, AICGS Advisor.