France's EU Referendum
By Sebastian Gerlach

In June 2004, the member states of the European Union concluded the negotiation process of a treaty which could give the EU a Constitution that in turn would bring about substantive changes to the way the Union works. For the first time, an individual would be appointed president of the European Council, overseeing the regular summits of the heads of governments of the EU states. The EU would itself have a foreign minister and thus a better coordinated European foreign policy. The amended rules on majority voting would make the European decision process more efficient, allowing for a measure to pass if 55 percent of the member states were in favor, as long as they represented 65 percent of the EU's population. And the EU would gain new powers in justice and home affairs, requiring cooperation among interior ministries on immigration, asylum, crime, and justice.

For the United States, the naissance of this strengthened Europe would not only finally answer Mr. Kissinger's question of whom to call when the United States needs to consult Europe but would transform significantly their cooperation potential. But in light of the current developments on the referendum on the European constitution, this future is less than certain.

The voice of the European people
The governments of all twenty-five countries have signed the treaty, but it cannot take effect unless it is ratified by each member state, through parliamentary vote or referendum. Ten EU countries have chosen to hold referendums. In February, the Spanish voted 77 percent in favor. A similar margin of victory is expected in Portugal and Luxembourg. Till last month, it was only in the United Kingdom that the polls suggested a majority could vote no. But now, approval is less certain in the French referendum scheduled for May 29, 2005. In the remaining countries organizing referendums later on this year, the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark, Ireland and the Czech Republic, the opinion polls point to a positive result but cannot take into account a failing of the French referendum.

While one negative vote alone would throw the EU into a constitutional crisis, a French no-vote would be fatal to any initiative to salvage the constitutional treaty at that point. If only the euro-skeptic British and Danes rejected the constitutional treaty, an establishment of a "hard core" of states committed to a closer union, and thus formation of a new organization coexisting within the broader EU, could still have been an alternative. But if France, one of the founders and a traditionally very integrationist member state of the European Union, rejects the treaty, there is, as Mr. Blair said last month, "no constitutional framework anymore to discuss about."

A new euro-skeptic France in an enlarged EU?
In France, since the beginning of March, a narrow but growing majority of currently more than 50 percent has the intention of saying no on May 29th, the day of the referendum. This is a tremendous change in France's normally pro-European public opinion, raising several questions. Given that leaders of all mainstream parties, left as well as right, advocate a yes, the potency of the no side seems surprising. Its force comes from a combination of disgruntled political fringes -- assorted unionists, revolutionary communists and anti-globalists, plus right-wing nationalists behind Philippe de Villiers and Mr. Le Pen -- along with rejectionists from the Socialist Party, led by Laurent Fabius, the party's deputy leader.

Perhaps the biggest victory of the campaigners against the European constitution so far has been a demagogic introduction of unrelated social and economic topics in the current public discussion about the Constitution. True, the unemployed rate has not fallen below 10 percent in France for years, and, similar to the rest of Western Europe, the country experienced relocations of production to the East, with heavy job-loss concentrations in East and North-East regions. Furthermore, the French social security system is among the most developed (and most reluctant to reform) in Europe, and especially since the last enlargement, the French feel that they should defend it against a market-oriented economic system, which - in their view - could dilute existing social standards and protections. This fear of losing social standards and suffering job losses due to strong competition from eastern Europe is also becoming more common in the populations of all western European welfare states. But any of these topics barely have any relation to the content of the Constitution, which is aimed at reorganizing the institutions of the EU.

The adversaries to the Constitution strategically appealed to existing fears and to the general discontent with the French economy and politics. They succeeded in convincing a majority of the French people that defending the welfare state and preventing further relocations of production to other parts of Europe simply means saying no to the constitutional treaty. Mr. Fabius, for example, is positive that the referendum has to fail in order to salvage an opportunity to renegotiate a more social constitutional treaty and therefore a more socially protective EU. Such a view is clearly shortsighted, given that the original negotiating process took more than two years and represents the best possible compromise reached between twenty-five European states. Even if the EU head of states accept a renegotiation, with the majority of governments having changed to liberal-conservatives in the course of the last years, there will be even fewer chances to agree on a social constitution.

The French elite paralyzed...
Aside from the social discussion, yet more political issues have arisen, and the matter of the European constitution seems to be increasingly mingled into domestic political affairs in France. The current government under Mr. Raffarin just lived through a series of scandals, the latest one when finance minister Mr. Gaymard had to resign due to allegations of an expensive apartment rental at taxpayers' expense. Most of the Raffarin's timid reform attempts were stopped or even reversed after massive street protest by the still mighty unions. Overall, Mr. Raffarin's team gives the impression of a paralyzed, powerless and divided government. For the opposition leader Mr. Hollande, president of the socialist party, things are even worse. He is presiding over a party that is officially in favor but internally bitterly divided on the question of the constitutional treaty. As a consequence, he has to campaign against left-leaning no supporters without jeopardizing and alienating them and hence losing nearly half of his potential support should he decide to run for president in 2007. The new star of the French right, Nicholas Sarkozy -- leader of the presidential party, the ' Union pour un Mouvement Populaire' (UMP) - has so far not been of great help for the yes campaign. He spends much more time fostering his aspirations for the French presidency in 2007 than to defend and explain the EU constitutional treaty.

...can they wake up before it is too late?
If the yes campaigners want to turn around the vote, they have to start now. The president decided last week to take the lead in the campaign, putting his presidential authority on the front line, similar to the last president, Mr. Mitterand, who secured a narrow yes for the vote on the Maastricht treaty in 1992. While Mr. Chirac is known for sweeping appeals to history, his position also threatens to provoke a protest vote. Confidence in him has slid to 36 percent in April and many left-leaning voters are reluctant to back their president again -- as they had to in May 2002, when Mr. Chirac faced Mr. Le Pen in the presidential run-off.

Alas, the televised chat between Mr. Chirac and a carefully chosen group of young people on April 14 proved to be a disaster for the president and a backslash for the then starting yes campaign. Mr. Chirac looked overstrained while listening to the questions and sorrows of the youth, and gave them only dissatisfying answers and elusive explanations as to why they should vote yes. Visibly shocked by the worries and the EU-skepticism of these young people, he reiterated only one phrase: "Don't be afraid." To this day, after two weeks of campaigning - with strong support from European politicians, especially from the German government - Chirac has not yet found the right way to convince the French that their social standards are not threatened by the Constitution and that it should be in their best interest to vote for the constitutional treaty, therefore strengthening the EU.

A fatal blow to European Integration
If the unthinkable becomes reality on the evening of May 29th and the French reject the Constitution, no further discussion will be necessary, the Constitution will be dead. Nearly two years of negotiating and bargaining to achieve a compromise in reforming the European institutions, simplifying the rules and bringing them closer to the European citizens will have been in vain. The major project of simultaneously deepening and enlarging of the EU will be lost and the EU will be back at square one.

Again, Europe would spend several years trying to sort out its institutions, rather than coping with the plentiful security, economic, and environmental challenges that it faces. The EU would stop the enlargement process following the admission of Romania and Bulgaria, a situation that could bring instability back into the Balkans and could damage the reform process in both Turkey and Ukraine. Moreover, the Union's chances of pushing ahead with economic reforms and developing a coherent foreign policy would diminish dramatically.

Such a development would not bode well for either the EU's future or transatlantic relations. The United States and Europe are partners out of necessity. A rejection of the Constitution would put Europe years behind in the vital process of transforming itself politically and militarily to remain an important strategic partner for the United States.

This Constitution may not be the ultimate framework for the European Union and it is far from being perfect, but it could make the EU more capable for the future. Also it would make Europe stronger and more united, for example through the establishment of a European foreign minister. It is in the interest of the United States to hope for a success of the Constitution, and hence having a more united Europe to work with as a valuable, more equal partner solving future challenges.

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This essay appeared in the May 5, 2005 AICGS Advisor.